- A Case for Machine Ethics in Modeling Human-Level Intelligent Agents.Robert James M. Boyles - 2018 - Kritike 12 (1):182–200.details
|
|
Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):1-24.details
|
|
Epistemic Normativity is Independent of our Goals.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
Are epistemic reasons normative?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):670-695.details
|
|
Equal treatment for belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.details
|
|
Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
|
|
The Point of Political Belief.Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder - 2021 - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
|
|
Against Evidential Minimalism.Daniel Buckley - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.details
|
|
Why We Should Promote Irrationality.Sebastian Schmidt - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):605-615.details
|
|
Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
|
|
How Norms (Might) Guide Belief.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):396-409.details
|
|
Towards a Theory of Propositional Curriculum Content.John Tillson - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 48 (1):137-148.details
|
|
Against the newer evidentialists.David Thorstad - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (12):3511-3532.details
|
|
Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):94-110.details
|
|
An Instrumentalist Explanation of Pragmatic Encroachment.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
|
|
La théorie de l’erreur épistémique fait-elle une erreur?Quentin Soussen - 2022 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 116 (4):555-570.details
|
|
Discussion Note: Selim Berker’s Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Adam Shmidt - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):763-776.details
|
|
Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3791-3809.details
|
|
Reasons as Reasons for Preferences.R. A. Rowland - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):297-311.details
|
|
Conceptual Role Semantics and Rationality.Bradley Rives - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (2):271-289.details
|
|
No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.details
|
|
Believing for Practical Reasons.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - Noûs (4):763-784.details
|
|
The disvalue of knowledge.David Papineau - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5311-5332.details
|
|
Radical Pragmatism in the Ethics of Belief.Samuel Montplaisir - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):403-419.details
|
|
Epistemic Reasons Are Not Normative Reasons for Belief.Samuel Montplaisir - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):573-587.details
|
|
Normativity as a Kind of Conformity: Towards a naturalistic account of epistemic normativity.Basil Müller - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):49-74.details
|
|
The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.details
|
|
Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.details
|
|
Engel on doxastic correctness.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1451-1462.details
|
|
The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
|
|
On the Nature of Belief in Pluralistic Ignorance.Marco Antonio Joven-Romero - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (1):23-45.details
|
|
Do We Need Reasons for the Normativity of Belief?Marco A. Joven-Romero - 2018 - Kritike 12 (1):162-200.details
|
|
Belief and pluralistic ignorance.Marco Antonio Joven Romero - 2020 - Filosofia Unisinos 21 (3):260-267.details
|
|
Weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief.Christopher Howard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2227-2243.details
|
|
Transparency and the ethics of belief.Christopher Howard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1191-1201.details
|
|
Conscientious Objection or an Internal Morality of Medicine?David Hershenov - 2021 - Christian Bioethics 27 (1):104-121.details
|
|
Desire That Amounts to Knowledge.Allan Hazlett - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):56-73.details
|
|
Why is Warrant Normative?Peter J. Graham - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):110-128.details
|
|
Interlocking content and attitude: a reply to the anti-normativist.Javier González de Prado & Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (10):1051-1072.details
|
|
On the alleged normative significance of a platitude.Benoit Https://Orcidorg Gaultier - 2018 - Ratio 32 (1):42-52.details
|
|
Against normativism about mental attitudes.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):295-311.details
|
|
Belief, Correctness and Constitutivity.Davide Fassio - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1084-1106.details
|
|
No Commitment to the Truth.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - Synthese 198:7449-7472.details
|
|
There Are No Purely Aesthetic Obligations.John Dyck - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):592-612.details
|
|
Norms of judgement, naturalism, and normativism about content.E. Diaz-Leon - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):48-58.details
|
|
Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
|
|
In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity.Christopher Cowie - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):4003-4017.details
|
|
Companions in guilt arguments.Christopher Cowie - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12528.details
|
|
‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1641-1656.details
|
|