Dario Martinelli examines the nature of songs of social protest (SSPs) in Give Peace a Chant: Popular Music, Politics and Social Protest and provides readers with a book that is engaging, provoking, and enjoyable. Martinelli’s research is thorough, astute, and structured in a way that is both rigorous and accessible. Combining typology with several case studies, Martinelli achieves his stated goal of showing how context, song lyrics, and the music itself are organic and equally important elements that constitute SSPs.

Decisions made so far by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany have always been characterized by their writing and content, even down to details, precision, accuracy, professional legal style of writing, always clear in the elaboration and adjudication of cases from its competence, but surprisingly, in our country, only a few have paid attention to the German Court in a scientific context, which can be seen from the only few materials we possess in the Albanian language. The (...) purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of this Court, so that the comparative aspects can be made, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages, in case of dictating the state need for reform of the Constitutional Courts. Those who have institutionalized this constitutional institution know its value in the system of constitutional justice, which performs it in terms of protection of constitutions, its principles and value, and most importantly in the protection of freedoms and rights of human beings and citizens. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, to this date, has conveyed the efficiency of the protection of the German legal order, the serious approach and law interpretation, for the protection of freedoms and human rights, which ranks this court into a high level among all other powers in the German law system. The author, in the following paper, gives an overview of this Court starting with its history, organization and functioning, which today undoubtedly constitutes one of the most important constitutional courts in the world. (shrink)

Constitutional review was the most original idea stemming from the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920. It is argued that the politician Karl Renner gave birth to the idea of a constitutional court. Hans Kelsen played the predominant role in the drafting of constitutional provisions. The new Constitutional Court provided for a centralized system of review, with an eye to a number of politically important issues. Owing to the pressure that stemmed from various discussions between (...) and among the politicians of the national state and the Länder, Kelsen was obliged to depart from the German model of the federal state and to develop in its place a new theory. (shrink)

The article deals with the constitutional right of a person to apply to court. While construing this constitutionally entrenched right of a person, one analyses the doctrine of the right of a person to apply to court, which was formed in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. The right of a person to court is entrenched expressis verbis in Paragraph 1 of Article 30 of the Constitution whereby the person (...) whose constitutional rights or freedoms are violated shall have the right to apply to court. The doctrine of the Constitutional Court derives this right also from the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law. The right of a person to court is inseparable from other norms and principles of the Constitution, which are equality of rights, the right to compensation of damage, the right to a proper court process, etc. (shrink)

This article aims to present four case studies of the different responses to governmental measures to fight the COVID-19 pandemic by supreme and constitutional courts, especially in cases of jurisdictions that have been facing democratic erosion. The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic demanded immediate public policies and other political decisions from the branches of government. Executive authorities were the main actors in effecting constitutional public health norms. The expectation was that they will abide by the rule of law (...) in fulfilling their duties; that has not been the case under governments that promoted democratic erosion. The different contexts of the threats posed to the constitutional democracies led populist and illiberal leaders to opportunistically either try to—and then be contained by courts—or effectively consolidate the expansion of powers under the conditions of the pandemic. Concentrating on four jurisdictions (the USA, Hungary, El Salvador, and Brazil), the article demonstrates that courts can effectively work as bulwarks against waves of democratic erosion, especially in situations of stress, as it was the case in the global COVID-19 pandemic. This hypothesis is also proven by episodes in which courts did not sufficiently operate to curb illiberalism because they were already captured. The analyses enable classifying the court’s responses to the COVID-19 executive measures in a threefold pattern: deferential, restrictive, and of forced capitulation. (shrink)

Hungarian legal scholarship is dominated by a formal, “technical” conception of the rule of law and this is even truer in the jurisprudence of criminal law. This fact can be demonstrated by analysing the case-law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court with regard to the constitutional review of judicial decisions and criminal statutes. In constitutional complaint proceedings the Constitutional Court has ruled out legal certainty issues from the review of legal norms and judicial decisions by (...) stating that legal certainty is not a value of constitutional importance and does not raise human rights issues. In this paper the author argues for the claim that conceiving the principle of the rule of law and legal certainty as a formal and technical value which is isolated from the principles of political morality, can lead to a narrow and weak protection of human rights. If the rule of law and legal certainty issues are regarded as amoral values, (criminal) norms can become servants of political interests where highly unjust laws can be held to be constitutional. (shrink)

The article discusses the certain features of the constitutional doctrine of human rights developed by the Constitutional Court of Lithuania which were influenced by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the role of the European Convention on Human Rights as a legal source in the system of sources of constitutional law. The intersection of the jurisprudences, which came into being due to different assessments of the legal regulation in cases where the same (...) legal act was recognized by the Constitutional Court being in compliance with the Constitution and the European Court of Human Rights recognized that the application of the said act was a cause of the violation of a certain person’s rights protected by the Convention (or vice versa) is one of the most important questions and raises many theoretical and practical problems. Different assessment of the legal acts made by the European Court of Human Rights with regard to their compliance with the Conventionshould not be regarded as such an essential circumstance which could lead to possible repeated review of such legal act at the Constitutional Court, such intersection of the jurisprudences, should be solved by ordinary courts while following the doctrine that in cases where legal acts contain the legal regulation which competes with that established in the international treaty, the international treaty should be applied. (shrink)

This article critically evaluates the possible impact of the Charter on the relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union and national constitutional courts. While it is premature to provide a definitive assessment of the kind of collaboration that these courts will develop, it is crucial to identify a number of features of the new landscape that will influence the direction in which the relationship between the CJEU and constitutional courts will evolve. This article discusses (...) several reasons that may result in better or a higher number of judicial interactions, as well as factors that may create tension or cause problems in the relationship between the CJEU and national constitutional courts. As such, it offers a framework that may help us to understand future post-Charter judgments by these courts setting out how they conceive their engagement with their counterpart on fundamental rights issues. (shrink)

The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 10 September 2009 which repealed the proclaimed early elections to the Chamber of Deputies because of their alleged unconstitutionality fully manifests unjustifiability of the interference by the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic. The decision directly interfered with the process of democratic re-establishment of the Chamber of Deputies. At the same time, the Court´s intervention was only made possible by violating a number of constitutionally prescribed rules. Finally, the (...) respective ruling could not be issued without a “creative approach” on the part of the Constitutional Court towards the rules governing procedures before the Court. The approach eventually resulted in the violation of principles of fair trial – before a body that should guarantee them. The paper analyses in detail various individual aspects of the case, from general issues of the division of power and contents of the mandate of deputies to individual procedural stages before the Constitutional Court. (shrink)

This article focuses on the analysis of the main positions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in the cases of intellectual property law. In the article three judgments and the positions of the Constitutional Court extracted therefrom are analysed. The Constitutional Court has formed several important positions with reference to intellectual property law regarding usage of property protection norms for the protection of intellectual property, requirements of application of compensation as an (...) alternative to damages compensation and the calculation of criterions thereof as well as functional legal protection of trademarks. It should be noted that Article 23(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania has extended protection to property and, as the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has noted, the constitutional protection of property covers not only the protection of tangible, but also of intellectual property. In the same judgment, the Constitutional Court stated another important intellectual property related rule, namely that constitutionally established property protection rights have to be implemented regardless of whether a corresponding international treaty has not been ratified, as protection of authors’ rights is granted under Articles 23 and 42(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. However, the second position stating that the rights of foreign subjects are to be implemented even though a corresponding international treaty has not been signed is to be criticised as by coming to such a conclusion the Constitutional Court has ignored the otherwise generally recognised principle of territoriality of intellectual property rights. In two other cases the Constitutional Court has made important statements relevant to intellectual property law. First of all, the Court stated that compensation instead of claiming actual damages is constitutional. By analysing the positions formulated by the Court, an indirect conclusion can be made to the effect that compensation instead of claiming actual damages is necessary in order to ensure effective protection of intellectual property rights. In other words, the purposes of compensation can be recognised: restoring (compensating) the infringed interests of the injured party; simplifying judicial proceedings, whereby faster proceedings (litigation) and easier substantiation is sought; and the preventive purpose (strong preventive effect). However, the Court’s argument regarding the criterion of compensation calculation, saying that the damages incurred by the intellectual property rights owner depend on the sale value of the product concerned is criticisable, as it is rarely the case that the licence fee or profit acquired in the result of unauthorised use of intellectual property objects is calculated with reference to the final sale price of the product. Notwithstanding the arguably weak argument of the Court, the Court’s position regarding the criterion of final sale price itself does not preclude the possibility of reaching a fair final decision. Finally, the Court acknowledged that trademark protection was limited to the economic functions of the trademark and the full protection thereof. (shrink)

The author of the paper considers the influence of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court as the only official entity entitled to interpret the Constitution on the criminal procedure. The paper contains the review the following three trends of impact of the constitutional jurisprudence: influence on the legislature in criminal procedure law, influence on the practice of implementation of criminal procedural law and on the science of criminal procedural law. The paper mostly relies on the works by (...) professionals in the field of constitutional law, including publications by prof. dr. Juozas Žilys, the first Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania and the former dean of the Law Faculty of Mykolas Romeris University, as the area of criminal procedure has so far included only several publications, the direct objective of which was to study issues on the constitutionalisation of criminal procedure. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to determine how can new interpretations of old institutes change the status of the taxpayers and tax administrators and to suggest what can the Ministry of Finance do to solve the problem – it can try setting a uniform interpretation of tax institutes. It deals with two findings of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic concerning two institutes described in Tax Administration Act: time-limits for tax assessment and tax inspection; and one (...) finding of the Highest Administrative Court concerning local taxes. Court interpretation is only one of several possibilities of interpretation. Continental system of law differs from the Anglo-American system and we should search for information in the acts, and court practice should be used only alternatively. (shrink)

There is renewed scholarly interest in studying the dynamics of constitutional revolutions and the explanations for the rise of constitutional courts around the world. At the same time, there is growing discussion of democratic backsliding and concern that democracies are exhibiting extremism, weakening of opposition forces and constitutional courts, and violations of civil and political rights that are pertinent to vibrant democracies. Scholars try to study both phenomena and understand the relationship between them. Israel is an important (...) case study for both agendas. This Article analyzes the jurisprudence of Aharon Barak, one of the greatest jurists of our time with a worldwide reputation for revolutionizing both Israeli constitutional law and comparative constitutional law. It explains the tactics and strategy used by Barak to revolutionize Israeli constitutional law on issues of reasonableness, proportionality, standing, justiciability, constitutional review, equality, and supra-constitutional law. It reveals how each revolution paved the way for the next. It offers explanations for the effectiveness of these judicially-led revolutions as well as possible bases for their legitimation. Barak was a common law judge and ultimately treated parliamentary sovereignty as a doctrine arising from common law and constrained by common law, though he never quite put it in these terms. The Article concludes with explanations for the political backlash experienced by the current Israeli Supreme Court that some have characterized as democratic backsliding. It argues that the Court contributes to the development of law as part of a dialog and interaction between the different branches of government. As the Court operates within these dynamics, it must understand and take into account the institutional, political, and social environments in which it operates to preserve legitimacy and achieve efficacy. Barak was a strategic player that laid foundations for an expansive judicial power, but his Court was very prudent in utilizing that power. His successors may have contributed unintentionally to the backlash against the Court by following Barak’s substantive jurisprudence, but not necessarily his prudent tactics and strategy. (shrink)

Legal and political controversies persist about the performance of Kelsenian-type constitutional courts in democratic systems. One of the reasons is that the design of these institutions cannot easily accommodate simultaneous but conflicting demands for the strong protection of democracy and human rights, judicial independence and constitutional restraint. Challenging the dominant approach to the design of contemporary constitutional courts, this article proposes a new way to balance these three values through reforms to the structure of Kelsenian institutions. The (...) proposal seeks to institutionalize constitutional restraint, embedding it into courts’ internal functioning rules while, concurrently, emancipating constitutional judges from political control through a reform of appointment procedures. It is argued that the combined effects of these two reforms will produce constitutional courts that are more independent and able to protect the core elements of a democratic political community while, at the same time, increasing constitutional deference to the democratically elected legislator. (shrink)

The Article discusses the democratic backsliding after 2010 in Hungary, and how it affected the state of human rights in the country, a Member State of the European Union. The main argument of the Article is that paradoxically the non-legitimate 1989 constitution provided full-fledged protection of fundamental rights, while the procedurally legitimate 2011 constitution-making resulted in curtailment of rights and their constitutional guarantees. The Article first describes the democratic transition that occurred in 1989–1990 as a rights revolution and (...) the results of the 2011 “illiberal” constitution, called Fundamental Law, as counter-revolution. The second part of the Article illustrates the constitutional and statutory regulation of human rights protection after this “rule of law revolution,” and the activist jurisprudence of the first Constitutional Court using the concept of an “invisible constitution” to protect human rights. The third part discusses the rights provisions of the new Fundamental Law and several statutes dismantling the guarantees of human rights, with special attention to the decreased possibilities of state institutions, such as the Constitutional Court, the ordinary judiciary and ombudsmen, as well as civil society organizations to effectively protect fundamental rights. The fourth part assesses the efforts of European institutions to force the Hungarian government to comply with the human rights standards laid down in the European Convention of Human Rights and in the Treaty of the European Union. The Article concludes that neither internal nor external challenges could prevent the development of a new authoritarian regime with no guaranteed human rights. (shrink)

In this paper I take up aspects of the origins of the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany, with special attention to the reasons for the aggregation of power and to the question of how far constitutional court models from abroad played a role in the development of the Court. Where the beginnings of the Federal Constitutional Court are concerned, the German tradition and the experience with the lawless regime of the (...) national socialists played a fundamental role. To a certain degree the Austrian model and to a lesser degree that of the United States figured in the deliberations of Germany's post‐War constitutional framers, too. (shrink)

The article analyses the problem of using European constitutional heritage in the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia when interpreting the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. The author analyses several judgments of the Constitutional Court of Latvia, wherein the Court refers to European legal heritage, when interpreting separate norms of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. Such practice is particularly evident in two categories of cases. The influence of (...) European legal heritage is most clearly expressed in cases where the Court ascertains the essence of the continuity doctrine and when interpreting human rights enshrined in the Constitution (the Satversme). The author notes that constitutional courts reveal two tendencies. On the one hand, a constitutional court cannot ignore the international context. European courts are influenced by European Union law and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. On the other hand, constitutional court judges in every country have sworn to be loyal to the national constitution and thus have a duty to exercise constitutional control. These tendencies are not necessarily objectionable. On the contrary–knowledge of the international legal context helps the Constitutional Court exercise its mission. (shrink)

On 26 February 2020, the German Constitutional Court rejected a law from 2015 that prohibited any form of ‘business-like’ assisted suicide as unconstitutional. The landmark ruling of the highest federal court emphasised the high priority given to the rights of autonomy and free personal development, both of which constitute the principle of human dignity, the first principle of the German constitution. The ruling echoes particularities of post-war Germany’s end-of-life debate focusing on patient self-determination while rejecting any discussion (...) of active assistance to die through a lethal injection administered by a doctor. This brief report discusses the ruling in the light of the broader sociopolitical and historical context of the German end-of-life debate. (shrink)

This is a completely revised and updated second edition of Rights Before Courts (2005, paper edition 2008). This book carefully examines the most recent wave of the emergence and case law of activist constitutional courts: those that were set up after the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to most other analysts and scholars, the study does not take for granted that they are a "force for good" but rather subjects them to critical scrutiny against (...) a background of wide-ranging comparative and theoretical analysis of constitutional judicial review in the modern world. The new edition takes in new case law and constitutional developments in the decade since the first edition, including considering the recent disturbing disempowerment of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (which previously was probably the most powerful constitutional court in the world) resulting from the fundamental constitutional changes brought about by the Fidesz government. (shrink)

There are some problems in the implementation of rulings of the Constitutional Court. The legislator should make more efforts for implementing the concept of the provisions of the Constitution provided in the reasoning parts of rulings of the Constitutional Court. The Statute of the Seimas should be supplemented with provisions obligating structural sub-units of the Seimas to carry out permanent and systemic analysis of reasoning parts of rulings of the Constitutional Court. It would allow (...) timely to prepare proposals how to amend still unchallenged legal regulation which, however, from the constitutional standpoint is doubtful. One should consider whether the norm of Item 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 64 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, which allows one to challenge the compliance of a legal act with the Constitution on the grounds of the procedure for adoption regardless of any terms expired after the adoption of a law or other legal act, should be amended. It is to be presumed that the principles of legal certainty and legal security entrenched in the Constitution, as well as other constitutional provisions, imply a certain reasonable period of time within which the subjects provided for in the Constitution may apply to the Constitutional Court with a petition requesting to investigate whether a law or other legal act is not in conflict with the Constitution according to the procedure of their adoption. This period of time should not be a long one, for example, half a year or a year since the official publishing of the law; this term should be a prescriptive one–after it has finished, it would not be allowed to challenge the compliance of a law or other legal act with the Constitution according to the procedure of their adoption. In order to speed up the consideration of cases at the Constitutional Court, one would have to change the procedure of consideration of cases in this Court in essence. (shrink)

The article presents the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court from 26 February 2020 on assisted suicide. The statements regarding human dignity, human rights and the relationship between citizens and the state are examined. Furthermore, the consequences resulting from this interpretation of human dignity for states that are pluralistic and based on human rights will be laid out. The court’s judgment limits the power of parliaments and poses a challenge to many laws in states that see (...) themselves as pluralistic, human rights-based states. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

The article focuses on the new institute of the Lithuanian law of constitutional justice procedure – the dissenting opinion of a Constitutional Court justice as it is consolidated in the Law on the Constitutional Court. It is argued that the current statutory regulation is defective in essence because it creates preconditions for diminishing the quality of both the final act of the Constitutional Court (especially when the dissenting opinion is to be filed by (...) the judge rapporteur) and the dissenting opinion under preparation. The narrative is half-normative and half-behavioural: the institute is analysed in the context of established procedural practice of the Constitutional Court as an extremely collegial institution (also due to the statutory regulation), as well as in the context of the current condition of the public discourse in Lithuania. Namely, statutory regulation allows filing a dissenting opinion (which is not distinguished from the concurring opinion) within three working days after the public announcement of the decision (ruling, conclusion) of the Constitutional Court. Consequently, it is hardly possible to argue that the justice who filed the opinion did not do this in view of the immediate reaction to the decision by the media, the society, or the establishment, and even that he or she did not do this because such reaction took place. Also, the three-day period mentioned above puts any justice ready to file a dissenting (or concurring) opinion into the position where he or she simultaneously needs to participate in the collegial activity of the Court in deciding cases, as well as to write the dissenting (concurring) opinion. In the article, the legislative proposal is presented that the Law on the Constitutional Court should be amended so as to allow for a relatively long time span between the adoption of the decision (ruling, conclusion) and its announcement to the public at large. However, it is not suggested that the general mode of collectivism as dictated by the Law and as implemented in the established practice of the Constitutional Court shall be abandoned. By this article, the author continues his research on the matter as commenced in his two earlier articles (of 2011 and 2012). (shrink)

Allegations of bias against senior judges have not been common in English courts, so the House of Lords had little material to draw on when the Pinochet case was decided. It is therefore worthwhile to compare their Lordships» approach with that of the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany. This court has been selected because: (a) it has a comparable number of judges to the House of Lords and its decisions are unappealable, and (b) its cases have a (...) constitutional and (often) political content—as did the Pinochet case. The Federal Constitutional Court case law is comparatively prolific, so this study has been limited to the last 15 years. The case law covers a wide variety of issues, for example provision of legal opinions or representation, membership of associations, holding of public offices, public statements of opinion. If the standards set in this case law were applied to Lord Hoffmann's position in the Pinochet case, there are grounds for saying that he might not have been excluded. (shrink)

The paper is focused on the criticisms that theorists of political constitutionalism raise against legal constitutionalism, especially with regard to the idea of representation and political sovereignty. At the same time, the intention is to reconstruct the debate between legal and political constitutionalism in contemporary liberalism, starting from the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty. This debate concerns two different approaches: the political one rejects the idea of judicial review by the Supreme Court because it may establish a possible rule of the (...) judges (Michelman; Dworkin). It defends the role of Parliament in constitutional matters, in contrast with the role of the Supreme Court, inasmuch as – according to them – it is not open to political participation. Parliament is considered the only place in which we can exercise our constitutional power and in which our rights could be adequately protected (Bellamy; Waldron; Tushnet; Goldoni). On the other hand, legal constitutionalism upholds the idea of judicial review, defending the role of the Supreme Court as “exemplar of public reason” (Rawls 1993). This article tries to answer to three fundamental questions about constitutional democracy under the banner of political liberalism: 1. What do we mean by counter-majoritarian difficulty? 2. What is the answer that legal and political model of constitutionalism give to this question? 3. What is the role of constitutional courts in democratic regimes and what is their authority within the State? (shrink)

Florijn’s analysis of the Dutch Supreme Court ruling on the Albert Heringa case demonstrates that the Dutch approach to justifying physician-assisted death is based primarily on the physician...

In March 2008, the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) has passed an important, even though preliminary, decision concerning data retention. The GFCC’s decision accepts the storage of data, but greatly restricts their use to serious offenses like murder and organized crime. From an ethical point of view, it is particularly interesting to look at the justification given by the GFCC, which relies heavily on the argument that the “impartiality” (Unbefangenheit) of communication will be thoroughly damaged if feelings of (...) being watched spread in a society. This argument is examined in view of two contrasting theoretical approaches: Discourse ethics and evolutionary contractarian theory. (shrink)

Though nominally exercised on behalf of private citizens, constitutional judicial review does perform an insurance function for politicians who expect to lose power in future elections. This paper discusses the various dimensions of institutional design of constitutional courts and argues that the extent and power of judicial review can be expected to increase relative to the degree of political uncertainty at the time of constitutional design. The paper then develops a simple empirical test of this hypothesis using (...) data from Eastern Europe, regressing measures for various aspects of court design on the strength of the largest party in the legislature. The paper shows that the design of constitutional courts reflects the interests of the dominant political parties and that independent and powerful courts are associated with situations of divided or deadlocked politics. (shrink)

My text offers an attempt to justify theoretically the existence of an important pillar of contemporary constitutional democracy: judicial review. Why do Supreme and Constitutional Courts that are not electorally accountable organs have the power to modify and occasionally cancel from the books statutory legislation passed by elected and accountable representatives? The argument presented discusses and questions the standard doctrine of the separation of powers and is based on the foundations of modern political authority as the agency the (...) function of which is to protect and guarantee citizens’ rights. (shrink)

On 21 June 2011 the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania adopted extensive and important amendments of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Most of them came into force on 1 October 2011.One of the important tasks that have been mentioned for the preparation of amendments was to ensure the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s doctrine of matters of civil procedure. This article analyses one of the changed aspect - the system of defence of (...) public interest. The doctrine of concept of public interest was formed by the resolutions of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court adopted on 16 January and 21 September 2006. That concept was quite confusing and could be interpreted widely as well as narrowly (such as protection of special key values in the Constitution). This paper analyses the manner in which the doctrine of the Constitutional Court has been implemented in the law of civil procedure. In addition, the article analyzes the history of the amendments in the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the protection of public interest. The author presents a situation proposed to the Working Group that prepared the draft amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, and compares the proposals with the effective version of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same article analyses the way that the effective version of the Code of Civil Procedure forces to the protection of the public interest doctrine of the Constitutional Court. The author concludes that the current system is conducive to abuses when the state can envisage the existence of public interest in every dispute and intervene in its investigation. In addition, the court is transformed into an entity liable to defend public interest, while it should be an independent and impartial entity to administer justice. Let us hope that in judicial practice the concept of public interest will be interpreted very narrowly and the Code of Civil Procedure provides the right to collect evidence or apply interim protection measures and etc. will be seen as a political mistake and generally will not be applied (except when it comes to non dispositive cases). (shrink)

Die Arbeit des Bundesverfassungsgerichts hat Ausstrahlungswirkung auf alle drei Staatsgewalten. Während sich das Interesse der Öffentlichkeit wie der Medien im Wesentlichen auf spektakuläre Einzelurteile fokussiert, bemüht sich die Rechtswissenschaft, die Rechtsprechung des BVerfG in ihrer gesamten Breite zu erfassen, zu analysieren und zu strukturieren. Die wissenschaftlichen MitarbeiterInnen nehmen als Erste Tendenzen und Rechtsprechungslinien wahr und begleiten sie mit ihrer Arbeit. Aus dieser Nahsicht herauswird in dem vorliegenden Bandder Versuch unternommen, zentrale, charakteristische und bedeutsame Themen und Fragestellungen aufzugreifen und auf wissenschaftlichem (...) Niveau zu erörtern. Die Beiträge gehen dabei über bloße Entscheidungsbesprechungen ebenso hinaus wie über Rechtsprechungsübersichten. Im Aufzeigen sowohl von Hintergründen als auch von Tendenzen der Verfassungsrechtsprechung und ihrer aktuellen und praktischen Bezüge zur Tätigkeit der anderen Staatsgewalten gerade durch Mitarbeiter des Gerichts liegt der besondere Wert dieses Sammelbandes. (shrink)

In 'A Constitution of Many Minds' Cass Sunstein argues that the three major approaches to constitutional interpretation – Traditionalism, Populism and Cosmopolitanism – all rely on some variation of a ‘many-minds’ argument. Here we assess each of these claims through the lens of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. In regard to the first two approaches we explore the implications of sequential influence among courts (past and foreign, respectively). In regard to the Populist approach, we consider the influence of opinion leaders.

Committees multiply in firms, whether stakeholder boards or committees, multi-stakeholder initiatives, ethics committees, or oversight boards. These arrangements aim to organise and legitimise the social and political activities of corporations. This article raises the question of the appropriate form of such governance structures. The examples above illustrate three possible ways of legitimising corporate quasi-public social and political activities: deliberation within the company, deliberation outside, and an approach we label _corporate constitutionalism_. While the first two models have been tested in practice (...) and assessed in theory, the third one is comparatively more recent, both in practice and in theory. This article focuses on the latter model and asks whether corporate constitutionalism offers a suitable addition, or alternative, to deliberation (with or within firms) for legitimising corporate quasi-public social and political activities. It examines the respective merits of the three models and argues that a corporate constitutional court may mitigate some of the limits of deliberative practices alone. It argues the court is needed in weak regulatory environments, whether they are failing or inherently limited. (shrink)

The obligation to provide reasons may appear rather a simple and straightforward, but in actual practice—as the mutually antagonistic Weiss rulings of the CJEU and the German Bundesverfassungsgericht amply demonstrate—is fraught with constitutional complication. On the one side, there lies the concern with a deeply intrusive form of judicial review which substitutes judicially determined “good” reasons for those of the reviewee decisionmaker—legislatures, administrative agencies, or, as in Weiss, the European Central Bank. On the other side lies the concern with (...) judicial abdication in the face of technical expertise, uncertainty and complexity, turning the reason-giving requirement into a mere façade thereby placing democratic accountability in the modern administrative state beyond law’s remit. Either way, normatively and conceptually, we seem left with a half-way house only. Drawing on the recent US administrative law discourse—the neo-Fullerian concept of an “internal morality of law” and democratic experimentalism —this paper explores the concept of process review as tertium datur. Process review responds to concerns over the rule of law and administrative discretion through indirect, procedural safeguards, by imposing requirements of reasoned justification, rather than through wholesale invalidation or aggressive substantive review. (shrink)

Late last year the Constitutional Court of South Africa decided that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the common law definition of marriage and the statutory marriage formula was unconstitutional as it violated the rights of such couples to equality. The Court suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year to allow Parliament to enact new legislation to correct the defects, failing which certain words would be read into the legislation to accommodate same-sex marriage. A single judge (...) dissented on the issue of remedy, finding that the Court should have developed the common law to include same-sex couples within the definition of marriage and read the necessary wording into the legislation with immediate effect. The decision is the culmination of a legal struggle by gays and lesbians for recognition of their relationships and the protection of their rights. While the scope of the right to marry may have been extended, the rights of domestic partners lag behind, often to the detriment of women in these relationships. (shrink)

This paper discusses the nature of administrative judiciary through Decision No (10) of 2013 which stipulates considering administrative courts a part of regular courts and the effect of this decision on the scope of referral due to lack of jurisdiction, specifically, referral between civil courts and administrative courts. This paper found, through evaluating the decision of the constitutional court, that the considerations this decision was based on are invalid and according to the provisions of the constitution and the (...) regular Court Establishment Law, the administrative judiciary is merely a judicial entity independent from regular courts and could not be a part thereof. However, despite the necessity of abiding to the decision of the constitutional court, we concluded that it has no effect on deciding inadmissibility of referral due to lack of jurisdiction between regular and administrative courts. Although case law, prior to issuing the decision of the constitutional court, considered that the basis of inadmissibility is that the provision of Article (112) of the Civil Procedure Law is limited to regular courts, which administrative courts are not a part thereof; considering that there are other justifications to decide inadmissibility of referral between civil courts and administrative courts, most importantly the difference of judicial procedures followed before each of these courts. Thus, in this paper we provided several recommendations, most importantly, the necessity of interference of the constitutional legislator by explicitly stipulating to consider administrative judiciary as an independent judicial entity. As well, to amend the provision of Article (112) of the Civil Procedures Law by explicitly stipulating not to include referral due to lack of functional competence. (shrink)

This article argues that the decision by the Columbian high court to totally ban the advertising and promotion of tobacco products is sound and could indeed be applied to other types of harmful products.

Article 14 Chapter I ‘The State of Lithuania’ of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania of 1992 reads as follows: ‘Lithuanian shall be the State language’. This principle is not new in the Lithuanian history of constitutionalization, as Lithuanian was the official language of the State in the interwar period but lost this status during the Soviet occupation. After 1988, when many political, economic and social changes crucial for further development of the State took place in Lithuania, linguistic issues (...) re-emerged. It was recognized back then that language played a vital role in the life of the State and the society, and the Lithuanian language was given back its status of the official language by the Constitution. The principle that Lithuanian is the official language of the State, enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, was further elaborated by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in its rulings and judgments. According to its official constitutional doctrine, the Lithuanian language should be treated as a very specific constitutional value, as it forms the basis of the ethnic and cultural identity of the Lithuanian nation and is the guarantor of the national identity and survival. The status of Lithuanian as the official language means that the Lithuanian language must be used in all spheres of public life. The Court also holds that having this principle enshrined in Chapter I ‘The State of Lithuania’ of the Constitution implies that the Lithuanian language enjoys particular protection since the provisions of this Chapter may be amended only by a referendum. (shrink)