Essays centred on the methods, pleasures, and pitfalls of architectural interpretation.

One of the main purposes of feminist jurisprudence is to create or find better ways of being and living for women through the analysis, critique, and use of law. Rich work has emerged, and continues to emerge, from feminist theorists exploring conceptions of the self, personhood, identity and subjectivity that could be used to form a basic unit in law and politics. In this article, it is argued that a strong sense of human subjectivity needs to be retained to enable (...) the human potentiality of women and men to flourish. This can be done in a way which is not essentialist, yet does not dissolve the subject out of existence, issues pertinent to feminist jurisprudence in recent years. (shrink)

We examined here whether people believe consumers of natural foods are more virtuous than consumers of unnatural foods. In Study One we asked student participants (n = 84; 77 female, M age = 19.5) to form an impression of another person based solely upon whether they ate natural or unnatural foods, these being determined in a pilot survey. On an open response format, participants reported more positive moral and health traits in consumers of natural foods. These findings were further confirmed (...) using rating-based evaluations. In Study Two we determined if this belief in the virtuousness of natural food consumers translated into behaviour. Student participants (n = 40; 25 female, M age = 20.2) played a trust game, exchanging tokens with a fictitious player. Incidental diet information about the fictitious player was provided, with participants in one group playing against a natural food consumer and those in another against an unnatural food consumer. Participants who played against a natural food consumer behaved as if they trusted this person more, and their performance on the game was predicted by how moral they felt the fictitious player was, but not by other attributes such as health. These findings suggest that people believe consumers of natural food are more virtuous, and we suggest this is driven by the altruistic attitudes that people believe to be associated with natural food consumption. (shrink)

Four experiments investigated uncertainty about a premise in a deductive argument as a function of the expertise of the speaker and of the conversational context. The procedure mimicked everyday reasoning in that participants were not told that the premises were to be treated as certain. The results showed that the perceived likelihood of a conclusion was greater when the major or the minor premise was uttered by an expert rather than a novice (Experiment 1). The results also showed that uncertainty (...) about the conclusion was higher when the major premise was uttered by a novice and an alternative premise by an expert, compared to when the major premise was uttered by an expert and the alternative by a novice (Experiment 2). Similarly, the believability of a conclusion was considerably lower when the minor premise was uttered by a novice and denied by an expert, as opposed to when an expert uttered the minor premise and a novice denied it (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 showed that the nature of the uncertainty induced by a denial of the minor premise depended on whether or not the context was a conversation. These results pose difficult problems for current theories of reasoning, as current theories are based on the results of experiments in which the premises are treated as certain. Our discussion of the results emphasises the importance of pragmatics in reasoning, namely, the role of general knowledge about the world in assessing the probability of a premise uttered by an expert or a novice and the role of interpretations of the premise based on pragmatic inferences in revising these initial probabilities. (shrink)

The discrepancy between English if's and the horseshoe is far from being negligible. That is not a reason for distrusting the horseshoe, which is useful so long as it is taken to mean just what it is defined to mean; and it is not a reason for distrusting our English if's, which in spite of their ambiguities are indispensable to our daily discourse. But it is a reason for distrusting the current logical pedagogy that leads students to take the two (...) as being intertranslatable. So if symbolic logic is to help us in our English arguments (and that should surely be one of its functions) it needs to be supplemented: it needs to be provided with additional symbols (presumably with the introduction of one or more primitive concepts) that will preserve the meaning of our various if's with greater accuracy. In the present paper I shall point in the direction of such a logic. I cannot undertake to develop it in a complete postulational form; but I can at least call attention to certain English locutions by which the required postulates should be guided. And I can venture to state some of the postulates using appropriate symbols. (shrink)

The indiscernibility of identicals is incompatible with geach's theory of 'relative' identity, But consistent with the view that x is identical with y iff x is the same a as y, For some count-Noun 'a'. 'x is the same a as y' expresses identity only if x is an a, Otherwise it is merely an equivalence relation.

RATIONALE: The concept of evidence-based medicine is important in providing efficient health care. The process uses research findings as the basis for clinical decision making. Evidence-based practice helps optimize current health care and enables the practitioners to be suitably accountable for the interventions they provide. Little work has been undertaken to examine how allied health professionals change their clinical practice in light of the latest evidence. The use of opinion leaders to disseminate new evidence around the management of low back (...) pain into practice has been proposed. AIMS: The aim of this study was to investigate if physiotherapists' clinical management of patients with low back pain would change following an evidence-based education package, which utilized local opinion leaders and delivered the best evidence. METHOD: Thirty musculoskeletal physiotherapists from a Community Trust in North Staffordshire were cluster randomized by location of work, to two groups. The intervention group received an evidence-based programme on the management of low back pain, including advice regarding increasing activity levels and return to normal activity and challenging patients' fears and beliefs about their pain. The control group received a standard in-service training package on the management of common knee pathologies. The physiotherapists' clinical management of patients with low back pain was measured prior to training and 6 months post training. Outcome measures were based on physiotherapists completing 'discharge summary' questionnaires, which included information relating to the use and importance of therapies for treating their low back pain patients. RESULTS: There were few significant differences in treatment options between the intervention and control groups post training. Whilst there was some indication that physiotherapists were already utilizing aspects of psychosocial management for patients with low back pain, there was little change in what physiotherapists perceived to be important to patient recovery and actual clinical practice following the intervention. CONCLUSIONS: Psychosocial factors have been identified as an important factor in the recovery of patients with low back pain. This project incorporated the latest evidence on the management of low back pain and utilized the theory of opinion leaders to disseminate this evidence into clinical practice. Whilst there were some limitations in the overall size of the study, the results help to give an insight into the challenges faced by the health care system and researchers alike to ensure quality evidence is actually utilized by practitioners for the benefits of patient care. (shrink)

Underlying many of our uneasy debates about the social and moral responsibilities of professionals is a form of scepticism about the role of reason in morals. This claim is illustrated by examples drawn from both the pure-knowledge and applied-knowledge professionals. Hume's sceptical views about the role of reason in our knowledge of matters of fact and in morals are critically examined. An alternative theory of reasonableness that combines elements of foundationalism and coherentism, cognitivism and emotivism, and that emphasizes a process (...) of congruence achieved through reflection, dialectic and dialogue is sketched and illustrated. It is claimed that this notion of reasonableness is the one actually involved in science, law and morals. (shrink)

Intended both for undergraduate students and for general readers, this introduction to the philosophy of science uses case studies, anecdotes and personal comment to portray many heroes and villains from the field of science through the ages.

UK-based research conducted within a healthcare setting generally requires approval from the National Research Ethics Service. Research ethics committees are required to assess a vast range of proposals, differing in both their topic and methodology. We argue the methodological benchmarks with which research ethics committees are generally familiar and which form the basis of assessments of quality do not fit with the aims and objectives of many forms of qualitative inquiry and their more iterative goals of describing social processes/mechanisms and (...) making visible the complexities of social practices. We review current debates in the literature related to ethical review and social research, and illustrate the importance of re-visiting the notion of ethics in healthcare research. (shrink)

Can a moral monster - a person whose life is characterised by immoral actions - live a meaningful life? Pre-theoretical intuitions appear divided. For some, moral monsters can't live a meaningful life because they were immoral, while for others they did because morality is irrelevant. So what is the relationship between morality and meaning? This article contends that both sides are partially correct but for the wrong reasons: moral monsters don’t live meaningful lives, but morality is irrelevant for meaning. First, (...) it is argued moral monsters live meaningless lives not because of immoral actions per se, but rather the harm they cause. Second, that moral monsters can live meaningful lives confuses meaningfulness with significance. Significance, I propose, is conferred upon a life when one's actions impact others' well-being for good or ill. On the view, moral monsters live meaningless but significant lives. (shrink)

This insightful book explores the life and ideas of Italian Marxist theoretician Antonio Gramsci, and argues his work has considerable contemporary relevance when re-considering educational leadership in today's age of crises. This volume will be of pivotal interest to academics, researchers, and postgraduates in the fields of educational leadership, the sociology of education, and education policy and politics. Practitioners interested in educational leadership and social theory, and those active in social movements, may also find the book of use.

Although the criteria of double effect is usually used with issues of warfare and human health, such as abortion and euthanasia, the authors suggest using T. A. Cavanaugh's version of double effect reasoning when deliberating about cases that deal with the social media. With the creation of a modified version of Cavanaugh's three criteria, both social media users and those who evaluate decisions in that medium will have an alternate ethical decision-making model to use. The authors show how one might (...) use this model in the age of anytime, anywhere technology. (shrink)

Leibniz vollbringt ein wichtiges philosophisches Manover, wenn er behauptet, daß Wunder, wenn sie auch nicht im Einklang mit den Naturgesetzen stehen, so doch im Einklang mit den allgemeineren metaphysischen Gesetzen, die Gott den Monaden in Form von Kraft eingeprägt hat. Leider hat er jedoch nie genug abgeklärt, auf welche Weise das Auftreten von Wundern mit seiner Physik der Kraft übereinstimmen kann. In verschiedenen Passagen scheint Leibniz sogar in einen Widerspruch verwickelt zu sein: wahrend er darauf besteht, daß Wunder über den (...) Naturgesetzen und der substaniellen Kraft stehen, erkennt er doch an, daß jede Substanz "n'agit que pour sa propre force et n'en reçoit jamais d'ailleurs" und daß alles, das je innerhalb einer Substanz geschehen wird, "est deja compris virtuellement dans sa nature ou notion". Wie kann ein Wunder – das per definitionem über der substantiellen Natur und Kraft steht – überhaupt vorkommen, wenn alles was mit einer Substanz geschieht, aus substantieller Natur oder Kraft folgen oder in ihr 'eingeprägt' sein muß? Um das Problem der Vereinbarkeit der Moglichkeit von Wundern und der Struktur des Leibnizschen metaphysischen Systems zu losen – und so ganz allgemein eine Annäherung zwischen Leibniz' theologischen Ansichten und seiner Metaphysik zu bewirken – rege ich an, daß wir Leibniz' Diskussion der derivativen Kraft bereichern und den Unterschied zwischen substanieller Essenz und Natur erhellen müssen. Erst wenn wir intermonadische von intramonadischer derivativer Kraft unterscheiden und substantielle Essenz mit primitiver Kraft verbinden und substantielle Natur mit intermonadischer derivativer Kraft, können wir sehen, wie Wunder über substantieller Kraft stehen können – nämlich insoweit sie über intermonadischer Kraft/substantieller Natur stehen, ohne gleichzeitig über primitiver Kraft/substantieller Essenz zu stehen. (shrink)

This book is about "the meaning of life" or “the spiritual quest”. It offers a selective and critical evaluation of some central strands of Western religious and philosophical thought over two and a half thousand years. It starts with Socrates' philosophy of life, and the Greek tradition of philosophy that he initiated. It gives its own “take” on the teaching of Jesus, and on the long and controversial history of Christianity. There is a chapter devoted to George Fox and the (...) beginning of the Quaker movement, suggesting some surprising parallels between the undogmatic spirituality of the Quakers and the heavyweight philosophy of Immanuel Kant. It recommends a non-literal interpretation of language about God, with some reference to Austin Farrer on “poetic truth”. It is intended for the intelligent general reader – it is accessible but not “dumbed down”, knowledgeable but not overburdened with detail, critically argumentative but not prejudiced. (shrink)

A simple, visual beginner's guide to philosophy If you've ever wondered 'What is philosophy?' then Idiot's Guides: Philosophyhas the answers, with illustrations helping to explain and enhance philosophical ideas. Idiot's Guides: Philosophytakes you on a journey through all the major philosophers and schools from pre-Socratics to Post-Modernism, showing you the relevance of philosophical ideas to everyday life. Along the way you'll learn all about Renaissance Humanism, Idealism, Existentialism and much more, with religious philosophies included. You'll never be baffled by Post-Structuralism (...) again and will easily be able to discuss Eastern philosophies at a dinner party or down the pub. Idiot's Guides: Philosophy(previous ISBN 9781592573615) is perfect for anyone looking for a simple, visual guide to this fascinating subject. (shrink)

Philosophical interest in intentional action has flourished in recent decades. Typically, action theorists propose necessary and sufficient conditions for a movement's being an action, conditions derived from a conceptual analysis of folk psychological action ascriptions. However, several key doctrinal and methodological features of contemporary action theory are troubling, in particular (i) the insistence that folk psychological kinds like beliefs and desires have neurophysiological correlates, (ii) the assumption that the concept of action is "classical" in structure (making it amenable to definition (...) in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for its proper application), and (iii) the assumption that deferring to intuitions about the application of the concept of action amidst the context of fantastical thought experiments furnishes an effective method for judging the adequacy of proposed analyses. After consideration of these problems it is argued that action theory needs to be reoriented in a more naturalistic direction, the methods and aims of which are continuous with those of the empirical sciences. The paper concludes with a sketch (and defense) of the methodological foundations of a naturalistic approach to intentional action. (shrink)