We discuss some recent work by Tim Maudlin concerning Black Hole Information Loss. We argue, contra Maudlin, that there is a paradox, in the straightforward sense that there are propositions that appear true, but which are incompatible with one another. We discuss the significance of the paradox and Maudlin's response to it.

We show a sense in which the spacetime property of effective completeness—a type of “local hole-freeness” or “local inextendibility”—is not stable.

Little is in print on the development in Britain of university disciplines including the academic study of education. This paper provides a historical narrative of the study of adolescence from the 1870 Education Act to the contemporary day. Adolescence textbooks are examined in the context of changes in the education system, such as the demand for secondary education and the expansion of teacher education. Changing emphases in adolescence research are traced through various publications to illustrate curriculum developments. The important contributions (...) of Dame Olive Wheeler, Professor W. D. Wall and other leading writers on adolescence are evaluated. It is clear that in over a century of national educational provision British teachers have never faced a great choice of adolescence texts and the paper concludes with some reflections on this observation. (shrink)

Introduction.--Dualism and the new problem.--Truth and experience.--Plan and stages of the argument.--The interpretation of sense-experience: and of perceptual experience.--Understanding and the world of noumena and phenomena.--Self-conscious experience.--The sphere of reason, scientific experience.--The sphere of finite spirit, moral experience.--The sphere of absolute spirit, religious experience, contemplation.

J B O O’Malley; Style and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 1, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 19–28, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1967.t.

If one takes a course in philosophy to-day at a British university, a discreet silence is usually observed about existentialism. Often the professors understand little of its methods or its doctrine. If their excuse in part is the inaccessibility in English of standard existentialist texts, it is true also that philosophers trained in the “critical philosophy” now in vogue feel a certain aversion to existentialism or, at all events, to the notion they have formed of it. If Christianity was a (...) scandal to the Greeks and remains a scandal, as Dr. Brunner has recently told us, to contemporary humanists, existentialism is a scandal to the positivists. The latter are aware that the existentialists habitually trespass in the fields of religion, ethics, aesthetics and psychology, fields which, on the positivist view, should be reserved to other disciplines than philosophy, which has its own distinctive subject-matter and approach. They know that certain existentialists, notably Heidegger, provide a happy hunting ground for examples of “metaphysics.” They have heard that existentialism has sought to turn the tables on positivism by accusing it, if not of metaphysics, at all events of a barrenness of significant content, of a preoccupation with mere logistics which removes philosophy completely from men's business and bosoms. If the positivist accuses the existentialist of perpetrating “nonsense” in a technical sense, the latter retorts by accusing the positivist of reducing philosophy to nonsense in a pragmatic sense. (shrink)

In its dominantly ahistorical character, the Journal of Religious Ethics has much in common with its counterparts among philosophical journals, show- ing as clearly as they do the widespread antihistorical bias of twentieth- century analytical philosophy. Moreover, such historical work as the journal has published has been tied unnecessarily closely to the voluntarist (divine command) paradigm. While drawing attention to the antivoluntarist strand in the history of ethics, the articles by John Bowlin, Mark Cladis, and Mark Larrimore, together with the (...) introduction by Jennifer Herdt, demonstrate that the purposes of inquiry in religious ethics are better served by attending to the past than by ignoring it. (shrink)