George Berkeley. Alciphron/Siris. Tradução, apresentação e notas de Jaimir Conte. São Paulo: Editora da Unesp, 2022. O volume reúne traduções de duas obras de George Berkeley, “Alciphron, ou o filósofo minucioso” e “Siris”. “Alciphron” é estruturado como um diálogo filosófico entre quatro personagens, no qual Berkeley combate os argumentos dos chamados “livres-pensadores” (como Mandeville ou Shaftesbury), fazendo uma apologia do Cristianismo. Já “Siris” é tanto um tratado sobre as virtudes medicinais da água de alcatrão quanto uma visão (...) do filósofo das cadeias do ser, explorando a gradual ascensão que vai do mundo dos sentidos e da mente, até chegar ao sobrenatural e a Deus, a essência trina. (shrink)

_Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher_ is Berkeley's main work of philosophical theology and a crucial source of his views on meaning and language. This edition contains the four most important dialogues and a selection of critical essays and commentaries reflecting the response of such writers as Hutcheson, Mill and Antony Flew. The only single edition currently in print, it argues that _Alciphron_ has a more important place both in the Berkeley canon and in early modern philosophy than is generally thought.

Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (1732) is Berkeley's main work of philosophical theology and a crucial source of his views on meaning and language. This edition contains the four most important dialogues and a selection of critical essays and commentaries reflecting the response of such writers as Hutcheson, Mill and Antony Flew. The only single edition currently in print, it argues that Alciphron has a more important place both in the Berkeley canon and in early modern philosophy than (...) is generally thought. (shrink)

In this article I consider George Berkeley's Alciphron from the standpoint of the literary techniques and rhetorical procedures employed, as evidence for placing this composition within the tradition of Christian apologetic rhetoric. The argument develops around three main issues: 1) Berkeley's employment of the traditional rhetorical tool of attacking his opponents using their own weapons; 2) Berkeley's resort to a perennial tradition of pre‐Christian or non‐Christian wisdom, in order to validate his Christian‐theistic claims; and 3) Berkeley's ‘argument from utility’ (...) . These three theses are discussed in light of the history of Christian apologetic rhetoric, with references to the works of St. Augustine, St. Justin Martyr, Origen, St. Thomas Aquinas and other Christian authors. (shrink)

(2002). Emotive meaning and Christian mysteries in Berkeley’s Alciphron. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 401-411. doi: 10.1080/09608780210143218.

The phonetic evolution of the Greek language which, towards the end of the Hellenistic period, substituted for the quantitative rhythm, based on the opposition of duration of the syllables, a rhythm based on the distance between stressed syllables, allowed the emergence of new poetic processes which followed after the traditional metrics: the equality of number of accents between several cola and the echoes between stress-related clausulae. The analysis of some of Alciphro’s bucolic letters from this point of view reveals that (...) they are sorts of poèmes en prose organized in isotonic stanzas, with isotony of cola and recurring clausulae in close echoes. This discovery reveals the really artistic character of these letters. It also supplies a criterion of choice between variants or conjectures when the text is corrupted. (shrink)

A acusação de entusiasmo é um dos temas mais paradoxais da polêmica entabulada por Berkeley no Alciphron contra o livre-pensamento. Com efeito, o entusiasmo designa tradicionalmente uma forma de iluminação religiosa aparentemente incompatível com as pretensões do livre-pensamento à racionalidade crítica. Ora, essa acusação não se dirige aos principais deistas como Toland e Collins (antes qualificados como racionalistas obstinados) mas principalmente a Shaftesbury, cuja análise inovadora do entusiasmo como paixão universal, criativa ou destrutiva segundo o temperamento do indivíduo, é (...) recusada por Berkeley. Este artigo quer mostrar que a recusa de Berkeley traz subentendida uma concepção da razão como disciplina educativa heterônoma e que ela reenvia a uma imagem tradicional do homem, cuja natureza só é bestial antes ou sem a educação religiosa, contra a reavaliação do papel epistemológico e moral conferido pela análise shaftesburiana do entusiasmo ao desejo e ao sentimento individuais. Freethinking: an Enthusiasm of Reason?In the polemic raised by Berkeleys Alciphron against Freethinking, one of the most paradoxical topics is the accusation of enthusiasm. For enthusiasm traditionnally means a kind of religious illumination seemingly incompatible with the critical rationalism the freethinkers pretend to assume. Now this accusation is not raised against the foremost british deists like Toland and Collins (rather dismissed as rationalistic bigots), but against Shaftesbury, whose new analysis of enthusiasm as a universal passion, creative or destructive following only the temper of the individual, is strongly rejected by Berkeley. This papers aim is to show that Berkeleys rejection of this modern sense of enthusiasm involves a traditional and conservative conception of reason as an heteronomous, educational discipline of man, whose nature would only be bestial before -or withoutreligious education, against the new epistemological and moral role given to desire and sentiment by Shaftesburys analysis of enthusiasm. (shrink)

The problem of divine attributes was one of the most intensely debated topics in the 17-18th century Irish philosophy. Simply put, the problem revolves around the ontological question (i) whether human and divine attributes differ in degree or in kind, and the semantical (ii) how we ought to describe these divine attributes by means of our human language. While there was a consensus that analogies play a key role in solving the semantical problem there was a controversy about the kind (...) of speech they allow for. Especially, it was contested if using analogies for divine predication allows for a separate kind of speech, i.e. allows us to speak neither literally nor metaphorically but analogically. The aim of my paper is to contextualize George Berkeley's position on the problem of divine attributes as developed in § 21 of the IV. Dialogue in Alciphron.More specifically and contrary to what most scholars hold, I argue Berkeley fails to follow Cardinal Cajetan with remarkable closeness. Despite paraphrasing parts of Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia in § 21, the solution Berkeley advances is closer to the position of John Duns Scotus – and hence, ironically, with the position Cajetan aimed to reject. (shrink)

My goal in this paper is to reconstruct Anthony Collins’ challenge to the authority of orthodox Anglican figures, which arises due to arguments Collins develops in his Vindication of the Divine Attributes (1710) and Discourse on Free-Thinking (1713). In addition to shedding light on a hitherto underappreciated argument by Collins, my reconstruction allows me to propose a solution to the interpretive problem posed by §§16–22 of the fourth dialogue of Berkeley’s Alciphron (1732). While it has been acknowledged that Collins (...) looms large in the background of these sections, Berkeley’s argumentative strategy has remained perplexing to commentators, particularly his references to several Scholastic thinkers. I argue that we can make sense of Berkeley’s strategy and references if we appreciate that these sections are intended to evade Collins’ challenge. (shrink)

For more than 200 years scholars have proceeded on the assumption that there was a controversy (in the sense of an argumentative exchange) between the bishop of Cork and Ross, Peter Browne (c. 1665–1735), and his nowadays more famous contemporary, the bishop of Cloyne, George Berkeley (1685–1753) about what we might call ‘the problem of divine attributes’. This problem concerns one of the most vexing issues for 17th /18th century Irish intellectuals. Simply put, it turns on two interconnected questions, namely (...) (1) an ontological question regarding God’s attributes and (2) a semantical question regarding the proper conception of analogy: -/- (1) Do God’s attributes only differ in degree or also in kind from their human counterparts? -/- (2) Is “analogical attribution” only concerned with the structure or the modus of the attribution? That is, is it a separate mode of speech (apart from the metaphorical and literal) or does it just mean we have to use analogies for our divine attributions? -/- In regard to the first question Berkeley argues the attributes of God and humans only differ in degree but not in kind (Alc. 4.22). Browne, on the other hand, is convinced that human and divine attributes differ in kind: “What Knowledge and Goodness are in the Nature of Man, that some inconceivable but correspondent Perfections are in the Nature of God […] which tho’ totally different in Kind from those Properties in us bearing the same Name” (Procedure, 138). Furthermore, Berkeley rejects the notion that analogical attribution is a separate mode of speech in addition to the literal and the metaphorical. Rather, it is an attribution made in the form of an analogy in which the words can be used literally or metaphorically (Alc. 4.21). By contrast, Browne repeatedly insists analogical attribution is more than just using analogies for attributing something to God. He thinks it is a separate mode of speech that ought to be distinguished from literal and metaphorical language (Procedure, 12, 23–29, 123–46). -/- Hence, there can be no doubt that Browne and Berkeley advance conflicting solutions to the problem of divine attributes. Yet, advancing disagreeing positions is not the same as having a (heated) argumentative exchange, i.e., a controversy. In contrast to the controversy-reading, I will defend the following view: Browne surely felt attacked by Berkeley’s elaborations in Alciphron (1732) and reacted to them in his Divine Analogy (1732/3). However, there was no argumentative exchange because Browne’s Procedure (1728) had virtually no influence on Berkeley when he was writing Alciphron. Furthermore, the available evidence suggests that Berkeley was indifferent to the (elaborate) criticisms of Alciphron found in Browne’s Divine Analogy. Thus, while the two bishops have differing positions and Browne reacted to Berkeley there is no reaction on Berkeley’s part and hence there is no argumentative exchange between the two at all, which is why their differing opinions are best described as such and not as a controversy. (shrink)

I love information upon all subjects that come in my way, and especially upon those that are most important. Thus boldly declares Euphranor, one of the defenders of Christian faith in Berkley’s Alciphron (Berkeley, (1732), Dialogue 1, Section 5, Paragraph 6/10). Evidently, information has been an object of philosophical desire for some time, well before the computer revolution, Internet or the dotcompandemonium (see for example Dunn (2001) and Adams (2003)). Yet what does Euphranor love, exactly? What is information? The (...) question has received many answers in different fields. Unsurprisingly, several surveys do not even converge on a single, unified definition of information (see for example Braman 1989, Losee (1997), Machlup and Mansfield (1983), Debons and Cameron (1975), Larson and Debons (1983)). (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, our purpose is to show what George Berkeley really said about ethics and the background conditions of religious life. The point is that true happiness is only possible in a religious sense; it means happiness in afterlife. The major threat to this is freethinking, or what we see as emerging enlightened modernism. His rather quixotic fix against freethinking shows the man as he is behind all the conventional panegyrics. He is a real Anglican soldier who anticipated but (...) never admitted a critical defeat in the most important of all battles. Interest in George Berkeley’s life’s work has been exceptionally selective. Yet his revolutionary immaterialism is only an early episode in his struggles towards a better society and religious life for all the people, regardless of their denomination. From this point of view, Alciphron is central. But he also develops his ethical ideas in his various minor writings, which have been largely overlooked. (shrink)

Recent political events suggest that there is more political, religious, and moral division than many had previously realized. Since people on all sides think they’re in the right, mitigating division is in everyone’s interest. But overcoming division requires changing minds, and changing minds requires advocacy. These considerations raise important questions in the epistemology of advocacy. In particular, who are the best advocates? After making some general remarks about the epistemology of advocacy, I explore the thought, found in Berkeley’s dialogue (...) class='Hi'>Alciphron, that an important variable to consider when assessing advocates is whether they are converts. I argue that this is indeed an important variable to consider, as certain kinds of converts can avoid some attempts to dismiss advocates. However, non-converts score better than converts in other respects. I conclude by suggesting that empirical work must be done to assess the role conversion plays in assessing advocates. (shrink)

This is a short scholarly note about my retrieval an original copy of the Daily Post-Boy issue no. 7024 from September 9th,1732 from a private seller. In this issue we find an anonymous letter addressed to Berkeley which gave rise to him writing the Theory of Vision Vindicated. While Berkeley Berkeley appended a copy of the anonymous critic’s letter to TVV, until now an original copy of The Daily Post-Boy issue had yet to be discovered. -/- I have donated the (...) original copy to the Marsh's Library in Dublin, but you will find a scan of the original document attached to the note. -/- . (shrink)

The purpose of this text is to analyze the debate between Berkeley’s Alciphron and Mandeville’s The fable of the bees and Letter to Dion, focusing on the questions indirectly raised by Berkeley to his opponent: Would there be a place for religion in Mandeville’s society or in his social, political and economic system? If so, what role would it play? Without religion, on what foundations would morality in social life be based? Key words: Berkeley, Mandeville, morality.

The argument presented on behalf of ‘the slightest philosophy’ by Hume that ‘The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: But the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration’, in contrasting the seen with the real table requires the first relative clause to be defining; but the possibility of identifying tables independently of being seen requires the clause to be non-defining. John P. Wright's objection to Reid's rejoinder is rebutted. A similarly (...) worded argument in Alciphron avoids confusion since Berkeley denies that things like tables can be said in any unqualified sense to be seen. (Published Online February 27 2006). (shrink)

Berkeley “argues with the learned and speaks with the vulgar.” I use his double maxim to interpret his ethics. My approach is new. The Sermons and Guardian Essays mainly speak to the vulgar and Passive Obedience and Alciphron reason with the learned. The reward of ethics is eternal bliss in a future state: religion and ethics are connected. I study a set of problems: resurrection, eternal life, happiness, benevolence, the goodness of God, and self-love. Divine bliss is unlike any (...) earthly happiness. The idea of law does not support benevolence, even if it is a Christian duty and virtue. God is good, but how to prove it? The learned must study the complex theodicy problem; the vulgar need assurance based on their sensuous experience and fervent hope of eternal bliss. Self-love may be a vital issue to the learned, although the vulgar may not realize their need to overcome it. The main questions concern Berkeley’s two approaches to ethical problems: first, how do their topics differ, and second, are they mutually consistent? (shrink)

Faut-il chercher un principe de la morale, quelque chose qui serait là, en nous, pour qu'elle puisse exister? La morale ne nous vient-elle pas aussi de l'extérieur, d'une contrainte sociale? Les protagonistes de la troisième partie de l'Alciphron s'engagent dans un vif débat sur cette question. Toutefois l'attention est détournée du « bien » vers le beau, objet du sens moral. L'exposé de cette thèse, les objections qui lui sont faites, sont le levier qui permet d'envisager la place de (...) l'intérêt, de nos sentiments de crainte et d'espoir, et de l'obéissance à la loi divine. L'enjeu, c'est la possibilité d'une morale autonome. Should one try and find some principle of ethics, i.e. something that would be herein, within us, so that it may be liable to exist? Do not ethics also come from outside, i.e. from a social constraint? The protagonists of Alciphron's third part start an acute debate on the topic. However attention is turned from the « good » towards the beautiful which is the object of the moral sense. This thesis and objections made to it are the lever enabling to grasp the part played by interest, by our feelings both of fear and of hope and by obedience to the divine law. What is at stake is the liability of autonomous ethics. (shrink)

Berkeley's Theory of Vision, or Visual Language Showing The Immediate Presence and Providence of A Deity, Vindicated And Explained was published in 1733, occasioned by an anonymous letter of the previous year to the London Daily Post Boy . The letter criticized Berkeley's New Theory of Vision , which had been published in 1709, but which had been appended to Berekely's Alciphron , published in 1732. No one has ever identified the author whose criticisms led Berkeley to his Theory (...) of Vision Vindicated . Circumstantial evidence presented here suggests that the author was Catherine Trotter Cockburn. Part of the evidence is the brilliance of her interpretation of Locke, whose position is defended in the letter against Berkeley. (shrink)

This essay provides some historical background for, and considers the philosophical importance of, the collection of Anne Berkeley’s letters to Adam Gordon. The primary philosophical significance of the letters is her arguments against the so-called “free thinkers.” She discusses the philosophical view and the behavior of five prominent free-thinkers: Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Hume. Her discussion of Shaftesbury is particularly illuminating and can be read as a commentary on Alciphron III.13-14. Because the work of the other four were (...) published mainly after the Bishop’s death, the letters also show Anne ’s independent lifelong interest in matters theological, philosophical, and moral. (shrink)

Whereas previous studies have made George Berkeley (1685-1753) the object of philosophical study, Peter Walmsley assesses Berkeley as a writer, offering rhetorical and literary analyses of Berkeley's four major philosophical texts, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Alciphron, and Siris. Berkeley emerges from this study as an accomplished stylist who builds structures of affective imagery, creates dramatic voices in his texts, and masters the range of philosophical genres--the treatise, the dialogue, and (...) the essay. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME ON THE 'DISTINCTION OF REASON1* In a 1959 paper, Richard H. Popkin1 propounded what was then taken to be a most extraordinary thesis: Hume may never have read Berkeley. Popkin's paper marks the end of one of the stranger stories in the history of philosophy, the relationship of the British Empiricists — Locke, Berkeley, Hume — to one another. The thesis was hardly news either to Berkeley or (...) Hume scholars because for several decades in careful studies of the historical contexts and sources they had relied less and less on any theory about significant common themes. In this paper I rehearse the arguments against the "partnership" doctrine and then turn to some ways in which Berkeley and Hume differ over abstractionism and the 'distinction of reason'. Finally, I discuss George Davie's suggestion that this 'distinction' may belong to a very different side of Hume's thought. The linking of Locke with Berkeley is not a feature of early commentary on Berkeley. Berkeley was seen by his contemporaries as a product of Pierre Bayle's scepticism or of Malebranche's immaterialism.2 The work of A.A. Luce, and to a lesser extent, of T. E. Jessop, seeks to restore Berkeley to a place in those traditions and to reduce his indebtedness to Locke. The work of Hume scholars from Kemp Smith to Ardal, Davie, Norton, and Popkin all places Hume outside the direct Berkeley line. So far as the traditional epistemological picture was concerned, there was not enough internal evidence to support a Hume-Berkeley connection. The argument took a different turn when a new Hume letter came to light. Hume's letter to Michael Ramsay from Orleans is dated August 31, 1737. I desire of you, if you have Leizure, to read over La Recherche de la Vérité of Pere Malebranche, the Principles of 90 Human Knowledge by Dr Berkeley, some of the more metaphysical Articles of Bailes Dictionary; such as those /...of/ Zeno, & Spinoza. Des-Cartes Meditations wou'd also be useful....5 In 1973, Michael Morrisroe, Jr., surveyed the contributions of Wiener, Popkin, Mossner, Hall, Flew, and Conroy to the debate. Morrisroe takes the several Hume references to Berkeley as internal evidence that Hume read Berkeley. He then prints a new Hume letter to Michael Ramsay, dated "Rheims. Sepfc. 29 1734. N. S." A ten sentence letter, the eighth reads: "It is my Pleasure to read over again today Locke's Essays and the Principles of Human Knowledge by Dr. Berkeley which are printed in their original state and in French copy." Morrisroe explains in a footnote that he was granted permission to make a typescript of the letter, that it was sold at auction, and that its "present location... is unknown." In addition, he thanks six graduate students: "without their attention to bibliogaphical detail this letter might not have been made ready for publication until much later." But the bibliographical detail does not include telling us whether he saw the original or how the Hume authorship was established; nor does it include speculation on what Hume means in that eighth sentence. Did Hume find one book containing Locke and Berkeley in French and in English which he then read in one day? A bilingual Locke plus a bilingual Berkeley? Or can he mean an edition of Locke's Essay in French and an edition of Berkeley's Principles in English? That seems to be the least likely interpretation, unless the reference to Berkeley is a mere parenthetical afterthought, and Hume had his hands on Locke in English and French plus an English edition of Berkeley. Whatever this letter means, we know that Locke's Essay was available in Pierre Coste's translation. Berkeley is another story. The "Principles appeared in 1710. A revised edition, together with the Three Dialogues (also revised) was published in 1734. The first French edition appears to have been in 1889. The Three Dialogues first appeared in 1713 and the first French translation in 1750. The New Theory of Vision, first published in 1709, appeared together with the first edition of Alciphron in 1732. French translations appeared together in 1734. In any case, it can be granted, if only on... (shrink)