Panichas offers a straightforward introduction to the life and thought of Epicurus. Directed at the general reader, the book follows the traditional categories of Epicurus' system: atomism, cosmology, theology, happiness and friendship. Whenever the extant fragments fail to provide full information, the author relies heavily on Lucretius to fill the gaps. The author's particular field of competence reveals itself in the concluding chapter which includes a rather detailed discussion of Epicurean influence in English thought. The work has adequate (...) footnotes, bibliography, and index.--J. G. G. (shrink)

Philosophers and natural scientists have often drawn a distinction between two kinds of properties that physical objects may have. It is particularly associated with atomistic accounts of matter, and is as old as the ancient Greek theories of Democritus and Epicurus. According to the atomists, matter consists of tiny particles ‐ atoms ‐ having no other properties than those such as shape, weight, solidity, and size. Other putative properties ‐ for example, those of color, taste, and smell ‐ were (...) regarded as the names of experiences caused by the impact of particles on an observer, and had no independent existence as qualities in the object. Since the seventeenth century it has been normal to characterize the division between these two supposedly different kinds of properties as the primary‐secondary quality distinction. (shrink)

In 1884 Ivo Bruns began his Lucrez-Studien, on the relationship between Lucretius' treatment of Epicureanism and the exposition by the philosopher himself in the extant Epistles, with the question for whom did Lucretius write? His answer was to show that the general public, who were the poet's real objective, were very different readers from the disciples whom Epicurus addressed in the Letter to Herodotus and similar works. This conclusion, and the subsequent investigation of the ways in which this difference (...) affected the treatment of doctrine in the two works, does not concern me. My interest is rather in the manner in which Bruns tackles the problem of the ostensible addressee, Memmius, and the extent to which this man remains in Lucretius' mind throughout the whole six books. (shrink)

Farrington has written a fascinating and provocative introduction to fourth-century Greece in the form of a cultural dispute between the Garden, the Academy, and the Lyceum. In the political and religious chaos of the late fourth century, Epicurus appears as a radical social reformer, not the recluse of earlier interpreters, bent on returning Greek society to its primitive ideal of friendship. While in agreement with Plato that Greek society was desperately sick, his remedy was antithetical to Plato's and heavily (...) dependent on the later Aristotle. Friendship not justice, freedom not authority, individuality not universality, sensory experience not a priori axioms--these were the hallmarks of Epicurus' desired reform. The practical, almost prophetic direction of Epicurus' philosophy emerges most clearly in his bitter opposition to political religion, used by the ruling class to keep the people in line and typified by Plato's insistence on religious orthodoxy in his republic. Against this background, Epicurus' theology, as well as his physics, serves as a polemical thrust designed to release men from superstition and irrational fear of would-be gods. Farrington's obvious delight in Epicurus, together with his desire to set right past misinterpretations of his thought, make the account all the more interesting to read. The final chapter traces Epicurean influence in later Roman thought, notably in the Platonist Cicero and the Stoic Seneca, its decline in the Middle Ages, and its rebirth in the Renaissance. The book concludes with a brief but adequate bibliography of ancient and modern works.--J. G. G. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:102 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY historical circumstances a suprahistorical, eternal significance, and that a historian or interpreter of a philosophy will do it justice only if he grasps this lasting truth and content, in addition to comparing it with the opinions of other earlier or later thinkers. One cannot see how a thinker who considered Plato as valid while treating him and others historically could have arrived at a different (...) conclusion. But it is a position admirably expressed that would deserve greater attention and a wider following among the present practitioners of the history of philosophy. Hoffmann's method and style in this, as in most of his other writings, deserve the highest praise, for he combines simplicity with density. His manner of expression reflects his commitment to truth (a commitment curiously omitted by many contemporary existentialists), and the integrity of his character: Hoffmann was one of the few German scholars who made no concessions to Nazism because he was a faithful representative of that German tradition which was incompatible with Nazism: classical humanism in its scholarly, literary and educational meaning, philosophical idealism, and liberal protestantism. Guided by Plato, Kant and Goethe, Hoffmann was untouched by the Romantic and nationalistic strands of German thought. His work transmits to us the precious heritage of a life completely devoted to philosophy and to scholarship, and of an important period in the history of German thought. He omits many things which we have learned in the last few years, or which we may still learn through future studies. Yet he can teach us many important things that are too easily forgotten in our present discussions: the role of Platonism in the history of philosophy and of the sciences, and the fundamental impact of ancient philosophy upon early Christian, medieval and modern thought. It is a heritage which we should try to enlarge, if we can, but also strive to preserve, and to keep alive. PAUL OSKARKRISTELLER Columbia University Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle. By Philip Merlan. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz [Klassisch-Philologische Studien, Heft 22], 1960. Pp. viii + 112. P1. 4. DM 12.--) Ever since the publication in 1936 of Bignone's L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro there have been attempts to define the exact nature of the debt which Epicurus owes to the Peripatos. In this collection of essays, the author of From Platonism to Neoplatonism turns his keen powers of analysis upon a number of specific problems deriving from Plato's Laws and carrying us via Aristotle's Metaphysics and Ethics to Epicurus's theology and beyond. In the first chapter, "Hedone in Epicurus and Aristotle," the author takes us on a generous stroll through hedonist materials, BOOK REVIEWS 103 including an ode by Schiller, to explore the precise meaning of the term hedone. More especially he is concerned to show how close the Epicurean understanding of the term is to that of Aristotle in at least some of his writings, notably Protrepticus and Nic. Eth. H and Met. A. The results of this investigation may be stated in the author's own words: Whether it occurs in Epicurus or in Aristotle, the term hedone can mean anything between gross sensual "pleasure" and entirely spiritual "joy." And on the whole it seems preferable to speak of the philosophy of Epicurus as a philosophy of joy rather than of pleasure. As far as Aristotle is concerned, it seems more appropriate to say that his Changeless Changer (or Changeless Changers) live a life that is filled with joy rather than pleasure, and that his hedonism is ultimately rooted in that of Eudoxus. Chapter 2, "How Many Kinds of Divinities Did Epicurus Recognize?," argues from the theory of the existence of indiscernible non-identicals (Cicero,4cademica 2.17.55; Philodemus De Pietate col. 80 = fr. 40 Us.) and from the theory of "isonomia," i.e., the balancing of one class of things by an equally large class of a different or opposite character (cf. C. Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 461 ff.) that the Epicureans recognized two types of worshippables, as is indeed suggested by schol. Diog. Laert. 10.139: (I) the popular traditional divinities who are kar arithmon, i.e., severally unique, and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347–274 BC)Carlos SteelJohn M. Dillon. The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347–274 BC). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. Pp. x + 252. Cloth, $65.00.When Plato died, in 347 BC, he left behind not only the collection of philosophical dialogues we still read with admiration, but also a remarkable organization, the "Academy," wherein his students continued (...) the discussion he had initiated. Dillon's latest book is an attempt to recreate the intellectual climate in the Academy during the first generations after Plato's death, the "Old Academy," called thus to distinguish it from the "New Academy," which started with Arcesilaus in the mid 270's, who abandoned doctrinal speculations for a sceptical stance. Given the elusive nature of the dialogues, the interpretation of Plato's philosophy has been controversial from the beginning. Therefore, scholars always have been eager to know in which direction Plato's first successors—Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo—took the Academy; thus they hoped to find some justification for their own interpretation of Plato. Unfortunately, our information on the doctrines of Plato's first successors is scarce. Browsing through the fragments collected by scholars, one may be tempted to conclude that it is not such a great disaster that most texts of the Old Academy have been lost. For it seems that the Academy after Plato was leaning towards a rather esoteric metaphysical speculation about the first principles, which makes us lament on what has become of the philosophical heritage of Plato, a genius fallen into the hands of epigones. One gets the impression that the original and refreshing philosophical contributions came from outside the Academy, from the Lyceum founded by Aristotle and continued by Theophrastus, and later from Epicurus and Zeno and their new schools, which will dominate the Hellenistic period. This, however, is not the view of Dillon: "It will be the thesis of this book that Speusippus and Xenocrates set the agenda for what was to become, over the succeeding centuries, the intellectual tradition which we call Platonism" (v). Even early Stoicism is, in Dillon's view, a "development and formalization of contemporary Platonism" (235).In an introductory chapter Dillon discusses the location and juridical structure of the Academy and gives a general survey of the main doctrines of the school. The following three chapters present the lives, work and thought of the first heads of the Academy; a final chapter is devoted to some minor members of the early Academy. The book concludes with a short epilogue on Arcesilaus and the reasons for his turn to scepticism. Dillon is an [End Page 204] excellent writer who knows how to tease out and expound the most abstruse philosophical doctrines in a captivating way, mixing, as he does here, biographical anecdotes and witty comments with a sharp analysis of arguments and a speculative reconstruction of lost doctrines. I doubt, however, whether this book will become such a classic as his celebrated The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, 1977).My first worry is anticipated by Dillon himself: "This is perforce a rather speculative book, and no doubt it will be criticized for that" (vii). Dillon defends himself against this critique: I have tried, he says, "to put the most favourable construction on the evidence available to us," his assumption being that the figures he is dealing with "were not philosophical imbeciles"(vii). My reservations are not about Dillon's attempt to construct a coherent doctrine using all relevant information on an author, but about his method of reconstruction, in particular his speculation and his preference for often questionable later material to fill the gaps in our information. "With a good deal of speculation, our exiguous information on Polemo's philosophical position can be fleshed out somewhat" (176). Thus, in his exposition of Speusippus's doctrine of the first principles, Dillon does not start from Aristotle, considering him too biased, but from chapter 4 of Iamblichus's treatise De communi mathematica scientia. In this Neo-Pythagorean treatise, Speusippus is not even mentioned. Even if there are arguments, as Dillon believes, to attribute the doctrine of Chapter 4 to Speusippus, one should... (shrink)

This volume forms a part of the Great American Thinkers Series and is intended for the general reader. It is largely devoted to a highly readable biography of Jefferson in which main emphasis is placed on his political activities and ideas, and their influence upon the development of the United States. A separate essay at the end gives the outlines of Jefferson's thought, relating it to the contemporary ideas of the enlightenment, and tracing its sources to those thinkers whom Jefferson (...) most admired, Bacon, Newton, Locke, and Epicurus. In discussing these figures, the author exhibits an unfortunate tendency towards facile and occasionally incorrect generalizations.—A. F. G. (shrink)

Using the Epicurean position on death as a starting point, this article re-examines the basic assumptions of philosophers regarding their views on whether death should be seen as a bad. It questions the positions of philosophers such as Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit by applying Wittgenstein’s notion of grammar as developed by G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker. While philosophers may characterize questions such as ‘What is the nature of death?’ and ‘Is death a bad?’ as metaphysical, I (...) propose that such questions can be better characterized as grammatical. The failure to understand the grammatical character of such questions creates the illusion that questions concerning the nature of death can be adequately tackled with reference to empirical or metaphysical ‘facts’. If the arguments in this article are substantiated, some philosophical puzzles about death can be dissolved. (shrink)

: In Contra Academicos 3.11.24, Augustine responds to skepticism about the existence of the external world by arguing that what appears to be the world — as he terms things, the "quasi-earth" and "quasi-sky" — cannot be doubted. While some (e.g., M. Burnyeat and G. Matthews) interpret this passage as a subjectivist response to global skepticism, it is here argued that Augustine's debt to Epicurean epistemology and theology, especially as presented in Cicero's De Natura Deorum 1.25.69 - 1.26.74, provides the (...) basis for a much more plausible, realist interpretation of Augustine's argument. (shrink)

In this paper I shall offer new definitions for what seem to be the most dominant terms in Epicurus’ theory of pleasures - “kinetic” and “katastematic”. While most of the scholarly literature treats these terms as entirely concerned with states of motion and states of stability, I shall argue that the distinction concerns whether pain is or is not removed by this or that pleasure. As the removal of pain is a necessary condition for the Epicurean goal of ataraxia (...) and aponia, “katastematic” pleasure, having to do with the removal of pain, is the necessary pleasure pertaining both to the process of removing pain and to its result, namely the absence of pain, while “kinetic” pleasure is an unnecessary pleasure having nothing to do with the removal of pain, e.g. it starts after pain has been removed. If my analysis and interpretation prove correct, the two conventional classifications - “kinetic-katastematic” and “necessary-unnecessary” - turn out to be referring to the same phenomenon and are aspects of one classification. Moreover, this new interpretation resolves some of the main problems arising from our testimonia concerning “kinetic” and “katastematic” pleasures. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 1':'3 for an integrated life (197). But he does not mention that for Plato the desire for knowledge and understanding, drawn to its objects, the Forms, is part of what accounts for this compulsion and its intensity. Listening to the Cicadas is an outstanding example of a philosophically sensitive, literary reading of a Platonic dialogue. Ferrari writes demandingly but beautifully, and his dialectical reading often has just (...) the effect he desires, to draw the reader into the Phaedrus's world. In addition, he is familiar with contemporary moral philosophy, moral psychology, and philosophy of action, and employs notions from Williams, Frankfurt, and others in sensible and helpful ways. The book should be accessible to a wide audience; the Greek is transliterated and translated, with virtually all technical discussion confined to notes. But although the series in which the book appears is well known to specialists in classics and classical philosophy, it is probably not familiar to philosophers generally and literary theorists. This is unfortunate, for Ferrari's work is an important one for all of these audiences. Micn^~t. L. MORCAN Indiana University, Bloomington Walter G. Englert. Epicurus on the Swerve and Voluntary Action. American Philological Assocation. American Classical Studies. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987. Pp. x + 215. Cloth, $~ 1-95. Paper, $1 ~-95Though he has fallen from top billing (Aristotle and Epicurus on Voluntary. Action was the work's original title as a x981 Stanford dissertation), Aristotle has retained his prominence in Englert's only slightly revised text. Englert's thesis, in fact, is that the Epicurean "swerve was first developed in response to Aristotelian challenges to atomism in cosmology, physics, psychology, and physiology, and in particular, was meant to be the atomic equivalent of Aristotle's sumphuton pneuma in Epicurus's analysis of the voluntary actions of all living creatures" (145). My skepticism toward this assertion is based not so much on the doubtful availability of Aristotelian texts to Hellenistic philosophers (though Englert's depiction of Epicurus responding to specific passages of the De caelo, Physics, and De motu animalium certainly invites this objection) as on the following considerations: (a) Englert's Epicurus posits weight as an atomic property to counter Aristotle's objection that Democritean atoms have no natural motion with which forced motion might contrast. But why would Epicurus think Aristotle's objection any more forceful than we do? If Epicurus insists that atoms fall down, it is not from a metaphysical conviction that every body must have a natural locomotive tendency, but because of his empirical observation that things in fact fall. (b) Englert's Epicurus, casting about for a third cause of motion besides collisions and weight, stumbles upon Aristotle's description of "the accidental" (to sumbebekos) as an event without definite cause happening at an indeterminate time and place, and conceives of the swerve. But the similarity of the two doctrines is entirely superficial. The accident, for Aristotle, is the nonessential: man is not pale by nature, for instance, 124 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28"1 JANUARY 1990 but "by accident," e.g., if he happens to stay indoors. If there is an analogue for this in Epicurus, it's in his notion ofsuraptomata. But what has this to do with the swerve? (c) Finally, Englert's Epicurus posits the swerve as an atomistic adaptation of the workings of Aristotle's sumphuton pneuma. (Does this mean the pneuma's motion is accidental? The relation of this thesis to the last is unclear.) The analogy of the expanding pneuma and the swerving atom is supposed to be that both are physical bodies whose motion marks a more or less "fresh start," breaking the otherwise deterministic causal chain. More or less? Englert speaks of a "delicate balance" in Aristotle's account "between a purely passive causal sequence" (from the stimulus of phantasia to the agent's response) and a "sequence involving a completely new beginning of motion" (93)- But what is this balance if not Stoic compatibilism, an endless causal chain balanced against the ascription of responsibility for personal initiative? Is Aristotle then a proto-Stoic? That is, does Aristotle believe that stimulus plus character determines response? Englert wants to say... (shrink)

On-line English translation of this summary of Epicurus' ethics.

Prema Epikurovoj epistemologiji svi su opažaji istiniti. Ta teza podrazumijeva da naša osjetila nikada ne griješe, te da nam opažaji uvijek daju točne izvještaje o vanjskom svijetu. Iako se na prvi pogled čini vrlo neuvjerljivom, podrobnija analiza Epikurovih tekstova pokazuje da je ona potkrijepljena zanimljivim argumentima. Pokazuje se da je jasna motivacija Epikura za obranu te teze leži u prihvaćanju radikalnog empirizma i težnji da izbjegne skeptičke opasnosti u koje je zapao Demokrit. Nadalje, opravdanje te teze leži u Epikurovu objašnjenju (...) samog opažajnog procesa, tj. u fizikalnom objašnjenju mehanizma opažanja, koje se uklapa u atomističku sliku svijeta. Opažajni proces pokazuje da su opažaji sirovi podaci koji ne mogu biti lažni, budući da su samo puke reakcije osjetilnog organa na vanjske podražaje, te kao takvi ne mogu biti neistiniti.According to Epicurean epistemology all perceptions are true. The thesis implies that our senses do not ever err and that perceptions give us always correct report of the external world. Although it seems very problematic and counterintuitive, careful investigation of the main sources shows us that Epicurus ’ claim for the truth of perceptions is not so hasty but supported with some serious arguments. Epicurus ’ main concern was to show that we can attain knowledge about the external world. In order to secure the possibility of knowledge Epicurus proposed to rely on perceptions as incorrigible foundation of our knowledge and argue that all perceptions are true. The defense of the thesis and explanation how can it be the case that all perceptions are true is provided by the theory of what happens in the process of perceiving a physical object. In this paper I try to show that his epistemological remarks on infallibility of the senses become more convincing and plausible if properly placed within Epicurus ’ general physical theory. His theory explains perceptions as a raw material which cannot be false since it is a mere response of a sense organ on the impact from the outside, namely from g*T8. Because g*T8 are true and secure reports of external objects, truthfulness of all perceptions is guaranteed. The truth of all perceptions simply follows from the mechanical explanation of the way they are produced, so the truthfulness of perceptions must be accepted on the basis of their origin. (shrink)

On-line English translation of Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus, his summary of his physics.

In addition to the commonly cited quotations of Epicurus found among the Principal Doctrines and the Vatican Sayings, many others have been passed down to us from a variety of classical sources. This popular arrangement of 87 fragments follows the outline set forth by C. Bailey's 1926 collection—each translation is a consensus of several different editions.

On-line English translation of Epicurus' last will, as preserved in Diogenes Laertius.

On-line English translation of these 40 short statements of doctrine, mostly concerning ethics.

Epicurus, born at Samos, Greece, in 341 BC, and died at Athens in 270 BC, founded a school of philosophy in the ancient world which has little to do with the meanings that surround the word "Epicureanism" today and more to do with living a mindful, simple life, maximizing simple pleasures and minimizing pain, such as the irrational fear of death--"Death is nothing to us, since when we are, death has not come, and when death has come, we are (...) not." Epicurus did not believe that humans would be punished for their sins after death, and stressed the search for lasting pleasures during the life we have, such as tranquility, friendship, and philosophical inquiry. What is good is what is pleasurable and what is bad is what is painful. Epicurus was a prolific author, but very few of his writings have come down to us. Included in this collection, edited and translated by George K. Strodach, are a collection of observations that were preserved by the biographer of ancient philosophers, Diogenes Laertius, and three important letters. (shrink)

"First published in the United States of America as The philisophy of Epicurus: letters, doctrines, and parallel passages from Lucretius."--T.p, verso.

On-line English translation of Epicurus' summary of his explanations for celestial and meteorological phenomena.

On-line English translation of this collection of short Epicurean sayings, mainly on ethics.

Pros Menoikea, epistolē gia tēn eutychia -- Epistolē pros Hērodoto -- Epistolē pros Pythoklē.