How Moral Facts Cause Moral Progress

Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (4):429-448 (2019)
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Abstract

Morally progressive social changes seem to have taken place with the onset of democratic governance, the abolition of slavery, the rise of gender equality, and other developments. This essay attempts to demonstrate that natural and objective moral facts are a plausible cause of some morally progressive social changes. Since this hypothesis is a version of naturalistic moral realism, I call it the Naturalist-Realist Hypothesis. To support the NRH, I argue that objective moral facts are natural facts pertaining to the impartial promotion of well-being within a population of agents facing a social dilemma. I then describe a mechanism to explain how natural and objective moral facts so construed may cause some morally progressive social changes. I suggest that the NRH is a credible hypothesis because it is compatible with empirical findings from research on the evolution of moral cognition and on the sociology of mass political movements.

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Citations of this work

Shame, Vulnerability, and Change.Jing Iris Hu - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (2):373-390.
Moral Progress and Grand Narrative Genealogy.Jinglin Zhou - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1.

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References found in this work

The ethical project.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
“How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
The expanding circle: ethics, evolution, and moral progress.Peter Singer - 2011 - Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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