In studies publishing identifying personal information, obtaining consent is regarded as necessary, as it is impossible to ensure complete anonymity. However, current journal practices around specific points to consider when obtaining consent, the contents of consent forms and how consent forms are managed have not yet been fully examined. This study was conducted to identify potential issues surrounding consent to publish identifying personal information.

Own-age bias is a well-known bias reflecting the effects of age, and its role has been demonstrated, particularly, in face recognition. However, it remains unclear whether an own-age bias exists in facial impression formation. In the present study, we used three datasets from two published and one unpublished functional magnetic resonance imaging study that employed the same pleasantness rating task with fMRI scanning and preferential choice task after the fMRI to investigate whether healthy young and older participants showed own-age effects (...) in face preference. Specifically, we employed a drift-diffusion model to elaborate the existence of own-age bias in the processes of preferential choice. The behavioral results showed higher rating scores and higher drift rate for young faces than for older faces, regardless of the ages of participants. We identified a young-age effect, but not an own-age effect. Neuroimaging results from aggregation analysis of the three datasets suggest a possibility that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex was associated with evidence accumulation of own-age faces; however, no clear evidence was provided. Importantly, we found no age-related decline in the responsiveness of the vmPFC to subjective pleasantness of faces, and both young and older participants showed a contribution of the vmPFC to the parametric representation of the subjective value of face and functional coupling between the vmPFC and ventral visual area, which reflects face preference. These results suggest that the preferential choice of face is less susceptible to the own-age bias across the lifespan of individuals. (shrink)

This article offers a characterization of what I call multiple-models juxtaposition, a strategy for managing trade-offs among modeling desiderata. MMJ displays models of distinct phenomena to...

Does the A-theory have an intuitive advantage over the B-theory? Many A-theorists have claimed so, arguing that their theory has a much better explanation for the fact that we all experience the passage of time: we experience time as passing because time really does pass. In this paper I expose and reject the argument behind the A-theorist’s claim. I argue that all parties have conceded far too easily that there is an experience that needs explaining in the first place. For (...) what exactly is an experience of temporal passage? One natural thought is that we experience passage in virtue of experiencing change, or in virtue of experiencing change as ‘dynamic’. Another is that we experience passage in virtue of experiencing events as (successively) present. None of these experiences, I argue, amounts to an experience of passage. Although there might still be other ways to experience passage, A-theorists would have to provide us with a plausible candidate experience. If there is such an experience at all, it won’t be one that qualifies as what we intuitively take to be an experience of passage. The ‘intuitive advantage’, it seems, has dissolved in any case. (shrink)

Abstract- Presentism And Temporal Experience Intuitively, we all believe that we experience change and the passage of time. Presentism prides itself as the most intuitive theory of time. However, a closer look at how we would experience temporality if presentism was true reveals that this is far from obvious. For if presentism was really so intuitive, then it would do justice to these intuitions. In the course of this article I examine how presentism fares when combined with various leading theories (...) of perception and temporal perception. I focused on two Central Questions. Can presentism, given theory X, account for experiences of change and duration? And can presentism, given theory X, account for experiences of time as passing? I argue that there is no possible combination which allows for an experience of time as passing. This result alone undermines the alleged intuitive advantage of presentism and with it the motivation for the view. Presentism, it remains safe to say, is not as intuitive a theory as its adherents like to portray it. (shrink)

To ‘find one’s true self’ or to ‘reveal one’s true self’ are common enough expressions. But what do we really mean by the ‘true self’? Does it play an important explanatory role in understanding ourselves? The aim of this article is to shed light on the intuition that people have a true self—in contrast to their more readily perceptible “everyday self”—and to see whether we can give a clear philosophical account of it. When it comes to characterizing the true self (...) on the basis of these, I argue, our intuitions point us in two directions. The first suggests that the true self expresses a person’s essential nature. The second focuses on our own role in creating and maintaining a true self. I argue that both suggestions fail. Although the idea of a true self does not lack intuitive appeal, it is neither conducive to a convincing account, nor does it advance a theoretical understanding of ourselves as persons. (shrink)

This study investigates Japanese compliments produced at a distinct sequential position and how the complimentees treat the compliments. In ordinary conversation, speakers sometimes talk about their accomplishments. Drawing on Conversation Analysis and multimodal interaction analysis, the study demonstrates how telling recipients deploy compliments at the possible completion of such tellings of accomplishment. The analysis also shows how the tellers deal with the complimentary telling responses, taking into consideration the design of tellings and the possibility of engaging in self-praise. The study (...) illuminates a context-sensitive nature of complimenting activity and managing two conflicting preferences by illustrating a specific interactional pattern of compliment sequences in Japanese ordinary conversation. (shrink)

Shweder et al. (1997) proposed the three domains of morality: Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. This study used situation sampling to explore how people from Japan and the U.S. interpret moral transgressions provided in their own and another cultural context. Specifically, the analysis tested whether participants with one cultural background recognize culturally congruent moral transgressions as violations more frequently and feel more harshly towards them than culturally incongruent domains. Furthermore, the extent of evocation caused by the home and another culture was (...) investigated. This study asked 102 Japanese and 168 U.S. participants to judge which domain would be primarily involved in each transgression and to rate their wrongness. Participants showed a higher perceived magnitude of transgressions in culturally valued domains provided by in-group than outside members. Cross-cultural differences in morality and future directions are discussed. (shrink)

Perceptual grouping has traditionally been thought to be governed by innate, universal principles. However, recent work has found differences in Japanese and English speakers' non-linguistic perceptual grouping, implicating language in non-linguistic perceptual processes (Iversen, Patel, & Ohgushi, 2008). Two experiments test Japanese- and English-learning infants of 5-6 and 7-8 months of age to explore the development of grouping preferences. At 5-6 months, neither the Japanese nor the English infants revealed any systematic perceptual biases. However, by 7-8 months, the same age (...) as when linguistic phrasal grouping develops, infants developed non-linguistic grouping preferences consistent with their language's structure (and the grouping biases found in adulthood). These results reveal an early difference in non-linguistic perception between infants growing up in different language environments. The possibility that infants' linguistic phrasal grouping is bootstrapped by abstract perceptual principles is discussed. (shrink)

Is it the case that, in order to have a perceptual experience as of change, duration, or any other temporally extended occurrence at all, the duration of the experience itself must come apart from the apparent duration of what is experienced? I shall argue that such a view is at least coherent. The largest part of the paper will be concerned with an objection from Ian Phillips . The objection is interesting in so far as it is an argument from (...) introspection. If it worked, it would give us a priori, non-empirical grounds for thinking that a cluster of views about temporal perception are wrong, or worse, impossible. I will argue, however, that the objection fails. Towards the end, I briefly explore the view that we have no introspective access at all to the duration of our experiences. I suggest that such a view may well be supported by some considerations about the phenomenal continuity of consciousness. (shrink)

The project of my dissertation was to advance the metaphysical debate about temporal passage, by relating it to debates about the perceptual experience of time and change. It seems true that we experience temporal passage, even if there is disagreement whether time actually passes, or what temporal passage consists in. This appears to give the defender of dynamic time an advantage in accounting for our experience. I challenge this by arguing that no major account of temporal perception can accommodate experiences (...) of temporal passage such that we could infer passage from them. This shows that static theories of time are at no disadvantage in accounting for the phenomenology of temporality. The conclusion has far reaching consequences: for instance, an important motivation for holding an A-theory of time is precisely the psychological intuition that we experience temporal passage. By undermining that intuition, I undermine the motivation for holding an A-theory. (shrink)

Using an eighth-century copy of the 60-fascicle Flower Ornament Sutra as a case study, this article examines the transformation of a Buddhist scripture into an aesthetic object in early modern Japan. On the 14th day of the second month, 1667, a fire decimated Nigatsudo at Todaiji (Nara prefecture) along with most of the sacred objects within. Clerics salvaged partially burnt scrolls of an eighth-century Flower Ornament Sutra done in silver ink on indigo-dyed paper. The scrolls were restored ten years later, (...) but by the first half of the eighteenth century, part of the set left the temple and began circulating in the art market as collectable calligraphy fragments, later known as the “Nigatsudo burnt sutra” (Nigatsudo yakegyo). This study traces the curious shift in the attribution of Nigatsudo yakegyo’s calligrapher that took place in the eighteenth century to consider how the burn marks impacted the transformation of this scripture from a devotional text into a collectable artefact. I argue that the curious switch in attribution occurred adhering to the popular imagination of the calligraphers, as well as the distinct role certain fragments played within the early-modern calligraphy collecting culture. (shrink)

We develop a theory about the metaphysics of time and modality that combines the conceptual resources devised in recent sympathetic work on ontological pluralism (the thesis that there are fundamentally distinct kinds of being) with the thought that what is past, future, and merely possible is less real than what is present and actual (albeit real enough to serve as truthmakers for statements about the past, future, and merely possible). However, we also show that despite being a coherent, distinctive, and (...) prima facie appealing position, the theory succumbs to what we call the “problem of mixed ontological status”. We conclude that the proponents of the theory can only evade these problems by developing ontological pluralism in a radically different way than it has been by its recent sympathizers. (shrink)

When we cook, by meticulously following a recipe, or adding a personal twist to it, we sometimes care not only to (re-)produce a taste that we can enjoy, but also to give our food a certain aftertaste. This is not surprising, given that we ordinarily take aftertaste to be an important part of the gustatory experience as a whole, one which we seek out, and through which we evaluate what we eat and drink—at least in many cases. What is surprising (...) is that aftertastes, from a psychological point of view, seem to be analogous to afterimages, and thus have little or no epistemic import. In this paper we tackle this puzzle, and argue that we are right in treating aftertastes seriously. The moral is that both from a metaphysical and an epistemic point of view aftertastes should be categorized differently from afterimages. (shrink)

As I have pointed out in a series of papers, which appeared about fifteen years ago in the Revue de l'histoire des religions, there are numerous resemblances between the ancient myths of the Indo-Europeans, on the one hand, and those of Japan, on the other. These resemblances, relating both to the fundamental structures of the two mythological systems and to a number of curious details, constitute an assemblage which seems too conspicuous to be regarded as either accidental or the result (...) of a similitude of human mentalities, manifesting itself, so it seems, through the creation of a great many similar myths and legends throughout the length and breadth of the surface of our planet. (shrink)

「脳死は人の死」のごまかし、がんでなくても人は死ぬ、「少年A」を解釈するな、埴谷雄高と大森荘蔵など、「魂」(プシューケー)の文体で考える純粋思惟の広大な視界。.

This paper explores new avenues of research on social bases of cognition and a more adequate framework to conceive the phenomena of the human mind. It firstly examines Bartlett's work on social bases of cognition, from which three pertinent features are identified, namely multi-level analyses, evolutionary perspective and embodied mind approach. It then examines recent works on social origins of cognition in ethology and paleoanthropology, and various forms of the embodied mind approach recently proposed in neuroscience and cognitive science. The (...) paper concludes that extending the embodied mind approach would provide the most potent framework to enable, amongst others, the conceptual integration of the biological, psychological and social bases of the human mind, which have in the past been treated mainly as competing alternatives. (shrink)

This paper reports on a quiz robot experiment in which we explore similarities and differences in human participant speech, gaze, and bodily conduct in responding to a robot’s speech, gaze, and bodily conduct across two languages. Our experiment involved three-person groups of Japanese and English-speaking participants who stood facing the robot and a projection screen that displayed pictures related to the robot’s questions. The robot was programmed so that its speech was coordinated with its gaze, body position, and gestures in (...) relation to transition relevance places, key words, and deictic words and expressions in both languages. Contrary to findings on human interaction, we found that the frequency of English speakers’ head nodding was higher than that of Japanese speakers in human-robot interaction. Our findings suggest that the coordination of the robot’s verbal and non-verbal actions surrounding TRPs, key words, and deictic words and expressions is important for facilitating HRI irrespective of participants’ native language. Keywords: coordination of verbal and non-verbal actions; robot gaze comparison between English and Japanese; human-robot interaction ; transition relevance place ; conversation analysis. (shrink)

In the by now well known talks he gave at Princeton, Saul Kripke claimed that “[t]heoretical identities … are generally identities involving two rigid designators and therefore are examples of the necessary a posteriori.” 253-355; A rigid designator is an expression that designates the same object in all possible worlds when it is used. So Kripke is claiming that ‘Water is H20’ and ‘Heat is the motion of molecules’ are generally identities involving expressions like ‘water’ and ‘the motion of molecules’ (...) which designate the same objects in all possible worlds. If the identity statement is true, both sides designate the same object rigidly, i.e., in all possible worlds, and therefore the statement is necessarily true. On the other hand, whether it is true is determined ultimately by appeal to experience. It follows that if true, the identity is necessary a posteriori. (shrink)

The author reflects on his long career as an educational psychologist and on the role of literature in his vision of psychological science. The author followed with great interest the major developments in psychology around the world, but he felt himself progressively alienated from the revealing power of art and literature. At one moment, he realized that a simple narrative constitutes the most profound and also the most effective means of transmitting genuine insights about teaching from one generation to another. (...) This narrative reveals a career guided by high ideals and compromised by the harsh realities of the discipline of psychology. (shrink)

Moral appraisals are found to be associated with a person’s individual differences (e.g., political ideology), and the effects of individual differences on language use have been studied within the framework of the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). However, the relationship between one’s moral concern and the use of language involving morality on social media is not self-evident. The present exploratory study investigated that relationship using the MFT. Participants’ tweets and self-reported responses to the questionnaire were collected to measure the degree of (...) their appraisals according to the five foundations of the MFT. The Japanese version of the Moral Foundations Dictionary (J-MFD) was used to quantify the number of words in tweets relevant to the MFT’s five moral foundations. The results showed that endorsement of the Fairness and Authority foundations predicted the word frequency in the J-MFD across all five foundations. The findings suggest that the trade-off relationship between the Fairness and Authority foundations plays a key role in online language communication. The implications and future directions to scrutinize that foundation are discussed. (shrink)

Background: Nurses are expected to make and implement autonomous decisions to provide patients with excellent quality nursing while practicing complex, high-level care. However, studies have shown that nursing practice based on autonomous decision-making is difficult, and a gap exists between decision-making and implementation. Research question/aim/objectives: This study aims to clarify trends among nursing professionals who recognize they are practicing ethical behavior in their nursing practice. Research design/Participants and research context: We surveyed the basic attributes of and used the Ode’s Ethical (...) Behavior Scale for Nurses with 3467 nursing professionals working at 34 hospitals in suburban cities of Japan and investigated the relationships among these factors. Ethical considerations: This study was approved by the appropriate research ethics committee. The Ethical Behavior Scale for Nurses was used with the authors’ permission. Findings/results: Significant differences were found in the mean “ethical behavior” scores between nurses and licensed practical nurses and midwives and licensed practical nurses. Mean scores for the “justice” subscale differed significantly between the low experience group and mid-level experience group and between the high experience group and mid-level experience group. Significant differences were also found in the mean scores between those with ethics education experience and those without, those with ethics training experience and those without, and those with ethics conference experience and those without. Discussion: Midwives and nurses had higher ethical behaviors than licensed practical nurses. Nursing professionals with low and high experience had higher justice scores than those with mid-level experience. Finally, nursing professionals with ethics education, training, or conference experience had higher ethical behavior than those without such experience. Conclusion: Nursing professionals who recognize they are practicing ethical behavior tend to be midwives or nurses with low or high levels of experience who attended ethics education, training, or conferences. (shrink)

Kei Yoshida critically assesses five different theoretical approaches to cultural interpretivism and conclusions on rationality. This book reveals the need for a cogent solution to the problem of rationality and urges social scientists to interpret symbolic systems' or agents’ intentions as well as explain the consequences of human actions.

How are we aware of time? How do we perceive change and duration? What is it like to experience temporality as opposed to spatiality? Does the way we experience time tell us anything about the nature of time? This chapter focusses on some of the most pertinent questions in the philosophy of time—on the relation between subjective and objective time, on the metaphysical and psychological priority of the present, on the phenomenal difference between our experiences of space and our experiences (...) of time, and on how to reconcile relativistic time concepts with our common-sense ideas. It gives us an interesting in sight into leading debates on the topic, largely within the phenomenological and hermeneutic philosophical traditions. This article intends to complement the chapter by providing a brief overview over views and debates about time consciousness in contemporary analytic philosophy. (shrink)

To ‘find one’s true self’ or to ‘reveal one’s true self’ are common enough expressions. But what do we really mean by the ‘true self’? Does it play an important explanatory role in understanding ourselves? The aim of this article is to shed light on the intuition that people have a true self—in contrast to their more readily perceptible “everyday self”—and to see whether we can give a clear philosophical account of it. When it comes to characterizing the true self (...) on the basis of these, I argue, our intuitions point us in two directions. The first suggests that the true self expresses a person’s essential nature. The second focuses on our own role in creating and maintaining a true self. I argue that both suggestions fail. Although the idea of a true self does not lack intuitive appeal, it is neither conducive to a convincing account, nor does it advance a theoretical understanding of ourselves as persons. (shrink)

We prove in the framework of Bishop's constructive mathematics that the sequential completion equation image of the space [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D] is filter-complete. Then it follows as a corollary that the filter-completeness of [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D] is equivalent to the principle BD-ℕ, which can be proved in classical mathematics, Brouwer's intuitionistic mathematics and constructive recursive mathematics of Markov's school, but does not in Bishop's constructive mathematics. We also show that equation image is identical with the filter-completion which was (...) provided by Bishop. (shrink)