Both in the Introduction to the Treatise of Human Nature and in the, Hume expressly declared that his goal was to contribute to the development of a “science of man” methodologically akin to the natural sciences, and capable of emulating their “accuracy” and explanatory success. He regarded these sciences as starting from careful observation of phenomena, and proceeding to the establish-ment of “principles” of increasing generality. Although rejecting as vain any hope of discovering “the ultimate principles” of any science, he (...) did not make clear what exactly he thought the principles actually involved in natural philosophy are. This article aims to shed some light on this issue through a survey and examination of the principles of Hume’s “science of man”, and of the most representative examples of principles of natural philosophy considered by Hume. (shrink)

Ao defender, nos Princípios matemáticos de filosofia natural, a existência de uma força de gravitação universal, Newton desencadeou uma onda de dúvidas e objeções filosóficas. Suas próprias declarações sobre a natureza da gravitação não são facilmente interpretáveis como formando um conjunto consistente de opiniões. Por um lado, logo após fornecer as três definições de "quantidades de forças centrípetas" (Defs. 6-8), Newton observa que está tratando tais forças "matematicamente", sem se pronunciar sobre sua realidade física. Mas, por outro lado, no Escólio (...) Geral inserido no final da segunda edição do livro, Newton diz que foi capaz de "explicar" vários fenômenos de movimento por meio da força de gravidade - que ele mostrou ser um tipo de força centrípeta -, embora não tivesse ainda conseguido explicar a causa dessa força. Uma interpretação plausível dessas últimas afirmações é que Newton acreditava que pôde inferir, a partir dos fenômenos, a existência da força de gravidade, enquanto agente causal real de certos movimentos, mas que ainda não havia tido sucesso em descobrir a causa dessa causa. O objetivo principal do presente artigo não é aprofundar a análise histórica das declarações de Newton, mas examinar como essa questão se insere no debate mais geral sobre o estatuto epistemológico das hipóteses científicas que transcendem a experiência imediata. Segundo a posição defendida, entre muitos outros, por John Locke, tais hipóteses devem ser interpretadas como tentativas legítimas de descrever aspectos inobserváveis da realidade. Em contraste com isso, no caso específico das hipóteses sobre forças - de gravitação ou quaisquer outras -, George Berkeley argumentou vigorosamente a favor de sua interpretação como meros artifícios teóricos úteis às "demonstrações matemáticas" na ciência da mecânica. Ao longo da análise das vantagens e desvantagens filosóficas dessas posições opostas, indica-se aqui que, embora a interpretação realista pareça fazer mais justiça ao desenvolvimento real da física após os Princípios matemáticos, a interpretação instrumentalista de Berkeley tem o mérito filosófico inegável de representar uma adesão mais firme ao empirismo, que é, de um modo ou de outro, valorizado por ambas as partes envolvidas na disputa sobre a natureza da gravitação. Newton's defence, in the Principia, of the existence of a universal force of gravity immediately gave rise to a wave of philosophical doubts and objections. His own remarks on the nature of gravitation are not easily amenable of a consistent, uniform interpretation. This paper begins by reviewing briefly these remarks. Its primary objective is, however, to examine how this important scientific issue contributed to demarcate two main epistemological positions on the status of scientific hypotheses transcending immediate experience. In Newton's time, two exponents of these positions were, respectively, Locke and Berkeley. Intriguingly, Newton fuelled both the Berkeleyan, instrumentalist interpretation, and the Lockean, realist interpretation. On the one hand, immediately after offering the definitions of "quantities of centripetal forces" (Definitions 6-8), he warned that he was treating these forces "mathematically", without pronouncing on its physical status. This remark lends support to Berkeley's anti-realist interpretation of forces, as Berkeley himself was keen to point out. But in the General Scholium, at the end of the book, Newton declared that he could "explain" certain important phenomena of motion by the force of gravity, although he had not yet been able to explain the cause of this force, adding, famously, that he would "feign no hypotheses" about this issue. A natural, realist interpretation of this statement is that Newton believed that he could infer, from the phenomena, the existence of gravity, as a real, causal physical agent, but that he had not yet succeeded in discovering the cause of this cause. In discussing the shortcomings and advantages of these opposing views, we indicate that although the realist interpretation appears to do more justice to the actual development of physics after the Principia, Berkeley's interpretation has the philosophical merit of representing a firmer adherence to empiricism, a position valued, in one way or another, by all parties involved in the dispute on the nature of gravitation. (shrink)

This paper discusses an argument for scientific realism put forward by Anthony Quinton in The Nature of Things. The argument – here called the controlled continuity argument – seems to have received no attention in the literature, apparently because it may easily be mistaken for a better-known argument, Grover Maxwell’s “argument from the continuum”. It is argued here that, in point of fact, the two are quite distinct and that Quinton’s argument has several advantages over Maxwell’s. The controlled continuity argument (...) is also compared to Ian Hacking’s “argument from coincidence”. It is pointed out that both arguments are to a large extent independent from considerations about high-level scientific theories, and that both are abductive arguments at the core. But these similarities do not dilute an important difference related to the fact that Quinton’s argument cleverly seeks to anchor belief in unobservable entities in realism about ordinary objects, which is a position shared by most contemporary scientific anti-realists. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p229 Tanto no Tratado da Natureza Humana como na Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano , Hume mostra-se convencido de que “não há acaso no mundo”, e que “aquilo que o vulgo chama de acaso não passa de uma causa secreta e escondida”. Essa tese desempenha papel crucial em sua análise do livre-arbítrio e, conseguintemente, da responsabilidade moral; é também um elemento importante em sua discussão sobre os milagres. No entanto, o próprio Hume ofereceu, no Tratado , um argumento convincente para (...) mostrar que o princípio de causalidade, segundo o qual tudo o que começa a existir tem uma causa, não pode ser conhecido a priori , por intuição ou demonstração. Logo, essa “opinião tem necessariamente de provir da observação e experiência”. O presente trabalho examina essa tese, mostrando, inicialmente, qual era a proposta de Hume para fundar na experiência o princípio de causalidade, e depois qual, de fato, teria sido o mais robusto fundamento para esse princípio: a mecânica newtoniana. Explica-se, por fim, como esse fundamento empírico indireto e o próprio argumento de Hume foram solapados pela física quântica, no século XX. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p49 The aim of this article is to offer a rejoinder to an argument against scientific realism put forward by van Fraassen, based on theoretical considerations regarding microphysics. At a certain stage of his general attack to scientific realism, van Fraassen argues, in contrast to what realists typically hold, that empirical regularities should sometimes be regarded as “brute facts”, which do not ask for explanation in terms of deeper, unobservable mechanisms. The argument from microphysics formulated by van Fraassen is based (...) on the claim that in microphysics the demand for explanation leads to a demand for the so-called hidden-variable theories, which “runs contrary to at least one major school of thought in twentieth-century physics”. It is shown here that this argument does not represent an insurmountable obstacle to scientific realism, not even when a series of important theoretical and experimental results against hidden-variable theories — and not merely a conflict with a certain school of thought—is taken into account. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to offer a rejoinder to an argument against scientific realism put forward by van Fraassen, based on theoretical considerations regarding microphysics. At a certain stage of his general attack to scientific realism, van Fraassen argues, in contrast to what realists typically hold, that empirical regularities should sometimes be regarded as “brute facts”, which do not ask for explanation in terms of deeper, unobservable mechanisms. The argument from microphysics formulated by van Fraassen is based on (...) the claim that in microphysics the demand for explanation leads to a demand for the so-called hidden-variable theories, which “runs contrary to at least one major school of thought in twentieth-century physics”. It is shown here that this argument does not represent an insurmountable obstacle to scientific realism, not even when a series of important theoretical and experimental results against hidden-variable theories — and not merely a conflict with a certain school of thought—is taken into account. (shrink)

Both in the Treatise of Human Nature and in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Hume defends that “there is no chance in the world”, and that “what the vulgar call chance is nothing but a secret and conceal’d cause”. This view plays a crucial role in Hume’s influential analysis of free will and moral responsibility. It functions also as a central presupposition in his discussion of miracles. However, Hume himself argued convincingly that the “maxim of causality”, according to which “whatever (...) begins to exist, must have a cause of existence” cannot be established a priori, by either intuition or demonstration. He concludes, then, that such “opinion must necessarily arise from observation and experience”. In the present article I analyse this latter statement, showing, first, what was Hume detailed proposal for funding the principle of causality on experience. Given the apparent weakness of this proposal, I then speculate on what kind of firmer empirical foundation could, instead, have been given, in Hume’s time, to the principle of causality, namely, the indirect support offered by Newtonian mechanics. Finally, I show how this theoretical link between experience and the principle, and also Hume’s straightforward, inductive argument, were undermined by the inception of quantum physics, at the beginning of the 20th century. (shrink)

In this paper we present a general theory of normal forms, based on a categorial result for the free monoid construction. We shall use the theory mainly for proposictional modal logic, although it seems to have a wider range of applications. We shall formally represent normal forms as combinatorial objects, basically labelled trees and forests. This geometric conceptualization is implicit in and our approach will extend it to other cases and make it more direct: operations of a purely geometric and (...) combinatorial nature will be introduced in order to give a mathematical description of the basic logical/algebraic constructions .We begin by recalling the above-mentioned categorial construction: we need a careful inspection of it because in the various examples considered later we plan to deduce from it in a uniform way the normal forms and the description of finitely generated free algebras. This method always works whenever we can describe the category of algebras corresponding to the logic under consideration as a T-objects category. When this simple description seems not to be available, still the general theory might be of some interest, because a description of the category of algebras as a T-objects category plus equation is possible .The central part of the paper is more advanced and specific: we show how the general approach presented here can provide some insights even in the basic case of the modal system K. Section 4 contains a contribution to the theory of normal forms, namely the description of the uniform substitution. This result will enable us to give a duality theorem for the category of finitely generated free modal algebras and in Section 5 to provide a characterization of the collections of normal forms which happen to be normal forms for a logic, thus giving a description of the lattice of modal logics.Section 6 deals with some applications: we shall show how to use normal forms in order to prove for the modal system K the definability of higher-order propositional quantifiers and of the tense operator F .As to the prerequisites, the paper is almost self-contained. The reader is only assumed to have familiarity with standard techniques in algebraic logic ). Knowledge of the basic facts about adjoint functors is required too, see e.g. McLane or the appendix. (shrink)

We characterize (both from a syntactic and an algebraic point of view) the normal K4-logics for which unification is filtering. We also give a sufficient semantic criterion for existence of most general unifiers, covering natural extensions of K4.2⁺ (i.e., of the modal system obtained from K4 by adding to it, as a further axiom schemata, the modal translation of the weak excluded middle principle).

We show that the variety of Heyting algebras has finitary unification type. We also show that the subvariety obtained by adding it De Morgan law is the biggest variety of Heyting algebras having unitary unification type. Proofs make essential use of suitable characterizations (both from the semantic and the syntactic side) of finitely presented projective algebras.

We show that some common varieties of modal K4-algebras have finitary unification type, thus providing effective best solutions for equations in free algebras. Applications to admissible inference rules are immediate.

By means of models in toposes of C-sets (where C is a small category), necessary conditions are found for the minimum quantified extension of a propositional (intermediate, modal) logic to be complete with respect to Kripke semantics; in particular, many well-known systems turn out to be incomplete.

We show that (contrary to the parallel case of intuitionistic logic, see [7], [4]) there does not exist a translation fromS42 (the propositional modal systemS4 enriched with propositional quantifiers) intoS4 that preserves provability and reduces to identity for Boolean connectives and.

A. M. Pitts in [Pi] proved that HA op fp is a bi-Heyting category satisfying the Lawrence condition. We show that the embedding $\Phi: HA^\mathrm{op}_\mathrm{fp} \longrightarrow Sh(\mathbf{P_0,J_0})$ into the topos of sheaves, (P 0 is the category of finite rooted posets and open maps, J 0 the canonical topology on P 0 ) given by $H \longmapsto HA(H,\mathscr{D}(-)): \mathbf{P_0} \longrightarrow \text{Set}$ preserves the structure mentioned above, finite coproducts, and subobject classifier, it is also conservative. This whole structure on HA op (...) fp can be derived from that of Sh(P 0 ,J 0 ) via the embedding Φ. We also show that the equivalence relations in HA op fp are not effective in general. On the way to these results we establish a new kind of duality between HA op fp and a category of sheaves equipped with certain structure defined in terms of Ehrenfeucht games. Our methods are model-theoretic and combinatorial as opposed to proof-theoretic as in [Pi]. (shrink)

This article suggests developing the concept of spiritual ecology into that of balanced spiritual ecosystems. Philosophies, theologies, education systems, political parties, and gender-based and ethnic identity politics need to be critiqued both from within and without so that they can finally contribute to the creation, maintenance and flourishing of balanced spiritual ecosystems.Contribution: Spiritual ecology is a concept on which converge different worldviews. This article recommends using balanced spiritual ecosystems, instead. The new concept could provoke further reflection on how our -ontologies (...) and communities co-exist and whether they do it organically and spiritually. This article befits HTS’s interest in ‘theology and nature’. (shrink)

Este articulo tiene el objetivo de cuestionar los sentidos del aula de filosofia, sobre todo en la educaciön secundaria. Para eso, parte de la definiciön de filosofia expuesta por Deleuze y Guattari en Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?, donde la senala como una actividad de creaciön de conceptos, hace critica a las concepciones del aula de filosofia como momentos de reflexion, de contemplaciön o incluso de diälogos, una vez que ninguna de estas tareas se hace especfficamente filosöfica. Para garantizar esa especificidad, (...) intenta caracterizar el aula de filosofia como un "taller de conceptos", un espacio donde el maestro y los alumnos se hacen creadores de conceptos, alrededor de problemas vividos, tomando como herramientas los conceptos histöricamente producidos. (shrink)

Aquí lo que me interesa es, primero, distinguir dos problemas de justificación con respecto a la inferencia inductiva: por un lado, el de una justificación persuasiva de este tipo de inferencia y, por otro lado, el de una justificación explicativa de tal inferencia. En segundo lugar, intento mostrar que el argumento de Ramsey-de Finetti a favor de las reglas inductivas de la lógica bayesiana no es capaz de proporcionar una justifi-cación persuasiva de estas reglas. Finalmente, propongo una justificación explicativa para (...) las reglas de condicionalización bayesianas en términos de un argumento trascendental de inspiración kantiana y de estilo davidsoniano.Here, I am interested, firstly, in distinguishing two justification problems concerning inductive inference: on the one hand, the problem of a persuasive justification of induction and, on the other, the problem of an explicative justification of this sort of inference. Secondly, I intend to show that Ramsey-de Finetti’s argument in favor of Bayesian inductive rules cannot provide a persuasive justification for these rules. Finally, I propose an explicative justification for Bayesian conditionalization rules in terms of a transcendental argument of Kantian inspiration and Davidsonian style. (shrink)

Die Entwicklung der Rationalität ist eine Erfolgsgeschichte. Denn die Rationalität war und ist der Motor der abendländischen Kultur und der Grund dafür, dass sie in der Neuzeit allen anderen Weltkulturen machtpolitisch überlegen ist. Zwischen dem 8. und 6. Jahrhundert v. Chr. formierte sich das logische Denken gleich auf mehreren Feldern: Durch die Erfindung der philosophischen Wissenschaft, die Geometrisierung des Raumes und der Schlachtordnung, die Berechnung der Zeit, durch die Geldwirtschaft und die neuen Organisationsformen des Politischen wurde Rationalität zum Synonym für (...) Fortschritt. Auch die Begriffe Freiheit und Demokratie gehören in diesen Zusammenhang. Silvio Vietta zeichnet diese Erfolgsgeschichte nach, beschreibt aber auch ihre Gefahren und Kurzschlüsse. In der Konsequenz entwickelt er eine : ndere9 aisthetisch rückgebundene und reflexive Rationalität, die uns aus den gegenwärtigen Krisen herausführen könnte. (shrink)

This text through the direct use to Foucault’s work and using the concepts of ‘care of the self’ and biopolitics is questioning and analyzing resistance and practices of freedom. Mainly, from the Foucault’s courses at the College de France and the methodological tools found there, here I present a discussion about Gilles Deleuze’s contributions to Foucault’s thought and I develop a dialog where I try to explain the concepts of domination, power, ethics, esthetics and the relationship of the self with (...) himself. (shrink)

In the literature, the nature of the relationships between memory processes and summary evaluations is still a debate. According to some theoretical approaches (e.g., “two-memory hypothesis”; Anderson, 1989) retrospective evaluations are based on the impression formed while attending to the to-be-assessed stimuli(on-line judgment) – no functional dependence between information retrieval and judgment is implied. Conversely, several theories entail that judgment must depend, at least in part, on memory processes (e.g., Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Schwarz, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). (...) The present study contributes to this debate by addressing two important issues. First, it shows how more comprehensive memory measures than those used previously (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986) are necessary in order to detect a relationship between memory and retrospective evaluations. Secondly, it demonstrates how memory strategies influence the relationship between memory and judgment. Participants recalled lists of words, after having assessed each of them for their pleasantness. Results showed a clear association between memory and judgment, which was mediated by the individual strategies participants used to recall the items. (shrink)

In this paper we show that the usual intuitionistic characterization of the decidability of the propositional function B prop [x : A], i. e. to require that the predicate ∨ ¬ B) is provable, is equivalent, when working within the framework of Martin-Löf's Intuitionistic Type Theory, to require that there exists a decision function ψ: A → Boole such that = Booletrue) ↔ B). Since we will also show that the proposition x = Booletrue [x: Boole] is decidable, we can (...) alternatively say that the main result of this paper is a proof that the decidability of the predicate Bprop [x : A] can be effectively reduced by a function ψ A → Boole to the decidability of the predicate ψ = Booletrue [x : A]. All the proofs are carried out within the Intuitionistic Type Theory and hence the decision function ψ, together with a proof of its correctness, is effectively constructed as a function of the proof of ∨ ¬ B). (shrink)

We analyze some extensions of Martin-Löf 's constructive type theory by means of extensional set constructors and we show that often the most natural requirements over them lead to classical logic or even to inconsistency.

In this paper we prove that any quantale Q is a quantale of suitable relations on Q. As a consequence two isomorphism theorems are also shown with suitable sets of functions of Q into Q. These theorems are the mathematical background one needs in order to give natural and complete semantics for Linear Logic using relations.

Abstract.Formal topologies are today an established topic in the development of constructive mathematics. One of the main tools in formal topology is inductive generation since it allows to introduce inductive methods in topology. The problem of inductively generating formal topologies with a cover relation and a unary positivity predicate has been solved in [CSSV]. However, to deal both with open and closed subsets, a binary positivity predicate has to be considered. In this paper we will show how to adapt to (...) this framework the method used to generate inductively formal topologies with a unary positivity predicate; the main problem that one has to face in such a new setting is that, as a consequence of the lack of a complete formalization, both the cover relation and the positivity predicate can have proper axioms. (shrink)

By using some classical reasoning we show that any countably presented formal topology, namely, a formal topology with a countable axiom set, is spatial.

Formal topology is today an established topic in the development of constructive mathematics and constructive proofs for many classical results of general topology have been obtained by using this approach. Here we analyze one of the main concepts in formal topology, namely, the notion of formal point. We will contrast two classically equivalent definitions of formal points and we will see that from a constructive point of view they are completely different. Indeed, according to the first definition the formal points (...) of the formal topology of the real numbers can be indexed by a set whereas this is not possible according to the second one. (shrink)

Under some assumptions on an equational theory S , we give a necessary and sufficient condition so that S admits a model completion. These assumptions are often met by the equational theories arising from logic. They say that the dual of the category of finitely presented S-algebras has some categorical stucture. The results of this paper combined with those of [7] show that all the 8 theories of amalgamable varieties of Heyting algebras [12] admit a model completion. Further applications to (...) varieties of modal algebras are given in [8]. (shrink)

The pandemic period has placed the organizations in a state of great tension. It has generated a situation of confusion, lack of rules, and production-related criticalities that have called into question the very existence of many productive realities. This article aims to highlight the dimensions of care and ethics put in place by HR managers in COVID-19. The objective that animated the authors have focused on the HRM level of medium and large companies in Italy to highlight the protective actions (...) toward people and the organization in the period COVID 19, highlighting what were the ethical values and actions of care put in place. In this article, we wanted to give voice to managers who had management tasks in their organizations by asking them to tell us how they dealt with the challenges imposed by the emergency. In the research, we start from a way of understanding workplaces understood as a “process of ongoing social relationship” within which the HR function is dedicated to the care of the quality of relationships. HR managers have to manage a complex role of mediating between the interests of people and employers by trying to find good mediations. (shrink)

I propose to show in this paper how Bosanquet’s aesthetics, in certain of its aspects, conditions William Temple’s reflection on art — a reflection which occupies a central position in Temple’s “Christo-centric metaphysics,” and which finds expression particularly in Mens Creatrix. Bosanquet’s influence becomes still more evident if we compare Temple’s position with the philosophy of art which R.G. Collingwood delineated in the initial phase of his thought, above all in Speculum Mentis and Outlines of a Philosophy of Art.

Pretende-se abordar como os argumentos luteranos ─ de natureza constitucional das "magistraturas inferiores" e de direito privado ─ acerca do direito de resistência, desenvolvidos no final da década de 1520 e início de 1530, foram recepcionados no _Segundo Tratado Sobre o Governo Civil_, de John Locke, escrito no século XVII. O argumento de direito privado compreende que todo governante que abandona as boas ações e se dedica a cometer atos tirânicos se despoja de sua autoridade e, consequentemente, deve ser tratado (...) como uma pessoa privada, portanto, sujeita ao lícito revide, o que configura uma espécie de legítima defesa. O argumento constitucional das "magistraturas inferiores" afirma a possibilidade de órgãos intermediários entre o governante e o povo estarem legitimados para oferecer resistência às tiranias. Em John Locke, ambos os argumentos objetivam a solução do problema da tirania para se obter liberdade política e religiosa. (shrink)