Groove—defined as the pleasurable urge to move to a rhythm—depends on a fine-tuned interplay between predictability arising from repetitive rhythmic patterns, and surprise arising from rhythmic deviations, for example in the form of syncopation. The perfect balance between predictability and surprise is commonly found in rhythmic patterns with a moderate level of rhythmic complexity and represents the sweet spot of the groove experience. In contrast, rhythms with low or high complexity are usually associated with a weaker experience of groove because (...) they are too boring to be engaging or too complex to be interpreted, respectively. Consequently, the relationship between rhythmic complexity and groove experience can be described by an inverted U-shaped function. We interpret this inverted U shape in light of the theory of predictive processing and provide perspectives on how rhythmic complexity and groove can help us to understand the underlying neural mechanisms linking temporal predictions, movement, and reward. A better understanding of these mechanisms can guide future approaches to improve treatments for patients with motor impairments, such as Parkinson’s disease, and to investigate prosocial aspects of interpersonal interactions that feature music, such as dancing. Finally, we present some open questions and ideas for future research. (shrink)

The book gives an painstaking analysis of Niels Bohr's understanding of quantum mechanics based on a claim that Bohr was influenced by Harald Høffding's approach to philosophical problems.

Are the political ideals of liberty and equality compatible? This question is of central and continuing importance in political philosophy, moral philosophy, and welfare economics. In this book, two distinguished philosophers take up the debate. Jan Narveson argues that a political ideal of negative liberty is incompatible with any substantive ideal of equality, while James P. Sterba argues that Narveson's own ideal of negative liberty is compatible, and in fact leads to the requirements of a substantive ideal of equality. Of (...) course, they cannot both be right. Thus, the details of their arguments about the political ideal of negative liberty and its requirements will determine which of them is right. Engagingly and accessibly written, their debate will be of value to all who are interested in the central issue of what are the practical requirements of a political ideal of liberty. (shrink)

Students of Thomas Aquinas have so far lacked a comprehensive study of his doctrine of the transcendentals. This volume fills this lacuna, showing the fundamental character of the notions of being, one, true and good for his thought. The book inquires into the beginnings of the doctrine in the thirteenth century and explains the relation of the transcendental way of thought to Aquinas's conception of metaphysics. It analyzes 'Being', 'One', 'True', 'Good' and 'Beautiful' individually and discusses their importance for the (...) philosophical knowledge of God. Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas is intended as a contribution to the question 'What is philosophy in the Middle Ages?' It argues that the doctrine of the transcendentals is essential for understanding medieval philosophy. (shrink)

_Vygotsky Philosophy and Education_ reassesses the works of Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky work by arguing that his central ideas about the nature of rationality and knowledge were informed by the philosophic tradition of Spinoza and Hegel. Presents a reassessment of the works of Lev Vygotsky in light of the tradition of Spinoza and Hegel informing his work Reveals Vygotsky’s connection with the work of contemporary philosophers such as Brandom and McDowell Draws on discussions in contemporary philosophy to revise prominent readings (...) of Vygotskian psychology and revisits educational debates where Vygotsky’s ideas were central Reveals the limitations of appropriations of Vygotsky which fail to recognize the Hegelian provenance of his work Shows the relevance of Brandom’s inferentialism for contemporary educational theory and practice. (shrink)

Starting from an abstract sketch of scenarios for philosophical reception stimulated by disagreement and school rivalry, part one of this chapter highlights the case of an older, marginalized position that tries to reinsert itself into the debate through radical modernization of its terminology and argumentative strategies and thereby triggers various forms of orthodox response. Part two discusses examples for this scenario extracted from some of the remains of the Peripatetic ethical literature of the late Hellenistic era (Critolaus, Arius Didymus). Challenging (...) the traditional picture of contamination and decline in the development of the Peripatetic school, the chapter demonstrates how the reception of Stoic concepts and strategies by Peripatetic modernizers and the subsequent more orthodox approaches created an intellectually fruitful dynamic exemplifying different styles of reception. (shrink)

After more than 15 years of study, the 1/f noise or complex-systems approach to cognitive science has delivered promises of progress, colorful verbiage, and statistical analyses of phenomena whose relevance for cognition remains unclear. What the complex-systems approach has arguably failed to deliver are concrete insights about how people perceive, think, decide, and act. Without formal models that implement the proposed abstract concepts, the complex-systems approach to cognitive science runs the danger of becoming a philosophical exercise in futility. The complex-systems (...) approach can be informative and innovative, but only if it is implemented as a formal model that allows concrete prediction, falsification, and comparison against more traditional approaches. (shrink)

This paper argues that there are practical problems of such a kind that neither impartial morality nor rational choice theory can provide us with comfort and guidance in our attempt to make the right choice if confronted with such a problem. It argues that both morality and rational choice theory are bound to misconstrue problems of this kind. Appreciating the limits of both morality and rational choice theory, as currently discussed in the literature (Wolf, Morton, Pettit, Hollis & Sugden), enables (...) us to identify the features of these particular practical problems, and allows us to elaborate the idea of an alternative of oneself, which is crucial to a proper understanding of the kind of practical problem the paper draws attention to. (shrink)

A frequentist confidence interval can be constructed by inverting a hypothesis test, such that the interval contains only parameter values that would not have been rejected by the test. We show how a similar definition can be employed to construct a Bayesian support interval. Consistent with Carnap’s theory of corroboration, the support interval contains only parameter values that receive at least some minimum amount of support from the data. The support interval is not subject to Lindley’s paradox and provides an (...) evidence-based perspective on inference that differs from the belief-based perspective that forms the basis of the standard Bayesian credible interval. (shrink)

In this paper I explore Žižek’s stance on ideology. I begin with an overview, move to his understanding of the ‘act’ and then move into the second part of the paper which is a discussion of the first part in relation to his encounter with Deleuze in Organs Without Body. I claim that this was a missed encounter, or rather it will always remain an impossible encounter given that Lacan, Badiou and Žižek’s philosophical embrace of negativity bumps up squarely against (...) Deleuze and Guattari’s affirmative stance. This deadlock does not offer a ‘solution’ as much as the political consequences that emerge from the two paths taken. It is further claimed that these crossroads are separated by two very different understandings of infinity as they are developed in the Kantian antinomy of the mathematical and dynamic sublime. (shrink)

A serious difficulty for theories of consciousness is to go beyond mere correlation between physical processes and experience. Currently, neural workspace and sensorimotor contingency theories are two of the most promising approaches to make any headway here. This paper explores the relation between these two sets of theories. Workspace theories build on large-scale activity within the brain. Sensorimotor theories include external processes in their explanations, stressing the sensorimotor contingencies that arise from our interaction with the environment. Despite the basic differences, (...) we argue that workspace- and sensorimotor theories are complementary rather than competitive. By combining these theories, a number of problems that hamper them individually may be overcome and their strengths combined: Workspace theories have more to offer for explaining how there can be consciousness in the first place, while sensorimotor theories are strong in making sense of the specific phenomenal character of experiences. (shrink)

The paper is the analysis a Feyerabend philosophy of science, his criticism of glorification of science reason and his ”surprising” thoughts of the last period of his life such as ”... objectivism and relativism not only are untenable as philosophies, they are bad guides for fruitful cultural collaboration”.

The paper is a critique of Professor Anna Jedynak's claim, propounded in her article "The structure of scientific theories and value systems" (Filozofia Nauki, no. 31-32/2000, pp. 31-44), that there exist some significant analogies between scientific theories perceived from the viewpoint of various scientific methodologies and systems of normative ethics considered from the perspectives of various metaethical theories. The authors attempt to justify the thesis that principal structural similarities postulated by Professor Jedynak are questionable, thus challenging her proposition that metaethics (...) can incorporate into its domain a number of problems which were hitherto seen as specific to the philosophy of science. (shrink)

In this article I am dealing mainly with the following notions: “perception apparatus” (Weltbildapparat), “view of the world” (Weltbild, picture of the world) and “representation”. The first and the second ones belong to the basic notions in the vocabulary of K. Lorenz’s evolutionary epistemology, the third in cognitive sciences. I seek to demonstrate the relationships between them. This analysis is put in a broader context, indicating the relationships between expensively developing cognitive sciences and evolutionary epistemology (much less popular today). It (...) is quite easy to determine what the perception apparatus is, however, it is harder to state what the view of the world, especially in its ontological aspect, is. Nevertheless, the view of the representation in the context of evolutionary epistemology points to the fact that this notion is still unclear and many representational features can be assigned to objects which, as it seems, are not representations according to cognitive sciences. (shrink)