Reflections on differences between the works of literature and writings that offer spiritual guidance.

The paper presents the emergence of the concept of xenotransplantation which is a relatively new issue in the literature on the subject. It is due to the fact that transplants of animal organs are currently in the experimental phase. The main current problem of transplantology is the shortage of organs; hence, the search for new solutions has become an everyday challenge. If a way for the human body to tolerate animal organs could be found, transplant medicine and humanity would be (...) in a completely different place. The authors introduce the concepts of transplantation and xenotransplantation and their origins, then they raise ethical issues related to this type of organ transplantation. Finally, the authors conclude that xenotransplantations have a chance to be “incorporated” in the “transplants” category when the experimental phase of xenotransplantation shifts to the implementation stage. Time will tell whether it will be possible. (shrink)

Virtue and vice remain at the margins of feminist conceptual analysis although both establish a dualism that denies women full citizenship. To make this argument, this analysis explores the historical case of the Lowell mill girls – the first nearly all-female labour force in the United States between 1826 and 1850. Their public debate illustrates how virtue aligns some women with the economic and political status quo while society affiliates those who challenge its dominant beliefs with vice. This moral location (...) reveals the ‘virtues of vice’ or the political benefits that women may derive from vice which places them outside traditional moral and political discourse, enabling them to question existing moral paradigms, consider alternatives, and politically organize against the status quo. As such, the Lowell mill girl debate can inform contemporary feminist theory by raising serious questions about virtue and suggesting how vice opens up a critical space for ideological innovation, referred to here as a moral middle ground, that may result in a more democratic, feminist ethics. (shrink)

A groundbreaking study of how concepts of virtue and vice are used to deny American women full political rights.

A survey of some classes of Post algebras is given including the class of plain semi-Post algebras, Post algebras of order m, m>1, as its particular instance, Post algebras of order ω+, and Post algebras of order ω + ω∗. Representation theorems for each of the classes are given. Some examples of the algebras in the classes are constructed.

The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted data collection for longitudinal studies in developmental sciences to an immeasurable extent. Restrictions on conducting in-person standardized assessments have led to disruptive innovation, in which novel methods are applied to increase participant engagement. Here, we focus on remote administration of behavioral assessment. We argue that these innovations in remote assessment should become part of the new standard protocol in developmental sciences to facilitate data collection in populations that may be hard to reach or engage due (...) to burdensome requirements. We present a series of adaptations to developmental assessments and a detailed discussion of data analytic approaches to be applied in the less-than-ideal circumstances encountered during the pandemic-related shutdown. Ultimately, these remote approaches actually strengthen the ability to gain insight into developmental populations and foster pragmatic innovation that should result in enduring change. (shrink)

Tekst podejmuje temat kondycji i tożsamości etyki środowiskowej XXI wieku w oparciu o analizę wybranych narracji występujących w debacie na temat antropocenu. Czy zwrot w stronę antropocenu odmienia nasze dotychczasowe myślenie dotyczące troski o przyrodę? Artykuł pokazuje, że nauka o systemie Ziemi i ograniczeniach planetarnych umożliwia nam identyfikację zupełnie nowych problemów etycznych. Są to m.in. problem nieodwracalnych strat, utraty kontroli i sterowalności a także kluczowa kwestia irracjonalnej krótkowzroczności wpisanej w ludzkie horyzonty moralne. Tekst szuka odpowiedzi na dwa dodatkowe pytania: 1) (...) Czy troska o postprzyrodę okaże się wyłącznie zarządzaniem stratą? 2) Czy etyka postprzyrody jest antropocentryczna? (shrink)

Myślą Ludwika Gumplowicza polscy uczeni zainteresowali się stosunkowo późno. Jej pierwsze opracowania autorstwa Jana Karola Kochanowskiego, Stanisława Posnera, Mieczysława Szerera, Jana Stanisława Bystronia, Aleksandra Kraushara przypadają na lata 1910–1917, a więc na okres zwany Młodą Polską, który wpisuje się w ogólnoeuropejski modernizm. Nowa generacja uczonych, pisarzy i artystów, działająca w okresie młodopolskim znacząco różniła się w przyjmowanych założeniach filozoficzno-ideowych od pokolenia pozytywistów i realistów krytycznych. Niemniej ukształtowane w pozytywizmie nawyki myślenia nie zanikły po roku 1890 całkowicie – pozostały one indywidualnym (...) a zarazem wspólnym dorobkiem intelektualnym generacji szkół i uczonych wykształconych w dobie pozytywizmu. Postawy światopoglądowe pozytywizmu i modernizmu przenikały się, zaś zasadniczym łączącym je elementem, pomimo programowego buntu modernizmu wobec haseł pozytywistycznych, było zadłużenie wobec naturalizmu. Jednak że schyłkowe lata XIX wieku przynoszą antyscjentystyczne niepokoje, w tym krytykę pozytywistycznego modelu nauki, teorii ewolucjonizmu i jemu właściwego rozumienia postępu, protest przeciwko utylitaryzmowi i odrodzenie metafizyki. […] W polskich pracach z lat 1910–30 poświeconych socjologii L. Gumplowicza interesujące są trzy wątki, wskazujące na kierunek i postać, jaki przybrała recepcja dzieła socjologa z Grazu: zespół wspólne podzielanych przekonań odnośnie genezy systemu Gumplowicza oraz dwie warstwy wartościowania jego dorobku: pozytywna i negatywna. Zatem nasze ujęcie opinii, sądów i ocen sformułowanych przez St. Posnera, M. Szerera, J. St. Bystronia, A. Kraushara oraz F. Mirka pod adresem teorii Gumplowicza będzie miało charakter syntetyzującego przeglądu, uwzględniającego specyfikę stanowisk w kwestiach, które znacząco się od siebie różnią. Ta uwaga odnosi się przede wszystkim do bardzo zindywidualizowanej krytyki spuścizny Gumplowicza. Jako odrębne w tym przeglądzie wyróżnione zostanie stanowisko J. K. Kochanowskiego z uwagi na jego odmienność: oryginalne i twórcze nawiązanie polskiego historyka i socjologa do myśliciela z Grazu. (shrink)

Moralne programy rezygnacji ze stosowania przemocy są zjawiskiem zasługującym na wnikliwą uwagę. W swym artykule przyjmuję, że jest moralnie pożądane, aby zakres stosowania tych programów w rozwiązywaniu konfliktów indywidualnych i grupowych ulegał rozszerzaniu. Ponadto zakładam, że najbardziej efektywne, spośród różnych systemów normatywnych regulujących zachowania jednostek w społeczeństwie, są normy moralności potocznej. Jej cechą charakterystyczną jest unikanie skrajności. W artykule staram się wykazać, że postulaty "nonviolence" mogą być traktowane jako program moralności potocznej po odrzuceniu tych programów, które z jednej strony traktują (...) postulat niestosowania przemocy jako kategoryczny nakaz moralny (absolutyzm moralny L. Tołstoja), a z drugiej zaś - w sposób wyłącznie instrumentalny (propozycje M. Lernera). (shrink)

Recenzja książek: M. Heller, Wierzę, żeby rozumieć: w osobistej rozmowie o życiowych wyborach; rozmawiają Wojciech Bonowicz, Bartosz Brożek, Zbigniew Liana, Znak, Kraków 2016 oraz Heller M. Brotti G., Bóg i nauka: moje dwie drogi do jednego celu; Michał Heller w rozmowie z Giulio Brottim, tłum. Ewa Nicewicz-Staszowska, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2013.

Recenzja książek: M. Heller, Wierzę, żeby rozumieć: w osobistej rozmowie o życiowych wyborach; rozmawiają Wojciech Bonowicz, Bartosz Brożek, Zbigniew Liana, Znak, Kraków 2016 oraz Heller M. Brotti G., Bóg i nauka: moje dwie drogi do jednego celu; Michał Heller w rozmowie z Giulio Brottim, tłum. Ewa Nicewicz-Staszowska, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2013.

This paper examines the role of reason in Shepherd's account of acquiring knowledge of the external world via first principles. Reason is important, but does not have a foundational role. Certain principles enable us to draw the required inferences for acquiring knowledge of the external world. These principles are basic, foundational and, more importantly, self‐evident and thus justified in other ways than by demonstration. Justificatory demonstrations of these principles are neither required, nor possible. By drawing on textual and contextual evidence, (...) I will show that Shepherd should have said that we know the first principles of any science, in general, and that “everything which begins to exist must have a cause”, in particular, via intuition, not via reason. Reasoning about such principles can help their self‐evidence shine through in certain cases; their justification, and our being justified in believing them, does not come from this reasoning, however. (shrink)

Epiphenomenalism is the view that phenomenal properties – which characterize what it is like, or how it feels, for a subject to be in conscious states – have no physical effects. One of the earliest arguments against epiphenomenalism is the evolutionary argument (James 1890/1981; Eccles and Popper 1977; Popper 1978), which starts from the following problem: why is pain correlated with stimuli detrimental to survival and reproduction – such as suffocation, hunger and burning? And why is pleasure correlated with stimuli (...) beneficial to survival and reproduction – such as eating and breathing? According to the argument, the fact that we have these particular correlations and not other ones must have an evolutionary explanation. But given epiphenomenalism, differences in phenomenal properties could not cause differences in fitness, so natural selection would not be expected to favor these correlations over any other ones. Epiphenomenalism thus renders these correlations an inexplicable coincidence, and should therefore be rejected. The evolutionary argument has been widely criticized and few have deemed it cogent (Broad 1925; Jackson 1982; Robinson 2007; Corabi 2014). In this paper, I will consider previous and potential criticisms and conclude some of them are indeed fatal to the argument if it is understood, as it traditionally has been, as an argument for any standard version of non-epiphenomenalism such as physicalism and interactionism. I will then offer a new and improved version of the argument, as an argument for a particular non-epiphenomenalist view, which I will call the phenomenal powers view. This is the view that phenomenal properties produce and thereby (metaphysically) necessitate their effects in virtue of how they feel, or in virtue of their intrinsic, phenomenal character alone – along the lines of C. B. Martin and John Heil’s powerful qualities view (Martin and Heil 1999; Heil 2003). I will argue that the phenomenal powers view explains the correlations given natural selection far better than any other view. It follows that if (and only if) understood as an argument for the phenomenal powers view, the evolutionary argument is far stronger than it is usually thought to be. (shrink)

In metaethics, evolutionary debunking arguments combine empirical and epistemological premises to purportedly show that our moral judgments are unjustified. One objection to these arguments has been to distinguish between those judgments that evolutionary influence might undermine versus those that it does not. This response is powerful but not well understood. In this paper I flesh out the response by drawing upon a familiar distinction in the natural sciences, where it is common to distinguish folk judgments from theoretical judgments. I argue (...) that this in turn illuminates the proper scope of the evolutionary debunking argument, but not in an obvious way: it is a very specific type of undermining argument that targets those theories where theoretical judgments are inferred merely from folk judgments. One upshot of this conclusion is that it reveals a verboten methodology in metaethics. The evolutionary debunking argument is therefore much less powerful than its proponents have supposed, but it nevertheless rules out what is perhaps a common way of attempting to justify moral judgments. (shrink)

According to recent arguments for panpsychism, all physical properties are dispositional, dispositions require categorical grounds, and the only categorical properties we know are phenomenal properties. Therefore, phenomenal properties can be posited as the categorical grounds of all physical properties—in order to solve the mind–body problem and/or in order avoid noumenalism about the grounds of the physical world. One challenge to this case comes from dispositionalism, which agrees that all physical properties are dispositional, but denies that dispositions require categorical grounds. In (...) this paper, I propose that this challenge can be met by the claim that the only dispositional properties we know are phenomenal properties, in particular, phenomenal properties associated with agency, intention and/or motivation. Versions of this claim have been common in the history of philosophy, and have also been supported by a number of contemporary dispositionalists. I will defend a new and updated version of it. Combined with other premises from the original case for panpsychism—which are not affected by the challenge from dispositionalism—it forms an argument that dispositionalism entails panpsychism. (shrink)

Considering whether existence, i.e., being, is a thing might seem like the height of aimless metaphysical chin stroking. However, the issue—specifically, whether existence is a quality—is significant, bearing on how reality, this all-encompassing totality, is. On one view, reality at large is ontologically fixed, the sum total of things does not (and cannot) vary; on another view, reality is ontologically transient, the sum total of things varies. I first show that if existence is a thing, that reality is ontologically fixed (...) follows. So I consider whether existence is indeed a thing. I demonstrate that “it” could not be: existence is no existent. I then discuss what it is to exist, given existence is nothing at all. I maintain there are no grounds for the view that reality is ontologically fixed. I argue, from the irrefragable basis of temporal differentiation—the world going from thus…to as so—that reality is ontologically transient. I consider some objections to ontological transience and conclude by considering the key to understanding the overall structure in reality and what it reveals about how very inconstant all this is. (shrink)

Research on conspiracy theories has proliferated since 2016, in part due to the US election of President Trump, the COVID-19 pandemic, and increasingly threatening environmental conditions. In the rush to publication given these concerning social consequences, researchers have increasingly treated as definitive a 2016 paper by Michael Wood (Political Psychology, 37(5), 695–705, 2016) that concludes that the phrase “conspiracy theory” has no negative effect upon people’s willingness to endorse a claim. We revisit Wood’s findings and its (re)uptake in the recent (...) literature. Is the label “conspiracy theory” a pejorative? If so, does it sway or affect people’s belief in specific claims of conspiracy (i.e. particular conspiracy theories), or is the effect one that concerns claims of conspiracy more generally (i.e. all conspiracy theories)? Through an examination of the conceptual and methodological scope of Wood’s work and the results of our similar quasi-experimental design, we argue that it is premature to suggest the label “conspiracy theory” has no impact on the believability of a claim, or that it has no rhetorical power. (shrink)

This paper deals with the problem of verification of game-like structures by means of symbolic model checking. Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL) is used for expressing properties of multi-agent systems represented by alternating epistemic temporal systems as well as concurrent epistemic game structures. Unbounded model checking (a SAT based technique) is applied for the first time to verification of ATEL. An example is given to show an application of the technique.

Recent work in philosophy of science has shown how the challenges posed by extremely complex systems require that scientists employ a range of modelling strategies, leading to partial perspectives that make apparently conflicting claims about the target (Mitchell 2009b, Longino 2013). The brain is of course extremely complex, and the same arguments apply here. In this paper I present a variety of perspectivism called _haptic realism_. This account foregrounds the process by which the instrumental goals of neuroscience shape the way (...) that objects of investigation are probed experimentally and conceptualised through modelling. Because such models do not aim to represent their targets exactly as they are, but in ways that are most useful for the investigators, the models should not be interpreted as literal descriptions of neural systems. Scientific realism traditionally involves a semantic commitment to interpreting theories and models as literal descriptions of human-independent nature. Haptic realism makes a significant departure from this tradition. Haptic realism also calls us to reassess the ontological commitments and knowledge claims of neuroscientific models and theories. (shrink)

Neo-republicanism seems well suited to provide insight into current policies for the control and restriction of immigration. In this paper, I discuss three different accounts of domination to assess whether they can provide intuitively acceptable responses to the types of domination experienced by different groups of immigrants. First, I present and criticize an argument offered by Philip Pettit in support of the view that immigration restrictions could in principle avoid being dominating. My criticism focuses on Pettit’s account of non-arbitrary governmental (...) action that claims that laws and policies are not dominating when people have democratic control over the government’s activity. Given the failure of Pettit’s argument, I turn to the proceduralist account of non-arbitrary state action proposed by Frank Lovett, and discuss the limitations of the account in diagnosing all ways in which border controls and immigration policy can generate domination. Finally, I present and defend the view that governmental action is not dominating when there are adequate checks that protect the objective interests of individuals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics by Alexander R. PrussBenedict M. Guevin O.S.B.One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics. By Alexander R. Pruss. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013. Pp. ix + 465. $45.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-268-03897-7.As a professor of moral theology in general and of sexual ethics in particular, I found Alexander Pruss’s largely philosophical account of sexual ethics to be (...) refreshing. As much as I try to dissuade my students from using religious legalism to justify the rightness or wrongness of certain sexual practices, I find it almost impossible to break them of the bad habit of using such phrases as “Because the Church teaches...” or “Because the Bible says...”. Even when I counter by saying, “The Church teaches that something is good because it is good and not because the Church says it is good, and such goodness is grounded in the natural law and a sound anthropology,” such legalism still persists. And so, to read Pruss’s extensive analysis of sexual ethics using both personalist and Thomistic principles as well as what we have received from divine revelation is a much-needed tonic not only for students of theology and philosophy but for all those interested in discovering the role of human reason and biology in crafting a sexual ethic.After an introduction, the proper beginning of Pruss’s analysis is found in chapter 2. Here, the author discusses love and its forms with a particular focus on the meaning of agapē in the New Testament. Pruss argues that, philosophically speaking, we should love everyone. But love should not be understood as monolithic. There are various kinds of love: agapē, philia, and erōs. The New Testament understanding of agapē contains the other two, for it is love itself. This kind of love is a love that loves the other as the other is, for the other’s sake, and in a way that is appropriate to that person in the light of objective facts. Moreover, this kind of love is not simply a feeling or an emotion but is concentrated in an action that is an expression of one’s will.In chapter 3, Pruss takes up the issue of desire. He evaluates desire in two ways: (1) desire and libido, and (2) sexual desire, need, and pleasure. He [End Page 485] concludes that sexual desire is not a need in the same way that we desire food, drink, communication, love, and to be loved. Without these latter, human life would be seriously lacking or, in the case of food and drink, quickly cut short. Second, he observes that circumstances may not be appropriate for fulfilling one’s sexual desire. Finally, while human life would be seriously compromised by the lack of food, drink, communication, love, and the need to be loved, abstaining from the fulfillment of sexual desire even over a long period of time would not be detrimental to human well-being in the same way.Pruss does not imply by the preceding that sexuality does not matter. Chapter 4, in fact, deals with the meaningfulness of sexuality. There are two sets of rules regarding sexuality and its expression. Some rules are moral in nature, like the prohibition against rape. Other rules are customs, for example, the exchanging of rings after the exchange of marital vows. With respect to the moral rules regarding sexuality, Pruss highlights casual sex, sexual assault, gay rights, and romantic love. Apart from sexual assault and rape—both of which lack consent—casual sex, homosexual sex, and romantic love have the following in common, namely, that sex is indeed innately important to human beings and that sex aspires to be romantic in nature. While, as in the case of casual sex, romantic love does not necessarily give rise to true love, romantic love is often the prelude to a deep and unique form of love. Why this is so has to do with the meaning of sexual union.Sexual union is the topic of chapter 5, presented under the title “One Flesh, One Body.” Scripture, Pruss affirms, describes the person as... (shrink)

Parental decision making is necessary for contracting medical interventions that require personal risk–benefit evaluation, and for overseeing matters of education. In the nineteenth century, exemptions from obligatory vaccination were granted for religious and conscientious reasons. Then and today, religion and moral values play marginal roles in vaccine hesitancy and denialism. Rather, the key values invoked by vaccine hesitants and denialists are liberty and pluralism. Neither is compatible with limiting adolescents’ choice. Because vaccination does not require assessment of personal medical risks, (...) because it does not need to occur within the sphere of the doctor–patient relationship, and because the risk involved is within the range of their daily activities, adolescents have the right to free access to vaccination without legal requirement of parental involvement. Drawing on the development of Common Law, and on the development of respect for personal conscience in the history of ideas, this paper does not promote an argument that grants public health an overriding moral power. Rather, this paper rejects the presumption that vaccination of adolescents might involve a conflict between parental authority and public health. Free access to vaccination is compatible with the law and ethics of adolescents’ evolving autonomy in relation to healthcare. (shrink)

This book provides a clear and nuanced appraisal of Hegel's treatment of Africa, India, and Islam, and of the implications of this treatment for postcolonial and global studies. Analyzing Hegel's master-slave dialectic and his views on Africa, India, and Islam, it situates these views not only within Hegel's historical scheme but also within a broader European philosophical context and the debates they have provoked within Hegel scholarship. Each chapter explores various in depth readings of Hegel by postcolonial critics, investigating both (...) the Eurocentric and potentially global nature of his dialectic. Ultimately, the book shows both where of this profoundly influential thinker archetypally embodies certain Eurocentric traits that have characterized modernity and how, ironically, he himself gives us the tools for working towards a more global vision. Offering a concise introduction not only to an important dimension of Hegel's thought - his orientation towards "empire" - but also to the various issues raised by postcolonial theory and global studies, this book will be of use to philosophers as well as advanced students of literary and cultural theory alike. (shrink)

How ought the historian to reconcile themselves philosophically with the fact of evental contingency and of its relationship to structural determination? Does the existence of contingent causation undermine the very concept of historical necessity, or do the two instead in dialectical entanglement? In this essay, I engage with the problem of historical contingency from a transcendental-materialist perspective informed by the work of Slavoj Žižek, tendering a philosophically serious response to the famous Pascalian conundrum of Cleopatra’s nose and its challenge to (...) structuralist accounts of historical causation. The position associated with Laplace – that is to say, that the course of history would be entirely predictable were one provided with a complete account of initial conditions – is firmly rejected. Instead, I revive Althusser’s attempt to craft a theory of ‘aleatory materialism’, in which the determinative power of structural forces nevertheless leave space for the radical and unpredictable transformation of a situation by the chance crystallisation of events and encounters. In this effort, I recruit conceptual architecture not only from the fields of historiography and philosophy, but also quantum physics, psychoanalysis, and mathematics. (shrink)

Examines the work of Kierkegaard as an ironist, reevaluating the works he penned under pseudonyms to show both their ironic character and the serious purpose that informed the deception Kierkegaard carried out.

In this paper I argue that Martha Nussbaum's Aristotelian analysis of compassion and pity is faulty, largely because she fails to distinguish between an emotion's basic constitutive conditions and the associated constitutive or "intrinsic" norms, "extrinsic" normative conditions, for instance, instrumental and moral considerations, and the causal conditions under which emotion is most likely to be experienced. I also argue that her defense of compassion and pity as morally valuable emotions is inadequate because she treats a wide variety of objections (...) as all stemming from a common commitment to a Stoic conception of the good. I argue that these objections can be construed as neutral between conceptions of the good. I conclude by arguing that construed in this way there are nonetheless plausible replies to these objections. (shrink)

Philosophical Thought in Russia in the Second Half of the 20th Century is the first book of its kind that offers a systematic overview of an often misrepresented period in Russia's philosophy. Focusing on philosophical ideas produced during the late 1950s – early 1990s, it reconstructs the development of genuine philosophical thought in the Soviet period and introduces those non-dogmatic Russian thinkers who saw in philosophy a means of reforming social and intellectual life. Covering such areas of philosophical inquiry as (...) philosophy of science, philosophical anthropology, the history of philosophy, activity approach as well as communication and dialogue studies, the volume presents and thoroughly discusses central topics and concepts developed by Soviet thinkers in that particular fields. Written by a team of internationally recognized scholars from Russia and abroad, it examines the work of well-known Soviet philosophers (such as Mikhail Bakhtin, Evald Ilyenkov and Merab Mamardashvili) as well as those important figures (such as Vladimir Bibler, Alexander Zinoviev, Yury Lotman, Georgy Shchedrovitsky, Genrich Batishchev, Sergey Rubinstein, and others) who have often been overlooked. By introducing and examining original philosophical ideas that evolved in the Soviet period, the book confirms that not all Soviet philosophy was dogmatic and tied to orthodox Marxism and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. It shows Russian philosophical development of the Soviet period in a new light, as a philosophy defined by a genuine discourse of exploration and intellectual progress, rather than stagnation and dogmatism. In addition to providing the historical and cultural background that explains the development of the 20th-century Russian philosophy, the book also puts the discussed ideas and theories in the context of contemporary philosophical discussions showing their relevance to nowadays debates in Western philosophy. With short biographies of key thinkers, an extensive current bibliography and a detailed chronology of Soviet philosophy, this research resource provides a new understanding of the Soviet period and its intellectual legacy 100 years after the Russian Revolution. (shrink)

Мета. У цій статті передбачено провести морфологічне дослідження життя Григорія Сковороди як самоконструювання філософа порівняно з життям таких філософів, як Іммануїл Кант, Фрідріх Ніцше, Мартін Гайдеґґер і Генрі Торо. Теоретичний базис. В основі дослідження лежить застосування монадологічного підходу до історії у сполученні з біографічним методом. Ідеї класичних філософських систем Ґотфріда Ляйбніца та Освальда Шпенглера застосовано з урахуванням їхнього переосмислення українськими філософами Іваном Бойченком та Вадимом Менжуліним. Завдяки цьому життя українського філософа Григорія Сковороди розглянуто як монаду, яка невпинно здійснює власне смислове (...) саморозгортання. Наукова новизна. Наскрізну парадоксальність філософії Григорія Сковороди, яку приписують йому, виходячи з інших філософських систем, повністю знімає перформативна послідовність його життя як філософа, що показують системні порівняння основних характеристик його життя з життям інших видатних філософів, які підпорядкували свої дії своїй філософській концепції. Висновки. Філософія Григорія Сковороди є монадою, тобто таким першофеноменом, який неможливо пояснити з інших феноменів: порівняння з іншими монадами є лише приводом для виявлення власних характеристик досліджуваної монади, які поступово розкриваються як прояв її самобутності й неповторності. Оригінальність філософської концептуалізації життя Сковороди варто здійснювати в поетапному порівнянні зі свідомим життям інших філософів, і таке порівняння потребує продовження, постійного здійснення. Особливістю цього дослідження є спроба надати методологічне обґрунтування такому компаративному морфологічно-біографічному філософському дослідженню. (shrink)

This study adopts the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Patterns (CCSARP) framework to investigate the apology strategies used by L1 speakers of Tashelhit, a variety of Amazigh spoken in central Morocco. To this end, 82 university students either filled an assessment questionnaire or participated in an oral closed role-play. The findings indicated that L1 speakers of Tashelhit employed seven strategies to apologize, namely taking on responsibility, Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices (IFIDs), explanation or account, offer of repair, promise of forbearance, determinism, and (...) self-criticism. While taking on responsibility, IFIDs, and explanation or account were used most frequently in all the role-play situations to realize apologies, the other apology strategies appeared to be situation-dependent. There was also a tendency for L1 speakers of Tashelhit to use certain religious expressions to modify their apologies. These findings yielded a number of recommendations for further research and suggestions for improving the teaching of apologies in Tashelhit. (shrink)

Perhaps more than any philosophy written in the past few centuries, the work of Friedrich Nietzsche has given rise to controversy, misunderstanding, and dissent. Today Nietzsche is remembered as the revolutionary author of such polemical ideas as the death of God, the revaluation of values, the will to untruth, and the Übermensch. Yet is Nietzsche’s philosophy as atheistic, relativistic, nihilistic, and immoral as some commentators have claimed? Or ought we perhaps to give more credence to Nietzsche’s own assertion that one (...) writes books “precisely to conceal what one harbors” (BGE, 9, 289)? If “whatever is profound loves masks” (BGE, 2, 40) then might Nietzsche’s more daring claims be interpreted as clever masks behind which he conceals a deeper philosophy and on which he reveals a hidden truth? Is it not possible that the standard readings of Nietzsche are in fact misreadings—that his work invites misreading, that it is intentionally unclear, deceptive, disguised? The goal of this volume is to reread Nietzsche for all that he shows and all that he hides. It is to dig deeper into his work in order to challenge misreadings of old and invite misreadings anew—as, indeed, his work itself calls for and demands. (shrink)