Dewey's "Art as Experience" defends the view that art and life are a y. But his version of this view exhibits an ambiguity, arising from his ency to move back and forth in the text between two usages of "art". These usages allow for two different interpretations of the theme of the unity and life: an "aesthetic" interpretation emphasizing the uniqueness of the arts as instrumentally valuable sources of aesthetic and ummatoryexperience, and an "aestheticist" interpretation emphasizing the ence of such (...) experience not only in the fine arts but throughout the trum of intelligent practice. Are these interpretations necessarily in ion, or can we read them as part of a single consistent argument about the re of art in Dewey's text? I arguethat we can, but to do so we need to dialectically, and with a glance toward a figure whose influence on Dewey nderappreciated in the recent literature: Hegel. (shrink)

It is hard to get very far in discussing aesthetic or religious subjects without invoking some version of the thought that ordinary consciousness is but the tip.

Danto was not a fan of Dewey, the pragmatist who dominated Columbia's philosophy department for much of the twentieth century. A broad context for what might at first seem their total clash of philosophical temperaments is Danto's embrace of analytic philosophy in a period when classical pragmatism was evolving into the neopragmatism of Richard Rorty. A more specific context is Danto's preference for Cartesian‐inflected forms of atomistic explanation and representationalism, in contrast to Dewey's anti‐dualist and anti‐representationalist holism. In addition, Dewey's (...) vision of art as embodied in human experiences across the modern institutional spectrum contrasts starkly with Danto's more “compartmental” account of the Artworld. Yet despite these differences, both philosophers were also (in Dewey's case since the turn of the twentieth century, in Danto's case in late career) deeply, if differently, indebted to Hegel, who provided a fertile framework for understanding how human beings can at one and the same time be social, self‐interpreting spiritual beings and also natural beings. This fact provides a basis for thinking that while Danto never renounced his lifelong aversion to pragmatism, a subtler strand of Dewey's pervasive influence is present in his later writings. (shrink)

Addresses recent perspectives central to the interpretation and criticism of Dewey’s philosophy.

Writers in pragmatist aesthetics tend, as naturalists, to avoid the originally Kantian-Idealist term “autonomy” when discussing art and aesthetic experience. Even so, a more general autonomy concept, emphasizing that art and the aesthetic comprise a normatively special aspect of experience, is already implicit in much of the pragmatist aesthetics literature, including in John Dewey’s seminal Art as Experience. As the cultural disciplines move beyond earlier modernist- and postmodernist-era debates about art’s total autonomy from or total “heteronomous” absorption within the processes (...) of life, I argue that a more naturalistically down-to-earth version of the above general autonomy idea remains indispensable in a century of social, environmental, and existential crises whose solutions demand creative agency of a kind that artistically charged experiences can inspire. Drawing upon key pragmatist themes, I further develop the general autonomy idea by arguing that aesthetic experiences within and without the fine arts are horizontally transcendent; that art and the aesthetic answer a persistent human need for experiences that are intrinsically rewarding while also serving the instrumental function of being redemptive; that to this end, our global culture needs collectively accessible autonomous spaces within language and experience that can help people explore and interrogate the meanings of what we individually and collectively do; and that the value of our theoretical beliefs about the arts lies not in their power to represent a world supposedly independent of human thought and action but in what they lead us to do in the world. In conclusion, I illustrate this pragmatic interpretation of the general autonomy idea with a reading of Richard Powers’ novel The Overstory. (shrink)

This is a historical account of Niebuhr's and Dewey's relationship which spans the thirties, forties, and early fifties, when Dewey was philosophy professor emeritus at Columbia and Niebuhr was professor of Christian Ethics at Union Theological Seminary. The author advances two claims of interest to the general philosophical reader: first, that the two thinkers' ethical and political visions were much closer in substance and method than either they or their followers tended to acknowledge; and second, that Niebuhr was in his (...) practice, if not in his self-understanding, a kind of theological pragmatist. (shrink)