Matija Vlačić Ilirik was one of the pillars of Luther’s Reformation. In a special way, he dedicated himself to one of its most important issues – the understanding of the Scriptures, and can, therefore, be considered a significant instigator of the founding of modern hermeneutics. As an excellent connoisseur of classical languages (Hebrew, Greek and Latin) he recognized the importance and dealt with many issues of language, grammar, logic, and dialectic, as essential prerequisites for understanding everything which exists, and hence (...) of the written text also. In this connection, his skepticism towards philosophy is apparent, since the main source of theological cognition, for him, is revelation, and not the human reason, which was principally destroyed by Original Sin. He found the confirmation of his ideas in the current debates with both proponents and opponents of the Reformation, as well as in his research into church history, wherein he incessantly tried to find the witnesses of the truth, as he perceived it. (shrink)

The relation between philosophy and theology in Martin Heidegger’s thought is multilayered and tense. On the one hand, he admits that his theological origin, i.e. his Christian-Catholic rootedness, determines the direction of his thought, while on the other hand, he has been fighting against theology that is too much tinted with philosophy. At the same time, he opposes that his thought be called theistic or atheistic. In the analytic of Dasein he wants to create assumptions that would enable him to (...) talk about God, gods or divine in general. This brings him close to mysticism, and even more so to mythology, which is revealed in his interpretation of Hölderlin. Nietzsche’s talk about God’s death helps him in this context. However, neither with Nietzsche nor with Heidegger does this death look like real death. Both thinkers hold that death strikes that God who has in philosophy and theology been made a being. After the thinking of the Being had thrown light upon their thought, God of Biblical theology and above all God whose coming is expected according to Heidegger cannot be left to death, because he evades human comprehension, especially one in the form of philosophy and theology. (shrink)

Matija Vlačić Ilirik was one of the pillars of Luther’s Reformation. In a special way, he dedicated himself to one of its most important issues – the understanding of the Scriptures, and can, therefore, be considered a significant instigator of the founding of modern hermeneutics. As an excellent connoisseur of classical languages he recognized the importance and dealt with many issues of language, grammar, logic, and dialectic, as essential prerequisites for understanding everything which exists, and hence of the written text (...) also. In this connection, his skepticism towards philosophy is apparent, since the main source of theological cognition, for him, is revelation, and not the human reason, which was principally destroyed by Original Sin. He found the confirmation of his ideas in the current debates with both proponents and opponents of the Reformation, as well as in his research into church history, wherein he incessantly tried to find the witnesses of the truth, as he perceived it. (shrink)

Heidegger, first of all, perceives modern thinking to be a source of technology in its partly threatening dimension, though this source was inherited fromGreek thinkers. However, technology and threat, which arises from it, are not some kind of inevitable fate, but are the destiny of Being, which should be calmly awaited in its mysteriousness. For where there are threat and danger, there also is a prospect of salvation – in this way Heidegger adopts Hölderlin’s restrained optimism. Furthermore, salvation presupposes constant (...) inquiry as an expression of the piety of thought. If it does not fall to its proper place, then the forgotness of Being, the abandonment of Being, war and triumph of different modern technologies, which have created a lot of trouble in the technological age, can take root. Therefore, it seems that only enlightened thinking, which is revealed in its inquisitive piety, can offer some way out. (shrink)

The relation between philosophy and theology in Martin Heidegger’s thought is multilayered and tense. On the one hand, he admits that his theological origin, i.e. his Christian-Catholic rootedness, determines the direction of his thought, while on the other hand, he has been fighting against theology that is too much tinted with philosophy. At the same time, he opposes that his thought be called theistic or atheistic. In the analytic of Dasein he wants to create assumptions that would enable him to (...) talk about God, gods or divine in general. This brings him close to mysticism, and even more so to mythology, which is revealed in his interpretation of Hölderlin. Nietzsche’s talk about God’s death helps him in this context. However, neither with Nietzsche nor with Heidegger does this death look like real death. Both thinkers hold that death strikes that God who has in philosophy and theology been made a being. After the thinking of the Being had thrown light upon their thought, God of Biblical theology and above all God whose coming is expected according to Heidegger cannot be left to death, because he evades human comprehension, especially oneDas Verhältnis zwischen Philosophie und Theologie im Denken von Martin Heidegger ist vielschichtig und gespannt. Einerseits gibt Heidegger zu, daß seine theologische Herkunft, d.h. seine christlich-katholische Verwurzelung, für sein Denken auch richtungsweisend ist, andererseits kämpft er sein ganzes Leben lang gegen eine Theologie, die allzu sehr philosophisch geprägt ist. Zur gleichen Zeit wehrt er sich dagegen, daß sein Denken theistisch oder atheistisch genannt wird. In einer Daseinsanalytik will er Voraussetzungen schaffen, um von Gott, von Göttern, oder vom Göttlichem überhaupt sprechen zu können. Dies bringt ihn in die Nähe von Mystik, ja sogar in die Nähe von Mythologie, was vor allem in seiner Hölderlininterpretation seinen Niederschlag findet. In diesem Zusammenhang hilft ihm auch Nietzsches Rede vom Tode Gottes. Dieser Tod aber scheint weder bei Nietzsche noch bei Heidegger ein echter zu sein. Der Tod trifft bei beiden Denkern den Gott, der in Philosophie und in Theologie zum Seienden gemacht wurde. Der Gott der biblischen Theologie, und vor allem der Gott, dessen Ankunft, nach Heidegger, zu erwarten ist, nachdem das Seins-Denken ihr Gedachtes gelichtet hat, kann nicht dem Tode überliefert werden, weil er sich dem Zugriff des Menschen, vor allem in Form von Philosophie und Theologie, entzieht. (shrink)

Identifying, classifying, and analyzing arguments in legal discourse has been a prominent area of research since the inception of the argument mining field. However, there has been a major discrepancy between the way natural language processing (NLP) researchers model and annotate arguments in court decisions and the way legal experts understand and analyze legal argumentation. While computational approaches typically simplify arguments into generic premises and claims, arguments in legal research usually exhibit a rich typology that is important for gaining insights (...) into the particular case and applications of law in general. We address this problem and make several substantial contributions to move the field forward. First, we design a new annotation scheme for legal arguments in proceedings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) that is deeply rooted in the theory and practice of legal argumentation research. Second, we compile and annotate a large corpus of 373 court decisions (2.3M tokens and 15k annotated argument spans). Finally, we train an argument mining model that outperforms state-of-the-art models in the legal NLP domain and provide a thorough expert-based evaluation. All datasets and source codes are available under open lincenses at https://github.com/trusthlt/mining-legal-arguments. (shrink)

An overview on archaeological evidence, provided by Colagè and d’Errico, reveals that the timing, location, and pace of cultural innovations are more consistent with scenarios that take culture, rather than genetic evolutionary processes, as the key driving force for human cognition. The authors elaborate on those mechanisms by which cultural evolution operates, with a specific focus on cultural exaptation and cultural neural reuse.

Is property-awareness constituted by representation or not? If it were, merely being aware of the qualities of physical objects would involve being in a representational state. This would have considerable implications for a prominent view of the nature of successful perceptual experiences. According to naïve realism, any such experience—or more specifically its character—is fundamentally a relation of awareness to concrete items in the environment. Naïve realists take their view to be a genuine alternative to representationalism, the view on which the (...) character of such experiences is constituted by representation. But naïve realists must admit qualities or property instances as items of awareness if they are to remain wedded to common sense, and the nature of property-awareness may smuggle constitutive representation into the naïve realist account of character. I argue that whether property-awareness involves representation, and consequently whether naïve realism is distinct from representationalism or not, depends on what qualities are fundamentally. On universalist and nominalist accounts, property-awareness turns out to involve representation. Not so under tropism. (shrink)

If we are to believe the proponents of the Theory of Practice and of Rational Choice, the gap between these two paradigmatic approaches cannot be bridged. They rely on ontological premises, theories of motivations and causal models that stand too far apart. In this article, I argue that this theoretical antinomy loses much of its edge when we take as objects of sociological investigation processes of historical change, that is, when we try to specify in theoretical terms how and in (...) which conditions historical actors enact and endorse shifts in patterns of relations as well as shifts in the symbolic and cognitive categories that make these relations significant. I substantiate this argument in light of the distinction between two temporalities of historical change: first, the long waves of gradual change and, second, the short waves of moments of breaks and ruptures. Along the way, I develop an argument about the conditions of emergence of self-limiting norms and the centrality of epistemic beliefs in situations of high disruption. (shrink)

Orthomodular posets form an algebraic formalization of the logic of quantum mechanics. A central question is how to introduce implication in such a logic. We give a positive answer whenever the orthomodular poset in question is of finite height. The crucial advantage of our solution is that the corresponding algebra, called implication orthomodular poset, i.e. a poset equipped with a binary operator of implication, corresponds to the original orthomodular poset and that its implication operator is everywhere defined. We present here (...) a complete list of axioms for implication orthomodular posets. This enables us to derive an axiomatization in Gentzen style for the algebraizable logic of orthomodular posets of finite height. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPeople hiss and swear when they make errors, frown and swear again when they encounter conflicting information. Such error- and conflict-related signs of negative affect are found even when there is no time pressure or external reward and the task itself is very simple. Previous studies, however, provide inconsistent evidence regarding the affective consequences of resolved conflicts, that is, conflicts that resulted in correct responses. We tested whether response accuracy in the Eriksen flanker task will moderate the effect of trial (...) incongruence using affective priming to measure positive and negative affect. We found that responses to incongruent trials elicit positive affect irrespective of their accuracy. Errors, in turn, result in negative affect irrespective of trial congruence. The effects of conflicts and errors do not interact and affect different dimensions of affective priming. Conflicts change the speed of evaluative categorisation while errors are reflected in categorisation accuracy... (shrink)

During the 1980s Illich added another dimension to his thought through the study of Medieval history. In the current volume he aims to demonstrate the extent to which the groundwork for the institutions that characterize our world today was laid in the twelfth century.

Increasingly privatized auditory spaces resulting from the mutual engendering of auditory cultural practices and sound technologies that separated the sense of hearing and segmented acoustic spaces have had a muting effect on our experience of Others that has intensified since the advent of mobile listening devices. In Section 1 of the article, I outline features of the social realm of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries that made modern sound technologies possible and then features of the technological realm that have shaped (...) today’s social realm – all with an eye toward our experience of other people. Then, in Section 2, I reach for a few phenomenological tools from the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, and Don Ihde to draw out the phenomenological vectors that have taken shape within the enmeshed sociotechnological context described in Section 1. Specifically, I show how technologically mediated auditory experience has been individualized and how the use of sound technologies on the go – whether wearing earphones or in a car – has had a muting effect on our experience of others. (shrink)

Is self-deception something that just happens to us, or is it an intentional action of an agent? This paper discusses intentionalism, a theory claiming that self-deception is intentional behavior that aims to produce a belief that the agent does not share. The agent is motivated by his belief that p (e.g. he is bald) and his desire that not-p (e.g. not to be bald), and if self-deceiving is successful, the agent will end up believing not-p. Opponents of intentionalism raise two (...) different objections: it seems that self-deceiver should then simultaneously hold two incompatible beliefs (namely, that p and not-p), as well as simultaneously intend the deception and be unaware of it. This paper reviews possible answers to anti-intentionalist objections (temporal partitioning, psychological partitioning, and the attentional strategy account) and offers guidelines to strengthen intentionalist claims. (shrink)