With the removal of the ‘final state’ vision from the perception of historical process recasts the coexistence of differences as a perpetual condition of modernity. Given that ‘difference’ masks all too often inequality, perpetuity of the ‘wars of recognition’ is therefore a likely prospect, since the instability of all extant and emerging power settings triggers reconnaissance-through-battle. The politics of recognition, though, tends to be viewed and practiced, wrongly, as an alternative rather than complement of distributive justice, thereby inflaming rather than (...) mollifying the intensity of ‘recognition wars’. (shrink)

ArgumentThe revolutionary transformation in Russian science toward the Soviet model of research started even before the revolution of 1917. It was triggered by the crisis of World War I, in response to which Russian academics proposed radical changes in the goals and infrastructure of the country’s scientific effort. Their drafts envisioned the recognition of science as a profession separate from teaching, the creation of research institutes, and the turn toward practical, applied research linked to the military and industrial needs of (...) the nation. The political revolution and especially the Bolshevik government that shared or appropriated many of the same views on science, helped these reforms materialize during the subsequent Civil War. By 1921, the foundation of a novel system of research and development became established, which in its most essential characteristics was similar to the U.S. later phenomenon known as “big science.”. (shrink)

In this essay I explore three firsthand accounts of religious faith from The First World War: Forsaken by Private Orr, The Letters of John Ayscough to His Mother, and The Making of a Mind: Letters from a Soldier Priest 1914-1919, by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. These three priests provide us with a glimpse of how faithful people responded to very challenging situations. Private Orr came into the war as an ordained priest, but lost his faith after two years of fighting. (...) Monsignor Ayscough worked mainly with wounded soldiers, offering them pastoral care in many different settings. Teilhard de Chardin served as a stretcher-bearer on the frontlines of many fierce battles, earning the respect he would need to talk to soldiers about their faith in the moments just before they went ‘over the top.’ In a concluding section, I try to draw out some implications of their stories for pastoral care today. (shrink)

In this essay I explore three firsthand accounts of religious faith from The First World War: Forsaken by Private Orr, The Letters of John Ayscough to His Mother, and The Making of a Mind: Letters from a Soldier Priest 1914-1919, by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. These three priests provide us with a glimpse of how faithful people responded to very challenging situations. Private Orr came into the war as an ordained priest, but lost his faith after two years of fighting. (...) Monsignor Ayscough worked mainly with wounded soldiers, offering them pastoral care in many different settings. Teilhard de Chardin served as a stretcher-bearer on the frontlines of many fierce battles, earning the respect he would need to talk to soldiers about their faith in the moments just before they went ‘over the top.’ In a concluding section, I try to draw out some implications of their stories for pastoral care today. (shrink)

In this essay I explore three firsthand accounts of religious faith from The First World War: Forsaken by Private Orr, The Letters of John Ayscough to His Mother, and The Making of a Mind: Letters from a Soldier Priest 1914-1919, by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. These three priests provide us with a glimpse of how faithful people responded to very challenging situations. Private Orr came into the war as an ordained priest, but lost his faith after two years of fighting. (...) Monsignor Ayscough worked mainly with wounded soldiers, offering them pastoral care in many different settings. Teilhard de Chardin served as a stretcher-bearer on the frontlines of many fierce battles, earning the respect he would need to talk to soldiers about their faith in the moments just before they went ‘over the top.’ In a concluding section, I try to draw out some implications of their stories for pastoral care today. (shrink)

How did the Great War affect psychoanalysis? The common approach to this question has to do with assessing the extent to which psychoanalysis has influenced the medical and military understanding of the soldiers diagnosed with shell shock after the war, as well as the extent to which that influence further contributed to the new interest in Freudian psychoanalysis in Britain. If we take a conceptual approach and ask about the impact of the Great War on the theory of (...) psychoanalysis, we find ourselves investigating the more specific question: how did the Great War influence Freud’s psychoanalysis? For no matter how severely Freud has been and still is criticized, all psychoanalytic texts and schools lead back to his writings. When one examines Freud’s writings as a whole, comparing his pre-war work to his post-war writings, one can notice quite a few significant shifts. Perhaps most conspicuous is the shift in the theory of the mind as divided, a shift that is consolidated and articulated in The Ego and the Id. Prior to the war the main division was “topographical,” postulating more or less metaphorical “places” in the mind: consciousness, pre-consciousness, and the unconscious. After the war, the mind is divided “structurally” into three agencies, each with their own motivational functions: the Id, Ego and Super-Ego. The previous division, or rather the previous conception of the unconscious, was not abandoned. The Id, as well as parts of the Ego and the Super-Ego were said to be unconscious. But the main division of the mind was changed, especially since Freud came to understand that his conception of the unconscious did not lend itself to a unified definition. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the overlaps between the ‘cultural memory’ of the distant past and the memory of the Great War in Britain and Germany between 1914 and 1939, looking in particular at the use of medieval images in war memorials. There was a certain tension between advocates of medievalism and supporters of classicist images, but often, they reached a compromise. The chapter combines a discussion of the concept of ‘cultural memory’ with case studies on the reception of antiquity and (...) the Middle Ages in the era of the Great War. (shrink)

This article probes some of the issues The Great War and Modern Memory raises today, whether by Fussell himself, by critics at the time of its original publication, or by rereading the book anew now, in the context of a veritable renaissance in the study of World War I and of the revolution effected by the "literary turn" in historical study. I situate Fussell's book against the backdrop of three foundational works or points of view in cultural history that (...) came to the forefront after 1975. My purpose is not to chide Fussell for failing to anticipate the future directions of the cultural history of war, but rather to show how his work fits into the development of that history.I argue that The Great War and Modern Memory itself became a lieu de mémoire or "site of memory" of the Great War. But like many very successful works, Fussell's book became famous not exclusively or even primarily because of its originality, but because of its ability to reformulate or reinscribe pre-existing ways of understanding. As critic and as veteran, Fussell reasserted the "evidence of experience" as the cornerstone of war writing in the twentieth century. In addition, some of the impact of The Great War and Modern Memory can be explained by the way it supported the most venerable narrative explanation of the Great War, that of tragedy. (shrink)

This article addresses the critically neglected relation between Baedekers and nationalism, in order to articulate the reasons for the decline of the Baedeker empire in the early twentieth century. Conditions in the First World War undermined the Baedekers' foundational concepts of landscape description. Additionally, the guidebooks emblematized a lost pre-war style of international journey. However, evidence in unexplored archival and fictional sources qualifies our understanding of these changes. This article revisits and reconciles such assessments, by explaining how the war also (...) recast the Baedekers' mediation of international access as a form of nationalist expansionism, and hence a suspect project. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with the philosophical, ethical, political and other forms of criticism directed at Western European imperialism after the First World War. By concentrating on the British case it looks at the structural and individual critique coming from members of the British political and academic elite as well as from media representatives. Debates about imperial rule and the right of conquest confronted the very nature of European empires and questioned their continuation if they were not ready for reform. (...) While anticolonial arguments from the colonial “peripheries” in times of the “Wilsonian moment” were the rule and globally organised, “metropolitan” sceptics of empire were not only in the minority but also somewhat out-dated because they often connected to Victorian understandings of imperialism. Thus, they need to be seen both in nineteenth-century intellectual traditions and in their own right at a crucial time after the First World War when questions of the global order needed to be negotiated. (shrink)

In this chapter, I revisit the question of the philosophical significance of the Great War upon the trajectory of philosophy in the twentieth century. While accounts of this are very rare in philosophy, and this is itself symptomatic, those that are given are also strangely implausible. They usually assert one of two things: that the War had little or no philosophical significance because most of the major developments had already begun, or—at the opposite extreme—they maintain that nothing was ever (...) the same in philosophy. On the latter view, the creation of the so-called analytic-continental ‘divide’ is but one notable philosophical consequence of the Great War. I want here to steer a middle-way between these positions, both having a grain of truth but over-playing their respective hands. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Through a brief analysis of the reflections of some prestigious contemporary philosophers such as Norberto Bobbio, Mulford Quickert Sibley, Wilhelm Emil Mühlmann, Michael Allen Fox, David Cortright, Larry May, John Rawls, Eric Reitan, Johan Galtung and David Boersema, this essay reconstructs Russell's pacifist commitment during the First World War. This dramatic event represented a real watershed for his multifaceted and ingenious personality, leading to his new political and civil commitment. Through a series of articles and lectures, he fought against (...) militarism, was in favour of a world government and underlined the psychological causes of war. All this coincided in part with the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, the ideas of which he initially shared; at the time of the Leeds Convention, he believed that the March revolution would involve a complete political and economic change at the international level by removing the causes of war. It was not by chance that he decided to join the Independent Labour Party, a choice that marked his separation from the Liberals. Although the latter explored in depth different forms of pacifism, Russell implicitly recalled the formula ‘Pax enim non belli privatio’ by Baruch Spinoza, supporting a fundamental paradigm of the modern political theory. (shrink)

The historiographical debate over the Great War continues. It does so because the public’s interest in this first total war of human history does not abate and because there is a plethora of histor...

Because commemorations of historic events say as much about the present as the past, it is important to think carefully about how and why we should remember the Great War in the centenary year of its outbreak. Commemoration must not be allowed to degenerate into mere mass entertainment, thoughtless celebration of martial valour, an occasion for chauvinism, or an advertisement for the merits of war as a means of settling international disputes. More respectable reasons for commemorating the Great (...) War are that it provides opportunities to learn from past mistakes, to reaffirm some common core values, and to pay our respects to those who died in their country’s service. I argue, however, that each of these justifications raises serious problems of interpretation and application, and that careful thought and moral sensitivity are needed if our efforts at commemoration are not to send out the wrong messages. (shrink)

This article examines the dispute concerning the meaning of World War I among leading American intellectuals in the period 1915–1918. Taking center stage here are the views of one of the founding fathers of American pragmatism, John Dewey, on the causes of the “Great War,” its higher meaning and goals which led to America’s entry into the War and also its influence on the social reconstruction of American society and the post-War world order. The final section of the article (...) is devoted to a critique of Dewey’s position towards American participation in the War by another famous American intellectual, Randolph Bourne, who laid the foundations for a tradition of social criticism in the U.S. in the twentieth century. (shrink)

In historiography there is a tendency to see the Great War as marking the end of scientific optimism and the period that followed the war as a time of discord. Connecting to current (inter)national historiographical debate on the question of whether the First World War meant a disruption from the pre-war period or not, this article strives to prove that faith in scientific progress still prevailed in the 1920s. This is shown through the use of Belgium as a case (...) study, which suggests that the generally adopted cultural pessimism in the post-war years did not apply to the public rhetoric of science in this country. Diverse actors—scientists, industrialists, politicians, the public opinion and the military staff—declared a confidence in science, enhanced by wartime results. Furthermore, belief in science in Belgium was not affected by public outcry over the use of mustard gas, unlike in the former belligerent countries where the gas became an unpleasant reminder of how science was used during the war. Even German science with its industrial applications remained the norm after 1918. In fact, the faith in science exhibited during the pre-war years continued to exist, at least until the 1920s, despite anti-German sentiments being voiced by many sections of Belgian society in the immediate aftermath of the war. (shrink)

This book is a collection of specifically commissioned articles on the key continental European philosophical movements since 1914. It shows how each of these bodies of thought has been shaped by their responses to the horrors set in train by World War I, and considers whether we are yet ‘post-post-war’. The outbreak of World War I in August 1914,set in chain a series of crises and re-configurations, which have continued to shape the world for a century: industrialized slaughter, the end (...) of colonialism and European empires, the rise of the USA, economic crises, fascism, Soviet Marxism, the gulags and the Shoah. Nearly all of the major movements in European thinking were forged in, or shaped by, attempts to come to terms with the global trauma of the World Wars. This is the first book to describe the development of these movements after World War I, and as such promises to be of interest to philosophers and historians of philosophy around the world. (shrink)

It may be concluded that Mitchell's peace evolutionism incorporated most of the features of the cooperationist and Novicovian traditions. He questioned the conflict paradigm that underpinned biological militarism, and reinforced a holistic and more peaceful model of nature by reference to the emerging discipline of ecology. His “restrictionist” objections to the deterministic tendencies of much prevailing biosocial thought combined philosophical with biological arguments to assert that human history was sui generis, based upon the unique development of human consciousness and the (...) cultural transmission of knowledge. Mitchell's opposition to biological militarism reflected Victorian anxieties about the legitimacy of evolutionary ethics. However, he introduced an innovatory note, linked to the “modernist” intellectual milieu of the time, when he put objections to the use of analogy on the grounds (1) that the Darwinist paradigm had not been properly established, and (2) that scientific laws themselves were uncertain and subjective.The first objection related to the bitter controversies that racked the biological world in the 1900s when mutation theory thrust the Darwinian concept of natural selection into temporary disrepute. In this respect Mitchell encoutered continuing Darwinist orthodoxy, not least from peace biology itself, while confusion was added by his personal devotion to Darwinism and his sociopolitical suspicion of Mendelian hereditarianism. The later triumph of a new Darwinian synthesis under men like R. A. Fisher made Mitchell's criticisms seem outmoded. In the second respect, Mitchell's attack on the primacy of naturalistic science echoed the epistemology of the “new physics” and movements such as German neo-Kantianism. However, positivism was still deeply embedded in Britain, indeed enjoying a resurgence from the last decade of the nineteenth century.79 Mitchell's critique of the Darwinist version of it seems to have been too novel and puzzling to influence a generation still convinced of the soundness of the science.Mitchell made more impact when he put his objections to the use of analogy on the grounds of professional methodology. As a naturalist, he could argue:It is impossible to make correct comparisons even between an insect and spider, two creatures so closely allied that only zoologists would separate them, unless we could trace the qualities of the insect and of the spider respectively down to their common ancestor, and in so doing we should almost certainly lose all that made the comparison interesting and significant, and be left with little more than the qualities common to all protoplasm..., It is quite true that the whole web of life is in physical and physiological community, but considerations drawn from any part of it require so much modification before they can be applied to any other part, that they become merely verbal.80This type of criticism was to have a more lasting heritage. Chalmers Mitchell is worth remembering as an articulate early spokesman of a persistent, if often embattled, modern tradition that has resisted interpretations of human nature and history based upon genetic determinants or immutable biological laws, or upon the use of animal analogies to generalize too freely about human aggression and war. (shrink)

ExcerptWhat factors lead to any war being fought in a particular manner? How and why do those factors become institutionalized, or abandoned, as prime forms of war for typifying other armed conflicts in changing world orders? When and why do the prevailing parameters of world order shape the conduct of war? Questions about the forms of war became highly salient in 1945 when, by virtue of the United Nations Charter, “the peoples of the United Nations determined” to organize stronger institutions (...) for global governance with an elaborate apparatus of multiple functional agencies “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” by establishing conditions “under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained” as well as to “promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.”1. (shrink)

From 1918 to the late 1940s, a host of influential scientists and intellectuals in Europe and North America were engaged in a number of far-reaching unity of science projects. In this period of deep social and political divisions, scientists collaborated to unify sciences across disciplinary boundaries and to set up the international scientific community as a model for global political co-operation. They strove to align scientific and social objectives through rational planning and to promote unified science as the driving force (...) of human civilization and progress. This volume explores the unity of science movement, providing a synthetic view of its pursuits and placing it in its historical context as a scientific and political force. Through a coherent set of original case studies looking at the significance of various projects and strategies of unification, the book highlights the great variety of manifestations of this endeavour. These range from unifying nuclear physics to the evolutionary synthesis, and from the democratization of scientific planning to the utopianism of H.G. Wells's world state. At the same time, the collection brings out the substantive links between these different pursuits, especially in the form of interconnected networks of unification and the alignment of objectives among them. Notably, it shows that opposition to fascism, using the instrument of unified science, became the most urgent common goal in the 1930s and 1940s. In addressing these issues, the book makes visible important historical developments, showing how scientists participated in, and actively helped to create, an interwar ideology of unification, and bringing to light the cultural and political significance of this enterprise. (shrink)