If we return to the experiences of our youth, we perceive what had the power to awaken our curiosity and ambitions*. The non-conformism of the Surrealists was fostered by Romantic sources and every conceivable symbolism; even if in a roundabout manner, it was through them that the names of Klee and Kandinsky were first heard. The world of the marvellous, the only one decreed worthy of attention, opened out onto painting. The moderns of the group: Dali, Tanguy, Masson, received first (...) prize for poetic adventure, but they harked back to certain selected precursors—rightly or wrongly—for the same gifts that they had themselves: Uccello, Bosch, Dürer, Blake, and Gustave Moreau. And indeed, by retaining only the unexpected, the fantastic, and (often indulgently) the scandalous, a taste was maintained for emotional shock and association, as exemplified by the sustained style of André Breton, and the more supple prose of Aragon. (shrink)

This article presents an alternative understanding of corporations from the two problematic visions that see corporations as either the shareholders’ property or as nexuses of contracts. The alternative proposed here is based on the theories of pre-eighteenth-century philosophers, particularly Aristotle’s political philosophy, which Thomas Aquinas later refined. The article aims to advance a theory of corporate legal and moral responsibility for human rights based on the conception of corporations as imperfect communities whose purpose is to produce a good or service (...) through participatory work that allows individuals to self-develop while contributing to the community by satisfying consumers’ needs through collaborative work. The critical account of corporations presented here provides a sound foundation upon which to build a justification of corporate responsibility for human rights violations, providing a more accurate description of the reality of a corporation than most mainstream contemporary accounts do. (shrink)

We study versions of limit models adapted to the context of metric abstract elementary classes. Under categoricity and superstability-like assumptions, we generalize some theorems from 7, 15-17. We prove criteria for existence and uniqueness of limit models in the metric context.

We study notions of independence appropriate for a stability theory of metric abstract elementary classes (for short, MAECs). We build on previous notions used in the discrete case, and adapt definitions to the metric case. In particular, we study notions that behave well under superstability‐like assumptions. Also, under uniqueness of limit models, we study domination, orthogonality and parallelism of Galois types in MAECs.

In this paper I argue that the search for explainable models and interpretable decisions in AI must be reformulated in terms of the broader project of offering a pragmatic and naturalistic account of understanding in AI. Intuitively, the purpose of providing an explanation of a model or a decision is to make it understandable to its stakeholders. But without a previous grasp of what it means to say that an agent understands a model or a decision, the explanatory strategies will (...) lack a well-defined goal. Aside from providing a clearer objective for XAI, focusing on understanding also allows us to relax the factivity condition on explanation, which is impossible to fulfill in many machine learning models, and to focus instead on the pragmatic conditions that determine the best fit between a model and the methods and devices deployed to understand it. After an examination of the different types of understanding discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature, I conclude that interpretative or approximation models not only provide the best way to achieve the objectual understanding of a machine learning model, but are also a necessary condition to achieve post hoc interpretability. This conclusion is partly based on the shortcomings of the purely functionalist approach to post hoc interpretability that seems to be predominant in most recent literature. (shrink)

La flexibilidad y la mercantilización de lo espiritual ¿son aspectos característicos de la cultura contemporánea? Centrado en los casos de Alemania, Inglaterra y Francia, el artículo detalla cómo el romanticismo literario se articula como un movimiento pionero de la espiritualidad flexible, proceso que se entrelaza con su rol seminal en la formación del campo literario moderno. El crecimiento económico y demográfico sostenidos en Europa desde el s. XV, así como la alfabetización impulsada por el protestantismo, construyen un moderno público lector (...) que da pie —durante el s. XVIII— a la revolución y diversificación de la lectura, lo que promueve la difusión de incipientes tendencias modernas (ciencia, Ilustración, prensa). Oponiéndose parcialmente a estas tendencias y extendiendo la diversificación de lo impreso, surge la tendencia romántica. Sus autores flexibilizan la espiritualidad más allá de las convenciones religiosas de la época —y aportan a la formación del campo literario— (1) caracterizando el desencanto y otras formas de malestar moderno; (2) multiplicando el lenguaje imaginario-trascendente; (3) brindando connotaciones metafísicas al genio artístico; (4) promoviendo la autonomía y libertad expresiva del arte. La evidencia indica que el mercado fue una condición histórica básica para la EF. Se sugiere que esta flexibilidad se muestra como una adaptación de la espiritualidad a las circunstancias empíricas de la modernidad, la cual conlleva nuevas necesidades de sentido y una mayor capacidad para divergir de los relatos religiosos tradicionales. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the search for explainable models and interpretable decisions in AI must be reformulated in terms of the broader project of offering a pragmatic and naturalistic account of understanding in AI. Intuitively, the purpose of providing an explanation of a model or a decision is to make it understandable to its stakeholders. But without a previous grasp of what it means to say that an agent understands a model or a decision, the explanatory strategies will (...) lack a well-defined goal. Aside from providing a clearer objective for XAI, focusing on understanding also allows us to relax the factivity condition on explanation, which is impossible to fulfill in many machine learning models, and to focus instead on the pragmatic conditions that determine the best fit between a model and the methods and devices deployed to understand it. After an examination of the different types of understanding discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature, I conclude that interpretative or approximation models not only provide the best way to achieve the objectual understanding of a machine learning model, but are also a necessary condition to achieve post hoc interpretability. This conclusion is partly based on the shortcomings of the purely functionalist approach to post hoc interpretability that seems to be predominant in most recent literature. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the notion of ‘artifact’ and related notions in the dominant version of extended cognition theory grounded on extended functionalism. Although the term is ubiquitous in the literature, it is far from clear what ECT means by it. How are artifacts conceptualized in ECT? Is ‘artifact’ a meaningful and useful category for ECT? If the answer to the previous question is negative, should we worry? Is it important for ECT to have a coherent theory of artifacts? (...) And what are the demands and constraints that ECT imposes on this theory? I distinguish between two aspects of ECT, one narrow, aligned with extended functionalism ; and one broad or pluralistic, in which EF is combined with other theoretical resources in the context of diverse research programs. I begin by determining the problems in conceptualizing artifacts from EF. Then I address the question of why a concept of artifact may be relevant to ECT. Next, I examine the efforts of Richard Heersmink to combine ECT with dominant theories of artifacts in the philosophy of technology. I argue that both approaches fail to yield a meaningful notion of artifact, let alone one of ‘cognitive’ artifact. Finally, I argue that narrow ECT places rather strong constraints on a theory of artifacts, since it locates the specificity of ‘artifact’ in material aspects of realization that are, by definition, outside its theoretical purview. I examine, then discard, the possibility that a materialist and objectivist theory of artifacts may be of help. And finally I briefly explore some ways in which a broad, pluralistic ECT may address some of these shortcomings. (shrink)

Este ensayo argumenta que el análisis conceptual inmodesto es epistémicamente inviable para seres como nosotros, porque no tenemos forma de justificar afirmaciones inmodestas acerca de la naturaleza de algo. Como argumento más adelante, las afirmaciones inmodestas no pueden ser justificadas por medios a priori o a posteriori. Si como suponen nuestras prácticas epistemológicas evaluativas tradicionales, no hay otras formas de justificar una creencia, entonces no podemos justificar afirmaciones inmodestas sobre la naturaleza de algo. El análisis conceptual inmodesto es epistemológicamente inviable, (...) entonces, porque nosotros no tenemos una forma confiable de identificar y justificar afirmaciones inmodestas sobre la naturaleza de algo. El ensayo finaliza con una evaluación de las teorías jurídicas de Scott Shapiro y Mark Greenberg desde el punto de vista de una aproximación desde el análisis modesto, por ejemplo, lo que implican nuestras prácticas conceptuales sobre la naturaleza del derecho. (shrink)

Comunicado del Claustro de Profesores del Programa de Filosofía - Universidad del Quindío Llamado al diálogo, cuidado de la vida y solidaridad por las víctimas de las protestas sociales iniciadas el 28 de abril de 2021 en Colombia La protesta social expresa los deseos de un pueblo por salir de las situaciones políticas y económicas desfavorables, es una expresión de esperanza. Precisamente, las distintas acciones ciudadanas en la mayoría de los municipios quindianos, y en general, en el territorio colombiano, son (...) la muestra de un profundo deseo por aportar a la construcción de un país donde la vida en todas sus manifestaciones sea respetada y valorada. (shrink)

In this essay, I deal with the problem of the attribution of psychological predicates to non-human animals. The first section illustrates three research topics where it has become scientifically legitimate to explain the conduct of non-human animals by means of the attribution of psychological predicates. The second section discusses several philosophical objections to the legitimacy of such attributions provided by central thinkers from the last decades. I try to show that these objections —which are related among other questions to the (...) holism of the mental, the indeterminacy of the attributions, and the strangeness of animal concepts— can be alleviated. In the third section, I propose to adopt a literalist view of the attributions in the sense articulated by Figdor. At the same time, I argue that one must draw limits to the conceptual change forwarded by her literalist view, taking into account holistic considerations and the fact that the psychological concepts must retain their core notes. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza las “palabras sobre Dios” de cinco comunidades eclesiales periféricas de Medellín, a través de un método hermenéutico y etnográfico. Lo anterior se desarrolla en dos momentos; el primero, caracteriza la población sujeto y objeto de estudio; y el segundo, identifica la visiones y atributos de Dios que estas personas poseen desde la experiencia de lo religioso. Se concluye que la mayoría de las personas que participaron del estudio suponen la existencia de Dios, lo conciben como un ser (...) personal, eterno, espiritual y supremo. En sus afirmaciones se evidencia la influencia de una visión trinitaria de la divinidad que implica un acto de confianza. Dios, en ese contexto, es sobre todo poderoso, actúa y crea. En la manifestación de la experiencia de las personas no se percibe una diferencia conceptual en relación con la visión de Dios que profesa el cristianismo; y aunque hay un uso del lenguaje tradicional para referirse a los contenidos de la fe, no es sencilla la manera en que comprenden y explican cada uno de ellos. Lo anterior tiene una incidencia en las prácticas eclesiales. (shrink)

Many word forms in natural language are polysemous, but only some of them allow for co-predication, that is, they allow for simultaneous predications selecting for two different meanings or senses of a nominal in a sentence. In this paper, we try to explain (i) why some groups of senses allow co-predication and others do not, and (ii) how we interpret co-predicative sentences. The paper focuses on those groups of senses that allow co-predication in an especially robust and stable way. We (...) argue, using these cases, but focusing particularly on the multiply polysemous word ‘school’, that the senses involved in co-predication form especially robust activation packages, which allow hearers and readers to access all the different senses in interpretation. (shrink)

Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. (...) The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes. (shrink)

Plagiarism is a serious, yet widespread type of research misconduct, and is often neglected in developing countries. Despite its far-reaching implications, plagiarism is poorly acknowledged and discussed in the academic setting, and insufficient evidence exists in Latin America and developing countries to inform the development of preventive strategies. In this context, we present a longitudinal case study of seven instances of plagiarism and cheating arising in four consecutive classes of an Epidemiology Masters program in Lima, Peru, and describes the implementation (...) and outcomes of a multifaceted, “zero-tolerance” policy aimed at introducing research integrity. Two cases involved cheating in graded assignments, and five cases correspond to plagiarism in the thesis protocol. Cases revealed poor awareness of high tolerance to plagiarism, poor academic performance, and widespread writing deficiencies, compensated with patchwriting and copy-pasting. Depending on the events’ severity, penalties included course failure and separation from the program. Students at fault did not engage in further plagiarism. Between 2011 and 2013, the Masters program sequentially introduced a preventive policy consisting of: intensified research integrity and scientific writing education, a stepwise, cumulative writing process; honor codes; active search for plagiarism in all academic products; and a “zero-tolerance” policy in response to documented cases. No cases were detected in 2014. In conclusion, plagiarism seems to be widespread in resource-limited settings and a greater response with educational and zero-tolerance components is needed to prevent it. (shrink)

El siguiente artículo de reflexión es el resultado de un análisis y contrastación entre el pensamiento de Julián Marías, filósofo español y Ernst Bloch, filósofo alemán, sobre el tema del joven como lugar común en el desarrollo de la reflexión de ambos pensadores. ¿Qué han pensado y dicho cada uno de estos autores? ¿Cuáles son los lugares comunes o puntos de encuentro sobre esta etapa de la vida humana para estos filósofos tan divergentes en sus posturas? Al contrastar estos filósofos (...) tan dispares podremos encontrar en la reflexión sobre el joven interesantes coincidencias. (shrink)

In this article I respond to Yuk Hui by revisiting the crossroads in the philosophy of technology as represented by the philosophies of Stiegler and Ihde. Whereas Hui proposes the concept of cosmotechnics as an integrating perspective, I conceive of the crossroads in other terms, namely from the perspective of substantivism. I characterize our present situation, what a philosophy of technology should address and then examine Hui’s notion of cosmotechnics from this alternative perspective. My main concern is to show future (...) paths of development for cosmotechnical thought. (shrink)

In this article I argue that anti-perfectionist liberals can accept nudging in certain areas: in particular, they can accept nudges aimed at helping people to discharge their nonenforceable duties, and to secure personal autonomy. I claim that nudging is not disrespectful since it does not involve a comparative negative judgment on people’s ability to pursue their plans, and that the judgments that motivate nudging are compatible with treating citizens as free and equal. I also claim that despite being sometimes manipulative, (...) nudging is easy to resist and so it can be employed to pursue legitimate goals. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the impact that Lamarckian evolutionary theory had in the scientific community during the period between the advent of Zoological Philosophy and the publication Origin of Species. During these 50 years Lamarck’s model was a well known theory and it was discussed by the scientific community as a hypothesis to explain the changing nature of the fossil record throughout the history of Earth. Lamarck’s transmutation theory established the foundation of an evolutionary model introducing a new way to research (...) in nature. Darwin’s selectionist theory was proposed in 1859 to explain the origin of species within this epistemological process. In this context, Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology and Auguste Comte’s Cours de Philosophie Positive appear as two major works for the dissemination of Lamarck’s evolutionary ideology after the death of the French naturalist in 1829. (shrink)

Some versions of moral naturalism are faulted for implausibly denying that moral obligations and prescriptions entail categorical reasons for action. Categorical reasons for action are normative reasons that exist and apply to agents independently of whatever desires they have. I argue that several defenses of moral naturalism against this charge are unsuccessful. To be a tenable meta-ethical theory, moral naturalism must accommodate the proposition that, necessarily, if anyone morally ought to do something, then s/he has a categorical reason to do (...) it. Versions of moral naturalism that deny this claim would, if widely believed, disable some crucial practical uses of moral concepts. In particular, if the existence of normative reasons for action is taken to be dependent on agents’ desires, it would breed profound skepticism about the legitimacy of evaluating others’ actions from a moral point of view. Also, it would raise doubts about whether people ought to correct their own behavior in light of moral considerations. Following Richard Joyce, I take these consequences to indicate that the concept of a categorical reason is a “non-negotiable” part of moral concepts. (shrink)

Value is an inescapable part of the human experience and what life must be like for a conscious and feeling person. Philosophical questions about value are therefore naturally invited: What sort of thing would value be if it were part of the furniture of the world? How should we understand the relations that value is thought to stand in to other things? In a broad sense, these are formal questions calling for philosophical studies into the understanding of value notions. The (...) following work represents one such study. Its main concern lies specifically with the notion of final value, the idea that things can be good or bad for their own sakes. (shrink)

The idea of inclusive collective decision-making is important in establishing democratic legitimacy, but it fails when citizens are excluded. Stated-preference methods of valuation, which are commonly used in economics, have been criticised because the principle of willingness to pay may exclude low-income earners who do not have the capacity to pay. Deliberative valuation has been advocated as a way to overcome this problem, but deliberation may also be exclusive. In this review, two deliberative valuation frameworks are compared. The first is (...) grounded on the idea of rational discourse that emphasises argument at the expense of other communicative strategies. It seeks to secure inclusion through procedural rules and prerequisites, but fails to address the underlying democratic limitation of argumentation. The second does not rely on the distinction between rational and rhetorical speech, and therefore admits alternative forms of communication. This approach recognises differences in the communicative capacities and practices of those who take part in deliberation, and so is better equipped to improve, though not to guarantee, inclusion. (shrink)

Abstract In The Descent of Man (1879), Charles Darwin proposed a speculative evolutionary explanation of extended benevolence—a human sympathetic capacity that extends to all nations, races, and even to all sentient beings. This essay draws on twenty-first century social science to show that Darwin’s explanation is correct in its broad outlines. Extended benevolence is manifested in institutions such as legal human rights and democracy, in behaviors such as social movements for human rights and the protection of nonhuman animals, and in (...) normative attitudes such as emancipative values and a commitment to promote the rights or welfare of animals. These phenomena can be substantially explained by cultural evolutionary forces that trace back to three components of what Darwin called the human “moral sense”: (1) sympathy, (2) our disposition to follow community rules or norms, and (3) our capacity to make normative judgments. Extended benevolence likely emerged with “workarounds,” including political ideologies, that established an inclusive sympathetic concern for sentient life. It likely became as widespread as it is now due to recently arisen socio-economic conditions that have created more opportunities for people to have contact with and take the perspective of a broader cross-section of humanity, as well as other species. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the forays into metaphysics of The Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts Program (henceforth, DNP). I argue that the work of DNP is a valuable contribution to the epistemology of certain aspects of artifact design and use, but that it fails to advance a persuasive metaphysic. A central problem is that DNP approaches ontology from within a functionalist framework that is mainly concerned with ascriptions and justified beliefs. Thus, the materiality of artifacts emerges only as the external (...) conditions of realizability of function ascription. The work of DNP has a strong programmatic aspect and much of its foray into metaphysics is tentative, so the intent of my argument is partly synthetic: to sum up these issues as they are presented in the literature and highlight some recognized problems. But I also go beyond that, suggesting that these problems are foundational, arising from the very way in which DNP poses the question of artifact metaphysics. Although it sets out to incorporate objective aspects of technology, DNP places a strong focus on the intentional side of the purported matter-mind duality, bracketing off materiality in an irretrievable manner. Thus, some of the advantages of dualism are lost. I claim that DNP is dualistic, not merely based on “duality”, but that its version of dualism does not appropriately account for the material “nature” of artifacts. The paper ends by suggesting some correctives and alternatives to Dual Nature theory. (shrink)

Morally progressive social changes seem to have taken place with the onset of democratic governance, the abolition of slavery, the rise of gender equality, and other developments. This essay attempts to demonstrate that natural and objective moral facts are a plausible cause of some morally progressive social changes. Since this hypothesis is a version of naturalistic moral realism, I call it the Naturalist-Realist Hypothesis. To support the NRH, I argue that objective moral facts are natural facts pertaining to the impartial (...) promotion of well-being within a population of agents facing a social dilemma. I then describe a mechanism to explain how natural and objective moral facts so construed may cause some morally progressive social changes. I suggest that the NRH is a credible hypothesis because it is compatible with empirical findings from research on the evolution of moral cognition and on the sociology of mass political movements. (shrink)

A partir de un estudio longitudinal sobre cultura política en chilenos, discutimos la paradojal evidencia encontrada en la literatura que plantea que, por un lado, las actitudes políticas más pro-democráticas y anti-autoritarias se observarían en sectores sociales acomodados y, por otro lado, las actitudes más pro-conservadoras y anti-igualitaristas se observarían en grupos sociales dominantes. Nuestros datos muestran que el patrón de actitudes políticas (autoritarismo, apoyo a la democracia, conservadurismo y nacionalismo) es similar entre personas de derecha de estrato alto, izquierda (...) de estrato bajo, y centro de estrato medio. En cambio, quienes manifiestan una orientación política incongruente con su condición socioeconómica presentan actitudes políticas diferenciadas del patrón predominante. Concluimos que la paradoja puede resolverse explicando el patrón de actitudes políticas de un grupo en función del (des)ajuste de la orientación política a sus condiciones socioeconómicas. (shrink)

I defend the view that circular definitions can be useful and illuminating by focusing on the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This definition states that an item has value if and only if it is a fitting target of attitudes. Good items are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, and bad items are the fitting targets of negative ones. I shall argue that a circular version of this definition, defended by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006), is preferable to its non-circular counterpart and (...) upholds reasonable standards of acceptability. The standards I will be discussing come from Humberstone (1997), who claims that definitions cannot be informative as long as they are inferentially circular. (shrink)

This paper offers some insights and clarifications of the paramount role that Mexico has had in the forging of first-order cybernetics. Our account starts with Arturo Rosenblueth as a key intellectual figure in the foundation and formation of the field. After revisiting a historical context of people and places, we proceed to a cultural and media archeological investigation that helps us obtain new insights into the ongoing effort to intertwine the complex intellectual networks across different countries in Latin America, North (...) America, and Europe. We then present cases and first-hand interviews to discuss the legacy of cybernetics in Mexico around institutions where Rosenblueth was affiliated, mainly the Institute of Cardiology and, later on, the CINVESTAV at the Instituto Politécnico Nacional. We claim that subjective affinities are as important as common scientific goals to establish and keep connections alive, necessary to the development of a research field. As the active compound in spicy peppers, capsaicin represents a local component to the definition of cybernetics. Ultimately, the paper aims to contribute to the research on the importance of cybernetics in Latin America. (shrink)

In this book chapter, we study the preventive rule, raised in Ley 1333 de 2009, and the way that environmental law has been building its own rules; escaping from the administrative law and creating their own dogmatic, necessary to achieve its independence as a legal autonomous area. We also see that is possible to see how the preventive rule was designed out of the general theory of administrative act, because it has characteristics that make it unique in the Colombian legal (...) system. -/- En este capítulo se estudia la figura de la 'facultad a prevención' contenida en la Ley 1333 de 2009, para analizar la forma en la que el derecho ambiental ha venido construyendo una dogmática y reglas propias, escapando de la tradición del derecho administrativo, así como creando la dogmática propia necesaria para lograr su independencia y consolidación como un área autónoma de la disciplina jurídica. Al respecto, en este ejercicio de reflexión es posible ver cómo la figura aparte de estar diseñada por fuera de la teoría general del acto administrativo, también posee particularidades que la hacen única dentro del ordenamiento jurídico colombiano. (shrink)

In this book chapter, we study the preventive rule, raised in Ley 1333 de 2009, and the way that environmental law has been building its own rules; escaping from the administrative law and creating their own dogmatic, necessary to achieve its independence as a legal autonomous area. We also see that is possible to see how the preventive rule was designed out of the general theory of administrative act, because it has characteristics that make it unique in the Colombian legal (...) system. -/- En este capítulo se estudia la figura de la 'facultad a prevención' contenida en la Ley 1333 de 2009, para analizar la forma en la que el derecho ambiental ha venido construyendo una dogmática y reglas propias, escapando de la tradición del derecho administrativo, así como creando la dogmática propia necesaria para lograr su independencia y consolidación como un área autónoma de la disciplina jurídica. Al respecto, en este ejercicio de reflexión es posible ver cómo la figura aparte de estar diseñada por fuera de la teoría general del acto administrativo, también posee particularidades que la hacen única dentro del ordenamiento jurídico colombiano. (shrink)

Mainstream psychology has assumed a notion of the self that seems to rest on a substantialist notion of the psyche that became predominant despite important critical theories about the self. Although cultural psychology has recognized the diverse, dialogical, historical, narrative and performative nature of self, as opposed to the idea of self as entity, it is not clear how it accounts for the phenomenological experience of self as a unified image. In this paper, we offer a theoretical contribution to developing (...) the implications of a genetic approach to self in cultural psychology, taking into account an otherwise overlooked dimension: art and aesthetics. We draw on the work of classical authors relevant to cultural psychology, who, although geopolitically and theoretically diverse, are concerted in understanding human psychological life as part of a living process of becoming: James, Mead, Dewey, Vygotsky, Bakhtin and Vološinov. Overall, the hypothesis developed throughout the paper is that self is produced within psychological individuation as an effect of the aesthetic activity involved in everyday discursive life. We deepen the ideas that self is not an entity but a process of open becoming, and that cultural life entails a radical experience of alterity; but we recognize the psychological importance of the sense of unity and closure generated in this process. We argue that self entails not only the process of becoming, but also an aesthetical effect of unity in becoming. Self as an aesthetic effect emphasizes the self as a discursive and technical process of production, involving a product that, despite not being a finished entity, is felt as unitary and as mine by virtue of a specific transformation of experience. We thus propose to define self, on one level, as an epistemological category that points to the paradoxes of identity and agency in psychological individuation; and, on a different level, as a twofold operation that makes possible the subjective experience of a constitutive effort as much as a transient but experienced identity or agency. (shrink)

For millennia it has been discussed whether literature appropriately can or should be used in education for a moral purpose. Taking as a premise that it can actually be educative and not merely moralising, we tackle the case made against such use, based on the claim that it would be perverting the aesthetic nature of literature as a form of art, as it would be instrumentalised. Given that this claim is based on a dichotomy between an aesthetically educative approach and (...) a morally educative approach to literature, we examine how warranted such a formulation of this dichotomy is. We argue that, at least on some occasions, those two educative approaches to literature—the aesthetic and the moral—can actually be mutually reinforcing in such a way that aesthetic appreciation will suffer if the moral is not deeply examined with both mind and heart, and vice versa. This does not mean, however, that this relation of mutual contribution will always obtain in a neat way. It may actually be the case that just in a few cases, and only if carried out in a pedagogically appropriate manner, it will be correct to use literature with a morally educative purpose. (shrink)

El problema que se pretende resolver en este texto es el aporte del diálogo filosófico como unaaventura y experiencia que cura. El texto se justifica toda vez que ante una experiencia filosófica enla que las preguntas fundamentales parecen ser la fuente del quehacer filosófico, aparece el diálogocomo una excelente oportunidad de transformar la existencia y curar los males que aquejan alhombre postmoderno. El objetivo del texto se enmarca en la experiencia vital del filósofo quese ha dedicado toda su vida a (...) dar respuesta a inquietudes existenciales pero que en los actualesmomentos le apuesta al diálogo como la mejor manera de curar los males que nos aquejan. Laexperiencia curativa desde el filosofar transforma al ser humano y lo prepara para enfrentarlas grandes problemáticas de su quehacer cotidiano. La metodología utilizada fue de enfoquedescriptivo en la que las fuentes permitieron acercarse a la argumentación dialógica del filosofar.La experiencia íntima de la filosofía se da gracias al diálogo filosófico que, más que método, es unaexperiencia que posibilita la relación conmigo mismo, con los otros y con las cosas a través de lapalabra, la razón y la sensación que surge en el devenir mismo del diálogo; esto es lo que lleva aentender el diálogo como una experiencia que cura y transforma. Por medio del diálogo filosófico,se logra un autoconocimiento que tiene el poder de curar, sanar, reparar y transformar a la personahumana, al “hombre de carne y hueso”. (shrink)

There is a growing awareness that there are many subtle forms of exclusion and partiality that affect the correct workings of a judicial system. The concept of epistemic injustice, introduced by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, is a useful conceptual tool to understand forms of judicial partiality that often go undetected. In this paper, we present Fricker’s original theory and some of the applications of the concept of epistemic injustice in legal processes. In particular, we want to show that the seed (...) planted by Fricker has flourished into a rich field of study in which the concept is used to analyze many different phenomena in law, not always following the original characterization provided by her. This has led to a distinction between what we will call the narrow version of the concept, which is closer to Fricker’s original account, and the wider version of epistemic injustice, which is a more controversial notion because it is always on the verge of morphing into other well-known concepts like sexism, racial discrimination, oppression, silencing, and gaslighting. We will show that the value of the narrow version is mostly theoretical, and that in order to use the concept of epistemic injustice one must adopt a more liberal understanding of it. (shrink)