ニューロン発火がなぜ「心」になるのか? 私が私であることの不思議、意識の謎に正面から挑んだ、茂木健一郎の核心!

It has long been thought that transmembrane cell‐surface receptors, such as receptor tyrosine kinases and cytokine receptors, among others, are activated by ligand binding through ligand‐induced dimerization of the receptors. However, there is growing evidence that prior to ligand binding, various transmembrane receptors have a preformed, yet inactive, dimeric structure on the cell surface. Various studies also demonstrate that during transmembrane signaling, ligand binding to the extracellular domain of receptor dimers induces a rotation of transmembrane domains, followed by rearrangement and/or (...) activation of intracellular domains. The paper here describes transmembrane cell‐surface receptors that are known or proposed to exist in dimeric form prior to ligand binding, and discusses how these preformed dimers are activated by ligand binding. (shrink)

: Any precise version of H-D needs to handle various problems, most notably, the problem of selective confirmation: Precise formulations of H-D should not have the consequence that where S confirms T, for any T', S confirms T&T'. It is the perceived failure of H-D to solve such problems that has lead John Earman to recently conclude that H-D is "very nearly a dead horse". This suggests the following state of play: H-D is an intuitively plausible idea that breaks down (...) in the attempt to give it a precise formulation. Indeed I think that fairly captures the view among specialists in the field of confirmation theory. Here I argue that the truth about H-D is largely the reverse: H-D can be given a precise formulation that avoids the longstanding technical problems, however, it relies on a fundamentally unsound philosophical intuition. The bulk of this paper involves reviewing the problems affecting previous attempts at giving precise formulations of H-D and displaying some recent versions that can handle these problems. It then briefly explains why the basic intuition behind H-D is itself unsound, namely, because H-D involves a tacit assumption of inductive scepticism. Finally, the historical relation between H-D and the positivists' quest for a criterion of empirical significance will be reconsidered with the surprising result that having glossed H-D as fundamentally unsound it is concluded that a sound version of the criterion of empirical significance is now available. The demarcation criterion, the positivists' philosopher's stone that serves to separate claims with empirical significance from claims lacking empirical significance having finally been found, it is argued that we should regard empirical significance as just one among a variety of virtues and not follow the positivists in taking it to be a sin qua non for all meaningful statements. (shrink)

At the time of this writing, a widely publicized, waived-consent trial is underway. Sponsored by Northfield Laboratories, Inc. (Evanston, IL) the trial is intended to evaluate the emergency use of PolyHeme®, an oxygen-carrying resuscitative fluid that might prevent deaths from uncontrolled bleeding. The protocol allows patients in hemorrhagic shock to be randomized between PolyHeme® and saline in the field and, still without consent, randomized between PolyHeme® and blood after arrival at an emergency department. The Federal regulations that govern the waiver (...) of consent restrict its applicability to circumstances where proven, satisfactory treatments are unavailable. Blood - the standard treatment for hemorrhagic shock - is not available in ambulances but is available in hospitals. The authors argue that the in-hospital stage of the study fails to meet ethical and regulatory standards. (shrink)

This paper investigates how the reader of prose fiction fills in the blanks regarding a fictional character’s membership category, action, and reason for the action. Aligning with an ethnomethodological approach to texts and appropriating membership categorization analysis (MCA), we analyze how the readers of J. D. Salinger, an author whose works are well known for their ambiguity and ambivalence, would grasp the unwritten identities of characters and the meanings of their actions. Our analysis specifies two types of methods deployed for (...) the reader to understand the fictional texts. First, in an at-a-glance way, the reader can supply the missing categories and sequence of actions by turning to the commonsense knowledge and social norms regarding the association between the category and the activity. Second, the reader can construct various interpretations regarding the recognizably ambiguous scenes of the text by turning to the conceptual knowledge of the relevant social phenomena, the maxims specific to the act of storytelling, and the writer’s techniques peculiar to the fictional texts. The findings demonstrate the vast applicability of an MCA approach to the analysis of the work of reading prose fiction and shed light on the detailed operations of the author’s maxims and techniques in the textual configuration of prose fiction, thereby indicating the possibility of ethnomethodological analysis including the interwoven consideration of the reader’s activity and the textual organization. (shrink)

I interpret Mill?s view on logic as the instrumentalist view that logical inferences, complex statements, and logical operators are not necessary for reasoning itself, but are useful only for our remembering and communicating the results of the reasoning. To defend this view, I first show that we can transform all the complex statements in the language of classical first-order logic into what I call material inference rules and reduce logical inferences to inferences which involve only atomic statements and the material (...) inference rules. Then I explain why we introduce logical operators and logical inference rules into a system of the latter kind. In the end I determine what kind of negation is justified from this point of view. (shrink)

公平の正義の道筋を明らかにする試み!普遍等質国家における人間のあり方および人間世界の統治のあり方を提示する!

“How is society possible?” posed by Georg Simmel has been one of the fundamental problems in sociology. Although various attempts have been made to solve it, I conceive that “society” in the problem remains to be articulated. Simmel provides us with two concepts of society—“society as interaction” and “society as unity”—to be distinguished. Some research traditions in sociology have been concerned with the former, others have dealt with the latter. On the other hand, Simmel maintains continuity between them. In this (...) sense, his concept of “society” has “ambiguous” characteristics. It seems to me that in the ambiguous style Simmel had intended to reveal the secret of “society,” but in the end could not have got to it. In my opinion, in order to unveil the secret, it is required that, drawing on Schutzian phenomenologically oriented sociology, sociologists or social scientists make a differentiation between the society which is realized or brought about by partners with no need of an observer, “the social,” and the society which an observer recognizes by use of the concept. In this article, from a Schutzian point of view, I wish to articulate “society” and to indicate four phases of “society.” These investigations lead to a reformulation of the problem of “how is society possible?” and sociology (or the social sciences) which makes possible the deeper understanding of society. (shrink)

It is now 110 years since the first reported medical use of donor insemination. Despite its somewhat doubtful beginnings and its chequered history, especially up until the 1970s, DI has become a well accepted and utilised part of most infertility treatment services. An American survey in 1988 reported that approximately 80,000 women a year undergo the procedure, and that over 30,000 children are born each year. The only figures from the United Kingdom cover a 5-month period between August 1 and (...) December 31, 1991, and show that 4,260 patients were treated with DI during this period. The treatment was carried out in 85 different centres. (shrink)

This paper describes the situation of philosophy in Japan with respect to the question of internationalism. For more than a hundred years, Japan took Western culture as its model and European philosophy as the authentic philosophy. This tendency was paradoxically strengthened by the post‐war humanism. It gave us Japanese philosophers a clear discipline to work in but cut us off from our own native culture, history, and philosophical traditions. In wishing to recover this loss, I argue that it is necessary (...) to distinguish between two forms of internationalism: humanistic and merely fashionable. The latter in fact derives from domestic reasons. (shrink)

In American, the terms “schism,” “heresy,” “sect,” and “cult” have been used to describe splinter groups as they distinguish themselves from the majority religion. The term cult has been used in two different senses. Within the Roman Catholic Church a group’s devotion to a particular saint may earn them the title “Cult of” that particular saint. However, among contemporary American Protestants the term cult has come to be applied to religious groups that split from mainstream Christianity with regard to their (...) beliefs and behavior to the degree that the groups are considered dangerous to themselves and society. When it comes to defining what a cult is, only about ten percent of the attention is placed on a cult’s beliefs and ninety percent is placed on a cult’s behavior. In fact, there seems to be a general squeamishness about using the term cult in the first place. There are several reasons for this malaise toward the term, but this article will argue that the term cult can and should be used in general and scholarly contexts. (shrink)

One of the central debates amongst U. S. constitutional theorists for more than a generation has been between (conservative) ‘originalists’ arguing that, in interpreting and applying the Constitution, judges are duty bound to adhere to the original understandings at the time of the Constitution’s adoption and (liberal/progressive) ‘living constitutionalists’ arguing rather that, when appropriate, judges should read the Constitution in light of contemporary needs and moral aspirations. While acknowledging the significance and legitimacy of the originalist call for fidelity to history (...) and newly incorporating elements of their arguments into his theory, Fleming, in Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, re-affirms moral aspirationalism as the ultimate foundation of the interpretive project. I argue here, as against Fleming, that the opposition that he (and other American constitutional theorists) have drawn between originalism’s historicism and living constitutionalism’s moral aspirationalism is a false binary – the contingent product of a developmental succession of political battles between American conservatives and progressive/liberals over the course of the twentieth century. I argue here, contra Fleming, that in both theory and practice, in the U. S. at least, history and moral aspiration are and have always been inextricably intertwined —inseparable— and that, going forward, U. S. constitutional historians and theorists would do better by forthrightly acknowledging and accounting for this fact, and dynamic. (shrink)

Is racism an act of the will? A disease? A bad habit? A result of lost virtues or of historical economic forces? Can we reliably claim that racism is an affront to justice? How does our scientific understanding of "race" affect our ethical considerations ? How can we ever know if we are acting from racist assumptions? With Leonard Harris, Naomi Zack, and Hugh Taft-Morales.

From Locke to Kierkegaard to those annoying car ads that promise “No Boundaries”— Is our use of the word 'freedom' still coherent? Was it ever coherent? Is it significant that this fuzzy term is so often used to carry so much rhetorical force? With Larry Hatab , David Walsh , and Mark Murphy.

Is political discourse an impotent spectator to the ongoing exercise of political power? Can we ever resolve the tensions between the political values of liberty and equality? With Drew Arrowood, Lawrence Hatab, and James Sterba.

Can the rights of the disabled be justified by John Locke's theory of natural rights? Does an "ethics of caring" offer a better framework for considering these rights? When can we end a human life? With Anita Silvers, Patrick Sullivan, and John Loughney.

Can the rights of the disabled be justified by John Locke's theory of natural rights? Does an "ethics of caring" offer a better framework for considering these rights? When can we end a human life? With Anita Silvers, Patrick Sullivan, and John Loughney.

Does each of us have the right to terminate our own existence if we so decide? Can we delegate this task to others? With what methods can we decide these questions? With Michele Carter, John Loughney, and Patrick Sullivan.

Do the grand and intricate moral theories spun out by philosophers have much to do with the everyday ethical quandaries we grapple with? Just how do humans make ethical decisions anyway? With Claudette Jones, Nat Heiner, and Natash Kyburg.

Do the grand and intricate moral theories spun out by philosophers have much to do with the everyday ethical quandaries we grapple with? Just how do humans make ethical decisions anyway? With Claudette Jones, Nat Heiner, and Natash Kyburg.

Does each of us have the right to terminate our own existence if we so decide? Can we delegate this task to others? With what methods can we decide these questions? With Michele Carter, John Loughney, and Patrick Sullivan.

What duties, if any, do we the living have to future generations regarding the quality of the environment we shall bequeath to them? Does our responsibility diminish as we look further into the future? Do we have such a claim on those came before us? With Nat Heiner and Nikki Roy.

From Locke to Kierkegaard to those annoying car ads that promise “No Boundaries”— Is our use of the word 'freedom' still coherent? Was it ever coherent? Is it significant that this fuzzy term is so often used to carry so much rhetorical force? With Larry Hatab, David Walsh, and Mark Murphy.

Aristotle and the shape of modern friendships. With John McCarthy and Matthew West.

What is a right? Why do we say that individual humans have rights? Do humans have a unique moral status or do other living beings also have rights? Can animals ever be moral agents? Is there a tension between the animal rights movement and those whose see the environment as possessing some manner of rights? With Grace Clement, Bonnie Brown, and Mark Parascondola.

What makes the law the Law? Are the rules set by society based on immutable truths and forms of nature, or are they more like an evolving draft of guidelines for human conduct? Is the law the product of disinterested reason, or do the critical legal theorists have a point when they trace the shape of the law to the centers of power in our society? With Mark Tushnet, Andy Altman, and Jude Dougherty.

What makes the law the Law? Are the rules set by society based on immutable truths and forms of nature, or are they more like an evolving draft of guidelines for human conduct? Is the law the product of disinterested reason, or do the critical legal theorists have a point when they trace the shape of the law to the centers of power in our society? With Mark Tushnet, Andy Altman, and Jude Dougherty.

Can the use of terror as a political weapon ever be justified? What are the political implications of the struggle to define the concept of "terrorism"? Was the attack on the USS Cole a terrorist act? What role do the intentions of the terrorist and the state of mind of the victims play? Does the modern concept of the nation-state necessarily require the radical devaluation of the use of terror for political ends? With Robert Rafalko, Philip Devine, and Scott Hibbard.

Can the use of terror as a political weapon ever be justified? What are the political implications of the struggle to define the concept of "terrorism"? Was the attack on the USS Cole a terrorist act? What role do the intentions of the terrorist and the state of mind of the victims play? Does the modern concept of the nation-state necessarily require the radical devaluation of the use of terror for political ends? With Robert Rafalko, Philip Devine, and Scott Hibbard.

Is political discourse an impotent spectator to the ongoing exercise of political power? Can we ever resolve the tensions between the political values of liberty and equality? With Drew Arrowood, Lawrence Hatab, and James Sterba.

Is believing in "minds" as qualitatively distinct from "bodies" just wrong headed? Did René Descartes set us off on a four hundred year wild goose chase? How should we think about this traditional dichotomy? With Wayne Alt, Alicia Juerrero, and Daniel Robinson.

Is believing in "minds" as qualitatively distinct from "bodies" just wrong headed? Did René Descartes set us off on a four hundred year wild goose chase? How should we think about this traditional dichotomy? With Wayne Alt, Alicia Juerrero, and Daniel Robinson.

How should we evaluate the economic environment we live in? Does anyone really believe in capitalism? How good are the philosophical judgments that inform the structures and habits of our economic lives? With David Schweickart , David Haslett , and Ronald Duska.

How should we evaluate the economic environment we live in? Does anyone really believe in capitalism? How good are the philosophical judgments that inform the structures and habits of our economic lives? With David Schweickart, David Haslett, and Ronald Duska.

Is racism an act of the will? A disease? A bad habit? A result of lost virtues or of historical economic forces? Can we reliably claim that racism is an affront to justice? How does our scientific understanding of "race" affect our ethical considerations? How can we ever know if we are acting from racist assumptions? With Leonard Harris, Naomi Zack, and Hugh Taft-Morales.