In this paper, I provide an argument for pannormism, the view according to which there are normative properties all the way down. In particular, I argue for what I call the trickling down principle, which says that if there is a metaphysically basic normative property, then, if whatever instantiates it has a ground, that ground instantiates it as well.

The use of corporate ethical codes has been increasing. It is argued that the use of ethical codes solely as an instrument in a company’s image management is morally questionable. Therefore, the introduction and use of ethical codes must have the intention of achieving behavioural change or the maintenance of already superior behaviour. This change or superior behaviour may apply to ethics in general, but also to the different sub‐structures of ethics, namely the areas of reliability ethics, human ethics, capability (...) ethics and future ethics. Previous research has, with some exceptions, failed to demonstrate that the introduction of ethical codes has had any behavioural effect. A survey study of Norwegian professionals in business is reported here. Using the flexibility that a multivariate analysis provides, the existence or non‐existence of ethical codes, and their influence on attitudinal differences across the four ethical sub‐structures is tested. In the following discussion, three lines of argument are used, drawing on logical, social and managerial approaches, to explain why the codes do exist and yet do not seem to influence the members of a business organisation. Finally, the paper suggests some implications for business practice and for future research. (shrink)

The use of corporate ethical codes has been increasing. It is argued that the use of ethical codes solely as an instrument in a company’s image management is morally questionable. Therefore, the introduction and use of ethical codes must have the intention of achieving behavioural change or the maintenance of already superior behaviour. This change or superior behaviour may apply to ethics in general, but also to the different sub‐structures of ethics, namely the areas of reliability ethics, human ethics, capability (...) ethics and future ethics. Previous research has, with some exceptions, failed to demonstrate that the introduction of ethical codes has had any behavioural effect. A survey study of Norwegian professionals (N=449) in business is reported here. Using the flexibility that a multivariate analysis provides, the existence or non‐existence of ethical codes, and their influence on attitudinal differences across the four ethical sub‐structures is tested. In the following discussion, three lines of argument are used, drawing on logical, social and managerial approaches, to explain why the codes do exist and yet do not seem to influence the members of a business organisation. Finally, the paper suggests some implications for business practice and for future research. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against grounding being necessarily well-founded, and provide some reasons to think it's actually not well-founded.

In this paper I argue that composition as identity entails unrestricted composition. I also briefly consider a new take on the special composition question.

A prevailing conceptualization of values in organizations regards values as preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence. Accordingly, values are pursued through prescriptions, actions of implementation and evaluation, based on the presumption that values inform actions. Thus, holding the ‘right’ values leads to desired practice. However, this is a problematic stance, suppressing the fact that correlation between value and action is highly questioned. The article claims that proliferation of values in organizations is more plausible and influential turning the process (...) around, utilizing the ideas of sensemaking, tacit knowledge and virtue in a critical reflection-upon-action model, engaging organizational members as co-researchers of their own value constructions in context. (shrink)

In this work I first develop, motivate, and defend the view that mereological composition, the relation between an object and all its parts collectively, is a relation of identity. I argue that this view implies and hence can explain the logical necessity of classical mereology, the formal study of the part-whole relation. I then critically discuss four contemporary views of the same kind. Finally, I employ my thesis in a recent discussion of whether the world is fundamentally one in number.

In this short piece I provide an interpretation of David Lewis' thesis of Composition as Identity.

Empire was never an important concept in Ottoman politics. This did not stop Ottoman rulers from laying claim to three titles that may be called imperial : halife, hakan , and kayser . Each of these pertains to different translationes imperii , or claims of descent from different empires: the Caliphate, the steppe empires of the Huns, Turks, and Mongols, and the Roman Empire. Each of the three titles was geared toward a specific audience: Muslims, Turkic nomads, and Greek-Orthodox Christians, (...) respectively. In the nineteenth century a new audience emerged as an important source of political legitimacy: European-emergent international society. With it a new political vocabulary was introduced into the Ottoman language. Among those concepts was that of empire , which found its place in Ottoman discourse by connecting it with the existing imperial claims. (shrink)

The beginnings of epidemics are often told as if they are simple to locate in time. They take the form of a crisis, and as such, function as great synchronisers of different temporalities, bringing social temporalities “in line” with biological ones. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, political processes that are usually slow were accelerated in order to “catch up with” the fast pace of the virus's reproduction, as policymakers saw a need to contain the virus. The (...) end of an epidemic, on the other hand, is more difficult to pinpoint. This can be attributed to the fact that the myriad actors involved in and affected by an epidemic operate on diverging time scales. Although seemingly synchronised from its outset, these lifetimes become un-synchronised as the epidemic unfolds. Some effects of an epidemic outbreak are easily observed, such as infection rates and the number of deceased. Others-psychological or medical after-effects, or the lasting memory in a population-may be harder to spot. Declaring that an epidemic has “ended” usually relies on the ceasing of the former, not the latter. However, as this article argues, the ending(s) of an epidemic should be regarded in the plural, each operating within its own rhythm and scale. This article explores the multiplicity of lifetimes involved in epidemics-human, microbial, institutional-and tries to give an explanation as to how epidemics end (or linger on) using an approach of multiple temporalities. (shrink)

The topic of the article is how moral development theory can enlighten the understanding of ethical behaviour in business. It discusses previous research on the subject, and reports an empirical study of academics (engineers and business economists with a master degree) working in the private sector in Norway.Moral development theory is based on a long research tradition, and many researchers within business ethics have assumed the importance of moral reasoning in business environments. However, the truth of these assumptions has not (...) been confirmed by previous empirical research. (shrink)

I argue that Composition as Identity blocks the plural version of Cantor's Theorem, and that therefore the plural version of Cantor's Theorem can no longer be uncritically appealed to. As an example, I show how this result blocks a recent argument by Hawthorne and Uzquiano.

I first explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it is a proper part. I then explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it both is and has a proper part. Given two well recognized assumptions, I argue that both notions represent genuine metaphysical possibilities. Finally I consider, but dismiss, some possible objections.

Many metaphysicians accept the view that, necessarily, any collection of things composes some further thing. Necessarily, my arms, legs, head, and torso compose my body; necessarily, my arms, my heart, and the table compose something y; necessarily, my heart and the sun compose something z; and so on. 1 Though there have been a few recent attempts to argue against the necessity of this principle of unrestricted composition the consensus is that if it is true, it is necessarily true. 2In (...) what follows I will join the few dissenters and argue that this principle of unrestricted composition is not necessarily true. If I am right, it follows that either some principle of restricted composition is necessarily true or the existence of composite objects is a contingent matter. I will end by indicating why the latter option seems the most plausible. 3I proceed by reductio. Assume the following: Unrestricted composition is necessarily true.That is, assume that necessarily, any collection of things composes something. Then, necessarily, the collection of everything composes something. That is, necessarily, there exists a universal object U having all things as parts, not itself being a proper part of anything. Hence, by our assumption, we get: There must be a universal object U.It is important to note that this is so whether the world is finite or infinite. Holding that in worlds of finite cardinality there is a universal object U while in worlds of infinite cardinality there is no universal object U amounts to accepting a restricted form of composition. 4Now consider the following scenario. Everything in this world is spatially extended and just one half of something else that is also spatially extended. That is, for any thing in this world, there is something else of which …. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that we need to take irreducibly plural logic more seriously in metaphysical debates due to the fact that the verdict of many metaphysical debates hangs on it. I give two examples. The main example I focus on is the debate recently revived by Jonathan Schaffer over the fundamental cardinality of the world. I show how the three main arguments provided by Schaffer are unsound in virtue of an employment of plural logic. The second example I (...) give is a more general issue about the possibility of emergent properties of mereological wholes. Employing plural logic there is a new way to understand such cases. The upshot is that plural logic greatly matters to metaphysics and hence can no longer be ignored the way it has in this area. (shrink)

I develop and defend a version of panpsychism that avoids the combination problem by appealing to plural collective properties.

In this paper, I present the thesis of Composition as Identity as I think it should be understood, and reply to some objections to it. My aim is not to argue that CAI is true, but to show how CAI can be true, and push the debate forward in the direction I think it must and should go in light of some new objections.

Divine Foundationalism is the thesis that God is the source of all things (apart from God hirself). I clarify and defend the thesis, before I consider the main arguments for and against it.

I show that a particular version of Hume's Dictum together with the falsity of Composition as Identity entails an incoherency, so either that version of Hume's Dictum is false or Composition as Identity is true. I conditionally defend the particular version of Hume's Dictum in play, and hence conditionally conclude that Composition as Identity is true. I end by suggesting an alternative way out for a persistent foe of Composition as Identity, namely mereological nihilism.

Roughly, the problem of the Trinity is the problem of how God can be one and yet be the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which are three, not one. That one thing is identical with three distinct things seems to violate traditional laws of identity. I propose a solution to this problem according to which it is just an ordinary claim of one-many identity. For example, one pair of shoes is identical with two shoes; and my one body (...) is identical with its six limbs of arms, legs, head, and torso. The pair of shoes is not identical with each one of the two shoes, nor is my body identical with each one of its six limbs, but rather identical with all of them taken together, or collectively. I argue that the problem of the Trinity should be understood accordingly: God is identical with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit collectively, but not with each one of them distributively. According to the way I develop this proposal, no traditional laws of identity are violated, but merely generalized in an intuitive way. I argue that this is compatible with Christian Orthodoxy as given by the Athanasian Creed. I end by responding to some anticipated objections. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).