As the work of thinkers such as Michel Foucault, François Jacob, Louis Althusser, and Pierre Bourdieu demonstrates, Georges Canguilhem has exerted tremendous influence on the philosophy of science and French philosophy more generally. In Knowledge of Life, a book that spans twenty years of his essays and lectures, Canguilhem offers a series of epistemological histories that seek to establish and clarify the stakes, ambiguities, and emergence of philosophical and biological concepts that defined the rise of modern biology. How do (...) transformations in biology and modern medicine shape conceptions of life? How do philosophical concepts feed into biological ideas and experimental practices, and how are they themselves transformed? How does knowledge "undo the experience of life so as to help man remake what life has made without him, in him or outside of him?" Knowledge of Life is Canguilhem's effort to explain how the movements of knowledge and life come to rest upon each other. Published at the dawn of the genetic revolution and still pertinent today, the book tackles the history of cell theory, the conceptual moves toward and away from mechanical understandings of the organism, the persistence of vitalism, and the nature of normality in science and its objects. (shrink)

Title on added t.p.: Saint-Simon & son uvre.

I was brought up to believe that, in the “great debate” with the Rationalists, the Empiricists had largely won, particularly in view of Quine's holistic conception of justification, whereby even the claims of logic, though remote from experience, are indirectly tested by it. But some years ago I awoke to the possibility that there was something fishy in all this, and that the fallibilistic banalities that have played such a large role in driving the Quinean conception couldn't plausibly have such (...) dramatic consequences. “Everything can be revised in the light of experience” is good advice for someone who hasn't noticed just how rich, complex and indirect our reasonings about any issue, including logic and mathematics, can be; but does it really tell against what Kant and the others had in mind when they believed that there were some claimswhose justification needn't appeal to experience(which, it's crucial to remember, is how he and others thought of it, until the Positivists and Quine revised it to “unrevisability“)? (shrink)

I argue that philonous gives two versions of the argument from perceptual relativity--One for the secondary qualities and another for the primary. Further, Both versions ultimately turn on the epistemological assumption that every case of perceiving, Regardless of the conditions of observation, Is a case of "knowing" the character of some "object". This assumption is made in order to avoid a vicious regress that arises when one tries to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible.

Anyone familiar with some of Dewey’s major works knows that they are highly critical of nearly all that has traditionally passed under the name of “epistemology” or “theory of knowledge”. Even a casual reading of a few chapters of Reconstruction in Philosophy, The Quest for Certainty or Experience and Nature reveals Dewey’s iconoclasm toward “that species of confirmed intellectual lock-jaw called epistemology”. The source of this attitude is Dewey’s belief that all theories of knowledge previous to his own are based (...) upon an unexamined and mistaken conception of knowing. This is that knowing is a relation between a knower and a thing known, in which the knower is essentially a viewer or passive spectator of the thing known. Knowing is conceived on the analogy of seeing an object; it is, as Dewey says, “modeled on what [is] supposed to take place in the act of vision”. For Dewey, it is not a matter of consequence how the two members of the knowledge-relation are described. Whether the knower is identified with the self and the thing known with a material thing, or the knower with the mind and the thing known with an idea or collection of sense-data, or the knower with the knowing “subject” and the thing known with the “object”, is not important. Dewey’s contention is that no matter how one characterizes the spectator and the thing known, this conception of knowing is fundamentally mistaken, mythological. He collectively dubs all theories which share it “The Spectator Theory of Knowledge”. This common label reflects the fact that for Dewey theories as different as direct realism and epistemological dualism, British empiricism and continental rationalism, are simply variations on the same unlikely theme. (shrink)

Entre l'être et l'apparence Nietzsche a choisi l'apparence, c'est-à-dire le monde que nous présente notre connaissance sensible. Et la métaphysique classique, telle que l'entendait Platon, il la prit également pour un produit du monde des sens. Il en rendit responsables les humains faibles. Selon lui, c'est la faiblesse, sous ses différents aspects, qui, en conduisant à la morale, fait naître également la métaphysique, puisque celle-ci en dépendrait. La vérité devient ainsi l'apanage d'un idéal ascétique qui, au fond, est engendré par (...) une agression de l'être humain contre soi-même, c'est-à-dire par une des formes que prend le ressentiment. Le langage joue ici un rôle capital. En particulier les grands concepts du discours rationnel, taxés de fondamentaux, ont des origines empiriques certaines. Il s'ensuit que la philosophie, qui les utilise, ne saurait être en fait qu'erreur et fausseté. (shrink)

t. 1. Présentation de l'univers politique. v. 1. Société, politique et droit. --t. 3. La dynamique politique. v. 1. Les forces politiques. v. 2. La dialectique de l'ordre et du mouvement.--t. 4. Le statut du pouvoir dans l'Etat.--t. 5. Les régimes politiques.--t. 6. L'Etat libéral et les techniques politiques de la démocratie gouvernée. --t. 10. La révolte des colonisés.

The organizational justice literature and the family business literature have developed independently, which limits our understanding of fairness and justice in the family business workplace. So far, the concepts of justice and fairness have been used interchangeably in the family business literature, as if objective measures that aim to increase justice in the workplace will automatically translate into fairness perceptions among family business employees. By integrating the organizational justice literature and the family business literature, we first differentiate between the two (...) concepts of justice and fairness and argue that a utilitarian conceptualization of justice may come into direct conflict with fairness perceptions in the family business workplace. Second, we shed light on the importance of incorporating socioemotional goals, particularly those that reveal a bright side of socioemotional wealth, into rules and regulations designed to increase justice in the workplace, which, we argue, contributes to increasing fairness perceptions among employees and to building and maintaining an ethical family business workplace. Theoretical and practical contributions are discussed at the end of the paper. (shrink)

For all the inadequacies of empiricism that BonJour admirably sets out in his first three chapters, one wonders whether rationalism is any better off. I’m afraid I don’t find BonJour’s account reassuring. It seems to be precisely the one that has led so many to be wary of the a priori in the first place. I want here to reiterate the reasons for that wariness, and sketch what seems to me a more promising approach.

David Hume's _Treatise on Human Nature_ and _Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding_ are amongst the most widely-studies texts on philosophy. _Hume's Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Introduction_ presents in a clear, concise and accessible manner the key themes of these texts. Georges Dicker clarifies Hume's views on meaning, knowledge, causality, and sense perception step by step and provides us with a sharp picture of how philosophical thinking has been influenced by Hume. Accessible to anyone coming to Hume for the first time, (...) _Hume's Epistemology and Metaphysics_ is an indispensible guide to Hume's philosophical thinking. (shrink)

The essay aims to show how business ethics—understood as a three-level approach—can strengthen the social cohesion of a society, which is jeopardized today in many ways. In the first part, the purpose of business and the economy is explained as the creation of wealth defined as a combination of private and public wealth that includes natural, economic, human, and social capital. Special emphasis is placed on the implications of the creation of public wealth which requires institutions other than the market (...) and motivations other than self-regarding ones. In the second part, the question of what holds a society together is discussed through different approaches: enlightened self-interest, a new game-theoretical approach, and the concept of the common good advanced by Catholic Social Teaching, followed by my own proposal. The third part presents several perspectives for business ethics to strengthen social cohesion of a society by focusing on the purpose of business and the economy to create natural, economic, human, and social capital; by advancing public goods that stand the test of ethical scrutiny; and by securing human rights conceptualized as public goods. (shrink)

"Après des années de voyages en divers continents, j'ai éprouvé le besoin d'un "voyage intérieur". On suivra ici les étapes de ce cheminement, jalonnées par les fragments d'une autobiographie que je n'écrirai jamais. On trouvera aussi, communiquées par un homme qui croit connaître ses faiblesses, ses échecs, et ne les cachera pas, quelques réponses appelées par de grandes questions qu'il a tenté de vivre".

1. La philosophie et les mythes.--2. Les fondements de la psychologie.

Source et limites de l'unité dans la mathématique, par Georges Bouligand. Bibliographie (p. 16)--La crise de l'unité dans la physique contemporaine, par Jean Abelé.--A la recherche de l'unité de la matière; point de vue du chimiste, par Jean Moretti.--Le problème de l'unité de la vie. Polygénisme ou monogénisme; le problème de l'unité de l'espèc humaine, par J. Carles.

This paper examines the work of Nāgārjuna as interpreted by later Madhyamaka tradition, including the Tibetan Buddhist Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). It situates Madhyamaka skepticism in the context of Buddhist philosophy, Indian philosophy more generally, and Western equivalents. Find it broadly akin to Pyrrhonism, it argues that Madhyamaka skepticism still differs from its Greek equivalents in fundamental methodologies. Focusing on key hermeneutical principles like the two truths and those motivating the Svātantrika/Prāsaṅgika schism (i.e., whether followers of Nāgārjuna should offer positive arguments or (...) should proceed on a purely “negative” basis), it argues that the Svātantrika commitment to mere conventional practice is robust and allows for a skepticism consistent with the scientific practices we must take seriously in the modern world. These findings are put forth as an illustration of what the Western tradition might gain by better understanding of non-Western philosophy. (shrink)

This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires.

The paper examines the relation of esotericism and oblique politics in the Byzantine philosopher Michael Psellos on the basis of Eva De Vries’ study of the letters that Psellos addressed to the statesman Leo Paraspondylos. Traditionally, the name of Psellos signifies a revival of Neoplatonism in medieval Constantinople according to researchers like Chr. Zervos in the beginning of 20th century. Contemporary researchers such as Anthony Kaldellis and Stratis Papaioannou point to a more organic than speculative theorization in Psellos’ work while (...) another contemporary scholar, Frederick Lauritzen, undertakes a synthesis of the two approaches. In any case, as this paper supports, it would be inadequate to consider the relation of esotericism to politics without referring to the evolution of the moral standards considered in a contextualized manner. (shrink)

This paper is a personal dialogue of maneuvering the landscape of scholarship in the United States as a nurse faculty. The principal thesis of this paper is that a discursive shift from margins to mainstream literature has occurred within nursing discourse during the past 20 years as the result of a growing body of work by nurse philosophers. I utilize my own work in nursing philosophy as an exemplar and provide a narrative situated in a feminist‐critical paradigm. This paper: (1) (...) presents a historical background through a critical‐feminist lens of the discursive shift using my own work and lived experiences as exemplars; (2) examines a contemporary mainstream ‘authoritative’ text as an exemplar of this discursive shift and (3) proposes both potential positive intersections and threats in the future development of nursing philosophy resulting from this discursive shift. (shrink)