1. Tonga ilbo 1920-1929-yŏn -- 2. Tonga ilbo 1930-1940-yŏn -- 3. Chosŏn ilbo 1920-1929-yŏn -- 4. Chosŏn ilbo 1930-1940-yŏn -- 5. Kit'a sinmun 1920-1940-yŏn (Maeil sinbo, Chosŏn chungang ilbo, Chungoe ilbo, Sidae ilbo) -- 6. Chapchi (Kat'ollik ch'ŏngnyŏn, Kaebyŏk, Kongdo, Taejung kongnon, Taehan Hakhoe wŏlbo, Tonggwang, Pyŏlgŏngon, Pulgyo, Pulgyo Chinhŭnghoe wŏlbo, Pip'an) -- 7. Chapchi (Samch'ŏlli, Sŏbuk Hakhoe wŏlbo, Sin'gyedan, Sindonga, Sinmun'gye, Sinmin kongnon, Sinsaeng, Sinsaenghwal, Sinch'ŏnji, Sinhŭng) -- 8. Chapchi (Sinhŭng, Yŏsi, Yŏnhŭi, Yudo, Inmun P'yŏngnon, Irwŏl sibo) -- 9. (...) Chapchi (Irwŏl sibo, Chogwang, Chosŏn chigwang, Ch'ŏndogyohoe wŏlbo, Ch'ŏrhak) -- 10. Chapchi (Ch'ŏrhak, Ch'ŏngnyŏn, Ch'ŏngsaekchi, Ch'ŏngch'un, Ch'unch'u, Ch'wisan porim, Haktŭng, Hakchigwang, Hyŏndae p'yŏngnon) -- 11. Kŭndae Han'guk ch'ŏrhak hyŏngsŏng ŭi p'unggyŏng kwa chihyŏngdo, Ilche kangjŏmgi 'sinmun' chosa rŭl t'onghaesŏ -- 12. Kŭndae Han'guk ch'ŏrhak hyŏngsŏng ŭi ŏnsŏl konggan, Ilche kangjŏmgi 'chapchi' chosa rŭl t'onghaesŏ -- 13. Ilche kangjŏmgi Han'guk ch'ŏrhakcha chuyo inmul haesŏl (purok, Ilche kangjŏmgi sinmun, chapchi surok ch'ŏrhak kwallyŏn kisa ch'ongmongnok). (shrink)

The chapter will argue that the way current enthusiasm for moral enhancement is articulated in the extant literature is itself morally problematic. The moral evaluation of the discourse will proceed through three stages. First, we shall look at the chequered history of various societies’ attempts to cast evil, character, and generally undesirable behaviour, as biological problems. As will be argued, this is the larger context in which moral enhancement discourse should be understood, and abuses in the recent past and present (...) should therefore be highlighted. Second, it will be argued that, given moral functioning's profoundly contextual and responsive qualities, any notion of a fine-grained, powerfully efficacious moral enhancement is both unrealistic and, actually, incoherent. Since enthusiasts’ hopes are unrealistic and incoherent, such enhancement would not even be capable of providing the transformative ends that supposedly justify the sometimes extreme prescriptions set forward. Finally, the chapter concludes with the claim that moral enhancement enthusiasm actually serves to trivialise the evils of this world, and not only to trivialise the hard-won efforts required to diminish and overcome such evils, but to misdirect attention away from the real hard work that needs to be done in facing such evils. (shrink)

교사와 장학관을 역임한 저자가 들려주는 전통도덕의 원리와 실천서. 유가의 사상, 유가의 생활, 제도와 예법, 유가 전적의 이해 등을 설명했다. 전통적 생활방 식과 가치를 이해하고 실천하는데 도움이 되도록 엮었다.

When the odds of achieving world peace seem so long, do hopes for peace amount to anything more than wishful thinking? In this paper, I introduce the idea of meaningful hope, which can help us to u...

In a society marked by liberal gun ownership laws, and an increasingly militarized police force, how should we think about cases where a homeowner shoots a person who has mistakenly knocked on the wrong door, or where a police officer shoots someone who is unarmed? The general tendency – by shooters, courts, and many observers – is to use the framework of self-defense. However, as I will argue, relying on the framework of self-defense is inappropriate in these cases, because theories (...) of self-defensive killing are built up around a very specific type of case, namely, a random, sudden, one-off encounter between roughly equally matched strangers. When a person who acts in self-defense has undertaken certain preparations to kill in self-defense – such as buying a gun, or undergoing certain kinds of training – they transform what would have been defensive violence into offensive violence. But because the self-defense framework distinguishes only between defensive and aggressive violence, it cannot easily register the unique moral features of offensive violence. Relying on the self-defense framework, then, produces judgments that are overly permissive of killings by gun owners and police, masking them as self-defensive when in fact they are much more morally fraught. (shrink)

: We may better understand the development of the Neo-Confucian religiousethical tradition in East Asia if we can discern the different ways that the scholars of Japan and Korea reacted to and adjusted the discourse of the tradition. Focusing on the optimistic concept of human nature and an ethic of situation developed by the Kogakuha scholars in Japan, we will contrast them with the more rigoristic philosophy of kyŏng (reverential seriousness) and an ethic of principle emphasized by the Korean Neo-Confucian (...) thinkers Yi T'oegye and Yi Yulgok. By doing so, we attempt to delineate the salient characteristics of the Japanese and Korean traditions of moral culture. (shrink)

Trusting relationships are both valuable and risky. Where the risks are high and the fears of betrayal are also high, it might seem rational to try to mitigate the risks, while still enjoying the benefits of the trusting relationship, by forming a contingency plan. A contingency plan—in the sense I am interested in—involves contingent punishments for defection, which are primarily meant to encourage the trusted partner to act trustworthily. I argue, however, that such contingency plans suffer from an internal tension (...) wherein the contingency planner both seeks and undermines a particular level (or kind) of trust. There are two problems in particular, either of which is sufficient to undermine trusting relationships: one, the planner fails to see the trusted partner as sincerely engaged in the trusting relationship, and two, the planner separates herself out from the trusting relationship by seeing her flourishing as separate from her partner’s (or, even worse, as dependent on her partner’s harm). Continency plans, then, are not just about the future; they cast a moral shadow on what we are doing now. (shrink)

Relational reasoning is a higher-order executive function that involves the ability to perceive meaningful patterns within a body of seemingly unrelated information. In this study, the ability of 749 fourth (Mage= 10), sixth (Mage= 12), eighth (Mage= 14), and tenth graders (Mage= 16) to identify meaningful relational patterns was investigated. This general cognitive ability was assessed by means of the Test of Relational Reasoning-Junior (TORRjr), a 32-item measure organized into four 8-item scales that assess analogical, anomalous, antinomous, and antithetical reasoning. (...) Students’ performance on the TORRjr was analyzed using confirmatory factor analysis, measurement invariance test, and non-parametric median-based analyses. The confirmatory factor analysis supported that the higher-order factor model was the best fit for the TORRjr data for the Korean students. The measurement was determined to be invariant by gender but variant across grade levels. The non-parametric analysis resulted in an asymptotic (a constant increasing up to grade 6 and then a level off witnessed from grades 8 to 10) development pattern in overall relational reasoning across the grades. In comparison to analogy and anomaly, antinomy and antithesis scores were more fully developed by grade 8 and that level of performance was maintained at grade 10. The TORRjr appeared to be a viable measure for the Korean samples up to approximately 15 years of age. The significance of these findings for research and instructional practice are discussed. (shrink)

At first, the disciplined, proper, and moralistic Confucian might seem a far cry from the free, independent, and spontaneous individual of liberalism. However, Confucian self-discipline and ritual propriety are quite suitable for a democratic society. Liberal political theories privilege individual freedom, but there is little in them that deals with concrete ways in which this freedom can be exercised. Confucian theories of self-discipline and ritual propriety can fill this gap in liberal theory. Michel Foucault's investigations of Ancient Greek and Roman (...) technologies of the self show that self-cultivation, self-discipline, and ritual conduct are indispensable for the proper practice of freedom. Thus, Foucault provides us with a new perspective from which to investigate and affirm the democratic potential of Confucianism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Confucian Rituals and the Technology of the Self:A Foucaultian InterpretationHahm ChaibongIntroductionModern political theory is "liberation" theory. Liberalism pivots on the idea of individual liberty, defined largely as freedom from government interference in private lives. All major versions of it, from the Lockian social-contract theory to the Rawlsian theory of justice, focus on protecting the rights of the individual. Marxism and other leftist political theories revolve around the notion of (...) recovering and liberating the original freedom of humanity that has been corrupted or otherwise twisted out of recognition by modern society and its institutions. Rousseau, Marx, and Freud all long for the "total revolution" that will free humanity from the decadence of modern society, capitalism, and even civilization itself.1 In marked contrast to modern Western political theories, Confucianism emphasizes harmony in interpersonal relationships and affirms the role of the family, the community, and the state as essential components of a just and humane society. Civilization is considered both the means and the end of human flourishing, not something to be limited, abolished, or otherwise overcome. In terms of its "micro-theory," Confucianism emphasizes self-discipline, ritual propriety, and moral uprightness, not individual freedom and liberation.At first sight, the disciplined, proper, and moralistic Confucian might seem a far cry from the free, independent, and spontaneous individual of liberalism. The strong emphasis placed on human-relatedness and social harmony, enforced by elaborate codes of ritual conduct, would seem to encourage "rational adjustment to the world," not revolutionary incitement to change it. Confucianism is thus often regarded as the premodern political theory par excellence by modern political theorists. From the May Fourth Movement through the Great Cultural Revolution to the Asian Values debate, Confucianism has always stood as the symbol of feudalism and as the single greatest obstacle to modernity, hindering the development of a scientific outlook, class consciousness, and liberal democratic values.In what follows, however, I argue that the Confucian practices of self-discipline and ritual propriety are quite suitable for a democratic society. Indeed, not only is Confucianism suitable for democracy, but it also fills an important lacuna in modern democratic theory. In a liberal-democratic society, citizens are given ever more freedom to exercise their rights. However, theories of negative freedom and other "primacy-of-rights" theories have privileged individual liberty and rights to such an extent that citizens in a modern democracy have little basis for mutual consultation, deliberation, and agreement. As a result, there is very little in liberal theory, or in [End Page 315] theories of the left, for that matter, that deals with concrete ways in which freedom can be exercised. Confucian theories and practices of self-discipline and ritual propriety can fill this gap in liberal theory.In making this point, I enlist the help of Michel Foucault. Foucault's investigations of ancient Greek and Roman technologies of the self in his later works show that the practices of self-cultivation, self-discipline, and ritual conduct do not necessarily inhibit freedom.2 In fact, such practices are indispensable for the proper practice of freedom. Moreover, Foucault's now-famous investigation of the logic of power, discipline, truth, and knowledge provides a profound insight into the nature of freedom and its practice that is not to be found in currently dominant liberal theories. It provides an important antidote to the common misconception that selfdiscipline and ritual propriety are contrary to individual freedom. Foucault thus provides us with a new perspective from which to investigate and affirm the democratic potential of Confucianism.The Scrutable Body and LiIn the Western philosophical tradition, the metaphysical, the transcendental, or the purely rational has always been the "real." The Platonic eidos, the Christian soul, the Cartesian cogito, and the Kantian noumena all emphasize the priority and the primacy of the metaphysical over the physical as the repository of truth, beauty, and reality. The physical body, on the other hand, has been viewed as the corrupted shadow of the ideal form, the prison of the soul, a mere physical extension or a passing phenomenon. Modern psychology, Freudian or otherwise, emphasizes the conscious/unconscious as the realm that determines our being and character. In contrast... (shrink)