Many have begun to despair that climate justice will prevail even in a minimal form. The affective dimensions of such despair, we suggest, threaten to make climate action appear too demanding. Thus, despair constitutes a moral challenge to individual climate action that has not yet received adequate attention. In response, we defend a duty to act in hope for a more just (climate) future. However, as we see it, this duty falls differentially upon the shoulders of more and less advantaged (...) agents in society. From arguments by Black thinkers like Derrick Bell, we draw a set of distinctions between two types of hope: one for ideal justice, and one for more modest change; and between two types of hopeful actions, those undertaken through formal political channels and those we call 'extra-political' actions; and between two sites of differential moral burdens, those of the privileged and those of the oppressed. Ours is a case for facing even bleak realities, demanding otherwise, and acting in hope to achieve a better future. (shrink)

There is a remarkable trend in contemporary environmentalism that emphasizes ‘accepting responsibility’ for the natural world in contrast to outdated preservationist thinking that shirks such responsibility. This approach is often explained and justified by reference to the anthropocene: this fundamentally new epoch—defined by human domination—requires active human intervention to avert planetary catastrophe. However, in this paper, I suggest this rhetoric encourages a flight from history. This often jubilant, sometimes anxious, yearning for unprecedented human innovation and—ultimately—control in our new millennia mirrors (...) the Futurist movement that took off near the beginning of the last century. Despite the significant differences in the details of how academics have defended this twenty-first-century environmental outlook, they all represent the true flight from history; they too quickly jettison the ideas of historical environmentalists and so misunderstand the environmental values at the heart of preservation that are more salient than ever. (shrink)

This article substantiates the common intuition that it is wrong to contribute to dangerous climate change for no significant reason. To advance this claim, I first propose a basic principle that one has the moral obligation to act in accordance with the weight of moral reasons. I further claim that there are significant moral reasons for individuals not to emit greenhouse gases, as many other climate ethicists have already argued. Then, I assert that there are often no significant moral (or (...) excusing) reasons to emit greenhouse gases. In any such trivial-cost – but not necessarily trivial-impact – cases, the individual then has an obligation to refrain. Finally, I apply the moral weighing principle to everyday situations of emitting and establish two surprisingly substantial implications: the relevance of virtues to the interpersonal assessment of environmentally harmful actions and the extensive individual ethical obligations that exist short of moral purity. (shrink)

Within the last two decades, a philosophical field of individual climate ethics has taken off. This subdiscipline interrogates the individual’s moral responsibility in causing and preventing climate harm. On the one hand, environmental movements have long emphasized the importance of individual lifestyle changes in solving collective action problems like air pollution. In this tradition, personal obligations to reduce carbon emissions are well-founded. This is the climate individualist view. Against this thinking, skeptics of climate individualism argue that unilateral emissions reductions will (...) not make a difference to climate harms and insist that individuals instead have moral obligations to promote effective institutions through collective action. This is the climate collectivist camp. Climate individualists have replied to the climate collectivist’s charge in two ways. First, they have denied the description by arguing that individual emitting behaviors do cause harm or otherwise might make a difference. Second, they have denied the prescription by arguing that individual emissions reductions are required even if they do not make a difference. This chapter critically summarizes the arguments that have arisen in this debate, including the problem of inconsequentialism, the moral grounds of collective responsibility, and noncausal accounts of individual responsibility for climate harms. Ultimately, this chapter identifies a consensus in the literature that climate individualism is correct. It then turns to the emerging and contested discussion regarding the extent of individual obligations to minimize contribution to climate harms. (shrink)

On the basis of the „principle of the universal connection“ Leibniz connected the science of nature, anthropology and meteorology and linked climatic conditions with human diseases. In 1671/76 he put his bioclimarical conception in writing for the first time in the Directiones. Stimulated and supported by Caspar Neumann, Bernardo Ramazzini and Friedrich Hoffmann, Leibniz since 1690 demanded in several letters and papers bioclimatic observations for Germany. The Summariscbe Punctation is the best paper, where Leibniz named the conditions for an effective (...) bioclimatology. The present paper reports on the philosophical basis and the chronological sequence of Leibniz' bioclimatical project. (shrink)

Written both for general readers and college students, Dialogues on Climate Justice provides an engaging philosophical introduction to climate justice, and should be of interest to anyone wanting to think seriously about the climate crisis. -/- The story follows the life and conversations of Hope, a fictional protagonist whose life is shaped by a terrifyingly real problem: climate change. From the election of Donald Trump in 2016 until the 2060s, the book documents Hope’s discussions with a diverse cast of characters. (...) As she ages, her conversations move from establishing the nature of the problem, to engaging with climate skepticism, to exploring her own climate responsibilities, through managing contentious international negotiations, to considering big technological fixes, and finally, as an older woman, to reflecting with her granddaughter on what one generation owes another. Following a philosophical tradition established by Plato more than two thousand years ago, these dialogues are not only philosophically substantive and carefully argued, but also distinctly human. The differing perspectives on display mirror those involved in real-world climate dialogues going on today. (shrink)

Authors philosophical notes on life, conduct of life from the perspective of a life.

This is not your psychoanalyst's unconscious.

" En écrivant son Traité de l'Interprétation, Aristote a trempé sa plume à l'encre de son esprit! " L'antique remarque de Cassiodore vaut encore aujourd'hui tant la matière étudiée est complexe et le style ramassé. Aristote démonte les mécanismes du langage philosophique, aux confins de la linguistique et de la métaphysique. Il offre à cette occasion des développements fondateurs sur la formulation de la vérité, les règles de mise en contradiction, les propositions universelles, la contingence des jugements sur le futur, (...) ou encore les redoutables énonciations modales. S'appuyant sur ses prédécesseurs, Thomas d'Aquin en rédige un commentaire hautement structuré, reconnu comme l'un des plus explicites. Demeuré cependant inachevé, il est complété par Thomas de Vio, dit Cajetan, un des premiers grands thomistes et maître logicien. C'est de l'ensemble de ces deux parties de commentaires que nous proposons la traduction ; la seconde pour la première fois en langue française. (shrink)

As Anthony Tol explains in his general introduction to (his translation of) Vollenhoven's 1926 inaugural address, the Reformed epistemology that Vollenhoven espouses here is essentially three-layered. Most basic is the intuition - the starting point of all knowing. It starts with discerning. Then there is knowledge. At this point language, communication, and judgments are relevant. The third layer is thought. Thought may disclose and renew or criticize and correct against the background of what we know. Thought is also central to (...) concept formation. The factor that runs through these three layers is truth, taken realistically. It has its seat in the intuition of discerning. It is central to knowledge, for the essence of knowledge is said to be "possessing truth." And in connection with thought, or more particularly in concept formation, the latter is described as "truth grasped in a form." Apart from advocating his own understanding of epistemology in this inaugural address, Vollenhoven takes issue with how epistemology is generally understood. The critique is cast in a historical overview. (shrink)

Il sistema morale e l'agire umano secondo San Tommaso -- Il concetto di legge nella dottrina tomista -- La grazia e le virtù -- La conoscenza della giustizia -- Il pensiero politico di san Tommaso.

Theologien de haut vol et pasteur zele, Guillaume d'Auvergne a ete eveque de Paris de 1228 a 1249. Proche de la cour capetienne et des milieux mendiants de Paris, il a ete temoin et acteur des principaux evenements politiques et culturels qui ont caracterise la vie du royaume et de sa capitale. Ses sermons, au nombre de 582, dont 25 transmis en deux ou trois versions differentes et plusieurs sous la forme de reportationes, sont ici edites pour la premiere fois. (...) Apres les deux premiers volumes consacres aux sermons de tempore, les deux autres proposeront l'edition des sermons de sanctis et de communi sanctorum et de occasionibus.". (shrink)

This is a masterly introduction to the modern, and rigorous, theory of probability. The author emphasises martingales and develops all the necessary measure theory.

Depuis 2012, nous disposons enfin en français d'une traduction satisfaisante des livres publiés par Hannah Arendt aux Etats-Unis de 1951 à 1972. Il est ainsi possible à tout citoyen francophone curieux de cette pensée d'accéder directement à l'une des oeuvres politiques les plus originales du XXe siècle. Pensée toujours vivante et qui, dans un moment de changement d'époque, peut nous aider non à trouver les solutions, mais, ce qui est plus essentiel, à nous poser des questions pertinentes. Les commentaires sur (...) l'oeuvre d'Arendt se sont tellement multipliés depuis trente ans que le travail critique a peut-être fini par empêcher l'accès direct à sa pensée. Cet ouvrage poursuit donc un objectif : fournir un guide de voyage à travers l'oeuvre politique d'Arendt. La première partie est consacrée à la genèse, comme penseur politique, de Hannah Arendt depuis sa naissance en Allemagne en 1906 jusqu'à la publication aux Etats-Unis des Origines du totalitarisme en 1951. La deuxième partie constitue le coeur du livre. Le premier chapitre propose une vision d'ensemble des oeuvres en naviguant d'un ouvrage à l'autre et en saisissant le développement d'une pensée s'élaborant à partir des événements. Les sept chapitres suivants permettent au lecteur de s'orienter dans chacun des sept livres. Le dernier chapitre propose un glossaire, le lecteur voyageant, à nouveau, à travers les sept livres avec, pour fil directeur, un choix des notions et distinctions qu'ils abordent. La troisième et dernière partie ouvre une réflexion sous forme de questionnement. En quoi la matière apportée par l'oeuvre de Hannah Arendt peut-elle nous aider à penser nos choix et nos actions? (shrink)

Commentaire sur les Sentences de Pierre le Lombard (Selections) -- Commentaire de douze livres de la Métaphysique d'Aristote (Selection) -- Commentaire des dix livres de l'Éthique à Nicomaque d'Aristote (Selections) -- Commentaire des huit livres de la Politique d'Aristote, ou Traité de la vie civile (Selections) -- Commentaires de l'Écriture. Sur Mt 20, 24-26 ; Mt 22, 15-22 ; Rm 13, 1-7 ; Jn 8, 3-11.

This paper claims that the standard characterization of the motivational role of belief should be supplemented. Beliefs do not only, jointly with desires, cause and rationalize actions that will satisfy the desires, if the beliefs are true; beliefs are also the practical ground of other cognitive attitudes, like imagining, which means beliefs determine whether and when one acts with those other attitudes as the cognitive inputs into choices and practical reasoning. In addition to arguing for this thesis, I take issue (...) with Velleman's argument that belief and imagining cannot be distinguished on the basis of motivational role. (shrink)