This article has two purposes. The first speaks to the compatibilist quality of Charles Mills’ Black Radical Kantianism (BRK), its strengths and weaknesses and the pertinence of W. E. B Du Bois to it. BRK turns from Mills’ previous critique of Kantianism as representative of arassenstaatlichpolitical liberalism, underwritten and tainted by the racial/domination contract, to his current defence of a compatibilist Kantianism as representative of arechtsstaatlichpolitical liberalism supported by a non-ideal racially corrective critique of both that contract and the kind (...) of political liberalism affiliated with it. The second focuses on what I introduce as the ‘Radicalization of Kant in Black’ (RKB). RKB isnota compatibilist project. Rather it re-examines issues first posed by ‘slave- and black-encoded’ blacks coming to act and struggle with the primacy of practical reason under the historically normative authority of freedom and the abolition of enslavement. What are the ramifications of each for Kant-/Kantian-radicalization? (shrink)

The reasons supporting the ‘Racial Contract’ are reasons supporting the ‘metanarrative,’ which explains the Racial Contract. They are not reasons supportive of actions pertinent to undoing the Racial Contract, but reasons supportive of behavior pertinent to objectively confirming the ‘metanarrative’ of the ‘Racial Contract’ and rightfully establishing its place in political philosophy. This paper shall attempt to address these matters and their consequences.

There are three major items involved in Frederick Douglass's critique of enslavement—moral suasion, political abolitionism, and violent resistance. They are interrelated and comprise his critique. But ever since Angela Davis's use of existential philosophy to interpret Douglass's critique, the focus of existential readings on Douglass has been exclusively and constantly on the item of violent resistance, specifically Douglass's fight with Covey. The three items wholly derive their importance solely from this fight, according to the existential reading. Contrary to that reading, (...) this paper shall argue that a reading of Douglass's critique should endorse a normative coordination, through practical reason, of the three items rather than an existential priority of the fight with Covey over the other two. (shrink)

In this powerful volume, 15 leading American philosophers examine and critically reassess Douglass's significance for contemporary social and political thought. Philosophically, Douglass's work sought to establish better ways of thinking, especially in the light of his convictions about our humanity and democratic legitimacy - convictions that were culturally and historically shaped by his experience of, and struggle against, the institution of American slavery. Contributors include Bernard R. Boxill, Angela Y. Davis, Lewis R. Gordon, Leonard Harris, Tommy L. Lott, Howard McGary, (...) and John P. Pittman. (shrink)

The recent reception of Du Bois’ notion of “double consciousness” in the humanities has affirmed the notion as crucial and pivotal throughout his work. In contrast, its recent reception in the social sciences has tended to reject its centrality and importance. This essay will give general credence to the former position but, more importantly, show why a turn to Rousseau’s conception of amour‐propre may illuminate the importance of “double consciousness” in and for Du Bois’ 1903 work The Souls of Black (...) Folk , despite the fact that he never elaborated on or embraced the notion in work subsequent to SBF’s publication. (shrink)

The goal of Kant’s transcendental deduction is to demonstrate the reciprocal implication of self-consciousness and objectivity. Kant’s argument is that the subject possesses a priori cognizance concerning the thoroughgoing identity of itself and that this entails a priori for the subject cognition of the manners in which the combining activities of individual cognitive states must and can occur if its self-identity is to be maintained. Kant proposes that the cognitive subject makes judgments concerning its identity, and then shows that these (...) judgments must subscribe to formal rules of synthesis relating cognitive representations, for which the subject affirms such identity, to a domain of empirical things-in-themselves or enduring objects. (shrink)

Although the literature on, and the interest in, the relation of Husserlian phenomenology and Hegelian phenomenology are almost next to nil, the interpretations surrounding this relation are plagued by a number of aporiai. There is too much attention to extraneous matters. There is no adequate attempt to work out and explicate their respective theories of phenomenology and the coherency of the theories. There is a failure to spell out the presuppositions involved in the formation of transcendental philosophy which is to (...) be established within their respective phenomenological frameworks. Our approach avoids these pitfalls by focusing on Husserl's phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy within a subjectively dependent framework, and on Hegel's phenomenology as a propadeutic to a concept dependent framework. As a propadeutic, however, Hegelian phenomenology is an immanent critique of philosophical discourse, which is articulated within a subjectively dependent framework, in order for the concept dependent framework to be instituted. The question is raised as to whether Husserlian phenomenology can be encompassed by the immanent critique of the PhS. This would mean that Husserl's phenomenology must be prefigured by a cognitive formation in the PhS. We answer this question in the affirmative. We give individual treatment to Husserl and Hegel concerning the relation of phenomenology to logic. We go into a detailed analysis of what is involved in Husserl's notion of the subjective-logical and its aesthetic orientation, where we develop Husserl's full phenomenological theory of subjective life and its relation to world. We show that Husserl's full phenomenological theory of subjective life and world is prefigured by and maintains a family resemblance to the cognitive formation "Religion." We demonstrate finally that the argument of "Absolute Knowing" provides for the elimination of the subjective dependent framework as a viable principle for philosophical discourse. With this result, it becomes possible to claim that Hegel's PhS has encompassed and, hence, negated the subjectively dependent phenomenology of Husserl. (shrink)