Do the sciences aim to uncover the structure of nature, or are they ultimately a practical means of controlling our environment? In Instrumental Biology, or the Disunity of Science, Alexander Rosenberg argues that while physics and chemistry can develop laws that reveal the structure of natural phenomena, biology is fated to be a practical, instrumental discipline. Because of the complexity produced by natural selection, and because of the limits on human cognition, scientists are prevented from uncovering the basic structure (...) of biological phenomena. Consequently, biology and all of the disciplines that rest upon it--psychology and the other human sciences--must aim at most to provide practical tools for coping with the natural world rather than a complete theoretical understanding of it. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions often involve appeals to verdicts about particular cases, sometimes actual, more often hypothetical, and usually with little or no substantive argument in their defense. Philosophers — on both sides of debates over the standing of this practice — have often called the basis for such appeals ‘intuitions’. But, what might such ‘intuitions’ be, such that they could legitimately serve these purposes? Answers vary, ranging from ‘thin’ conceptions that identify intuitions as merely instances of some fairly generic and epistemologically (...) uncontroversial category of mental states or episodes to ‘thick’ conceptions that add to this thin base certain semantic, phenomenological, etiological, or methodological conditions. As this chapter discusses, thick conceptions turn out to have their own methodological problems; some may even leave philosophers in the methodologically untenable position of being unable to determine when anyone is doing philosophy correctly. (shrink)

The standard, foundationalist reading of Our Knowledge of the External World requires Russell to have a view of perceptual acquaintance that he demonstrably does not have. Russell’s actual purpose in “constructing” physical bodies out of sense-data is instead to show that psychology and physics are consistent. But how seriously engaged was Russell with actual psychology? I show that OKEW makes some non-trivial assumptions about the character of visual space, and I argue that he drew those assumptions from William James’s Principles. (...) This point helps us take a fresh look at the complex relationship between the two men. In light of this surprising background of agreement, I highlight ways their more general approaches to perception finally diverged in ways that put the two at epistemological odds. (shrink)

How do words mean? What is the nature of meaning? How can we grasp a word's meaning? The frame-semantic approach developed in this book offers some well-founded answers to such long-standing, but still controversial issues. Following Charles Fillmore's definition of frames as both organizers of experience and tools for understanding, the monograph attempts to examine one of the most important concepts of Cognitive Linguistics in more detail. The point of departure is Fillmore's conception of "frames of understanding" - an approach (...) to (cognitive) semantics that Fillmore developed from 1975 to 1985. The envisaged Understanding Semantics ("U-Semantics") is a semantic theory sui generis whose significance for linguistic research cannot be overestimated. In addition to its crucial role in the development of the theoretical foundations of U-semantics, corpus-based frame semantics can be applied fruitfully in the investigation of knowledge-building processes in text and discourse. (shrink)

A central claim of Jones & Love's (J&L's) article is that Bayesian Fundamentalism is empirically unconstrained. Unless constraints are placed on prior beliefs, likelihood, and utility functions, all behaviour is consistent with Bayesian rationality. Although such claims are commonplace, their basis is rarely justified. We fill this gap by sketching a proof, and we discuss possible solutions that would make Bayesian approaches empirically interesting.

According to J. L. Schellenberg, a perfectly loving God wouldn't permit the occurrence of non-resistant non-believers – that is, non-believers who are both capable of believing in and relating to God, but who fail to believe through no fault of their own. Since non-resistant non-believers exist, says Schellenberg, it follows that God doesn't. A popular response to this argument is some version or other of the greater good defence. God, it's argued, is justified in hiding himself when done for the (...) sake of some greater good. But proponents of this defence have overlooked or neglected an important sub-argument in Schellenberg's case – what I call the ‘pre-eminent good argument’. In this article, I identify the nature of the argument and offer a solution to it. (shrink)

TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction: Pragmatist Perspectives on Science and Technology and Contemporary Dewey Studies Philipp Dorstewitz & Alexander Kremer... 5 I. Pragmatist Perspectives on Science and Technology Useful for What? Dewey's Call to Humanize Techno-Industrial Civilization Steven Fesmire... 11 Will Brain Science Understand and Modify Morality? A Neuropragmatic and Neuro-Ecological Approach to Neuroethics John R. Shook & James Giordano... 20 Undermining Dopamine Democracy through Education: Synthetic Situations, Social Media, and Incentive Salience Mark Tschaepe... 32 We Deweyan Creatures Tibor Solymosi... (...) 41 II. Contemporary Dewey Studies Democracy, Constitutionalism and Way of Life: a Deweyan reading of R. Dworkin J. Carlos Mougan... 61 Dewey's 'Experience and Nature' - A Tale of Two Paradigms Barry E. Duff... 68 Aesthetic Experience - A Pragmatist Perspective in Cognitive Aesthetics Dario Cecchi... 82 Dewey and the Art of Experience Barry Allen... 93 Miracle and the Miraculous: A Pragmatic Approach Ulf Zackariasson... 100. (shrink)

Social philosophy as a discipline has a number of standard research topics at its disposal, such as the search for the best form of government, the elucidation of the laws of the development of society, the problem of free will and will to power, etc., while the study of the phenomenon of fear is knocked out of this series and is not prerogative of social philosophy. However, upon closer examination, the problem of fear is extremely urgent for social philosophy, and (...) some of its aspects can be correctly interpreted only when using optics and the methodology of this field of scientific knowledge. In this article, we are talking about the peculiarities of the phenomenon of fear, which has an impact on a specific individual in particular and on society as a whole. The author strives to isolate those features that distinguish fear from the total number of problems of modern societies and to present fear as a phenomenon that can not be analyzed only with the help of the means of the natural sciences. Having these features determined, we will understand the need to examine the phenomenon of fear in studying the state of modern societies as well as social philosophy will possess the necessary tools for this analysis. (shrink)

Arguing About Science is an outstanding, engaging introduction to the essential topics in philosophy of science, edited by two leading experts in the field. This exciting and innovative anthology contains a selection of classic and contemporary readings that examine a broad range of issues, from classic problems such as scientific reasoning; causation; and scientific realism, to more recent topics such as science and race; forensic science; and the scientific status of medicine. The editors bring together some of the most influential (...) contributions of famous philosophers in the field, including John Stuart Mill and Karl Popper, as well as more recent extracts from philosophers and scientists such as Ian Hacking, Stephen Jay Gould, Bas van Fraassen, Nancy Cartwright, and John Worrall. The anthology is organised into nine clear sections: science, non science and pseudo-science race, gender and science scientific reasoning scientific explanation laws and causation science and medicine probability and forensic science risk, uncertainty and science policy scientific realism and anti-realism. The articles chosen are clear, interesting, and free from unnecessary jargon. The editors provide lucid introductions to each section in which they provide an overview of the debate, as well as suggestions for further reading. (shrink)

Spiel und Arbeit gelten oft als Gegensätze: Das Spiel als freie Betätigung menschlicher Vermögen, die Arbeit als deren Subordination unter einen äußeren Zweck. Die Festlegung des Spiels auf konsequenzlose Wiederholbarkeit hat ihm den Ruf des Unernsten eingetragen, während das Abzwecken der Arbeit auf die Nützlichkeit ihres Resultats im Bund mit der Sorge ums Dasein steht. Auf einen zweiten Blick scheint dieser Gegensatz jedoch, gerade in den hochentwickeltsten Ausprägungen beider Tätigkeitsformen, zu verschwinden. So kann eine hochgradige Rationalisierung von Spielpraktiken in Arbeit (...) umschlagen, wie etwa im Leistungssport, oder ein komplexer Arbeitsvorgang selbstzweckhafte Momente und Eigendynamiken gewinnen, die ihm Spielcharakter verleihen. Auch andere technologische Entwicklungen geben Anlass dazu, das Verhältnis von Spiel und Arbeit noch einmal grundsätzlich zu bedenken, etwa im Hinblick auf: adaptive Systeme in der Robotik, serious games, Kreativitätstechniken in Unternehmenskulturen, wissenschaftliche Experimentalanordnungen, Online-Rollenspiele oder die Kommodifizierung nicht-zweckrationaler Lebensvollzüge, die traditionell vom Begriff produktiver Arbeit ausgeschlossen waren – einschließlich der Spielräume, die durch neue Umwelt- und Biotechniken erschlossen werden. Die Beschaffenheit der jeweils zum Einsatz kommenden Mittel und Verfahren sowie die Setzung, Variation oder Preisgabe von Zwecken können den Charakter von Spiel und Arbeit sowie ihr Verhältnis zueinander bestimmen oder verändern. Mit Beiträgen von Francesco Amigoni, Andreas Brenneis, Petra Gehring, Armin Grunwald, Florian Heßdörfer, Wolfram Ette, Christoph Hubig, Andreas Kaminski, Nicole C. Karafyllis, Christian Klager, Alexander Kluge, Uwe Küster, Oliver Laas, Hildrun Lampe, Pieter Lemmens, Stefan Meißner, Alfred Nordmann, Felix Raczkowski, Markus Rautzenberg, Michael Resch, Nicole J. Saam, Viola Schiaffonati, Alexander Schmidl, Jan C. Schmidt und G. Günter Voß. (shrink)

There can be no disputing the proposition that doctors and nurses should be held accountable for their professional activities. In most circumstances this accountability should be achieved through appropriate and effective complaints and disciplinary procedures, but there will be cases where the criminal law should become involved. The criminal law, however, is a serious weapon, and should only be used to punish those whose conduct is truly criminal; it should not be used against those who have merely made a human (...) error. The task of the law should therefore be to identify those situations where a doctor or nurse has behaved in a way which demonstrates a criminally culpable state of mind. In NZ recently the law has failed to do this and has been used as a weapon against those who may be in no sense morally blameworthy. -/- In New Zealand recently the law has failed to do this and has been used as a weapon against those who may be in no sense morally blameworthy. In this respect, NZ has been out of step with other comparable jurisdictions and has demonstrably failed to distinguish between cases where death is caused accidentally (through the making of an ordinary human error) and cases where it is caused criminally (through recklessness or culpable negligence). This is a surprising situation in a jurisdiction which has prided itself on its willingness to adopt a reformist legal agenda. (shrink)

Common errors on the mind.--Errors of suppressed correlatives.--The civil service examinations.--The classical controversy.--Metaphysics and debating societies.--The university ideal, past and present.--The art of study.--Religious tests and subscriptions.--Procedure of deliberative bodies.

How do words mean? What is the nature of meaning? How can we grasp a word's meaning? The frame-semantic approach developed in this book offers some well-founded answers to such long-standing, but still controversial issues. Following Charles Fillmore's definition of frames as both organizers of experience and tools for understanding, the monograph attempts to examine one of the most important concepts of Cognitive Linguistics in more detail. The point of departure is Fillmore's conception of "frames of understanding" - an approach (...) to (cognitive) semantics that Fillmore developed from 1975 to 1985. The envisaged Understanding Semantics ("U-Semantics") is a semantic theory sui generis whose significance for linguistic research cannot be overestimated. In addition to its crucial role in the development of the theoretical foundations of U-semantics, corpus-based frame semantics can be applied fruitfully in the investigation of knowledge-building processes in text and discourse. (shrink)