Institutional ethics committees (IECs) are part of a growing phenomenon in the American health care system. Although a major force driving hospitals to establish IECs is the desire to resolve difficult clinical dilemmas in a quick and systematic way, in this paper we argue that such a goal is naive and, to some extent, misguided. We assess the growing trend of these committees, analyse the theoretical assumptions underlying their establishment, and evaluate their strengths and shortcomings. We show how the 'medical (...) consultation' model is often inappropriately applied to IECs and suggest that IECs must operate under a different framework. Finally, we argue that IECs should be valued for the process they facilitate, and not for the product that they are, often unreasonably, expected to deliver. (shrink)

The end of World War II marked the beginning of a new chapter in German Leibniz scholarship, with conferences all over the country gearing up to commemorate the 300th anniversary of his birth in 1946, and participants intent on promoting Leibniz as a pan-European thinker. Just a few years earlier, for obvious reasons, the outlook could not have been more different. To take one example, Oskar Becker, in his lecture, “Leibniz, the German Thinker and Good European,” had divided the different (...) versions of Leibniz up along strictly national lines: “In the international Leibniz literature of today the different aspects of his philosophy… are shown in the views of one nation from this, of another nation from that side. Thus for the West European scholars Louis Couturat and Bertrand Russell Leibniz is fundamentally a logician, while for the Germans he is fundamentally a metaphysician.”. (shrink)

The end of World War II marked the beginning of a new chapter in German Leibniz scholarship, with conferences all over the country gearing up to commemorate the 300th anniversary of his birth in 1946, and participants intent on promoting Leibniz as a pan-European thinker. Just a few years earlier, for obvious reasons, the outlook could not have been more different. To take one example, Oskar Becker, in his lecture, “Leibniz, the German Thinker and Good European,” had divided the different (...) versions of Leibniz up along strictly national lines: “In the international Leibniz literature of today the different aspects of his philosophy… are shown in the views of one nation from this, of another nation from that side. Thus for the West European scholars Louis Couturat and Bertrand Russell Leibniz is fundamentally a logician, while for the Germans he is fundamentally a metaphysician.”. (shrink)

Upon mention of the logical structure of anything in the title of a book, many of us will, no doubt, recall a certain strain of philosophy of a few generations ago, one that ascribed to logic a centrality it has seldom enjoyed before or since. Thus might one easily be steered off course in trying to guess Andreas Blank’s primary thesis from the title he chose for his work. The reference to Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt is only an (...) apparent one: not only does the author of Der logische Aufbau von Leibniz’ Metaphysik not believe that Leibniz’s metaphysics is constructed from logic in the same way that Carnap took the world to be logically aufgebaut, but indeed, one gets the impression that it is the main purpose of this informative and well-argued new book to downplay the role of logic in the development of Leibniz’s metaphysics. (shrink)

The subject is in both cases the voyage of the Argo, and therefore the use of the same words is not likely to be coincidental, even though the words themselves are scarcely uncommon. One would hesitate to deny, however, that such reminiscence might be unconscious; that Lucan had famous tags in his head is suggested by another allusion to famous opening lines.

The recent far-reaching developments of Physics have produced the widespread impression that all those ideas of mechanics and mechanism, which were so influential in the nineteenth century, have now been completely abandoned, because they have proved to be quite inadequate as explanations, or even as mere descriptions, of the ultimate constitution of the physical world. “Has not modern physics”, asks Prof. Millikan, “thrown the purely mechanistic view of the universe root and branch out of its house?“ It is frequently contended, (...) still further, that the place of these concepts has been taken by others, very closely approximating to biological, or even to psychological, interpretations of all natural phenomena; the physics of today, in short, and yet more of tomorrow, is essentially non-mechanical. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.