The most influential philosopher in the analytic tradition of his time, Willard Van Orman Quine changed the way we think about language and its relation to the world. His rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, his scepticism about modal logic and essentialism, his celebrated theme of the indeterminacy of translation, and his advocacy of naturalism have challenged key assumptions of the prevailing orthodoxy and helped shape the development of much of recent philosophy.This introduction to Quine's philosophical ideas provides philosophers, students, and (...) generalists with an authoritative analysis of Quine's lasting contributions to philosophy. The major themes covered include the adaptation of the language of modern logic to formulate a criterion of ontological commitment; Quine's own ontological commitments; Duhemian-Holistic empiricism and the attendant rejection of a priori knowledge; the nature and grounds of logical truth; Quine's criticisms of such notions as meaning, synonymy, analyticity, and necessity; the conjecture of the indeterminacy of translation; modal logic; propositional attitudes; and Quine's work on naturalized epistemology.Quine's ideas throughout are contrasted with more traditional views, as well as with contemporaries such as Frege, Russell, Carnap, Davidson, Field, Kripke, and Chomsky, enabling the reader to grasp a clear sense of the place of Quine's views in twentieth-century philosophy and the important criticisms of them. (shrink)

The most influential philosopher in the analytic tradition of his time, Willard Van Orman Quine changed the way we think about language and its relation to the world. His rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, his scepticism about modal logic and essentialism, his celebrated theme of the indeterminacy of translation, and his advocacy of naturalism have challenged key assumptions of the prevailing orthodoxy and helped shape the development of much of recent philosophy. This introduction to Quine's philosophical ideas provides philosophers, students (...) and generalists with an authoritative analysis of his lasting contributions to philosophy. Quine's ideas throughout are contrasted with more traditional views, as well as with contemporaries such as Frege, Russell, Carnap, Davidson, Field, Kripke and Chomsky, enabling the reader to grasp a clear sense of the place of Quine's views in twentieth-century philosophy and the important criticisms of them. (shrink)

The essays in this collection are by some of the leading figures in their fields and they touch on the most recent turnings in Quine's work.

Geach's account of the Aristotelian logic of categorical sentences supplemented the views shared by Frege, Russell, Quine and others. I argue that this particular predicate logic approach and Geach's points apply to only one variety of natural language categorical sentences. For example, it takes the universal categorical as a universal conditional “If anything is a man, then it is mortal”. A different natural language form can and should be invoked: “Every man is a mortal.” Employing special restricted quantifiers in a (...) version of predicate logic, we justify a full square of opposition and the rules of quality and quantity that Geach rejected. (shrink)

An account of Aristotle's syllogistic (including a full square of opposition and allowing for empty nouns) as an integral part of first-order predicate logic is lacking. Some say it is not possible. It is not found in the tradition stemming from ukasiewicz's attempt nor in less formal approaches such as Strawson's. The ukasiewicz tradition leaves Aristotle's syllogistic as an autonomous axiomatized system. In this paper Aristotle's syllogistic is presented within first-order predicate logic with special restricted quantifiers. The theory is not (...) motivated primarily by historical considerations but as an accurate account of categorical sentences along lines suggested by recent work on natural language quantifiers and themes from supposition theory. It provides logical forms which conform to grammatical ones and is intended as a rival to accounts of quantifiers in natural language that appeal to binary quantifiers, for example, Wiggins or to restricted quantifiers, for example, Neale. (shrink)

The most influential philosopher in the analytic tradition of his time, Willard Van Orman Quine changed the way we think about language and its relation to the world. His rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, his scepticism about modal logic and essentialism, his celebrated theme of the indeterminacy of translation, and his advocacy of naturalism have challenged key assumptions of the prevailing orthodoxy and helped shape the development of much of recent philosophy. This introduction to Quine's philosophical ideas provides philosophers, students (...) and generalists with an authoritative analysis of his lasting contributions to philosophy. Quine's ideas throughout are contrasted with more traditional views, as well as with contemporaries such as Frege, Russell, Carnap, Davidson, Field, Kripke and Chomsky, enabling the reader to grasp a clear sense of the place of Quine's views in twentieth-century philosophy and the important criticisms of them. (shrink)

This paper presents an anti‐realist account of fictional objects. Arguing for the involvement of non‐veridical prepositional attitude ascriptions in the understanding of fiction, I maintain that there is no need to invoke Meinongian objects, possibilia or abstract objects for this purpose. In addition I argue against object dependent views . I make a case for empty names playing a more significant role than that accorded on direct reference accounts of names. I close by noting points of similarity and of difference (...) with Amie Thomasson and with Kendall Walton. (shrink)

This paper presents an anti‐realist account of fictional objects. Arguing for the involvement of non‐veridical prepositional attitude ascriptions in the understanding of fiction, I maintain that there is no need to invoke Meinongian objects, possibilia or abstract objects for this purpose. In addition I argue against object dependent views. I make a case for empty names playing a more significant role than that accorded on direct reference accounts of names. I close by noting points of similarity and of difference with (...) Amie Thomasson and with Kendall Walton. (shrink)

Alex Orenstein; VI*—How to Get Something from Nothing, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95, Issue 1, 1 June 1995, Pages 93–112, https://doi.org/1.

The more traditional approaches to the history and philosophy of science and technology continue as well, and probably will continue as long as there are skillful practitioners such as Carl Hempel, Ernest Nagel, and th~ir students. Finally, there are still other approaches that address some of the technical problems arising when we try to provide an account of belief and of rational choice. - These include efforts to provide logical frameworks within which we can make sense of these notions. This (...) series will attempt to bring together work from all of these approaches to the history and philosophy of science and technology in the belief that each has something to add to our understanding. The volumes of this series have emerged either from lectures given by authors while they served as honorary visiting professors at the City College of New York or from conferences sponsored by that institution. The City College Program in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology oversees and directs these lectures and conferences with the financial aid of the Association for Philosophy of Science, Psychotheraphy, and Ethics. MARTIN TAMNY RAPHAEL STERN PREFACE The papers in this collection stem largely from the conference 'Foun dations: Logic, Language, and Mathematics' held at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York on 14-15 November 1980. (shrink)

Hans‐Johann Glock: The Relation between Quine and Davidson: The chapter assesses the interaction between our two protagonists from a historical, exegetical, and substantive perspective. The first section provides a brief biographical account, and contends that at the grand‐strategic level Quine and Davidson are united by a “logical pragmatism.” The next section presents their contrasting attitudes to naturalism. I then turn to more detailed comparisons concerning the philosophy of language: meaning and use, truth, radical interpretation, and the “third dogma of empiricism.” (...) The final section compares and contrasts their conceptions of mental phenomena, focusing on the idea of anomalous monism. Davidson modifies Quinean ideas in significant ways, yet without compromising the naturalistic framework or abandoning empiricism altogether. But whereas Quine's naturalism tends to be scientistic, Davidson's naturalism is anthropological. Human beings, their actions and utterances are physical phenomena; yet they cannot be properly understood by physics, but only by reference to reasons. (shrink)

There are good reasons for being dissatisfied with standard criticisms of the various arguments, all of which are referred to as being “The Ontological Argument”. While refutation by logical analogy is compelling, it merely teaches us that something is amiss. It does not specify the exact nature of the flaw. The first part of this paper examines and rejects several well-known attempts at refuting and clarifying the argument(s). The second part attempts to provide a principled uniform account of what is (...) wrong by treating the arguments as resting on definitions. Then, by bringing to bear Ajdukiewicz’s exhaustive classification of definitions, we arrive at a unified account of the flaw common to such arguments. In effect we have an explication of the dictum that one cannot define into existence. (shrink)

The central topics of this work are Aristotle’s conceptions of meaning, essence, and necessity. These are dealt with in the two parts of the book: in part 1, “Aristotle on Language and Thought,” and then in part 2, “Aristotle on Definition, Essence and Natural Kinds.” Aristotle is examined both from the perspective of his improvements on his contemporaries and predecessors, and also in relation to current twentieth-century views. The two leading current figures whose views are discussed are Saul Kripke and (...) Hilary Putnam. David Charles argues that Aristotle provides us with a viable rival alternative to the leading current views on the meaning of natural kind terms and associated essentialist claims. (shrink)

Too often Aristotle’s account of truth is summed up by repeating some variant of “to say of what is that it is and of what it is not that it is not, is to say the true; while to say of what is that it is not or of what is not that it is, is to say the false,” and matters are left at that. Or worse still, it is simply described as a “correspondence theory.” The importance of Paolo (...) Crivelli’s book is that it perspicuously fills in the blanks so that in its realm Aristotle’s account can be seen as comparable to current truth-conditional compositional accounts like Tarski’s and those deployed by figures such as Davidson. Crivelli’s goals are to provide “a precise reconstruction of all of Aristotle’s most significant views on truth and falsehood and to gain a philosophical understanding of them”. He goes far toward attaining these ends. His approach consists of relating Aristotle’s views to those at the forefront of contemporary discussions of similar topics and therewith adapting some of the most central themes of current philosophical logic and logical theory to explicate Aristotle on truth. One of these themes is the presentation of truth conditions for the various sorts of sentences dealt with by Aristotle and which still play a role on the present scene. In doing this he performs a valuable service to the scholarly community, allowing Aristotle scholars and others to apply seminal ideas from the Philosopher to topics in the history of philosophy, for example, the Terminist tradition, and to contemporary discussions. The book opens with an overview of Aristotle’s theory of truth and is followed by material organized into three parts: Bearers of Truth and Falsehood, Empty Terms, Truth and Time. These are followed by appendices which include translations of sections of the Metaphysics and discussions of many placed and of future-tense predication. (shrink)

This is an excellent exposition of Arthur Prior’s views on propositional attitudes and truth. It is also an interpretation and defense of these views. Prior’s work on propositional attitudes was collected by Peter Geach and Anthony Kenny and then published posthumously under the title Objects of Thought.

This is an excellent exposition of Arthur Prior’s views on propositional attitudes and truth. It is also an interpretation and defense of these views. Prior’s work on propositional attitudes was collected by Peter Geach and Anthony Kenny and then published posthumously under the title Objects of Thought.

This work contains interesting criticisms of and rebuttals to opponents of rationalism. In addition it contains a bold, heady, imaginative positive account of pure reason. BonJour offers us a late-twentieth-century persuasive rationalist approach to a priori knowledge. As a preliminary to stating and defending his positive theory, the opening chapters offer criticisms of varieties of empiricism on a priori knowledge: of Moderate Empiricism—which allows for the a priori but attempts to demythologize it by grounding it in analyticity—and of Radical, that (...) is, Quinian Empiricism—which denies or rather takes a skeptical stance towards the a priori. (shrink)

Each of the topics mentioned in the title has its own chapter. The unifying theme is McGinn’s conception of naive common sense views of identity, existence, predication, necessity, and truth, which are argued for as being correct. McGinn thinks they should replace entrenched rival treatments of these subjects. However, some of the views McGinn takes as naive seem far from naive or in common use to this reader. This is a technical work in philosophical logic, not in the sense that (...) it is strewn with technical symbols of formal logic. It takes up and discusses topics in a sophisticated way suitable for those working in the area and is not intended primarily for novices in the subject. Having said that, it is well written and clear so that there is much that would be rewarding to nonspecialists who wish to come to the subject. There is much in the way of close and interesting argumentation. (shrink)

What is a passionate moderate? What are the extremes to be avoided? The positions Susan Haack carves out for herself in these essays are defined by what they stand in opposition to. On the one side we find a set of more or less traditional views on pragmatism, truth, science, knowledge, and the roles in society, academia, and philosophy of women, minorities, and ethnic groups. These are accompanied by their well worn defenses. At the other extreme are a variety of (...) voguish views: neopragmatism as in Rorty, extreme varieties of feminism, and multiculturalism. These are defended mainly in terms of social constructivist views which dismiss scientific objectivity and related conceptions of truth, science, and knowledge. Taking care to state the opposing views and in many cases examining the rationales provided for them, Haack goes on to offer trenchant criticisms and to state her intermediate positions. Without ever saying so she exemplifies an Aristotelian conception of virtue in her habit of choosing a mean between two extremes. (shrink)

This is a collection of previously published papers. It is a pleasure to see them reedited, updated, and available under one cover at an accessible paperback price. The collection is divided into four parts: Reasoning, Analyticity, Meaning, and Mind. Harman is one of the best expositors of Quine’s views and part of his originality lies in extending Quinian lines of investigation. By adopting this as a unifying theme for the review, I fail to do justice to other interesting and important (...) material. (shrink)

This is a most significant publication. Buridan’s Summulae de Dialectica is among the finest contributions to philosophical logic, and aside from its own time, there is no better period than the present for it to be made available. No stage in the history of Western thought is closer to current work on logic and language than the fourteenth century. In their own way Ockham and Buridan dealt with the same central questions that Frege, Russell, Quine, Davidson, and Kripke have. It (...) has had quite a history—republished as late as 1740 and read carefully and cited by Schopenhauer. Anyone with a taste for logical problems will gain by studying this work, and not only gain, but enjoy it as well. We are in the debt of Gyula Klima and Yale University Press for this important publication. Klima has provided us with an excellent introduction to go along with his highly readable annotated translation. It would be a great service to the philosophical community if it were possible to make a much less expensive paperback version available. Yale University Press is to be commended for bringing out this and other works like it. However, while it is completely understandable why the book has its present price, I could not expect a graduate student in a class to purchase this relatively costly hardcover edition. (shrink)