O artigo pretende sublinhar a incompatibilidade que a hermenêutica filosófica de Gadamer apresenta com relação ao projecto filosófico de Heidegger. O seu objectivo é, desta forma, problematizar a ideia segundo a qual a hermenêutica filosófica constitui um desdobramento representativo do pensamento heideggeriano. O artigo apresenta, desta forma, a hermenêutica de Gadamer nos termos de uma filosofia comprometida com uma tarefa de refundação e onde a práxis, entendida como imanência da vida histórica, se mostra precisamente como o novo fundamento. Este encontro (...) de Gadamer com a práxis, no entanto, revela-se possível apenas na medida de uma não identificação, ainda que pouco explícita, da hermenêutica filosófica em relação ao projecto heideggeriano. Daí a relevância que em Gadamer, ao contrário de Heidegger, se dá a autores metafisicos tais como Hegel e Dilthey. /// This article stresses the incompatibility it sees at work between Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and the heideggerian philosophical project. The aim is to put into question the way of characterizing philosophical hermeneutics as a representative branch of Heidegger's way of thinking. Gadamer's hermeneutics is accordingly presented as a philosophy oriented towards the affirmation of a new foundation. Praxis, understood as the immanent flow of historical life, shows itself as a new foundation. This encounter with praxis, however, is possible only due to a type of non—identification, even though not in an explicit way, between philosophical hermeneutics and the heideggerian project. This explains why metaphysical authors such as Hegel and Dilthey have in Gadamer's work a relevance not found within the framework of Heidegger's thought. (shrink)

La propuesta tiene como objetivo, plantear un modelo educativo sostenible respondiendo a las necesidades de los países en vías de desarrollo en materia de economía, sociedad, medio ambiente y cultura teniendo como principio fundamental el análisis de efectos que pueden poner en riesgo el bienestar de las generaciones futuras ante fenómenos como la escolaridad masiva, la correlación entre grado de estudio y movilidad social, los efectos de las subvenciones a fondo perdido en eldesarrollodeinnovacióntecnológica y no tecnológica y la preservación de (...) la cultura en los diferentes niveles educativos analizando las prospectivas de los modelos educativos; teniendo como directriz el Informe Brutland (1987) presentado en la comisión Mundial del Medio Ambiente y desarrollo de Naciones Unidas creada en 1983 y la Declaración en la sexagésimo novena sesión plenaria de naciones Unidas en 2010 sobre la cultura como cuarto pilar del desarrollo sostenible.Consecuentemente la propuesta tendrá como sustento los indicadores de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico (OCDE) de sus publicaciones de Education at a Glance 2014, Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS) 2013 y OECD Science, Technologyand Industry Scoreboard 2013, para efecto de realizar un análisis comparativo entre países en vías de desarrollo. (shrink)

The present framing of the cultural debate in terms of materialism versus religion has allowed materialism to go unchallenged as the only rationally-viable metaphysics. This book seeks to change this. It uncovers the absurd implications of materialism and then, uniquely, presents a hard-nosed non-materialist metaphysics substantiated by skepticism, hard empirical evidence, and clear logical argumentation. It lays out a coherent framework upon which one can interpret and make sense of every natural phenomenon and physical law, as well as the modalities (...) of human consciousness, without materialist assumptions. According to this framework, the brain is merely the image of a self-localization process of mind, analogously to how a whirlpool is the image of a self-localization process of water. The brain doesn’t generate mind in the same way that a whirlpool doesn’t generate water. It is the brain that is in mind, not mind in the brain. Physical death is merely a de-clenching of awareness. The book closes with a series of educated speculations regarding the afterlife, psychic phenomena, and other related subjects. (shrink)

Recent philosophy of mind has increasingly focused on the role of technology in shaping, influencing, and extending our mental faculties. Technology extends the mind in two basic ways: through the creative design of artifacts and the purposive use of instruments. If the meaningful activity of technological artifacts were exhaustively described in these mind-dependent terms, then a philosophy of technology would depend entirely on our theory of mind. In this dissertation, I argue that a mind-dependent approach to technology is mistaken. Instead, (...) some machines are best understood as independent participants in their own right, contributing to and augmenting a variety of social practices as active, though often unrecognized, community members. Beginning with Turing’s call for “fair play for machines”, I trace an argument concerning the social autonomy of nonhuman agents through the artificial intelligence debates of the 20th century. I’ll argue that undue focus on the mind has obscured the force of Turing’s proposal, leaving the debates in an unfortunate stalemate. I will then examine a network theoretic alternative to the study of multi-agent complex systems that can avoid anthropocentric, mind-dependent ways of framing human-machine interactions. I argue that this approach allows for both scientific and philosophical treatment of large and complicated sociotechnical systems, and suggests novel methods for designing, managing, and maintaining such systems. Rethinking machines in mind-independent terms will illuminate the nature, scope, and evolution of our social and technological practices, and will help clarify the relationships between minds, machines, and the environments we share. (shrink)

Seen from the point of view of evaluation conditions, a usual way to obtain a connexive logic is to take a well-known negation, for example, Boolean negation or de Morgan negation, and then assign special properties to the conditional to validate Aristotle’s and Boethius’ Theses. Nonetheless, another theoretical possibility is to have the extensional or the material conditional and then assign special properties to the negation to validate the theses. In this paper we examine that possibility, not sufficiently explored in (...) the connexive literature yet.We offer a characterization of connexive negation disentangled from the cancellation account of negation, a previous attempt to define connexivity on top of a distinctive negation. We also discuss an ancient view on connexive logics, according to which a valid implication is one where the negation of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent, and discuss the role of our idea of connexive negation for this kind of view. (shrink)

Em um dos vários encontros mundiais sobre a obra do filósofo tcheco-brasileiro Vilém Flusser, os autores deste livro decidem escrever juntos uma introdução a seu pensamento que ao mesmo tempo homenageie o pensador. Nasce daí 'Vilém Flusser - uma.

Turing’s much debated test has turned 70 and is still fairly controversial. His 1950 paper is seen as a complex and multilayered text, and key questions about it remain largely unanswered. Why did Turing select learning from experience as the best approach to achieve machine intelligence? Why did he spend several years working with chess playing as a task to illustrate and test for machine intelligence only to trade it out for conversational question-answering in 1950? Why did Turing refer to (...) gender imitation in a test for machine intelligence? In this article, I shall address these questions by unveiling social, historical and epistemological roots of the so-called Turing test. I will draw attention to a historical fact that has been only scarcely observed in the secondary literature thus far, namely that Turing’s 1950 test emerged out of a controversy over the cognitive capabilities of digital computers, most notably out of debates with physicist and computer pioneer Douglas Hartree, chemist and philosopher Michael Polanyi, and neurosurgeon Geoffrey Jefferson. Seen in its historical context, Turing’s 1950 paper can be understood as essentially a reply to a series of challenges posed to him by these thinkers arguing against his view that machines can think. Turing did propose gender learning and imitation as one of his various imitation tests for machine intelligence, and I argue here that this was done in response to Jefferson's suggestion that gendered behavior is causally related to the physiology of sex hormones. (shrink)

We provide here irrefutable facts that prove the falsehood of the claims published in [1] by Dehmer and Mowshowitz (DM) against our paper published in [2]. We first prove that Dehmer’s definition of node probability [3] is flawed. In addition, we show that it was not Dehmer in [3] who proposed this definition for the first time. We continue by proving how the use of Dehmer’s definition does not reveal all the physico-mathematical richness of the walk entropy of graphs. Finally, (...) we show a few facts about the failure of DM themselves to cite properly the relevant literature in their field. We also show here how the Editors of Complexity have failed to manage the publication of [1] in an appropriate way according to the accepted guidelines given in the Code of Conduct and Best Practice Guidelines for Journal Editors, published by the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE). (shrink)

I propose an idealist ontology that makes sense of reality in a more parsimonious and empirically rigorous manner than mainstream physicalism, bottom-up panpsychism, and cosmopsychism. The proposed ontology also offers more explanatory power than these three alternatives, in that it does not fall prey to the hard problem of consciousness, the combination problem, or the decombination problem, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: there is only cosmic consciousness. We, as well as all other living organisms, are but dissociated alters (...) of cosmic consciousness, surrounded by its thoughts. The inanimate world we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of these thoughts. The living organisms we share the world with are the extrinsic appearances of other dissociated alters. (shrink)

In this paper will show the terms in that is presented the Reinvention of Social Emancipation in the critical platform of the Portuguese author Boaventura de Sousa Santos.

The Idea of the World offers a grounded alternative to the frenzy of unrestrained abstractions and unexamined assumptions in philosophy and science today. This book examines what can be learned about the nature of reality based on conceptual parsimony, straightforward logic and empirical evidence from fields as diverse as physics and neuroscience. It compiles an overarching case for idealism - the notion that reality is essentially mental - from ten original articles the author has previously published in leading academic journals. (...) The case begins with an exposition of the logical fallacies and internal contradictions of the reigning physicalist ontology and its popular alternatives, such as bottom-up panpsychism. It then advances a compelling formulation of idealism that elegantly makes sense of - and reconciles - classical and quantum worlds. The main objections to idealism are systematically refuted and empirical evidence is reviewed that corroborates the formulation presented here. The book closes with an analysis of the hidden psychological motivations behind mainstream physicalism and the implications of idealism for the way we relate to the world. (shrink)

Departing from Anderson’s (2016) suggestion that there are three communities in Peirce’s thought corresponding to his three normative sciences of logic, ethics, and esthetics, I argue that these communities partake in a relationship of dependence similar to that found among the normative sciences. In this way, just as logic relies on ethics which relies on esthetics, so too would a logical community of inquirers rely on an ethical community of love, which would rely on an esthetic community of artists. A (...) community could conduct inquiry together only if it pursued the same goal; and it could pursue the same goal only if it first imaginatively construed it. Any logical or ethical community requires a shared imaginative repertoire of ideal ends. (shrink)

O artigo pretende sublinhar a incompatibilidade que a hermenêutica filosófica de Gadamer apresenta com relação ao projeto filosófico de Heidegger. O objetivo é, desta forma, problematizar a ideia segundo a qual a hermenêutica filosófica constitui um desdobramento representativo do pensamento heideggeriano. A hermenêutica de Gadamer é percebida aqui como estando comprometida com uma tarefa de refundação, e a práxis, entendida como imanência da vida histórica, se mostra precisamente como um novo fundamento. O encontro de Gadamer com a práxis revela-se, assim, (...) à luz de uma não identificação, ainda que pouco explícita, da hermenêutica filosófica em relação ao projeto heideggeriano. (shrink)

Introducción: los accidentes son de las primeras causas de muerte a nivel mundial, por lo que la prevención de los mismos es una emergencia. Objetivo: valorar la repercusión de una intervención comunitaria en la disminución de peligros potenciales de accidentes en familias con niños de 0 a 18 meses. Métodos: se realizó un estudio cuasi experimental multietápico, con enfoques cuantitativo y cualitativo, entre enero de 2009 a junio de 2012. Se trabajó con 39 familias entre las que se produjeron nacimientos (...) en el periodo enero de 2008 a enero de 2010 de los Consultorios Médicos del Consejo Popular 26 de julio del Municipio Santo Domingo. Se efectuó una intervención por un grupo de trabajo comunitario conformado por integrantes del Círculo de interés "Prevención es Salud" y brigadistas de la Cruz Roja, liderados por la enfermera de la familia, se empleó para ello la Guía para Análisis de vulnerabilidades y capacidades de la Cruz Roja, modificada en su etapa I. Resultados: Post intervención se logró la reversión de vulnerabilidades en cuanto a capacidades, se manifestaron cambios favorables en los conocimientos y disminuyó significativamente el número de peligros potenciales en cada hogar. Conclusiones: Cuando se trabaja con familias con instrumentos sencillos y accesibles, y con el grupo de trabajo comunitario, se favorece la toma de conciencia sobre el problema en el entorno donde se generó. Introduction: accidents are one of the first causes of death worldwide, so their prevention is an urgency. Objective: assess the effect of a community intervention in the reduction of potential dangers of accidents in family with children aged from zero to 18 months. Methods: a multiage cuasi experimental study was carried out, with quantitative and qualitative approaches, from January 2009 to June 2012. The sample was taken from thirty-nine families who had children in the period ranging from January 2008 to January 2010 belonging to the family doctor´s house of the community called "26 de Julio" from Santo Domingo municipality. An intervention was carried out by a community group work composed by members of centers of interests called ¨Prevention is health¨ and members of the Red Cross led by the family nurse. It was necessary to ask a guide to analyze the vulnerabilities and capabilities of the Red Cross, modified in the first stage. Results: During the post intervention, it was possible to change the vulnerabilities in terms of capacities, favorable changes were present in the knowledge and the number of potential risks significantly decreased in each house. Conclusions: when families are approached with simple and accessible instruments, and with a community group work it is possible to make favorable changes in terms of awareness of the problem in the same place where it emerged. (shrink)

The Turing test has been studied and run as a controlled experiment and found to be underspecified and poorly designed. On the other hand, it has been defended and still attracts interest as a test for true artificial intelligence (AI). Scientists and philosophers regret the test’s current status, acknowledging that the situation is at odds with the intellectual standards of Turing’s works. This article refers to this as the Turing Test Dilemma, following the observation that the test has been under (...) discussion for over seventy years and still is widely seen as either too bad or too good to be a valuable experiment for AI. An argument that solves the dilemma is presented, which relies on reconstructing the Turing test as a thought experiment in the modern scientific tradition. It is argued that Turing’s exposition of the imitation game satisfies Mach’s characterization of the basic method of thought experiments and that Turing’s uses of his test satisfy Popper’s conception of the critical and heuristic uses of thought experiments and Kuhn’s association of thought experiments to conceptual change. It is emphasized how Turing methodically varied the imitation game design to address specific challenges posed to him by other thinkers and how his test illustrates a property of the phenomenon of intelligence and suggests a hypothesis on machine learning. This reconstruction of the Turing test provides a rapprochement to the conflicting views on its value in the literature. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Plotinus does not limit the sphere of free human agency simply to intellectual contemplation, but rather extends it all the way to human praxis. Plotinus’s goal in the first six chapters of Ennead 6.8 is, accordingly, to demarcate the space of freedom within human practical actions. He ultimately concludes that our external actions are free whenever they actualize, in unhindered fashion, the moral principles derived from intellectual contemplation. This raises the question of how the (...) freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation. After considering two previously offered models—a model of double activity, and an Aristotelian model of practical syllogism—I offer a third alternative, namely a model of moral attunement, according to which our rational desires assume a kind of ‘care of the soul’ through active supervision. Practical life is thus imbued with freedom to the extent that the soul supervises its actions to conform to its will and choice of the good. (shrink)

In 2005, an essay was published in Nature asserting that the universe is mental and that we must abandon our tendency to conceptualize observations as things. Since then, experiments have confi rmed that — as predicted by quantum mechanics — reality is contextual, which contradicts at least intuitive formulations of realism and corroborates the hypothesis of a mental universe. Yet, to give this hypothesis a coherent rendering, one must explain how a mental universe can — at least in principle — (...) accommodate our experience of ourselves as distinct individual minds sharing a world beyond the control of our volition; and the empirical fact that this world is contextual despite being seemingly shared. By combining a modern formulation of the ontology of idealism with the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, the present paper attempts to provide a viable explanatory framework for both points. In the process of doing so, the paper also addresses key philosophical qualms of the relational interpretation. (shrink)

Several alternatives vie today for recognition as the most plausible ontology, from physicalism to panpsychism. By and large, these ontologies entail that physical structures circumscribe consciousness by bearing phenomenal properties within their physical boundaries. The ontology of idealism, on the other hand, entails that all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phenomenality in the first place. Unlike the other alternatives, however, idealism is often considered implausible today, particularly by analytic philosophers. A reason for this (...) is the strong intuition that an objective world transcending phenomenality is a self-evident fact. Other arguments—such as the dependency of phenomenal experience on brain function, the evidence for the existence of the universe before the origin of conscious life, etc.—are also often cited. In this essay, I will argue that these objections against the plausibility of idealism are false. As such, this essay seeks to show that idealism is an entirely plausible ontology. (shrink)

Political theory is a field that finds nourishment in others. From economics, history, sociology, psychology, and political science, theorists have drawn a rich repertoire of schemas to parse the social world and make sense of it. With each of these encounters, new subjects are brought into focus as others recede into the background, ushering a change not only in how questions are tackled but also in what questions are thought worth asking.

I argue for an idealist ontology consistent with empirical observations, which seeks to explain the facts of nature more parsimoniously than physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism. This ontology also attempts to offer more explanatory power than both physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism, in that it does not fall prey to either the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ or the ‘subject combination problem’, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: spatially unbound consciousness is posited to be nature’s sole ontological primitive. We, as well as (...) all other living organisms, are dissociated alters of this unbound consciousness. The universe we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of phenomenality surrounding—but dissociated from—our alter. The living organisms we share the world with are the extrinsic appearances of other dissociated alters. As such, the challenge to artificially create individualized consciousness becomes synonymous with the challenge to artificially induce abiogenesis. (shrink)

In 2005, an essay was published in Nature asserting that the universe is mental and that we must abandon our tendency to conceptualize observations as things. Since then, experiments have confirmed that — as predicted by quantum mechanics — reality is contextual, which contradicts at least intuitive formulations of realism and corroborates the hypothesis of a mental universe. Yet, to give this hypothesis a coherent rendering, one must explain how a mental universe can — at least in principle — accommodate (...) (a) our experience of ourselves as distinct individual minds sharing a world beyond the control of our volition; and (b) the empirical fact that this world is contextual despite being seemingly shared. By combining a modern formulation of the ontology of idealism with the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, the present paper attempts to provide a viable explanatory framework for both points. In the process of doing so, the paper also addresses key philosophical qualms of the relational interpretation. (shrink)

Las imágenes de Dios constituyen el núcleo del lenguaje religioso. Al poner en relación a Dios con los problemas y preocupaciones humanos, surge una motivación e inspiración que moviliza y fascina. La filosofía no sólo tiene como misión el diálogo con los distintos saberes y lenguajes, sino también su evaluación y crítica, analizando sus presupuestos, fines y consecuencias. En este volumen se analizan las imágenes de Dios en relación con el monoteísmo y el politeísmo, la violencia, la pluralidad de religiones, (...) la política, el nacionalismo, el nihilismo, el mal y la metafísica, así como los mismos lenguajes de la filosofía y de la ciencia. La ambigüedad de las imágenes religiosas, la tendencia a confundir a Dios con sus representaciones, la manipulación de Dios en la religión y en la sociedad, son algunas de las temáticas que se abordan. Especial incidencia tiene el problema de la violencia y sus raíces religiosas, al que se dedican varios trabajos, que ha cobrado trágica actualidad con el resurgir de los fundamentalismos e integrismos que se legitiman apelando a Dios. De ahí la importancia de una actitud crítica y racional, ya que la razón no lo es todo pero debe estar en todas partes so pena de fanatismos irracionales. Esto es lo que se pretende con estos trabajos, que apelan por igual a la crítica ilustrada y a la sospecha y el discernimiento en las tradiciones religiosas. (shrink)

An analysis of Nicholas of Cusa’s conception of the power of judgment that shows it enables morality as well as cognition.

Se intenta una contribución al conocimiento de la enseñanza de la filosofía en el Colegio de San Carlos de Buenos Aires hacia fines del siglo XVIII. Para ello se examinan las propuestas de Juan Baltasar Maziel (1727-1788) para dicho Colegio en materia de Filosofía, Teología y Derecho. Esta información se complementa con la exposición de otras ideas jurídico-políticas de Maziel, en el contexto de su actividad eclesiástica. The subject is the contribution of Juan Baltasar Maziel (1727-1778) to the teaching of (...) Philosophy, Theology and Law in the Colegio de San Carlos of Buenos Aires, in the last third of the XVIIIth Century. In addition, other political ideas of Maziel are considered. (shrink)

In his paper, Vardoulakis traces a genealogy of the concept of the ‘ineffectual’ that dominates many discussions in continental political philosophy back to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in the early 1920s. Although I sympathize with Vardoulakis’s suspicions concerning the ‘ineffectual’, I think his genealogy misses the main aspects of Heidegger’s analysis of praxis. In particular, Vardoulakis’s reading relies on two fundamentally ill-conceived assumptions: (a) that Heidegger’s thought can be read as a continuous endorsement of a series of fundamental claims, in (...) particular, the rejection of instrumentality, the critique of modern technical thinking, and a praise of a certain form of ineffectual meditative thought as an alternative; and (b) that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in general and of the Nichomachean Ethics in particular has, as its main aim, to ground in Greek thinking such form of ineffectual meditative thought. In this comment, I will challenge both these assumptions. I will claim that Heidegger’s project in the 1920s is oriented to provide an answer to the question that shaped the debate between Marburg Neo-Kantians, on the one hand, and Husserl, on the other: namely, how is it possible to account for lived experience and its categorial articulation. For Neo-Kantians such as Natorp (e.g. [1912: 28]), all conceptual understanding is an understanding of objects. Subjectivity as the pure form of activity—the Kantian I think—could not be understood but merely postulated. Hence, it is in principle impossible to account for subjectivity without objectifying it. This was a serious and potentially devastating objection to phenomenology’s fundamental project. It is in this context that Heidegger turns his attention to Aristotle’s ethics, precisely as a way of accounting for the kind of relationship between my understanding of experience and experience itself. Aristotelian praxis (and phronesis as the kind of ‘knowledge’ associated with praxis) provides a model for such understanding. Therefore, Heidegger has no interest in ethics or in developing a theory of action in the 1920s in general or when reading Aristotle in particular. Vardoulakis’s understanding of Heidegger’s mistranslation—even if there is one—can only make sense in hindsight, when reading those texts in the light of the later Heidegger’s interest in avoiding technical calculation and promoting a meditative thinking. If we abandon Vardoulakis’s assumptions, Heidegger’s analysis of praxis and, in particular, his reading of Aristotle’s hou heneka can be understood under a different light. Understanding the meaningful structure of the world as existing for the sake (hou heneka, umwillen) of Dasein is not so much a reflection on the role of ends in action—technical or otherwise—but an analysis of the way in which any understanding of the world and of our actions within it is an understanding of who we are and of the structures that constitute the very being of our subjectivity. This may suggest that there is in the early Heidegger a way out of the dilemma between ineffectuality and instrumentalism, a path that, perhaps, provides an alternative for contemporary ethics and political thinking. (shrink)

I argue for an idealist ontology consistent with empirical observations, which seeks to explain the facts of nature more parsimoniously than physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism. This ontology also attempts to offer more explanatory power than both physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism, in that it does not fall prey to either the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ or the ‘subject combination problem’, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: spatially unbound consciousness is posited to be nature’s sole ontological primitive. We, as well as (...) all other living organisms, are dissociated alters of this unbound consciousness. The universe we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of phenomenality surrounding—but dissociated from—our alter. The living organisms we share the world with are the extrinsic appearances of other dissociated alters. As such, the challenge to artificially create individualized consciousness becomes synonymous with the challenge to artificially induce abiogenesis. (shrink)

The future of human computation benefits from examining tasks that agents already perform and designing environments to give those tasks computational significance. We call this natural human computation. We consider the possible future of NHC through the lens of Swarm!, an application under development for Google Glass. Swarm! motivates users to compute the solutions to a class of economic optimization problems by engaging the attention dynamics of crowds. We argue that anticipating and managing economies of attention provides one of the (...) most tantalizing future applications for NHC. (shrink)

In order to perceive the world, we need more than just raw sensory input: a subliminal paradigm of thought is required to interpret raw sensory data and, thereby, create the objects and events we perceive around ourselves. As such, the world we see reflects our own unexamined, culture-bound assumptions and expectations, which explains why every generation in history has believed that it more or less understood the world. Today, we perceive a world of objects and events outside and independent of (...) mind, which merely reflects our current paradigm of thought. Anomalies that contradict this paradigm have been accumulated by physicists over the past couple of decades, which will eventually force our culture to move to a new paradigm. Under this new paradigm, a form of universal mind will be viewed as nature’s sole fundamental entity. In this paper, I offer a sketch of what the new paradigm may look like. (shrink)