Does the matter of the sensible world, for Plotinus as for Plato and Aristotle, exist without a cause of its existence? Long divided on the answer to that question, scholarly opinion now veers in favour of a derivation of matter from principles prior to matter, with disagreement limited to the details of the theory. What exactly is implied by the various passages of the Enneads where Plotinus writes of soul or physis in relation to `darkness' and `non-being', matter and form? (...) In the pages that follow, I argue that the soul's `making' of a `non-being' that by implication is matter, in Enn. III 9 [13] 3, is logically antecedent to the `making' of `visible form' ascribed to physis in Enn. III 8 [30] 2. A detailed study of the context and the syntax of the latter passage shows that, contrary to an interpretation put forward recently in this Journal, the two `makings' cannot be the same. (shrink)

Abstract Plotinus did not set out to be obscure. Difficulties of interpretation arise partly from his style of writing, compressed, elliptical, allusive. The allusions, easily enough recognisable by those he was writing for, are often not recognised at all by the modern reader who no longer has at his fingertips the texts of Plato and Aristotle that Plotinus undoubtedly alludes to, but whose authors he has no need to name. So it is pre-eminently with his subtle use of earlier ideas (...) in tackling the difficult question of the nature of matter and its place in the scheme of emanation. The frequent references to matter as `non-being' and as `privation' can be understood only if they are seen as a radical adaptation of the paradoxical definition of a `form that is, of what is not' in Plato's Sophist (258 D 5-7) and as a deliberate correction of Aristotle's unsuccessful attempt at including female desire in an analysis of privation in the Physics (i 9, 192 a 22-25). Only when the debt to Plato and Aristotle has been recognised for what it is are we able to appreciate that matter defined as `non-being' is not therefore `non-existent', and that the `privation' that is matter is not a terminus a quo of change, but a permanent substrate of change. The adaptation and the daring syncretism lead to deliberate paradox in Plotinus' own definition of matter as both `so to speak a form of sorts' and `formless' (I 8 [51] 3). The seeming inconsistency is Plotinus' acknowledgment of the use he has made of earlier ideas when he writes of matter, so defined, as `made' by a lower manifestation of soul, and therefore as the last and the least of the products flowing from, but not created by, the One. (shrink)

Empedocles’ repeated description of his four “roots” or elements by the repetition of three seemingly simple words (αὐτά + ἐστίν + ταῦτα) has constantly defied explanation. If the verb is given a copulative function, the result appears to be a pointless tautology (“these things are themselves”). If it is given an existential value, the result is puzzlingly abstruse (“these things themselves are”). Translators therefore commonly opt for a loose paraphrase, where one word out of three is not translated at all (...) (αὐτά) and an adverb (“only”) is added, seemingly from nowhere (“only these things are”). The solution to the puzzle is to be found in Empedocles’ reaction to his older contemporary, Anaxagoras. Empedocles’ repeated description is a covert criticism of Anaxagoras’ curious claim that “in everything there is a part of everything”. (shrink)

The article A small Iowa farmer's perspective on COVID-19, written by Denise O’Brien, was originally published electronically on the publisher’s internet portal on 14 May 2020 with open access. With the author’ decision to step back from Open Choice, the copyright of the article changed December/2020 to © Springer Nature B.V. 2020 and the article is forthwith distributed under the terms of copyright.

Recent attempts at giving meaning to Empedocles’ enigmatic metaphor of a ‘pathway’ and ‘summits’ suffer from weaknesses logical no less than philological. Contrary theses do not have to be contradictory. Does Empedocles express a preference for ‘summits’ as opposed to a ‘pathway’, or for a ‘pathway’ as opposed to ‘summits’? Very possibly neither. The context in which the two verses are quoted points rather to a graceful peroration. However many ‘summits’ there may have been on the way, the traveller has (...) to complete his journey. However many the fascinating topics Cleombrotus has spoken of, he has to know how to bring his speech, his ‘path of words’, to a successful conclusion. (shrink)

Soul springs from Intellect, Intellect springs from the One. But quite how does the sensible world arise? A pair of almost successive treatises points to the answer. A lower manifestation of soul `makes' or `gives birth to' what is variously described as `non-being', `utterly indefinite' and `utterly dark', before covering what she has made with form, specifically the form of `body', and before `entering rejoicing' into the object that, by its reception of form, has been made ready to receive her (...) and that, as the `dwelling place' of soul, will be none other than the visible cosmos. A pair of earlier, again almost successive treatises, spells out the implication. The matter of the sensible world, covered with at least a minimum of form, is described as a `corpse adorned'. The same object, but prior to its `adornment', prior therefore to its appearance as a `body' that is a `corpse', and prior to any `indwelling' of soul, is specifically said to be `non-being' and the `darkness of matter', a transparent allusion to the product of soul in the two later treatises. The soul's making of `darkness', so we may infer, is a making of `matter', the final act in the drama by which everything that exists, including the material substrate of the world we see and feel around us, stems ultimately from the One. (shrink)

The form of beauty is the ultimate correlate of love in Socrates' account of Diotima's teaching in the Symposium . To arrive at this insight, Socrates aims to show the `absurdity' of adopting any more specific correlate as a definition of the very nature of love. Were love defined as love `for a father or a mother', we could never love anyone who was not our father or our mother. An obvious absurdity.