This paper reviews the concept of professional autonomy from anhistorical perspective. It became formalised in the United Kingdom onlyafter a long struggle throughout most of the nineteenth century. In itspure form professional autonomy implies unlimited powers to undertakemedical investigations and to prescribe treatment, irrespective of cost.Doctors alone should determine the quality of care and the levels ofremuneration to which they should be entitled. In the second half of thetwentieth century a steady erosion of professional autonomy occurred inthe United Kingdom. The (...) level of remuneration has been restricted formost doctors for nearly fifty years, whilst the costs of health carehave steadily reduced the doctor's ability to provide unrestricted carewithin the health care system. Reorganisation of the National HealthService in 1983 and 1991 has substantially eroded professional autonomy,to the point where research developments, clinical judgement and ethicalstandards are all now being placed at risk. (shrink)

The fragment is preserved in two sources, Clement of Alexandria's Miscellanies, Strom. 5.14.112, which gives the order of words printed above, and Eusebius' Praep. Evang. 13.680c, in which the second line is given as. The latter reading was preferred by Bergk, but there seems at first little reason to prefer one order over the other. I shall return to this issue shortly.

The fragment is preserved in two sources, Clement of Alexandria's Miscellanies, Strom. 5.14.112 , which gives the order of words printed above, and Eusebius' Praep. Evang. 13.680c, in which the second line is given as . The latter reading was preferred by Bergk, but there seems at first little reason to prefer one order over the other. I shall return to this issue shortly.

Near the end of his Euboean Discourse, Dio attacks prostitution because it encourages men to seek sexual pleasure from other sources as well, including youths from noble households. While some scholars find no evidence in this diatribe for Dio's revulsion against male-male sexual relations per se, others conclude that it does indeed reflect Dio's contempt for all sexual relations between men. This study considers afresh Dio's treatments of sexual relations between men in his Discourses, and concludes that Dio may endorse (...) both male-male and male-female sexual relations when the agent initiating sexual contact pursues philia and eunoia. On the other hand, Dio expresses his disgust when the agent uses sexual relations self-indulgently for pleasure. The content and form of his arguments illustrate his familiarity with both Stoic doctrine and the forms of popular moralizing discourse. The paper first examines Dio's remarks in the third Discourse on Kingship, where he praises sexual relations in a measured way, indicating his familiarity with Stoic teachings on eros. Second, it considers Dio's remarks in the Euboean Discourse and supports John Winkler's argument that Dio objects to prostitution because it is rooted in self-indulgent pleasure-seeking. Dio's rhetorical approach reflects his awareness of popular teachings against self-indulgence typical of Cynic-Stoic diatribe. Third, the essay argues that Dio's remarks in the First Tarsian oration condemn adult male sexual passivity, not all aspects of sexual relations between males. Fourth, brief remarks in his Borystheniticus are not to be taken as evidence for Dio's hostility to sexual relations between men, though they possibly indicate his discomfort with how he imagines non-Greeks engage in sex. (shrink)

J P White; Intelligence and the Logic of the Nature-Nurture Issue, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 8, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 30–51, https://doi.

Flew's challenge to the religious believer asks him to specify what would count as a disproof for, e.g. ‘There is a God’. A statement of such a specifiable condition I called an ‘empirical denial’. In my earlier paper I was concerned to show that a statement is a statement whether or not it has such an empirical denial. I was not particularly concerned to show that there are some statements which do not have an empirical denial; my concern was to (...) show that it is not essential that they do. It was in connection with this point that the statement ‘John loves Mary’ was discussed. But this very same example may indeed serve as an example of a statement for which, in certain complex situations, there is no empirical denial. That is, in some circumstances, no matter what empirical conditions are specified, when the statement ‘John loves Mary’ is made, they could obtain and still John might love Mary, as the developing situation would make clear. If the condition specified is that John is cruel to Mary and shows no concern for her, details could always emerge in such a situation to explain why, even though he loved her, he was cruel and showed no concern. And so on. (shrink)