What is the basis for arguing that a volunteer army exploits citizens who lack civilian career opportunities? How do we determine that a doctor who has sex with his patients is exploiting them? In this book, Alan Wertheimer seeks to identify when a transaction or relationship can be properly regarded as exploitative--and not oppressive, manipulative, or morally deficient in some other way--and explores the moral weight of taking unfair advantage. Among the first political philosophers to examine this important topic from (...) a non-Marxist perspective, Wertheimer writes about ordinary experience in an accessible yet philosophically penetrating way. He considers whether it is seriously wrong for a party to exploit another if the transaction is consensual and mutually advantageous, whether society can justifiably prohibit people from entering into such a transaction, and whether it is wrong to allow oneself to be exploited. Wertheimer first considers several contexts commonly characterized as exploitive, including surrogate motherhood, unconscionable contracts, the exploitation of student athletes, and sexual exploitation in psychotherapy. In a section outlining his theory of exploitation, he sets forth the criteria for a fair transaction and the point at which we can properly say that a party has consented. Whereas many discussions of exploitation have dealt primarily with cases in which one party harms or coerces another, Wertheimer's book focuses on what makes a mutually advantageous and consensual transaction exploitive and analyzes the moral and legal implications of such exploitation. (shrink)

In this book, Alan Wertheimer seeks to identify when a transaction or relationship can be properly regarded as exploitative--and not oppressive, manipulative, or morally deficient in some other way--and explores the moral weight of taking ...

What is the basis for arguing that a volunteer army exploits citizens who lack civilian career opportunities? How do we determine that a doctor who has sex with his patients is exploiting them? In this book, Alan Wertheimer seeks to identify when a transaction or relationship can be properly regarded as exploitative--and not oppressive, manipulative, or morally deficient in some other way--and explores the moral weight of taking unfair advantage. Among the first political philosophers to examine this important topic from (...) a non-Marxist perspective, Wertheimer writes about ordinary experience in an accessible yet philosophically penetrating way. He considers whether it is seriously wrong for a party to exploit another if the transaction is consensual and mutually advantageous, whether society can justifiably prohibit people from entering into such a transaction, and whether it is wrong to allow oneself to be exploited.Wertheimer first considers several contexts commonly characterized as exploitive, including surrogate motherhood, unconscionable contracts, the exploitation of student athletes, and sexual exploitation in psychotherapy. In a section outlining his theory of exploitation, he sets forth the criteria for a fair transaction and the point at which we can properly say that a party has consented. Whereas many discussions of exploitation have dealt primarily with cases in which one party harms or coerces another, Wertheimer's book focuses on what makes a mutually advantageous and consensual transaction exploitive and analyzes the moral and legal implications of such exploitation. (shrink)

George Loewenstein is one of the pioneers of the rapidly growing field of behavioral economics. For over twenty years he has been working at the intersection of economics and psychology and is one of the few people of whom it can be said that their work is equally respected and well known within both disciplines. This book brings together a selection of his papers focusing on what he calls "exotic preferences"-- the disparate motives that drive human behavior. Anoriginal introduction outlines (...) Loewenstein's general approach to research, and there are short introductions to each paper outlining briefly when, how and why they came to be written, providing a fascinating and vivid insight into the process of intellectual creativity. (shrink)

When does a woman give valid consent to sexual relations? When does her consent render it morally or legally permissible for a man to have sexual relations with her? Why is sexual consent generally regarded as an issue about female consent? And what is the moral significance of consent? These are some of the questions discussed in this important book, which will appeal to a wide readership in philosophy, law, and the social sciences. Alan Wertheimer develops a theory of consent (...) to sexual relations that applies to both law and morality in the light of the psychology of sexual relations, the psychology of perpetrators, and the psychology of the victims. He considers a wide variety of difficult cases such as coercion, fraud, retardation, and intoxication. We can all agree that 'no' means 'no'. This book suggests that the difficult question is whether 'yes' means 'yes'. (shrink)

Our culture is conflicted about morally judging and condemning. We can't avoid it altogether, yet many layfolk today are loathe to do it for reasons neither they nor philosophers well understand. Their resistance is often confused (by themselves and by theorists) with some species of antiobjectivism. But unlike a nonobjectivist, most people think that (a) for us to judge and condemn is generally (objectively) morally wrong , yet (b) for God to do so is (objectively) proper, and (c) so too (...) for certain persons in certain relations (e.g., self-condemnation, parental child rearing.) Certainly, religious (e.g., Christian) critics of judging and condemning without doubting the objective truth of their tradition's core moral teachings. Most puzzling is that (a) merely judging and condemning in one's heart may be improper, and (b) someone else with no more evidence or expertise might properly judge and condemn the same action. The answer is in condemning's complex structure of presuppostions. Condemning and judging are acts, and attitudes initiated by the act. Condemnation is motivated by two judgments presumed to justify it, a criticism of a target, and a judgment that the criticism justifies some negative response toward the target. Unlike nonpunitive penalties, punishments are motivated and explained by condemnation. Condemnation is an act of a hostile will, wishing some evil for its target, not (just) as a means to some good. Its root is in damning, an act akin to cursing. It declares a degraded status. The hostility makes it harder to justify condemnation than criticism, and punishment than nonpunitive penalties. Condemning claims objectivity and authority. It involves reflexive evaluation, regarding itself justified, approving its hostile feelings toward the target. Condemners presume themselves entitled to sit in judgment, pass judgment, and cast the condemned down. Those presumptions inhere in sitting in judgment, assuming jurisdiction. Unlike mathematical or scientific judgments, passing moral judgment seems to be a political act subject to extraepistemic constraints. "Who are you to judge?" may properly challenge your right to pass judgment. (shrink)

Introduction George Loewenstein, Daniel Read, and Roy F. Baumeister P _L sychology and economics have a classic love-hate relationship. ...

These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions.

Allocation of very scarce medical interventions such as organs and vaccines is a persistent ethical challenge. We evaluate eight simple allocation principles that can be classified into four categories: treating people equally, favouring the worst-off, maximising total benefits, and promoting and rewarding social usefulness. No single principle is sufficient to incorporate all morally relevant considerations and therefore individual principles must be combined into multiprinciple allocation systems. We evaluate three systems: the United Network for Organ Sharing points systems, quality-adjusted life-years, and (...) disability-adjusted life-years. We recommend an alternative system—the complete lives system—which prioritises younger people who have not yet lived a complete life, and also incorporates prognosis, save the most lives, lottery, and instrumental value principles. (shrink)

Critique of prevailing textbook conception of sufficient conditions and necessary conditions as a truth functional relation of material implication (p->q)/(~q->~p). Explanation of common sense conception of condition as correlative of consequence, involving dependence. Utility of this conception exhibited in resolving puzzles regarding ontology, truth, and fatalism.

Name der Zeitschrift: Das Mittelalter Jahrgang: 18 Heft: 2 Seiten: 73-97.

Name der Zeitschrift: Das Mittelalter Jahrgang: 18 Heft: 2 Seiten: 55-72.

An analysis is presented of published methods that have been used by experimenters to justify the reliability of the theory of invasion of microorganisms into cultured cells. The results show that, to demonstrate this invasion, many experimenters used two or more methods that were based on independent technical and theoretical principles, and by doing so improved the reliability of the theory. Subsequently I compare this strategy of 'multiple derivability' with other strategies, discussed in the literature in relation to the mesosome, (...) a bacterial organelle that had been detected with the electron microsope, but which appeared later to be an artifact. I propose that different strategies have been applied in this problem, and multiple derivability may have been the decisive one. Finally I discuss the idea that multiple derivability may help to anchor theories in a larger network of theories. (shrink)

A longstanding puzzle about moral responsibility for negligence arises from three plausible yet jointly inconsistent theses: (i) an agent can, in certain circumstances, be morally responsible for some outcome O, even if her behavior with respect to O is negligent (i.e., even if she never adverted to the possibility that the behavior might result in O), (ii) an agent can be morally responsible for O only if she has some control over O, (iii) if an agent acts negligently with respect (...) to O, then she has no control over O. This paper is in two parts. First, I argue that reasons-responsiveness models of moral responsibility can be applied naturally to negligence scenarios; indeed, agents are intuitively responsible for the outcomes of their negligent behavior just when they meet the conditions for responsibility given by the best reason-responsiveness theories. Second, if the reasons-responsiveness conditions are applicable to negligence scenarios then one of two things follows: either agents can have direct control over outcomes they never adverted to, or reasons-responsiveness is not a condition of control but of something else connected to moral responsibility. Each possibility would be important in its own right—and each can solve the negligence puzzle. (shrink)

We have given a certain interpretation of Spinoza on the basis of an analysis of his methodology. In this study the present writer tried to restrict himself totally to this subject: viz. to give an exposition of Spinoza's methodology in its totality. He tried to give a modern approach in that he was primarily not concerned with the historical roots of Spinoza's ideas, but with the way in which these ideas function in his philosophy...... Zie: Introduction.

When does a woman give valid consent to sexual relations? When does her consent render it morally or legally permissible for a man to have sexual relations with her? Why is sexual consent generally regarded as an issue about female consent? And what is the moral significance of consent? These are some of the questions discussed in this important book, which will appeal to a wide readership in philosophy, law, and the social sciences. Alan Wertheimer develops a theory of consent (...) to sexual relations that applies to both law and morality in the light of the psychology of sexual relations, the psychology of perpetrators, and the psychology of the victims. He considers a wide variety of difficult cases such as coercion, fraud, retardation, and intoxication. We can all agree that 'no' means 'no'. This book suggests that the difficult question is whether 'yes' means 'yes'. (shrink)

An influential line of thinking in behavioral science, to which the two authors have long subscribed, is that many of society's most pressing problems can be addressed cheaply and effectively at the level of the individual, without modifying the system in which the individual operates. We now believe this was a mistake, along with, we suspect, many colleagues in both the academic and policy communities. Results from such interventions have been disappointingly modest. But more importantly, they have guided many (though (...) by no means all) behavioral scientists to frame policy problems in individual, not systemic, terms: To adopt what we call the “i-frame,” rather than the “s-frame.” The difference may be more consequential than i-frame advocates have realized, by deflecting attention and support away from s-frame policies. Indeed, highlighting the i-frame is a long-established objective of corporate opponents of concerted systemic action such as regulation and taxation. We illustrate our argument briefly for six policy problems, and in depth with the examples of climate change, obesity, retirement savings, and pollution from plastic waste. We argue that the most important way in which behavioral scientists can contribute to public policy is by employing their skills to develop and implement value-creating system-level change. (shrink)

1000 time-travelers travel back in time, each with the intention of killing their own infant-self. If there is no branching time, then on pain of bringing about a logical contradiction, all must fail. But this seems inexplicable: what is to ensure that the time-travelers are stopped? For a time, this inexplicability objection was thought to provide evidence that there is something incoherent about the possibility of backwards time travel in a universe without branching time. There is now near-consensus, however, that (...) the objection has no bite: there is nothing inexplicable about the mass failure. Lewis, Sider and Ismael independently argue that since it is built into the description of the class of cases considered that the time-travelers must fail – and so we consider only unsuccessful attempts – there is no mystery. Smith argues that the absence of possible worlds at which auto-infanticide is committed suffices as a complete explanation for the failures. And Baron and Colyvan maintain that available causal and logical explanations jointly account for everything that needs accounting for. I argue that these are wrong. There is remaining, problematic inexplicability. For backwards time travel not to lead to logical contradiction, something would need to do logic’s bidding, after all. (shrink)

Introduction -- Facing up to paternalism in research ethics -- Preface to a theory of consent transactions in research : beyond valid consent -- Should we worry about money? -- Exploitation in clinical research -- The interaction principle.

Es gibt offensichtlich nicht nur Moden der Kleidung, der Frisur oder des Wohnens, sondern auch Moden in den Wissenschaften, in Kunst, Philosophie und vielleicht sogar in der Religion. Das heisst aber gerade in Bereichen, die doch eigentlich 'feste Prinzipien' gegen den Wechsel des Zeitgeistes und der Moden verteidigen. Aber was bedeutet dann in diesen Zusammenhängen "Mode"? Und wie lassen sich solche geistigen Moden erklären? Gehören "Mode" und "Moderne" zusammen? Der vorliegende Band versucht eine systematische Antwort auf diese Fragen, indem er (...) zunächst das Phänomen des Modischen auf seinen offenkundigen Feldern untersucht: den Kleidungsmoden, Wohnmoden, Körpermoden und den Moden in Freizeitgestaltung und Tourismus sowie im Sport. Von hier aus wird nach den spezifisch intellektuellen Moden in den Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften, in der Kunst, in der Philosophie und in der Religion gefragt. Mit Beiträgen von: Georg Bertram, Hubertus Busche, Yvonne Förster, Robert Gugutzer, Rainer Hartmann, Frank Hillebrandt, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Irene Nierhaus, Daria Pezzoli-Olgiati, Verena Potthoff, Tim Rojek. (shrink)

Este artículo continúa el debate sobre la forma de fechar las predicciones agustinianas; en concreto, los sermones 5-8 y las prédicas de Navidad 184-196 y 369-370. Un "excursus" resume el estado de dicha cuestión y evalúa en perspectiva metodológica el valor y propósito del esfuerzo por darle una respuesta adecuada.

This article provides an overview of Augustine’s Christmas sermons. Christmas is more important for Augustine than his words to Januarius might suggest (Letter 55, 2). In fact, the parallels between his preaching at Christmas and at Easter are striking in this regard. The catechesis in the Christmas sermons is based on the Nicean creed (or that of Constantinopole) rather than on the Lenten and Easter baptismal creeds. Together, the feasts of Christmas and Easter celebrate—both theologically and liturgically—the one mystery of (...) salvation. (shrink)

El artículo intenta demostrar cómo, a través de la aplicación de la exégesis gramatical en sentido estrictamente cristológico, san Agustín llegó a la fórmula "una persona" en Cristo. Y lo hace en tres etapas: la exégisis gramatical en la educación y práctica agustinianas; exégesis gramatical y cristología en san Agustín; conceptos cristológicos anteriores a él y contemporáneos con él.

The article presents 111 newly-identified texts in manuscripts of the Bodleian Library, Oxford, which had hitherto all been attributed to Augustine of Hippo. Only thirty of them, however, proved to be authentic, fifty originate from works of other patristic and medieval authors, while thirty-one remain anonymous. Especially remarkable is the identification of two fragments from the new letters of St Augustine discovered by Johannes Divjak in Paris and Marseille, which predate the two manuscripts of his edition. These results complement the (...) catalogues on the manuscript transmission of Augustine’s works compiled by the Vienna Academy and continue the Author’s earlier publications on manuscripts in Germany, Great Britain, Poland, Spain, and Sweden. (shrink)