Claude Lefort is one of the leading social and political theorists in France today. This anthology of his most important work published over the last four decades makes his writing widely accessible to an English-speaking audience for the first time. With exceptional skill Lefort combines the analysis of contemporary political events with a sensitivity to the history of political thought. His critical account of the development of bureaucracy and totalitarianism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is a timely (...) contribution to current debates about the nature and shortcomings of these societies. His incisive analyses of Marx's theory of history and concept of ideology provide the backdrop for a highly original account of the role of symbolism in modern societies. While critical of many traditional assumptions and doctrines, Lefort develops a political position based on a reappraisal of the idea of human rights and a reconsideration of what "democracy" means today. The Political Forms of Modern Society is a major contribution to contemporary social and political theory. The volume includes a substantial introduction that describes the context of Lefort's writings and highlights the central themes of his work. (shrink)

Writing involves risks—the risk that one will be misunderstood, the risk of being persecuted, the risks of being made a champion for causes in which one does not believe, this risk of inadvertently supporting a reader’s prejudices, to name a few. In trying to give expression to what is true, the writer must “clear a passage within the agitated world of passions,” an undertaking that always to some extent fails: writers are never the master of their own speech. In _Writing: (...) The Political Test, _France’s leading political philosopher, Claude Lefort, illuminates the process by which writers negotiate difficult path to free themselves from the ideological and contextual traps that would doom their attempts to articulate a new vision. Lefort examines writers whose works provide special insights into this problem of risk, both literary artists and political philosophers. Among them are Salman Rushdie, Sade, Tocqueville,m Machiavelli, Leo Strauss, Orwell, Kant, Robespierre, Guizot, and Pierre Clastres. In Tocqueville, for example, Lefort finds that the author’s improvisatory and open-ended expression represents the character of the democratic experience. Orwell’s work on totalitarianism shows up the totalitarian subject’s complicity in this political regime. And Rushdie is remarkable for his solid attack on relativism. With the character and fate of the political forms of modernity, democracy, and totalitarianism a central theme, Lefort concludes with some reflections on the collapse of the Soviet Union. This intriguing and accessible exploration of literature’s political aspects and political philosophy’s literary ones will be welcomed by those who have been stymied by current efforts to bridge these two fields. Taken together, the essays in this volume also stand as an intellectual autobiography of Lefort, making it an excellent introduction to his work for less experience students of political theory or philosophy. (shrink)

In order to raise the question of a potential compatibility between the awareness of Otherness on the one hand, and a form of universality on the other, some hypotheses should first be formulated and defined. 1) How does moral relativism equate to the rejection of universal discourses? 2) Consequently, how can this rejection be understood as a result of Modernity? 3) How can Modernity be understood as recognition of Otherness? The current paper will attempt to outline some answers to these (...) questions based on a comparative reading between Kelsen and Lefort. Firstly, in order to explicate the main lines of the Kelsenian relativistic axiology it seems crucial to consider his second edition of the Pure Theory of Law, since one can find within it the grounds for a limitation of human cognition. His Farewell Lecture, “What is justice?”, is also relevant to this theme since in it he claims that the human world is a world of relative and conflicting values. The combination of these two ideas leads to the rejection of Universalist discourses – identified with the ones of Natural Law theories – in the name of science. Secondly, three of Lefort’s articles seem to be relevant. The first, “The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism”, enables us to understand his symbolic political philosophy, and more importantly, to introduce his definition of Modernity. “Dissolution of Marks and Democratic Challenge” focuses more on the concept of moral relativism, whilst interpreting it as a consistent reaction to modern indeterminacy. Finally, “Politics and Human Rights” offers a restricted concept of Human Rights, reminiscent of Hannah Arendt’s views, namely that human rights mean the rights to have rights. (shrink)

Al-Jazeera and other satellite television stations have transformed Arab politics over the last decade.

A growing interest in Claude Lefort is bringing to light his radical insights on modern democracy, totalitarianism, and human rights. While the notion perhaps most closely associated with Lefort is that of ‘the empty place of power,’ this article offers a reading of Lefort from a unique angle: his concept of the myth of the One. I demonstrate that to Lefort, the phantasmagorical appeal of the One – the desire for harmony, unity and stability – is the force that (...) continually endangers the democratic project, while the distinctive and unavoidable characteristic of democratic society is its ‘inability’ to name itself as One – a coherent and established social self. Thus, the main challenge of society is its symbolic self-institution. The discussion illuminates Lefort’s singular stance in the study of totalitarianism (Arendt), his rejection of the imaginary (next to Castoriadis), his debt to the structuralism scheme (Lévi-Strauss), as well as his conversation with anarchist voices (La Boétie, Clastres) and with psychoanalysis (Lacan). Ultimately, what Lefort coins ‘symbolic division’ condenses the pledge of democracy to embrace a neurotic self, a bodiless body, a nameless identity in an empty space of power. As such, Lefort’s anti-myth of the One promises to be a vexing objective. (shrink)

This article recovers Claude Lefort’s engagement with the issue of populism, which was inspired by the emergence of Jean-Marie Le Pen as a major figure in French politics during the late 1980s. I show how Lefort developed both an analysis of populism as a pathology of modern politics and a new vision of representative democracy as the alternative to populism. In doing so, Lefort drew upon his more familiar theory of democracy and totalitarianism, his study of the history of (...) French political thought, and his partnership with Pierre Ronsanvallon, who was also developing an analysis of populism in response to Le Pen. Lefort’s approach to populism has outlived the context in which he first expressed it. Over the last decade, a number of prominent political theorists have drawn on Lefortian themes to formulate their own accounts of populism and democracy. In many cases, their arguments are quite similar to those that Lefort was expressing in the late 1980s and 1990s. A particular version of Lefortianism, which was foreshadowed in the writings of Lefort himself, has become one of the defining democratic theories of our political moment. (shrink)

Claude Lefort is one of the leading social and political theorists in France today. This anthology of his most important work published over the last four decades makes his writing widely accessible to an English-speaking audience for the first time.With exceptional skill Lefort combines the analysis of contemporary political events with a sensitivity to the history of political thought. His critical account of the development of bureaucracy and totalitarianism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is a timely contribution (...) to current debates about the nature and shortcomings of these societies. His incisive analyses of Marx's theory of history and concept of ideology provide the backdrop for a highly original account of the role of symbolism in modern societies. While critical of many traditional assumptions and doctrines, Lefort develops a political position based on a reappraisal of the idea of human rights and a reconsideration of what "democracy" means today.The Political Forms of Modern Society is a major contribution to contemporary social and political theory. The volume includes a substantial introduction that describes the context of Lefort's writings and highlights the central themes of his work.Claude Lefort teaches social and political theory at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris. He was a founder, with Cornelius Castoriadis, of the influential independent journal of the left, Socialisme ou Barbarie. John B. Thompson is Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Cambridge. (shrink)

From the beginning the French philosopher Claude Lefort has set himself the task of interpreting the political life of modern society-and over time he has succeeded in elaborating a distinctive conception of modern democracy that is linked to both historical analysis and a novel form of philosophical reflection. This book, the first full-scale study of Lefort to appear in English, offers a clear and compelling account of Lefort's accomplishment-its unique merits, its relation to political philosophy within the Continental tradition, (...) and its great relevance today. Much of what passes for political philosophy in our day is merely politicized philosophical concepts, a distinction author Bernard Flynn underscores as he describes the development of Lefort's truly political philosophy-its ideas formed in response to his own political experience and to the work of certain major figures within the tradition of political thought. Beginning with Lefort's most important single work, his book on Machiavelli, Flynn presents the philosopher's conceptions of politics, modernity, and interpretation in the context within which they took shape. He then draws on a wide variety of Lefort's works to explicate his notions of premodern and modern democracy in which totalitarianism, in Lefort's singular and highly influential theory, is identified as a permanent problem of modernity. A valuable exposition of one of the most important Continental philosophers of the post-World War II period, Flynn's book is itself a noteworthy work of interpretive philosophy, pursuing the ideas and issues addressed by Lefort to a point of unparalleled clarity and depth. (shrink)

Claude Lefort's rethinking of ‘the political’ has been highly fruitful for political theory, yet its politics remain unclear. It has inspired transformative, radical-democratic projects, but has also served as a basis for more liberal conceptions. This article explores the sources and implications of this ambiguity by setting Lefort's work against the backdrop of the anti-totalitarian moment in French political thought and the trajectories of two of his students, Miguel Abensour and Marcel Gauchet. It emerges that although Lefort's democratic theory (...) cannot be reduced to a defensive liberalism, neither is it as expansive as some might hope. (shrink)

After asking whether the concept of totalitarianism still has a meaning in today’s world, and whether its critique makes political sense, the author turns to the model provided by the two phases of Claude Lefort’s attempts to understand totalitarianism over the past 60 years. He distinguishes two distinct phases; the first is framed by critical Marxism, the second influenced by the phenomenology of the late Merleau-Ponty. The author stresses Lefort’s major works, including the role of his pathbreaking work on (...) Machiavelli, ‘ La critique du totalitarisme et l’invention de la démocratie’, ‘ Un homme en trop’ (on Solzenhitsyn and the Goulag), and ‘ La complication’ (which rejects the oversimplified interpretation of totalitarianism as simply an ideology). (shrink)

El súbito consenso que se ha producido en nuestros días alrededor de la importancia de la noción democracia no se ha acompañado de una reflexión filosófica sobre su sentido moderno. La obra filosófica de Claude Lefort ha contribuido a llenar este vacío teórico. Para Lefort, el sentido de la democracia moderna no puede revelarse, como ha supuesto la ciencia política, a través de la descripción del funcionamiento de sus instituciones, sino puede estudiarse mediante la exploración de su dimensión simbólica. (...) En efecto, la fundación y el destino de la democracia son inseparables de la indeterminación de sus fundamentos y de la infigurabilidad del poder, de la ley y del saber. Origen y destino que bien pueden ser rastreados a la luz del contraste entre la sociedad democrática y la sociedad totalitaria. El presente ensayo se ocupa de contrastar la dimensión simbólica de ambas formas de sociedad. Palabras clave: Democracia; totalitarismo; dimensión simbólica; político; Claude Lefort Democracy and totalitarianism: The Symbolic Dimension of the Political according to Claude LefortThe sudden consensus prevailing nowadays on the importance of the concept of democracy has not been accompanied by a philosophical reflection on its modern sense. Claude Lefort’s philosophical work has helped to fill this theoretical vacuum. According to Lefort, the sense of modern democracy cannot be disclosed, as political science has assumed, just by describing the operation of its institutions. Rather, it may be studied by exploring its symbolic dimension. In fact, democracy’s origin and fate are inseparable from the indeterminacy of its foundation and the non-figurable nature of power, law and knowledge. Such an origin and fate may indeed be tracked in light of the contrast between the democratic society and the totalitarian one. This essay aims to contrast the symbolic dimension of both forms of society. Keywords : Democracy; totalitarianism; symbolic dimension; political; Claude Lefort. (shrink)

The question of the oeuvre -- The concept of Machiavellianism -- Reading The prince. First signs -- The logic of force -- The social abyss and attachment to power -- Good and evil, the stable and the unstable, the real and the imaginary -- The present and the possible -- Reading The discourses. From The prince to The discourses -- Rome and the "historical" society -- Class difference -- War, and the difference of times -- Authority and the political subject (...) -- The oeuvre, ideology, and interpretation. (shrink)

Tocqueville's judgment of the role of 18 th century men of letters in the preparation of the Revolution is well known. Under their influence, “each public passion disguised itself… in philosophy; political life was violendy forced back into the literature.” Less attention is paid to Tocqueville's reflections on the rise of new theoreticians — so-called “economists or physiocrats.” Tocqueville himself admits that they were not as influential as the philosophies, but he thinks that it is in their writings “that one (...) can best study the true nature” of the Revolution. Further: “One recognizes already in their books mis revolutionary, democratic temperament we know so well. (shrink)

If we take 1968 as a vantage point, certain ideological displacements become evident. When comparing the decade before with the one after the great tumult—which, although not a revolution, still briefly shook French society—one notices a change in the intellectual climate. It is not simply that actors have aged and sometimes changed their costumes, nor that others have come on the scene: the play itself is no longer the same. Since in the following pages I will argue that there has (...) been a renaissance in political thought, it might be useful to begin by listing the most significant ideas that have emerged during the last 50 years and to explain why they have to be interpreted differently. (shrink)

Writing involves risks—the risk that one will be misunderstood, the risk of being persecuted, the risks of being made a champion for causes in which one does not believe, this risk of inadvertently supporting a reader’s prejudices, to name a few. In trying to give expression to what is true, the writer must “clear a passage within the agitated world of passions,” an undertaking that always to some extent fails: writers are never the master of their own speech. In _Writing: (...) The Political Test, _France’s leading political philosopher, Claude Lefort, illuminates the process by which writers negotiate difficult path to free themselves from the ideological and contextual traps that would doom their attempts to articulate a new vision. Lefort examines writers whose works provide special insights into this problem of risk, both literary artists and political philosophers. Among them are Salman Rushdie, Sade, Tocqueville,m Machiavelli, Leo Strauss, Orwell, Kant, Robespierre, Guizot, and Pierre Clastres. In Tocqueville, for example, Lefort finds that the author’s improvisatory and open-ended expression represents the character of the democratic experience. Orwell’s work on totalitarianism shows up the totalitarian subject’s complicity in this political regime. And Rushdie is remarkable for his solid attack on relativism. With the character and fate of the political forms of modernity, democracy, and totalitarianism a central theme, Lefort concludes with some reflections on the collapse of the Soviet Union. This intriguing and accessible exploration of literature’s political aspects and political philosophy’s literary ones will be welcomed by those who have been stymied by current efforts to bridge these two fields. Taken together, the essays in this volume also stand as an intellectual autobiography of Lefort, making it an excellent introduction to his work for less experience students of political theory or philosophy. (shrink)

This essay starts by reviewing Claude Lefort’s writings on totalitarianism, a theme that runs like a red thread through his oeuvre and plays a key role in the different stages of his intellectual development. The analysis of the USSR is a central interest of Lefort and his colleagues at Socialisme ou Barbarie (and inspires them to adopt an explicitly “political” approach against the “economism” of their fellow Marxists); the problem of totalitarianism features prominently in Lefort’s theory of democracy and (...) human rights (where it functions as the “flipside” of democracy); and the theme holds Lefort’s attention well after the events of 1989. The emphasis of this essay, however, is not on the chronology of Lefort’s trajectory, but on the methodological role of totalitarianism in his theoretical framework. Lefort’s account of totalitarianism serves him as a tool to dissect the symbolic fabric of modern society. In Arendt’s view, totalitarian rule reveals something of the essence of modernity, as a movement towards ever increasing technical mastery. For Lefort, by contrast, totalitarian tendencies arise as an attempt to close off the experience of indeterminacy that has been opened up by political modernity. He shows that the totalitarian “imaginary” (which he dissects in psychoanalytic terms) presupposes yet deliberately inverts the very ideas that sparked the democratic revolution and that are central to the self-representation of democratic societies. In consequence, democracy is continuously at risk of degenerating into totalitarianism. Importantly, the totalitarian threat, which Lefort believes to be the main threat to modern society, only becomes visible by adopting a specifically “political” perspective. It is therefore of the utmost importance that we continue to understand and to interpret our society in “political” terms, that is, in reference to the symbolic constellation of collective power. (shrink)

French political philosophy has experienced a renewal over the last twenty years. One of its leading projects is Marcel Gauchet’s reflection on democracy and religion. This project situates itself within the context of the French debate on modernity and autonomy launched by the work of Cornelius Castoriadis. Gauchet’s work makes a significant contribution to this debate by building on the pioneering work of Lefort on the political self-instituting capacity of modern societies and the associated shift from religion to ideology. It (...) thus explores the centrality of the notion of sovereignty in the advent of liberal democracy and conducts this reflection within an overall discussion of the role played by Christianity in the genesis of European modernity. It elaborates an anthropology of modernity which explores the relationship between individualism and democracy and redefines modernity as a project of sovereignty which aims at creating a radically new society, the society of individuals. (shrink)

RESUMO: Tendo como eixo organizador o debate acerca da noção de direitos do homem e do cidadão e a eficácia destes no que se refere à luta política por novos direitos, o artigo investiga o caráter inovador da democracia moderna. Em sua abordagem do tema, C. Lefort combate três teses: a de que a defesa de direitos humanos universais representaria um perigo à política vigorosa, instituída em Estados benevolentes; a de que esses direitos seriam a expressão mais acabada da ideologia (...) do individualismo burguês e corresponderiam a formalidades vazias, cujo sentido seria apenas o de escamotear a violência social e sacralizar privilégios; e, por fim, a tese segundo a qual as instituições democráticas visariam somente a reproduzir as relações de propriedade e força vigentes no capitalismo e não permitiriam que as contradições sociais fossem expressas ou mesmo resolvidas no campo da política. Trata-se de retomar a filosofia política proposta por C. Lefort, a qual enfatiza o caráter inédito da democracia moderna, para então explicitar, contrariando tais críticas, a perspectiva histórica de luta por direitos aberta pela invenção democrática. ABSTRACT: Having as the central theme the debate about the notion of human and citizen rights and the effectiveness of these in relation to the political struggle for new rights, this article investigates the innovative character of modern democracy. In his approach to the subject, C. Lefort argues three theses: the idea that the defense of universal human rights represents a danger to vigorous politics in benevolent States; the thesis which says that these rights would be the most complete expression of the ideology of bourgeois individualism and correspond to empty formalities whose meaning would be simply to hide social violence and enshrine privileges; and, finally, the argument that democratic institutions would aim to only reproduce the property relations and forces existing in capitalism and not allow the expression of social contradictions or their resolution in the field of politics. The article reviews the political philosophy proposed by Lefort, which emphasizes the unprecedented nature of representative democracy, and then explains the historical perspective of struggle for rights opened by the democratic invention. (shrink)

The starting point of this article is that there is a kind of ‘hidden dialogue’ that Claude Lefort is trying to conduct with Leo Strauss on the theologico-political problem. If Strauss claims this problem to be ‘irresolvable’, Lefort seeks to show that the ‘permanence of the theologico-political’ in modernity is only an appearance, as democracy has, in the last instance, succeeded in ‘cutting’ the knot tied between the theological and the political in pre-modern societies. Moreover, while Strauss associates recognition (...) of the irresolvable character of the theologico-political problem with moderation, Lefort takes the exact opposite view, insisting on the lack of moderation, even excess, that weighs particularly on modern politics consequent to any attempt to amalgamate the theological with the political. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to compare two authors: Hans Kelsen and Leo Strauss. More specifically, it will compare Kelsen’s “What is Justice?”—his Farewell Lecture given at Berkeley in 1952—and Leo Strauss’s Natural Right and History—one of the main works on political philosophy published in twentieth century America. Both are key texts dealing with the same subject, justice. Although the two texts were written around the same time by authors who shared a similar history, they seem to defend radically (...) opposed points of view. However, despite and beyond their otherwise real differences, the two texts articulate the same important idea: if one wants to think about political issues, one has to address the question of justice. This chapter will attempt to illustrate through a comparison of these two texts the importance of addressing the question of justice, especially in our modern democracies. (shrink)

Interculturalism and multiculturalism have been the subject of university courses, seminars and international colloquia for two decades, producing a large literature which has become the basis for a general political debate about democracy in the US and Western Europe. These concepts are now central even in discussions about an Eastern Europe recently liberated from the communist yoke — especially in regions with large national minorities. Just mentioning them seems sufficient to resolve the age old problems of the struggles between majority (...) and minority in those regions. Is it legitimate to borrow such concepts? Can the same terms be used to describe the new migrations of people from the impoverished South or East to the rich West and those historical movements which resulted in the Europe of nations? (shrink)

Why did the French Revolution lead to the Terror when the American Revolution yielded a liberal democracy? Tocqueville spent his life trying to understand the paradox. This book on the genesis of Democracy in America considers themes of democracy and revolution in light of his early political activities and subsequent studies of the past.

There is a very fine line separating democracy from terror. Through analysis of the work of the French political philosopher Claude Lefort, I hope to show that there is an uncanny proximity between terror and democracy. In Lefort’s view, political power rests on the contingency and groundlessness that politics has experienced since the French Revolution. Since that time, political power has been separated from the divine and has become a human affair. For Lefort, totalitarianism can come only after the (...) democratic turn because democracy and totalitarianism have the same political foundation in the French Revolution. The openness of democracy is what allows for a totalitarian regime to take power and to terrorize people. But democracy is also able to combat terrorism because, by giving more voice to the excluded and the oppressed, democracy may be able to assimilate them; for if the claim of such people is a lack of autonomy, democracy is the system that should be able to allow them to exercise power. A true war on terror, therefore, would empower people through democracy and not disenfranchise them further. (shrink)

This essay offers only a broad description of a possible comparison between 'savage democracy' in the terms of Claude Lefort and the 'principle of anarchy' according to Reiner Schurmann. First, I shall try to define savage democracy. Then, in a second move, after having clarified Schurmann's principle of anarchy, I shall outline the terms for a possible confrontation of their respective views. The point here is to show the extent to which the contextualization of democracy with anarchy, considered as (...) principle, is of a nature to bring out democracy's most 'savage' characteristics - but without for all that concealing the difficulties that this perspective provokes or reveals. Indeed, it is precisely by returning to and excavating the gap between anarchy and principle that one most closely approaches the 'savage essence' of democracy. Key Words: anarchy • democracy • domination • Heidegger • Lefort • Machiavelli • politics • savage democracy • Schurmann • totalitarianism. (shrink)

In this article I confront Jürgen Habermas' deliberative model of democracy with Claude Lefort's analysis of democracy as a regime in which the locus of power remains an empty place. This confrontation reveals several structural similarities between the two authors and explains how the proceduralization of popular sovereignty provides a discourse-theoretical interpretation of the empty place of power. At the same time, Lefort's insistence on the open-ended nature of the democratic struggle also points towards an unresolved tension at the (...) core of Habermas' model between the cognitive nature of deliberation on the one hand and the freedom of moral and political agents on the other. A proper solution of this tension requires a full appreciation of the ineliminable gap between actual and ideal deliberation. Because actual deliberation can never result in an ideal consensus, the actual exercise of democratic power should be understood as an unavoidable interruption of deliberation. Key Words: consensus • deliberation • democracy • empty place of power • Jürgen Habermas • Claude Lefort. (shrink)

French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy is acting uneasily when it comes to contemporary politics. There is a sort of agitation in his work in relation to this question. At several places we read an appeal to deal thoroughly with this question and ‘ qu’il y a un travail à faire ’, that there is still work to do. From the beginning of the 1980s with the ‘Centre de Recherches Philosophiques sur le Politique’ and the two books resulting out of that, until (...) the many, rather short texts he published on this topic during the last years of the century, the question of politics crosses very clearly Nancy’s work. He not only fulminates against the contemporary philosophical ‘content’ with democracy. Instead of defending a political regime, he wants to think the form of politics in the most critical and sceptical way. To Nancy, the worst thing we can do in thinking contemporary politics, is taking it for granted that we know what politics is about today, given the evidence of the global democracy. So to him, we almost have to be at unease when it comes to politics. On the other hand, in thinking contemporary democracy, the work of Claude Lefort is undeniably the main reference. Long before the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the upsurge of an all-too-easy anti-Marxism, Lefort articulated in a nuanced way the formal differences between totalitarianism and democracy. According to Lefort, the specific ‘form’ of democracy is that it never becomes an accomplished and fulfilled form as such. In a certain sense, the only ‘form’ of democracy is formlessness, a form without form. In a democracy, the place of power becomes literally ‘ infigurable ’ as Lefort says. Democracy stands for formlessness or the relation to a void. Nancy objects so to say against a ‘Leformal’ conception of democracy – the empty place, the formless, the ‘ infigurable ’ or ‘ sans figure ’, the ever yet to come. ... This conception of democracy would still be caught in the infinite metaphysical, dialectical horizon of immanentism, while it pretends to have already left that horizon behind it, presenting itself as the finite alternative to the infinite totalitarian politics. Democracy as formlessness is indeed no longer based on a metaphysical Idea, Figure, or Truth. We want to clear up the philosophical sky of Nancy’s remarks by confronting them with some thoughts of Lefort. (shrink)

The author compares the different interpretations by Castoriadis and Lefort of democratic autonomy. For both, autonomy involves questioning all pregiven meaning. Castoriadis, while rejecting any law of historical progress, regards the history of autonomy as the development of a movement which commenced in a limited political domain in ancient Greece and expanded in other domains in Western Europe from the 11th century on. In theory, it has eliminated pregiven meaning, but has remained stuck in a liberal oligarchy, bogged down by (...) a tide of insignificance. It remains to further the project of autonomy to the point where a truly autonomous society will be able to accept as such the “Abyss” (the “Chaos”) it experiences without hiding behind replicas such as those provided by religion. Lefort, on the other hand, while similarly accepting democracy’s desire for autonomy, believes the source of its principles are enigmatic and it will continue to remain open to the authentic human experience of radical transcendence even without God. He believes that the threat of relativism can be avoided as democracy is more just since it allows its members to be more open to this radical transcendence than other forms of society. (shrink)

Winston Churchill said of democracy that it was ‘the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.’ The same could be said of liberalism. While liberalism displays an unfailing optimism with regard to the capacity of human beings to make themselves ‘masters and possessors of nature’, it displays a profound pessimism when it comes to appreciating their moral capacity to build a decent world for themselves. As Michea shows, the roots (...) of this pessimism lie in the idea – an eminently modern one – that the desire to establish the reign of the Good lies at the origin of all the ills besetting the human race. Liberalism’s critique of the ‘tyranny of the Good’ naturally had its costs. It created a view of modern politics as a purely negative art – that of defining the least bad society possible. It is in this sense that liberalism has to be understood, and understands itself, as the ‘politics of lesser evil’. By unravelling the logic that lies at the heart of the liberal project, Michea is able to shed fresh light on one of the key ideas that have shaped the civilization of the West. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to investigate how Lefort’s interpretation of Machiavelli’s works, during the period 1950-1972, influences his later writings. This will be done through a double objective: Firstly, Lefort gives an account of the relationship that exists between his theory of modern democracy –and the indeterminacy that is consubstantial– and the Machiavellian notion of the Republic; and, onthe other hand, how the importance of personal leadership for Machiavelli to think the political regimes is occluded. This double objective (...) is crossed by the following reading hypothesis: Machiavelli is a fundamental contribution to reflect on the lefortian theory of democracy, both for what Lefort takes from Machiavelli and for what he dismisses. (shrink)

One of the more perplexing terms to appear across Claude Lefort’s later oeuvre, ‘wild’ or ‘savage’ democracy has proved a difficult and divisive facet of Lefort’s political phi...

When young, Claude Lefort, was a committed Trotskyist. However, in the mid 50’s he lost his faith in the communist and truly proletarian revolution, which was presumed to lead to a truly socialist society. By claiming Marxism was not a political philosophy, he proposed a new view on politics. The foundation of this new philosophy was the opposition of totalitarianism and democracy. What kind of society it is, totalitarian or democratic, is decided by looking at the authority. In totalitarianism (...) the place of the authority is occupied by one particular person, or a particular group. In democracy, that place is empty. Nobody, or no group may take this place permanently. However, at the same time everyone has the right to it. So democracy as such has no solid foundations; its foundations are undefined and unstable. For Lefort, it is democracy that constitutes revolution, which makes members of the society constantly involved in politics, so as not to allow one person to take that empty place. A question then arises, does permanent revolution really determine a democratic society and protects against totalitarianism? (shrink)

The work that Maurice Merleau-Ponty planned to call _The Prose of the World,_ or _Introduction to the Prose of the World,_ was unfinished at the time of his death. The book was to constitute the first section of a two-part work whose aim was to offer, as an extension of his Phenomenology of Perception, a theory of truth. This edition's editor, Claude Lefort, has interpreted and transcribed the surviving typescript, reproducing Merleau-Ponty's own notes and adding documentation and commentary.

Thinking Radical Democracy is an introduction to nine key political thinkers who contributed to the emergence of radical democratic thought in post-war French political theory: Hannah Arendt, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Pierre Clastres, Claude Lefort, Cornelius Castoriadis, Guy Debord, Jacques Rancière, Étienne Balibar, and Miguel Abensour. The essays in this collection connect these writers through their shared contribution to the idea that division and difference in politics can be perceived as productive, creative, and fundamentally democratic. The questions they raise regarding equality (...) and emancipation in a democratic society will be of interest to those studying social and political thought or democratic activist movements like the Occupy movements and Idle No More. --Provided by publisher. (shrink)

There is a tendency today to substitute the affirmation of the absolute value of peace for an earlier, fully-formulated ideal of universal peace. This formula, if I am not mistaken, bears the mark of a new exigency: how to maintain the philosophical task, that is, give a basis to the idea of peace that does not arise solely from circumstantial considerations—however imperious they may be, since they come from the knowledge of the danger that a new world war would bring (...) to entire populations—without again falling under Utopian illusions that have fed the projects of perpetual peace. However, some of the difficulties with which the present consideration will deal give a glimpse of the definition of peace as an absolute value. I think it would be wise to examine this definition briefly in order to clear a way for myself. (shrink)