This article considers the function and value of the mythos in Plato's Statesman. As first, I recall the context of the story and its function within the framework of diairetic inquiry about the definition of the real politician. Secondly, I point out that the formulation of the myth is based on a series of traditional stories to which a historical-reconstructive method is applied. I then highlight the ways of reasoning used by the characters in order to reconstruct a rational and (...) plausible account from the mythical tradition. Finally, I try to show that the story, even though it cannot reach the truth of the most stable objects of knowledge, displays a certain degree of plausibility, based on the internal coherence, on the respect of a series of principles admitted as true and, eventually, on its correspondence with the mythical tradition. (shrink)

Focused sequent calculi are a refinement of sequent calculi, where additional side-conditions on the applicability of inference rules force the implementation of a proof search strategy. Focused cut-free proofs exhibit a special normal form that is used for defining identity of sequent calculi proofs. We introduce a novel focused display calculus fD.LG and a fully polarized algebraic semantics FP.LG\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbb {FP.LG}$$\end{document} for Lambek–Grishin logic by generalizing the theory of multi-type calculi and their (...) algebraic semantics with heterogenous consequence relations. The calculus fD.LG has strong focalization and it is sound and complete w.r.t. FP.LG\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbb {FP.LG}$$\end{document}. This completeness result is in a sense stronger than completeness with respect to standard polarized algebraic semantics, insofar as we do not need to quotient over proofs with consecutive applications of shifts over the same formula. We also show a number of additional results. fD.LG is sound and complete w.r.t. LG-algebras: this amounts to a semantic proof of the so-called completeness of focusing, given that the standard (display) sequent calculus for Lambek–Grishin logic is complete w.r.t. LG-algebras. fD.LG and the focused calculus fLG of Moortgat and Moot are equivalent with respect to proofs, indeed there is an effective translation from fLG-derivations to fD.LG-derivations and vice versa: this provides the link with operational semantics, given that every fLG-derivation is in a Curry–Howard correspondence with a directional λ¯μμ~\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\overline{\lambda }\mu \widetilde{\mu }$$\end{document}-term. (shrink)

In the present paper, we endow semi De Morgan logic and a family of its axiomatic extensions with proper multi-type display calculi which are sound, complete, conservative, and enjoy cut elimination and subformula property. Our proposal builds on an algebraic analysis of the variety of semi De Morgan algebras, and applies the guidelines of the multi-type methodology in the design of display calculi.

Some time ago I advanced on the pages of this journal a critique of the interpretation given by Jay L. Garfield and Mark Siderits (hereafter GS) of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the two truths (Ferraro, J Indian Philos 41(2):195–219, 2013.1); to my article the two authors responded with a ‘defense of the semantic interpretation’ of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness (GS, J Indian Philos 41(6):655–664, 2013). Their reply, however, could not consider my personal understanding of Nāgārjuna’s notions of śūnyatā and dve (...) satye. My interpretation of these notions was in fact absent in the paper GS responded, and was only related in a second paper of mine (Ferraro, J Indian Philos 41(5):563–590, 2013.2), still unpublished at the time of GS’s drafting of their ‘defense’. Therefore, in the present rejoinder, I found it appropriate, rather than responding point by point to the passages of GS’s reply, to advance a comparison between the semantic interpretation and my ‘realist antimetaphysical’ understanding of Nāgārjuna’s thought. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper I critically examine some of the main interpretations of “classical” Yogācāra philosophy of Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Among these interpretations, based on extant textual and contextual data, I consider philologically unlikely both metaphysical-idealistic readings, which ascribe to these authors the view that ultimate reality is a mental or subjective stuff, and epistemological-idealistic readings which advocate that either Yogācāra suspends judgment on the existence of the extramental or that it maintains that the extramental exists (...) in itself and ultimately. Instead, I consider more likely the thesis that classical Yogācāra upholds an epistemological idealism that, while admitting epistemological priority of the mental over the extramental, rules out the ultimate existence of both the former and the latter. This exclusion, however, does not amount to the exclusion of every metaphysics, but rather to the adoption of a metaphysics of emptiness conceived, in fact, as absence of the mental/extramental dichotomy. In the second part of the paper this reading of classical Yogācāra is compared with the interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy that I elsewhere called “realistic antimetaphysical”, and I reach the conclusion that, while with respect to epistemology between early Madhyamaka and classical Yogācāra there is continuity, regarding metaphysics these two schools are deeply distinct and discontinuous: while Nāgārjuna conceives of emptiness as an extinction of any metaphysical view, Yogācāra emptiness actually presents itself as a metaphysical point of view. (shrink)

This work suggests how much human sciences can learn from a booklet almost all cultures know, The Little Prince. It stimulates to read them in their anthropological aspects of behavior facing alterity, highlighting its value without proposing it as educational element to homogenize the different. The reflection is thus focused on the demolishing and lasting effects of European culture during its colonization of American and African people. The contribution ends with Ferraioli and De Vitoria's considerations on a society based on (...) the axiom of the free circulation of men and goods, and the legitimization of thinking given by natural law. (shrink)

Parte prima. Profili speculativi -- Parte seconda. Profili sociali, politici, giuridici -- Parte terza. Profili antropologici.

Premessa p.9 Capitolo I: Identità ebraica e nuovo pensiero p.13 Capitolo II: Qohelet nel “nuovo pensiero” p.81 Capitolo III: Etica e politica: un dialogo tra religioni? p. 149 Capitolo IV: Dal trascendentalismo all’esteriorità: fondazione etica della maestria p.207 Capitolo V: Dal primato della politica al primato dell’etica p.245 Capitolo VI: Emmanuel Lévinas: per una trascendenza non idolatrica p.287 Capitolo VII: Dall’umanismo dei superbi all’umanismo dell’altro uomo p.231.

Our paper is concerned with theories of direct perception in ecological psychology that first emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. Ecological psychology continues to be influential among philosophers and cognitive scientists today who defend a 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) approach to the scientific study of cognition. Ecological psychologists have experimentally investigated how animals are able to directly perceive their surrounding environment and what it affords to them. We pursue questions about direct perception through a discussion of (...) the ecological psychologist’s concept of affordances. In recent years, psychologists and philosophers have begun to mark out two explanatory roles for the affordance concept. In one role, affordances are cast as belonging to a shared, publicly available environment, and existing independent of the experience of any perceiving and acting animal. In a second role, affordances are described in phenomenological terms, in relation to an experiencing animal that has its own peculiar needs, interests and personal history. Our aim in this paper is to argue for a single phenomenological or experiential understanding of the affordance concept. We make our argument, first of all, based on William James’ concept of pure experience developed in his later, radical empiricist writings. James thought of pure experience as having a field structure that is organized by the selective interest and needs of the perceiver. We will argue however that James did not emphasize sufficiently the social and intersubjective character of the field of experience. Drawing on the phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch, we will argue that psychological factors like individual needs and attention must be thought of as already confronted with a social reality. On the phenomenological reading of affordances we develop, direct perception of affordances is understood as taking place within an intersubjective world structured by human social and cultural life. (shrink)

The usual representation of quantum algorithms, limited to the process of solving the problem, is physically incomplete. We complete it in three steps: extending the representation to the process of setting the problem, relativizing the extended representation to the problem solver to whom the problem setting must be concealed, and symmetrizing the relativized representation for time reversal to represent the reversibility of the underlying physical process. The third steps projects the input state of the representation, where the problem solver is (...) completely ignorant of the setting and thus the solution of the problem, on one where she knows half solution. Completing the physical representation shows that the number of computation steps required to solve any oracle problem in an optimal quantum way should be that of a classical algorithm endowed with the advanced knowledge of half solution. (shrink)

"El método seguido puede llamarse con una sola palabra comparativo. He tratado, en efecto, de que las ideas y los hechos procedan a la par, ayudándome también a veces del estudio de los vocablos, con los cuales las unas y los otros han sido expresados; he hecho que caminasen de frente los varios pueblos que concurrieron más eficazmente al desenvolvimiento de las instituciones jurídicas y sociales, así como también a los diferentes sistemas escogidos por los autores, y he procurado, por (...) fin, poner de relieve la correlación constante entre la vida económica, jurídica y moral en los distintos períodos de la historia y el concierto admirable que siempre se manifiesta entre las varias partes del organismo social. Presento este ensayo tal como ha llegado a ser después de varios años de trabajo y estudio, debiendo limitarme a hacer observar que, por razón de la lógica que lo rige, las varias partes de que consta se suponen recíprocamente por modo tal, que los primeros capítulos son la preparación indispensable para la inteligencia de los siguientes, y los últimos sirven de ilustración y complemento a los primeros. Por mi parte habré alcanzado el objeto que me proponía si logro infundir en alguno de mis lectores la profunda convicción que tengo de que el estudio del mundo social y humano ofrece tantos goces y no menores maravillas al sociólogo, como al físico y al naturalista el estudio del mundo material y orgánico, y que las investigaciones libros y sin prejuicios acerca de las instituciones primitivas de la sociedad, lejos de conmover las eternas convicciones del género huma-no, logran al fin confirmarlas científicamente". Giuseppe Carle. (shrink)

La differenza tra i concetti di sa?s?ra e nirv??a stabilita dal Buddha (VI-V sec. a.C.) nel suo primo sermone sembra essere messa in discussione dall’equiparazione dei due termini effettuata da N?g?rjuna (II sec. d.C.) in un passaggio-chiave delle sue MK2. Questo articolo, in primo luogo, difende la tesi che la contraddizione sia soltanto apparente e che la relazione, di differenza o di identità, tra le due dimensioni dipende dal registro filosofico, rispettivamente epistemologico e ontologico, usato – in entrambi i casi (...) per finalità soteriologiche – dal Buddha e da N?g?rjuna. In secondo luogo, cercheremo di provare che, in ogni caso, l’ontologia di N?g?rjuna, lungi dall’essere una novità filosofica o un’evoluzione rispetto al pensiero del fondatore del buddhismo è, al contrario, una delle possibili applicazioni della dottrina del non-sé (an?tma-v?da) – probabilmente il contributo più importante e originale del pensiero buddhista alla storia della filosofia universale – esposta dal Buddha nel suo secondo sermone. (shrink)

Nas primeiras duas seções deste artigo, apresento alguns dos argumentos que os filósofos budistas indianos Nāgārjuna (ca. séculos II-III) e Vasubandhu (ca. séculos IV-V) usam para mostrar a insustentabilidade lógica dos fenômenos, respectivamente, do movimento e da existência de objetos externos/extramentais. A lógica desses argumentos é comparável à lógica que Zenão de Eleia utiliza nos seus paradoxos contra o movimento e a multiplicidade – e, de fato, no interior dos estudos budológicos contemporâneos, essa comparação já foi sugerida. Na terceira seção, (...) entretanto, pretendo mostrar que os objetivos filosóficos mais imediatos desses três pensadores divergem e são inconciliáveis: enquanto Zenão critica o movimento e a multiplicidade para demonstrar a plausibilidade dos atributos da imobilidade e da univocidade do Ser parmenídico, os paradoxos de Nāgārjuna e Vasubandhu devem ser entendidos no âmbito de projetos filosóficos que, em continuidade com o ensinamento budiano do caminho do meio, pretendem ficar equidistantes das categorias do “ser” e do “não-ser”, evitando ambas. Finalmente, na quarta e última seção, defendo a tese de que os objetivos últimos dos Eleatas e aqueles dos dois filósofos budistas voltam a ser parecidos: Parmênides e o Buda, como também seus respectivos epígonos, buscam promover nos seus seguidores uma “revolução epistêmica” que consiste na passagem de uma visão ordinária da realidade a uma compreensão extraordinária ou suprema, coincidente com a realidade em si e, portanto, verdadeira em última análise. (shrink)