Human resource management in managing environmental, social, governance, or corporate social responsibility initiatives has been recently raised. Yet, little attention has been paid to integrating CSR and HRM. Our primary goal was to identify how and whether certain HR practices are critical for developing employee capability to operate in firms with active CSR initiatives. We first examine the impact of external CSR activities on firm-level work outcomes. Moreover, we attempt to identify a choice of particular HR practices that could be (...) aligned with external CSR activities. We then empirically examine how each HR practice interacts with external CSR activities that influence employee retention and labor productivity. Using three longitudinal datasets conducted by the government-sponsored research institution over 154 publicly traded Korean firms for five waves of survey years, the results show that external CSR has a limited impact on employee retention and labor productivity. However, when external CSR activities are combined with a specific set of HR practices, including person-organization fit-based selection, performance-based pay, extensive investment of training and development, and employee suggestion program, the impact of external CSR on employee work outcomes is more substantial. The results indicate that external CSR and a particular set of HR practices as internal CSR can be complementary and generate a positive interaction on creating sustainable human capabilities. (shrink)

A tic disorder (TD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by tics, which are repetitive movements and/or vocalizations that occur due to aberrant sensory gating. Its pathophysiology involves dysfunction in multiple parts of the cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical circuits. Spontaneous brain activity during the resting state can be used to evaluate the baseline brain state, and it is associated with various aspects of behavior and cognitive processes. Theta–gamma coupling (TGC) is an emerging technique for examining how neural networks process information through interactions. However, the (...) resting-state TGC of patients with TD and its correlation with cognitive function have not yet been studied. We investigated the resting-state TGC of 13 patients with TD and compared it with that of 13 age-matched healthy children. The participants underwent resting-state electroencephalography with their eyes closed. At the global level, patients with TD showed a significantly lower resting-state TGC than healthy children. Resting-state TGC with the eyes closed was significantly negatively correlated with the attention quotient calculated for omission errors in a selective visual attention test. These findings indicate that the resting-state brain network, which is important for the attentional processing of visual information, is dysfunctional in patients with TD. Additionally, these findings support the view that TGC reflects information processing and signal interactions at the global level. Patients with TD may have difficulty gating irrelevant sensory information in the resting state while their eyes are closed. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that various epistemic challenges associated with eating disorders (EDs) can negatively affect the care of already marginalized patient groups with various EDs. I will first outline deficiencies in our understanding of EDs—in research, healthcare settings, and beyond. I will then illustrate with examples cases where discriminatory misconceptions about what EDs are, the presentation and treatment of EDs, and who gets EDs, instantiate obstacles for the treatment of various ED patient groups.

In this article, I critique the commonly accepted distinction between commercial and altruistic surrogacy arrangements. The moral legitimacy of surrogacy, I claim, does not hinge on whether it is paid (‘commercial’) or unpaid (‘altruistic’); rather, it is best determined by appraisal of virtue-abiding conditions constitutive of the surrogacy arrangement. I begin my article by problematising the prevailing commercial/altruistic distinction; next, I demonstrate that an assessment of the virtue-abiding or non-virtue-abiding features of a surrogacy is crucial to navigating questions about the (...) moral legitimacy of surrogacy; in the final part, I reject other moral heuristics that might be proposed as alternatives to the commercial/altruistic dichotomy, and reiterate that a virtue-ethical framework is the most suitable way forward. (shrink)

In this paper, I claim that live uterus donors ought to be considered for the possibility of compensation. I support my claim on the basis of comparable arguments which have already been applied to gamete donation, surrogacy, and other kinds of organ donation. However, I acknowledge that there are specificities associated with uterus donation, which make the issue of incentive and reward a harder ethical case relative to gamete donation, surrogacy, and other kinds of organ donation. Ultimately, I contend that (...) while reimbursement for the costs incurred by live uterus donors should be treated as a necessary ethical minimum, how much further we ought to remunerate uterus donations remains an open question. (shrink)

Natalie Stoljar posits that those who have internalized oppressive norms lack normative competence, which requires true beliefs and critical reflection. A lack of normative competence makes agents nonautonomous, according to Stoljar. This framework is thereby meant to address what she calls the “feminist intuition”—the intuition that oppressive norms are incompatible with autonomy. On my view, however, Stoljar’s normative competence account of autonomy is subject to a worrying problem. Her account misattributes nonautonomy to those who perpetrate the oppression, making those who (...) are oppressed and those who oppress count as equally nonautonomous. I argue that this is implausible and demonstrate in this paper that we can establish an asymmetry of autonomy between those who oppress others and those who are made the target of oppression. (shrink)

Mere inability, which refers to what persons are naturally unable to do, is traditionally thought to be distinct from unfreedom, which is a social type of constraint. The advent of biomedical enhancement, however, challenges the idea that there is a clear division between mere inability and unfreedom. This is because bioenhancement makes it possible for some people’s mere inabilities to become matters of unfreedom. In this paper, I discuss several ways that this might occur: first, bioenhancement can exacerbate social pressures (...) to enhance one’s abilities; second, people may face discrimination for not enhancing; third, the new abilities made possible due to bioenhancement may be accompanied by new inabilities for the enhanced and unenhanced; and finally, shifting values around abilities and inabilities due to bioenhancement may reinforce a pre-existing ableism about human abilities. As such, we must give careful consideration to these potential unfreedom-generating outcomes when it comes to our moral evaluations of bioenhancement. (shrink)

In moral and political philosophy, topics like the distributive inequities conferred via special partial relationships – family relationships, for example – have been frequently debated. However, the epistemic dimensions of such partiality are seldom discussed in the ethical context, and the topic of partial relationships rarely feature in the realm of social epistemology. My view is that the role of partial relationships is worth exploring to enrich our understanding of epistemic injustice and its transmission. I claim that epistemic features typical (...) of partial relationships make phenomena like epistemic injustice easier to mask, more difficult to identify, and harder to correct. (shrink)

Ascribing autonomous status to agents is a valuable practice. As such, we ought to care about how we engage in practices of autonomy ascription. However, disagreement between first-personal experiences of an agent's autonomy and third-personal determinations of their autonomy presents challenges of ethical and epistemic concern. My view is that insights from a dialogical rather than nondialogical account of autonomy give us the resources to combat the challenges associated with autonomy ascription. I draw on Andrea Westlund's account of dialogical autonomy—on (...) which autonomy requires a dialogical disposition to hold oneself answerable to external critical perspectives—to make my case. (shrink)

Individualistic traditions of autonomy have long been critiqued by feminists for their atomistic and asocial presentation of human agents. Relational approaches to autonomy were developed as an alternative to these views. Relational accounts generally capture a more socially informed picture of human agents, and aim to differentiate between social phenomena that are conducive to our agency versus those that pose a hindrance to our agency. In this article, I explore the various relational conceptualizations of autonomy profferred to date. I critically (...) review some of the ongoing internal disputes within the relational autonomy literature, and conclude the article by taking stock of the value of relational autonomy despite these unresolved debates. (shrink)

In the future, full ectogestation – in which artificial placenta technology would be used to carry out the entirety of gestation – could be an alternative to human pregnancy. This article analyzes some underexplored objections to ectogestation which relate to the possibility for new and continuing forms of social oppression. In particular, we examine whether ectogestation could be linked to an unwarranted de-valuing of certain aspects of female reproductive embodiment, or exacerbate objectionable kinds of scrutiny over the reproductive choices of (...) gestating persons. Without discounting the potential benefits of full ectogestation, we conclude that the socially oppressive potential of ectogestation, on top of other concerns, warrants further critical ethical reflection. (shrink)

Should involuntarily childless people have the sameopportunities to access parenthood as those who are not involuntarily childless? In the context of assisted reproductive technologies, affirmative answers to this question are often cashed out in terms of positive rights, including rights to third-party reproduction. In this paper, wecritically explore the scope and extent to which any such right would hold up morally. Ultimately, we argue for a departure away from positive parental rights. Instead, we argue that the state has an imperfect (...) duty to benefit involuntarily childless people in relation to their parental aspirations. (shrink)

Philosophy as an academic discipline was introduced to Korea at the end of the 19th century. Philosophical education and professional research did not begin, however, until the 1920s. The first ins...

‘Globalization’ is on everybody's lips; a fad word fast turning into a shibboleth, a magic incantation, a pass-key meant to unlock the gates to all present and future mysteries. For some, ‘globalization' is what we bound to do if we wish to be happy; for others 'globalization' is the cause of our unhappiness. For everybody, though, 'globalization' is the intractable fate of the world, an irreversible process; it is also a process which affects us all in the same measure and (...) in the same way.1 These words of Zygmund Bauman succinctly depict the contemporary situation all of us are facing no matter where we come from. As Christians, it is very difficult for us to oppose globalization, in principle, since Christians have been globalist almost from the start. Even though Christians have historically felt a deep rootedness in a certain national, ethnic or cultural identity, there was always someone or some groups who were ready to transcend their local and cultural bounds. Christian zeal for mission work over the whole globe: “to the ends of the earth” demonstrates this. Christianity is a 'global religion,' even though there is still prejudice to think of it as typically Western. Contrary to the global North, Christianity is rapidly growing in the global South, especially in Africa and Latin America. (shrink)

Because many involuntarily childless people have equal interests in benefitting from assisted reproductive technologies like in vitro fertilization as a mode of treatment, we have normative reasons to ensure inclusive access to such interventions for as many of these people as is reasonable and possible. However, the prevailing eligibility criterion for access to assisted reproductive technologies—'infertility'—is inadequate to serve the goal of inclusive access. This is because the prevailing frameworks of infertility, which include medical and social infertility, fail to precisely (...) capture and unify the relevance of certain involuntarily childless experiences as warranting assisted reproductive technology (ART) treatment. I argue that the least we can do for those who have an interest in accessing ARTs is to conceptualize involuntarily childless experiences in dialogue with interactionist and ecological models of disability, to outline a unified and more inclusive eligibility criterion. (shrink)

According to Chloe Romanis, it is worth distinguishing interventions such as surrogacy, uterus transplantation (UTx), and potentially artificial placenta technology, as falling under the genus assisted gestative technologies (AGTs) rather than the more general term assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). The proposed genus of assisted gestative technologies is a helpful first step in the endeavour to distinguish between the different ethico-legal landscapes across various ‘assisted reproductive technologies.’ Yet, if assisted gestative technologies can be considered a genus of assisted reproductive technologies, we (...) might consider surrogacy, uterus transplantation (UTx), and artificial placenta technology their individual species. Between these various species of AGTs, I would argue, there remains enough ethico-legal diversity to warrant independent discussion about the descriptive and normative functions of each AGT and the relationship between gestation, genetic relatedness, and legal/moral parenthood. (shrink)

Kant is regarded as the key critic of eudemonic ethics. Interpreters have claimed that for Kant, happiness was neither a precondition for morality nor a reward for moral conduct. However, this study shows that happiness does play a key role in Kant s moral philosophy. It reveals Kant s practical philosophy as a theory that seriously considers the irrefutable necessity for individual happiness in life.".

Epistemic injustices are wrongs that agents can suffer in their capacity as knowers. In this article, I offer a conceptualisation of a phenomenon I call anticipatory epistemic injustice, which I claim is a distinct and particularly pernicious type of epistemic injustice worthy of independent analysis. I take anticipatory epistemic injustice to consist in the wrongs that agents can suffer as a result of anticipated challenges in their process of taking up testimony-sharing opportunities. I distinguish my account from paradigmatic cases of (...) epistemic injustice, such as Miranda Fricker’s concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice; additionally, I differentiate my view from Kristie Dotson’s account of testimonial smothering. I argue, ultimately, that anticipatory epistemic injustice is a useful addition to our current taxonomy of epistemic injustices, as it has promising explanatory potential for a range of non-standard cases of epistemic injustice. (shrink)

Coupled with ecological challenges, injustice such as unfair resource distribution and exploitation over nature and the poor has been disproportionately inflicted upon the powerless. As we look at the nexus of ecological challenges and injustice, we find establishing social sustainability like redressing the issues of injustice is closely linked with attaining environmental sustainability. This paper attempts to look into the nexus of ecological challenges and injustice from a missiological perspective. In a missiological paradigm, a biblical concept of justice for the (...) poor and the integrity of creation help us understand the relations of ecological challenges and injustice and offer insights into how to address these two interlinked issues. This article has academic significance of expanding the horizon of mission theology in linking missiology and environmental issues. (shrink)

이 글은 칸트 특유의 ‘실천이성’ 개념을 중심으로 칸트의 행위이론을 다룬다. 먼저, 칸트의 고유한 이성 개념, 즉 ‘실천이성’의 의미를 분명히 한 뒤, 도덕 외적인 차원까지 포괄하여 칸트의 행위 개념을 고찰한 다음, 칸트 철학에서 도덕적 행위이론을 위한 전제들을 탐구한다(Ⅱ). 다음으로, 자연인과성에서 귀결되는 행위 일반과는 다른 종류의 인과성 및 다른 행위의 가능성을 탐구한 뒤, 『도덕형이상학 정초』의 실천이성과 의지의 동일시 논변을 중심으로 자유로운 행위의 성립 조건과 실천적 필연성 혹은 이성의 강요(필연화)를 살펴본다(Ⅲ). 이를 통해 이 글은 도덕적 행위에 대한 칸트의 설명이 훨씬 더 복잡한 중층 (...) 구조를 지닌다는 점을 부각하고자 했다. (shrink)