This paper examines the possibilities for peripheral localities to achieve upward mobility in the world-system by “hooking on” to larger processes of world-system accumulation. In particular, is it possible for economies that are dependent on foreign investment to receive a flow of investments that is high enough to overcome the negative impacts of a high stock of foreign investment, thus enabling them to cross a threshold and achieve upward mobility in the world-system? An analysis of the recent experience of the (...) southern Irish “Celtic Tiger” economy during 1990-2000 indicates that such an upward movement is possible on the basis of massive foreign investment inflows. On closer examination, however, the Irish-type model appears to be highly deficient, because a high proportion of growth is illusionary and also on grounds of social desirability and lack of generalizability. (shrink)

We introduce a logic BI in which a multiplicative (or linear) and an additive (or intuitionistic) implication live side-by-side. The propositional version of BI arises from an analysis of the proof-theoretic relationship between conjunction and implication; it can be viewed as a merging of intuitionistic logic and multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. The naturality of BI can be seen categorically: models of propositional BI's proofs are given by bicartesian doubly closed categories, i.e., categories which freely combine the semantics of propositional intuitionistic (...) logic and propositional multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. The predicate version of BI includes, in addition to standard additive quantifiers, multiplicative (or intensional) quantifiers ∀ new and ∃ new which arise from observing restrictions on structural rules on the level of terms as well as propositions. We discuss computational interpretations, based on sharing, at both the propositional and predicate levels. (shrink)

sat es beatus (Catull. 23.27)In the aggressively philosophical poem 23, Catullus attempts to change Furius’ mind about how he perceives his poverty, ‘advice’ which has been identified as either Stoic or Epicurean. Irrespective of the precise school of thought, it is clear that the poet ridicules Furius in eudaimonistic language. The poet of social commentary seeks to define thebeatus uir. In fact, the termbeatushas rich philosophical resonance and Catullus uses it in several other poems where attitudes to wealth form a (...) significant backdrop to the poet's social posturing. Catullus was no philosopher. He employs the language and ideas of different schools, and, while his work does not reflect a coherent philosophical position, he was writing at a time when public discourse increasingly drew upon philosophical language and topoi. I will examine Catullus’ use of the termbeatusin poems 9, 10, 22 and 23 to demonstrate that the poet draws a contrast between its different meanings across these pairs of adjacent poems. I will argue that Catullus contrasts the eudaimonistic and material meanings of the word to show the differences between clear-sighted wisdom and deceptive pleasures, between the good life and a life filled with goods. (shrink)

Background Seeking assent from children for participation in medical research is an ethical imperative of numerous institutions globally. However, none of these organizations provide specific guidance on the criteria or process to be used when obtaining assent. The primary objective of this scoping review was to determine the descriptions of assent discussed in the literature and the reported criteria used for seeking assent for research participation in pre-adolescent children. Methods Medline and Embase databases were searched until November 2020 using the (...) term “assent” in the title or abstract. Inclusion criteria were (1) studies enrolling children which specifically described operationalization of the assent process and (2) studies of the assent process which provided a description of assent. Data collected included participant information, patient criteria for seeking assent, guidelines referenced, description of assent reported, how assent was obtained and assent information presented, and reported assent rate. For qualitative articles focusing on the assent process, important themes were identified. Results A total of 116 articles were included of which 79 (68.9%) operationalized assent and 57 studies (%) described the assent process. The most commonly reported criterion used to determine the ability of a child to assent was age (35.4%, 28/79). The reported minimal age for obtaining pediatric assent varied considerably across and within jurisdictions (5–13 years; median 7.5 years, IQR 7.0, 9.75). Cognitive ability was reported as a criterion for obtaining assent in 5.1% (4/79) of studies. Assent rates were only reported in 17.7% (14/79) of citations and ranged from 32.0 to 100%. Analysis of the 57 studies describing the assent process identified several themes, including age thresholds, assessment of capacity, variable knowledge of pediatric assent and parental roles. Conclusion We found significant variation in criteria used for assessment of patient capacity, delivery of information used to obtain assent and documentation of the assent process. While we acknowledge that individual children, settings and jurisdictions may require different approaches to obtaining assent, there should be agreement on important principles to be followed with resulting common guidance on assessing capacity, delivering information and documentation of the assent process for publication. (shrink)

One might poetically muse that computers have the essence both of logic and machines. Through the case of the history of Separation Logic, we explore how this assertion is more than idle poetry. Separation Logic works because it merges the software engineer’s conceptual model of a program’s manipulation of computer memory with the logical model that interprets what sentences in the logic are true, and because it has a proof theory which aids in the crucial problem of scaling the reasoning (...) task. Scalability is a central problem, and some would even say the central problem, in appli- cations of logic in computer science. Separation Logic is an interesting case because of its widespread success in verification tools. For these two senses of model—the engineering/conceptual and the logical—to merge in a genuine sense, each must maintain their norms of use from their home disciplines. When this occurs, both the logic and engineering benefit greatly. Seeking this intersection of two different senses of model provides a strategy for how computer scientists and logicians may be successful. Furthermore, the history of Separation Logic for analysing programs provides a novel case for philosophers of science of how software engineers and computer scientists develop models and the components of such models. We provide three contributions: an exploration of the extent of models merging that is necessary for success in computer science; an introduction to the technical details of Separation Logic, which can be used for reasoning about other exhaustible resources; and an introduction to the problems, process, and results of computer scientists for those outside the field. (shrink)

The cosmic cycle described in the surviving fragments of Empedocles' poem is the alternation, in endless succession, of Love and Strife. Dr O'Brien's book is primarily an analysis of this elaborate system. It seeks to determine the positions which Love and Strife occupy in the world at different times.

Stobaeus records a placitum where Empedocles says that the world is destroyed by the domination in turn of Love and of Strife. The placitum makes perfectly good sense in the context of Empedocles' belief that Love and Strife produce, in turn, a non-cosmic state of total unity (Love) and of total separation (Strife). But for over two hundred years scholars have been unable to hear that simple message. Sturz (1805) emended the text so as to make it fit the non-cyclical (...) interpretation of Empedocles that he had taken over from the pages of Tiedemann (1791). When Diels included Stobaeus' text in his edition of Aetius, in the "Doxographi graeci" (1879), he failed to remove the emendation, although his own reconstruction of the chapter heading in Aetius made the emendation impossible. Twenty years later, Diels saw the light, and printed Stobaeus' placitum, unemended, in his "Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta" (1901) and in successive editions of his "Fragmente der Vorsokratiker" (from 1903 onwards). But Kranz resurrected the emendation in the "Nachträge" to his sixth edition of the "Fragmente der Vorsokratiker" (1951). The emended placitum is used again by Uvo Hölscher (1965) to support a non-cyclical interpretation of Empedocles and is repeated in the latest collection of the fragments and testimonia (Brad Inwood, 1992). Hölscher fails to appreciate that the text that he uses to support his reconstruction is merely Sturz's translation into Greek of the non-cyclical interpretation of Empedocles proposed by Tiedemann at the end of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

Hitherto reconstructions of Empedocles' cosmic cycle have usually been offered as part of a larger work, a complete history of Presocratic thought, or a complete study of Empedocles. Consequently there has perhaps been a lack of thoroughness in collecting and sifting evidence that relates exclusively to the main features of the cosmic cycle.

Does the matter of the sensible world, for Plotinus as for Plato and Aristotle, exist without a cause of its existence? Long divided on the answer to that question, scholarly opinion now veers in favour of a derivation of matter from principles prior to matter, with disagreement limited to the details of the theory. What exactly is implied by the various passages of the Enneads where Plotinus writes of soul or physis in relation to `darkness' and `non-being', matter and form? (...) In the pages that follow, I argue that the soul's `making' of a `non-being' that by implication is matter, in Enn. III 9 [13] 3, is logically antecedent to the `making' of `visible form' ascribed to physis in Enn. III 8 [30] 2. A detailed study of the context and the syntax of the latter passage shows that, contrary to an interpretation put forward recently in this Journal, the two `makings' cannot be the same. (shrink)

A curious irony hangs over the two similes of the lantern and the clepsydra which Empedocles used to describe his theories of seeing and breathing. Similes were a feature of Empedocles' style, and it is clear that on these two in particular he has lavished considerable care. They have been preserved in their entirety, as almost the longest continuous quotations which Aristotle makes from any author. Despite such auspicious beginnings, these two similes have proved peculiarly resistant to modern attempts at (...) interpretation. The reason for this, I shall try to show, is that certain features in the two similes took on a spurious significance as a result of Plato's remodelling of Empedocles' theories. Difficulties of interpretation have been caused by trying to read back these innovations of Platonic theory into details of the similes that in their original context were fortuitous and inessential.In Plato vision occurs when fire leaves the eye and joins fire outside to form a single compacted body, along which movements from the visible object are communicated as sensations to the eye.According to Theophrastus, Empedocles explained vision as the result of effluences which are given off from objects and enter the appropriate pores of the eye. Dark effluences enter the watery pores of the eyes, and bright effluences enter the fiery pores of the eye. As I have tried to show in an earlier article, Empedocles distinguished good and bad vision, by day and by night, for eyes with a predominance of fire and for eyes with a predominance of water. Good vision results when the dark and light elements which enter the eye are equally balanced. Poor vision results either when there is too much fire in the eye, so that we are dazzled, or when there is too much water in the eye, so that our vision is dimmed. In the whole of his detailed and one would have thought exhaustive account, Theophrastus says nothing about fire leaving the eye as a factor in the act of vision. (shrink)

The origin of matter is one of the last and greatest unsolved mysteries bedevilling modern attempts at understanding the philosophy of the "Enneads." There are two stages in the production of Intellect and of soul. The One or Intellect produces an undifferentiated other, which becomes Intellect or soul by itself turning towards and looking towards the prior principle, with no possibility of the One's "turning towards" or "seeing" itself. But where does matter come from? To arrive at his conception of (...) matter, Plotinus has radically altered the definitions of non-being given by Plato and Aristotle in their refutation of Parmenides. Matter, for Plotinus, is a non-being opposed, not to "the being of each thing", as in Plato's "Sophist," but to all "the beings properly so-called", i.e. to all the forms. It is then further identified with Aristotle's definition of non-being as privation, with the crucial difference that privation, for Plotinus, is made a permanent substratum of change. This re-formulation of ideas from the "Sophist" and the "Physics" proves unmistakably that it is matter which is generated when soul produces a "non-being" which is also a "total lack of definition". The production of matter by soul does not, however, follow the model of the production of Intellect from the One or of soul from Intellect. Since matter is lifeless, it cannot turn towards its source. Soul therefore has to be herself directly responsible both for the production of matter and for the covering of matter with form. Matter is therefore included among the products which stem ultimately from the One. But the origin and the nature of matter have to be understood as very different from the double process of emanation which lies at the origin of Intellect and of soul. (shrink)

Empedocles’ repeated description of his four “roots” or elements by the repetition of three seemingly simple words (αὐτά + ἐστίν + ταῦτα) has constantly defied explanation. If the verb is given a copulative function, the result appears to be a pointless tautology (“these things are themselves”). If it is given an existential value, the result is puzzlingly abstruse (“these things themselves are”). Translators therefore commonly opt for a loose paraphrase, where one word out of three is not translated at all (...) (αὐτά) and an adverb (“only”) is added, seemingly from nowhere (“only these things are”). The solution to the puzzle is to be found in Empedocles’ reaction to his older contemporary, Anaxagoras. Empedocles’ repeated description is a covert criticism of Anaxagoras’ curious claim that “in everything there is a part of everything”. (shrink)

Abstract Plotinus did not set out to be obscure. Difficulties of interpretation arise partly from his style of writing, compressed, elliptical, allusive. The allusions, easily enough recognisable by those he was writing for, are often not recognised at all by the modern reader who no longer has at his fingertips the texts of Plato and Aristotle that Plotinus undoubtedly alludes to, but whose authors he has no need to name. So it is pre-eminently with his subtle use of earlier ideas (...) in tackling the difficult question of the nature of matter and its place in the scheme of emanation. The frequent references to matter as `non-being' and as `privation' can be understood only if they are seen as a radical adaptation of the paradoxical definition of a `form that is, of what is not' in Plato's Sophist (258 D 5-7) and as a deliberate correction of Aristotle's unsuccessful attempt at including female desire in an analysis of privation in the Physics (i 9, 192 a 22-25). Only when the debt to Plato and Aristotle has been recognised for what it is are we able to appreciate that matter defined as `non-being' is not therefore `non-existent', and that the `privation' that is matter is not a terminus a quo of change, but a permanent substrate of change. The adaptation and the daring syncretism lead to deliberate paradox in Plotinus' own definition of matter as both `so to speak a form of sorts' and `formless' (I 8 [51] 3). The seeming inconsistency is Plotinus' acknowledgment of the use he has made of earlier ideas when he writes of matter, so defined, as `made' by a lower manifestation of soul, and therefore as the last and the least of the products flowing from, but not created by, the One. (shrink)

Stobaeus records a placitum where Empedocles says that the world is destroyed by the domination in turn of Love and of Strife. The placitum makes perfectly good sense in the context of Empedocles' belief that Love and Strife produce, in turn, a non-cosmic state of total unity (Love) and of total separation (Strife). But for over two hundred years scholars have been unable to hear that simple message. Sturz (1805) emended the text so as to make it fit the non-cyclical (...) interpretation of Empedocles that he had taken over from the pages of Tiedemann (1791). When Diels included Stobaeus' text in his edition of Aetius, in the "Doxographi graeci" (1879), he failed to remove the emendation, although his own reconstruction of the chapter heading in Aetius made the emendation impossible. Twenty years later, Diels saw the light, and printed Stobaeus' placitum, unemended, in his "Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta" (1901) and in successive editions of his "Fragmente der Vorsokratiker" (from 1903 onwards). But Kranz resurrected the emendation in the "Nachträge" to his sixth edition of the "Fragmente der Vorsokratiker" (1951). The emended placitum is used again by Uvo Hölscher (1965) to support a non-cyclical interpretation of Empedocles and is repeated in the latest collection of the fragments and testimonia (Brad Inwood, 1992). Hölscher fails to appreciate that the text that he uses to support his reconstruction is merely Sturz's translation into Greek of the non-cyclical interpretation of Empedocles proposed by Tiedemann at the end of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

I am sorry to have annoyed Dr Dicks by criticising two articles of his in one of my footnotes. I limit myself to the four specific points raised, in the hope that Dr Dicks may one day be kind enough to substantiate his more general criticisms.Pseudo-GalenFive separate doxographical sources attribute to Anaxagoras the statement that the sun is larger, or many times larger, than the Peloponnese. Galen, or pseudo-Galen, notes that Anaxagoras' sun is larger than the earth. I suggested that (...) this second formula, although it may not misrepresent the substance of Anaxagoras' theory, was ‘probably in Galen simply a random error, arising from the fact that the preceding sentence, on Anaximander, twice makes a comparison of sun and earth’. It is hard to know what motivates Dr Dicks to omit my reasoning and to stigmatise my conclusion as ‘curious’ and ‘eccentric’. (shrink)

Recent attempts at giving meaning to Empedocles’ enigmatic metaphor of a ‘pathway’ and ‘summits’ suffer from weaknesses logical no less than philological. Contrary theses do not have to be contradictory. Does Empedocles express a preference for ‘summits’ as opposed to a ‘pathway’, or for a ‘pathway’ as opposed to ‘summits’? Very possibly neither. The context in which the two verses are quoted points rather to a graceful peroration. However many ‘summits’ there may have been on the way, the traveller has (...) to complete his journey. However many the fascinating topics Cleombrotus has spoken of, he has to know how to bring his speech, his ‘path of words’, to a successful conclusion. (shrink)

Empedocles' fr. 24 is known only from its quotation by Plutarch. The words as quoted leave themselves open to divergent interpretations. The context in Plutarch nonetheless holds out some hope of being able to decide which of the divergent interpretations would have matched the use that Empedocles himself made of the two verses in his poem.