Shaping the Future maps out the ascetic practices of a Neitzschean way of life. Hutter argues that Nietzsche's doctrines are attempts and "temptations" that aim to provoke his free-spirited readers into changing themselves by putting philosophy into practice in their lives.

Die philosophische Promotion Horst-Eberhard Richters stellt eine wichtige Auseinandersetzung mit der Phänomenologie des Schmerzes dar. Geprägt von seinem subjektiven Schmerzerleben und seinen Leiderfahrungen als Soldat im Zweiten Weltkrieg in Russland formuliert Richter bereits 1948 – im Alter von 25 Jahren – die Grundgedanken seines wirkmächtigen philosophischen Hauptwerks Der Gotteskomplex (1979). In seinem »Antrag auf Zulassung zur Promotion« im Fach Philosophie schrieb Richter, die »philosophische Arbeit« stelle für ihn »eine zentrale Lebensfrage« dar. Obwohl er seine »Zukunft als Mediziner« sehe, betrachte (...) er die Philosophie »als Basis für die weitere Entfaltung meiner philosophischen Tätigkeit«. Ihm schwebte eine Verbindung von Medizin und Philosophie vor, die er in der Psychosomatischen Medizin, der Psychoanalyse und auch in seinen sozialphilosophischen Schriften verwirklichte. (shrink)

Fifty years ago Hartman studied the barrier transmission time of wave packets (J Appl Phys 33:3427–3433, 1962). He was inspired by the tunneling experiments across thin insulating layers at that time. For opaque barriers he calculated faster than light propagation and a transmission time independent of barrier length, which is called the Hartman effect. A faster than light (FTL or superluminal) wave packet velocity was deduced in analog tunneling experiments with microwaves and with infrared light thirty years later. Recently, the (...) conjectured zero time of electron tunneling was claimed to have been observed in ionizing helium inside the barrier. The calculated and measured short tunneling time arises at the barrier front. This tunneling time was found to be universal for elastic fields as well as for electromagnetic fields. Remarkable is that the delay time is the same for the reflected and the transmitted waves in the case of symmetric barriers. Several theoretical physicists predicted this strange nature of the tunneling process. However, even with this background many members of the physics community do not accept a FTL signal velocity interpretation of the experimental tunneling results. Instead a luminal front velocity was calculated to explain the FTL experimental results frequently. However, Brillouin stated in his book on wave propagation and group velocity that the front velocity is given by the group velocity of wave packets in the case of physical signals, which have only finite frequency bandwidths. Some studies assumed barriers to be cavities and the observed tunneling time does represent the cavity lifetime. We are going to discus these continuing misleading interpretations, which are found in journals and in textbooks till today. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: A Contribution to Recent Discussion* ST. THOMAS AQUINAS accepted and consistently defended Boethius' definition of person: "persona est substantia individua rationalis naturae." St. Thomas' analysis of this definition necessarily involves metaphysical questions because of the implications of the terms " substance" and " nature" and moreover it manifests the inescapahle imprint of the theological problematics which surrounded the issue (e.g. the (...) Trinity and the hypostatic union). Both of these influences, metaphysical and theological, have engendered problems of interpretation and criticism. Contemporary discussions of person largely either continue the scholastic controversies or adopt a modern perspective from which to expose apparent contradictions in St. Thomas' doctrine. The purpose of this article will be limited to a consideration of the metaphysical problems concerning the relationship between individual substance, universal, nature, and existence. It is hoped that such a clarification will resolve not only the neoscholastic controversies, but also some of the contemporary problems. I. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION OF PERSON AND ST. THOMAS' EXPLANATION A. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION Boethius develops his definition of person in the Liber contra Eutychen et N estorium after a careful consideration of na- * I have to thank cordially Father Brian Shanley, 0.P. for having revised completely this English version, devoting much time and energy to fit the text and the footnotes to the style of The Thomist. He adapted the version in good style and verified the Latin quotations. 435 436 HORST SEIDL ture and substance.1 In the first chapter he sets out to define nature and discovers four possible meanings. The first and broadest definition, embracing both substances and accidents, describes nature as belonging to all things which by their being can be in some way or another be comprehended by reason: "natura est earum rermn quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt." A second definition, comprising substances alone both corporeal and incorporeal, describes nature as anything that can effect or suffer something: " natura est vel quod facere vel quod pati possit." A third sense, taken from the Aristotelian analysis of the motion of natural substances, describes nature as the immanent principle of movement : "natura est motus principium per se et non per accidens." Finally, nature can also refer to the formal cause which provides the specific difference: " natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia" (cf. ST Ia. 29, I ad 4). It is this last sense which is most important. In sum, "nature" is a broad term encompassing both composite beings and their causes. Boethius continues in chapter two by first narrowing the relevant sense of nature to substances (thus excluding accidents ) and then presenting a complete division of substances. The major distinction is between corporeal substances and incorporeal substances. Corporeal subdivides further into inanimate and animate, with animate dividing. into insensitive and sensitive and the latter dividing finally into irrational and rational. Incorporeal subdivides into rational and irrational (the life-principle of animals), with rational incorporeal substances being further distinguished into those that are immutable by nature (the Creator) and those that are not so by nature (the human soul and angels) but may become so by virtue of the immutable substance. Boethius then argues that person cannot be affirmed of inanimate beings or irrational animals. A 1 All citations from Boethius are taken from the Loeb text in Boethius: Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy, ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918). THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 437 final distinction of :substance into universal and particular leads to the conclusion that person must refer to an individual. Thus the background is set for the definition of person which opens the third chapter: " naturae rationalis individua substantia." Person must be an individual substance of a certain nature, namely rational, which nature accounts for the form or specific difference of the particular substance (the fourth meaning of chapter 1). The connection of this definition with Aristotle 's definition of man as a rational animal is unmistakable. It should also be noted that this definition of person is applicable not only to man, in whom the rational nature is not identical with his substance, but also to the... (shrink)

English summary: What does Dada mean? The answer lies in the distinction between the perceptible and the designation and the failure to mediate discursively between the two. With the inception of Dada-Zurich - at the intersection between literary and art studies, comparative studies, image-text theory and philosophy - the relationship between modernity and avant-garde as well as between avant-garde and Dadaism was redefined. This redefinition was a consequence of the scandalous aesthetic theoretical insights of Dada Zurich, which concretized in practical (...) and poetic form an aesthetic theory that in itself is aesthetic, and developed an aesthetic-theoretical understanding in which aisthesis takes up a central position. Dada uses the avant-garde as material. The aesthetic theoretical potential of Dada Zurich in turn had an impact not only on the artefacts that were actually used and aesthetically reflected by Dada, but on all modern - including avant-garde - artefacts. German description: Was bedeutet Dada? Die Antwort liegt in der Differenz von Wahrnehmbarem und Bezeichnung und deren scheiternder diskursiven Vermittlung. Mit der Konstitution des Gegenstandes Dada-Zurich - im Schnittfeld von Literatur- und Kunstwissenschaft, Komparatistik, Bild-Text-Theorie und Philosophie - wird das Verhaltnis von Moderne und Avantgarde sowie von Avantgarde und Dada neu bestimmt. Diese Neubestimmung resultiert aus der Erkenntnis der asthetisch-theoretischen Form Dada-Zurichs, deren Konstitution das theoretische Skandalon Asthetischer Theorie (als einer Theorie, die selber asthetisch wird) in praktischer und poietischer Form konkretisiert. Sie entwickelt eine asthetisch-theoretische Erkenntnisform, in der Aisthesis eine zentrale Stellung einnimmt. Dada nutzt die Avantgarde als Material. Das asthetisch-theoretische Potential Dada-Zurichs wirkt dabei nicht nur zuruck auf die von Dada tatsachlich verwendeten (asthetisch reflektierten), sondern auf alle modernen - auch avantgardistischen - Artefakte. (shrink)

Shepard's internalization concept is defended against Hecht's criticisms. By ignoring both Shepard's evolutionary perspective and the fact that internalization does not preclude modularization, Hecht advances inconclusive evidence. Developmental research supports Shepard's conclusion that kinematic geometry may be more deeply internalized than physical dynamics. This research also suggests that the internalization concept should be broadened to include representations acquired during ontogeny. [Hecht; Shepard].

1. Im Angesicht der Zeit.--2. Im Umkreis der Kunst.--3. Im Horizont des Absoluten.

Frederick II neither tolerated the Schwenckfeldians in Silesia as an independent denomination nor recognized them, but, rather from a legal basis demanded that they be incorporated into the Lutheran Church. With the acknowledgement of the Schwenckfeldian movement as an independant denomination, he would have gone beyond article VII of the Instrumenta Pacis Osnabrigense, jeopardizing future peace negotiations with the House of Habsburg. However, he did promise the Schwenckfeldians that the government would respect their personal faith and conscience and would be (...) willing to protect them from attack, though limited by the reason of state which would be endangered if the fundamental articles of the Christian religion were openly denied. For if these were negated one could not discount the possibility that not only Maria Theresea but also the Protestant and Catholic subjects would take offence, causing tension and diminishing the prosperity of the State. The philosopher of Sanssouci himself held freedom of faith and conscience highly, but felt it had to be subordinate to the welfare of the state. The actual reason for he gave this assurance to the Schwenckfeldians though, was not merely to give his subjects a relative amount of freedom, but, more important, to encourage further immigration into his lands. Frederick II, who saw himself as the first servant of his state, thereby hoped to raise the density of population in relatively depopulated areas, to promote manufacturing and trade, and with it the prosperity of the state. The positive impulse for the attitude of Frederic II against the Schwenckfeldians was therefore in the last analysis based on political motives. His concession of freedom of faith and conscience to the Schwenckfeldians was in principle possible only because he had granted such freedom to all his Silesian subjects - who had to belong to one of the three confessions recognized by the Peace of Westphalia- on the condition that they would not deny reverence to God or subservience to the State. In comparison to the intolerant attitude of many contemporary states which gave their subjects no liberty of faith or conscience, the position which the state of Frederic II hat taken vis-a-vis the Schwenckfeldians in Silesia therefore signifies a great step forward. This position, however, was considerably less than the religious freedom enjoyed by those Schwenckfeldians who emigrated to Pennsylvania. (shrink)

The following considerations are to be seen in the framework of nontraditional theory of predication (NTP), which stems in its basic features from Sinowjew (cf. Sinowjew 1970, Sinowjew/Wessel 1975), and which is described in detail in Wessel 1989.

Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this (...) implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding. In this book, Steven Horst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science. While reductionism was part of the philosophical orthodoxy fifty years ago, it has been decisively rejected by philosophers of science over the past thirty years, and for good reason. True reductions are in fact exceedingly rare in the sciences, and the conviction that they were there to be found was an artifact of armchair assumptions of 17th century Rationalists and 20th century Logical Empiricists. The explanatory gaps between mind and brain are far from unique. In fact, in the sciences it is gaps all the way down.And if reductions are rare in even the physical sciences, there is little reason to expect them in the case of psychology. Horst argues that this calls for a complete re-thinking of the contemporary problematic in philosophy of mind. Reductionism, dualism, eliminativism and non-reductive materialism are each severely compromised by post-reductionist philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind is in need of a new paradigm. Horst suggests that such a paradigm might be found in Cognitive Pluralism: the view that human cognitive architecture constrains us to understand the world through a plurality of partial, idealized, and pragmatically-constrained models, each employing a particular representational system optimized for its own problem domain. Such an architecture can explain the disunities of knowledge, and is plausible on evolutionary grounds. (shrink)

Germany is at the leading edge of European reflection on the nature and requirements of ethical business. Two scholars in the field provide a survey of the main lines of discussion in the current German business ethics scene, and discuss three important books which are helping set the scene for further developments. Prof. Dr. Horst Steinmann holds the Chair for Business Administration and Management at the University of Erlangen‐Nürnberg, Lange Gasse 20, D‐90403 Nürnberg, and Dipl.‐Hdl. Brigitte Kustermann is research (...) assistant to the same chair. (shrink)

Recent initiatives in Germany illustrate how major companies have changed their attitudes towards a critical public ‐ and thereby have improved their economic and ethical performance. Prof. Dr. Horst Steinmann and Dipl.‐Kfm. Ansgar Zerfaß belong to the University of Erlangen‐Nürnberg, Germany.