How likely is it that traumatic childhood events are misremembered or forgotten? Research on children′s recollections of painful or frightening medical procedures may help answer this question by identifying predictors of accurate versus inaccurate memory. In the present study, 46 3- to 10-year-old children were interviewed after undergoing a stressful medical procedure involving urethral catheterization. Age differences in memory emerged, especially when comparing 3- to 4-year-olds with older children. Children′s understanding of the event, parental communication and emotional support, and children′s (...) own emotional reactions also predicted accuracy. Memory did not reliably vary for children who endured the medical procedure once versus multiple times. Results are discussed in relation to possible precursors of accurate and false memories, and forgetting, of traumatic events experienced in childhood. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.2 (2000) 116-136 [Access article in PDF] Being, Time, and Definition: Toward a Semiotics of Figural Rhetoric Carol Poster For if History in the transferred sense of particular books called "histories," is rather apt to be false: nothing but History in the wider and higher sense will ever lead us to the truth. The Future is unknown and unknowable. The Present is turning to Past (...) even as we are trying to know it. Only the Past itself abides our knowledge. --George Saintsbury, A Letter BookDefining and classifying figures of speech and thought have been among the more important tasks of rhetoricians and grammarians for more than two millennia. The inventional focus, however, of much modern rhetorical theory has tended to relegate figuration either, on the one hand, to the domains of literary criticism or linguistics (the heirs of ancient grammar) or, on the other hand, to an ancillary position. The concomitant marginalization of the study of figures has had a significant effect upon contemporary scholarship in historical rhetoric. Many of the seminal scholarly works on the history of rhetoric have denigrated or minimized the importance of figural rhetoric. As Brian Vickers (1990, 294-95) has mentioned, George Kennedy and numerous other historians of rhetoric (e.g., Clarke 1996, 34) tend to condemn the teaching of figural rhetoric as dreary, tedious, and otiose. Often, the very periods themselves in which the study of the figures was pursued most vigorously and extensively are omitted from or condemned by modern scholarly discussion. As Marjorie Curry Woods has pointed out (1995, 73-78), biases against the medieval period, especially as found in Charles Sears Baldwin (1928) and Kennedy (1963, 1980) have in many ways defined the contours of our discipline, especially our attitudes toward the study of figures and tropes. Late antiquity and the Middle Ages, the periods of "decline" so deplored by Baldwin, Vickers, Kennedy, and others, were those in which figural rhetoric flourished, and both the sheer [End Page 116] volume of extant figural treatises and the continuity of figural rhetoric from the Hellenistic period through such contemporary semipopular books as Arthur Quinn's Figures of Speech: 60 Ways to Turn a Phrase (1982) and William Espy's The Garden of Eloquence: A Rhetorical Bestiary (1983) demand attention from the historical scholar. Along with the trivialization of figures in contemporary rhetoric has come a drastic oversimplification of the semiotics of figural terminology, which, in turn, contributes to the trivialization of many recent accounts of figures. To recover a more complex understanding of the semiotics of figural terms, we must start with a historical understanding of figuration, because rhetorical terms are encased in numerous historical strata that determine our understandings of them. 1 As Richard Rorty (1984, 49-75) argues concerning the historiography of philosophy, rational and historical reconstruction are mutually interdependent. A brief history of figural rhetoric From antiquity through the present, lists of figures have either occupied substantial sections of general treatises on rhetoric or grammar or have been the subject of specifically figural handbooks. Use of what we might term highly figured speech appears to predate the development of theoretical models for analysis of figures by many centuries. The Homeric epics, which were to provide the standard examples of rhetorical figures for many subsequent centuries, use patterns of speech later to be named and classified as rhetorical figures, but neither figural terminology nor self-conscious reflection upon figures qua figures appears in the epics. Similarly, although Gorgias was renowned for his use of the "Gorgianic" figures that later took his name, there is no evidence that he attempted systematic catologuing or development of specialized terminology for the figures. The testimonia describing his use of poetic words and figures (DK82a1, DK82a2, DK82a4, DK82a32--translated in Sprague 1972) do not attribute to him any invention of technical terminology.The question of invention of specific terminology for rhetorical figures is part of a more general historical question of the development of rhetoric as a self-conscious field. As Thomas Cole (1991) and Edward Schiappa (1991) have pointed out, the first... (shrink)

I raise these points because in 1941 I attempted to carry out a project of Wittgenstein’s and to show how all the so-called problems of Time arose out of a strange misunderstanding of the flexible ways of our language, so that we asked questions which could not be answered simply because they violated logical grammar. The concept of the Now of the Present is in ordinary usage infinitely flexible: it can be stretched to cover a decade or a century, (...) or narrowed down to cover what is over in a flash. We are, therefore, inclined to extend it till it covers the whole history of the universe, or to narrow it down till it becomes a mere limit, no sooner arrived at than departed from, and in which it is not significant to posit either a state or a change. In the latter case, we have, then, the problem of constituting Time out of such momentary nothings, which are, even qua nothings, not there all together or, alternatively, of wondering how anything can happen if, before it happens, something else must first happen, and before that again something else, and so on ad infinitum. We have, in short, all the difficulties with which Augustine and Zeno plagued the ancients, to which we may now add the difficulties with which McTaggart has worried the moderns, asking how the same event can be future, present, and past, when it must be these incompatible things at different successive times, and these times, in their turn, must be future, present, and past at different times, and so on ad infinitum. To all these celebrated difficulties the line that I took was plain: that they arose out of imposing a wrong exactness and a wrong generality on the flexible ways of our speech. Augustine and Zeno perplexed us since we failed to see that the present, though never of zero or infinite length, could be just as long or as short as we liked to make it, and McTaggart confused us since we failed to see that there were two distinct ways of talking about events and states, one which remained invariant wherever one was stationed in history, and one which changed according as one changed one’s historical position, and that there was nothing self-contradictory in either form of speech but only in the attempt to combine them. (shrink)

Joseph Almog says concerning “a certain locus where Quine doesn’t exist…qua evaluation locus, we take to it [singular] propositions involving Quine [as a constituent] which we have generated in our generation locus.” This seems to be either murder, or worse, self-contradiction. It presumes that certain designators designate their designata even at loci where the designata do not exist, i.e., the designators have “Kaplan rigidity.” Against this view, this paper argues that negative existentials such as “Quine does not exist” are true (...) only at ordered couples of loci (times or possible worlds) < l, l’ > such that the constituents of the truthmaker are the designatum itself from l and whatever corresponds to “does not exist” from l’. (shrink)

Interest in the nature and importance of ‘childhood goods’ recently has emerged within philosophy. Childhood goods, roughly, are things that are good for persons qua children independent of any contribution to the good of persons qua adults. According to Colin Macleod, John Rawls’s political conception of justice as fairness rests upon an adult-centered ‘agency assumption’ and thus is incapable of incorporating childhood goods into its content. Macleod concludes that because of this, justice as fairness cannot be regarded as a complete (...) conception of distributive justice. In this paper I provide a political liberal response to Macleod’s argument by advancing three claims. First, I propose that political liberalism should treat leisure time as a distinct ‘primary good.’ Second, I suggest that leisure time should be distributed via the ‘basic needs principle’ and the ‘difference principle’ for all citizens over the course of their complete lives, including their childhoods. Third, the provision of leisure time in this way supports the realization of childhood goods for citizens. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Motherhood According to KristevaOn Time and Matter in Plato and KristevaFanny SöderbäckThe state of the maternal has been disputed among feminists for quite some time. Julia Kristeva, whose work will be my focus of attention here, has been criticized for her emphasis on the maternal, particularly with regards to her alleged equation of maternity with femininity. Critics have suggested that such equation risks reducing woman to the (...) biological function of motherhood. Judith Butler, to give an example to which I will return at length, speaks of a “compulsory obligation on women’s bodies to reproduce” (Butler 1999, 115; I will refer to this text as GT for the remainder of this essay). Kristeva herself has noted that “it seems... difficult to speak today of maternity without being accused of normativism, read: of regression” (Kristeva 2003, 207).I will argue that Kristeva by no means reduces woman to the function of motherhood. Rather, she returns to the maternal body at least in part to free woman from this very reduction. By bringing the mother out of the shadows, she provides women with a past (a genealogy of their own, a community of women, a history hitherto repressed) and, simultaneously, with a future (in the sense of liberating them from predefined roles and positions—from motherhood as the only form of subjectivity available to them). It is exactly the future that is at stake when Kristeva speaks of the maternal, and more specifically, it is the possibility of temporal change that depends on it. The maternal body to which she urges us to return must, as I see it, be understood qua temporalization : that to which we return is temporal, moving, displacing, renewing. The return is neither nostalgic nor aimed at preserving some essential notion of motherhood—it makes possible [End Page 65] new beginnings, allowing for a future pregnant with change and transformation. Butler ends her critique of Kristeva with the following remark—one that is meant to describe what would happen if we stopped focusing on the mother in the way Kristeva has done hitherto: “The culturally constructed body will then be liberated, neither to its ‘natural’ past, nor to its original pleasures, but to an open future of cultural possibilities” (GT, 119). I will attempt to show that these words in fact capture Kristeva’s own project, that such “open future” is exactly what she is aiming at through her continuous return to the maternal body.The implication of this retrieval of the maternal is twofold: First, it situates Kristeva within a materialist tradition and allows her to articulate and inscribe a morphological-phenomenological legacy of embodiment contra merely constructionist or discursive narratives.1 Second, it gives her ground to rearticulate time as inseparable from space and thus to challenge and overcome the deep-rooted tradition that divides time and space alongside a mind-body dualism. Surprisingly, perhaps, she establishes this ground by returning to a thinker who for many feminist scholars is the example par excellence of the very dualism that is put into question: Plato. This essay aims at carefully tracing Kristeva’s engagement with Plato, and I will argue that the breakdown of the distinction between time and space is to be found at the core of his writing. If, as I will argue here, the maternal body to which Kristeva returns must be understood not only as corporeal but also as a temporal principle, then we are forced to think through the intimate relation between temporality and materiality in ways that will come to challenge and renew the very materialist tradition that Kristeva herself most often is understood to represent.Kristeva’s earliest thematization of the maternal appears in her doctoral dissertation, Revolution in Poetic Language. It is here that she first articulates her notion of the semiotic chora, associating it with the maternal body and early heterogeneous drives.2 Kristeva herself picks up the Greek term chora from Plato’s Timaeus; a dialogue that more than anything deals with the question of beginnings, as it narrates the story of how the cosmos and its living creatures were created. I will turn both to the Platonic text and to... (shrink)

How is it possible that a thing singled out not exist? How is it possible that two things singled out be numerically identical? How is one to understand the relationship between, say, a quality of a thing and what this quality is? And how is one to understand the relation between this quality and the thing which happens to be thus qualified? Trying to answer these four questions involves investigation of the four senses of the verb "to be," or of (...) the concepts of existence, identity, essential and accidental predication. Butchvarov’s thesis is that these four questions admit of a common answer, that the cornerstone of this comprehensive theory is an answer to the second question, and that this crucial answer depends on making some such distinction as his between "objects" and "entities." The bare bones of his argument are these: We commonly make statements of the form "a is b" where "a" and "b" are used referringly. A "material identity" statement of this form may be true. If true, it is about one thing; yet what it is about appears to be distinct things. This distinctness is not a real distinction among existents, nor does it arise solely or primarily from features of language. Butchvarov’s account is based on a distinction "of reason" between objects and entities. An entity is an existent, a constituent of the world. An object is whatever can be singled out once, and only once, in perception or imagination or in "thought". Entities as such cannot be singled out, yet they may be recognized through applications of a conceptual apparatus to objects. A material identity statement, then, states that two objects are one entity. If true, it is both about two distinct objects and about the one entity which each is. When two objects are judged to be one entity, then indiscernibility is enforced. Seeming counterexamples to the indiscernibility of identicals are explained in terms of the distinction between objects and entities. Though some applications of the concept of identity are relative to sortal characteristics, others are not. The latter are prior to the former. These primary judgments constitute the backbone of "thought" and discourse. They are governed by impersonal, nonhuman "paradigms." There are entities, of course; and there are objects, though as objects none exists. Some objects are entities, some are not. The notion of existence, like the notion of identity in its material role, is then a principle of classification, a concept. Butchvarov examines nine objections to this claim, and elaborates his distinction between objects and entities. He concludes that identifiability, hence indefinite reidentifiability, is the logically sufficient condition of applicability of the concept of existence. A statement such as "Socrates is white" is a disguised conjunction, viz., "Socrates has this color, and this color is white." The second conjunct is an "essential" statement; it says of an object singled out that it is a certain entity; or, to allow for essences of nonexistent objects, it states what entity the object would be were it an entity. An essential statement is not a material identity statement, for only one of its terms is used referringly. The essence of an object is not a property of it, for it is what the object is or would be. Whereas logically prior consciousness of objects is intentional and non-conceptual, consciousness of entities is conceptual and nonintentional; it consists in recognizing that a thing can be identified by oneself or by others. What is accidentally white, say, cannot be a material substance or bare particular; therefore it is a "cluster" of qualities. The Resemblance Theory, according to which qualities are particulars, is not a coherent alternative to the Identity Theory; therefore the qualities an individual happens to have are themselves universals. The Bradleyan critique of ontological atomism is cogent; therefore an individual is a cluster of qualities each of which depends for its "formal identity" on its being together with the rest. An individual’s having qualities is then to be understood in terms of the necessary togetherness of the qualities constitutive of it. Since in addition each of these qualities is essentially a universal, and specific universals are contingently coinstantiated, the predication in question is properly regarded as accidental. The problem of identifying quality-clusters through space and time is discussed. (shrink)

In Physics IV 14, 223a16-223a29 Aristotle raises two questions: (Q1) How is time related to the soul? (Q2) Why is time thought to be in everything? Aristotle's juxtaposition of these questions indicates some relation between them. I argue that Aristotle is committed to the claim that time only exists where change is countable. Aristotle must answer (Q2) in a way that doesn't conflict with this commitment. Aristotle's answer to (Q1) offers him such a way. Since time (...) is change qua countable, time is dependent on souls capable of counting. But the thing that time is, change, is not so dependent. Likewise, time is not located in everything, but change, the substratum of time, is. This answers (Q2) in a way that's compatible with Aristotle's commitments. (shrink)

The At-At Account of motion is the extremely popular view that, necessarily, something moves if and only if it’s at one place at one time, and at a distinct place at a distinct time. This, many believe, is all that motion consists in. However, I will present a case in which, intuitively, motion does not occur, though the At-At Account of motion entails that it does. I will then turn to the only tenable response that avoids revising the (...) At-At Account: denying the possibility of my case. I will argue that the response is both contentious and fails to defend the spirit of the At-At Account qua reduction of motion (rather than mere listing of necessary and sufficient conditions for motion’s occurring). (shrink)

When discussing one of Fyodor Dostoyevsky's novels, Mikhail Bakhtin ruminates on the poietic power of dialogue: in dialogue a person not only shows himself outwardly, but he becomes for the first time that which he is—and […] not only for others but for himself as well. To be means to communicate dialogically. When dialogue ends, everything ends. […] At the level of his religious-utopian worldview Dostoyevsky carries dialogue into eternity, conceiving of it as eternal co-rejoicing, co-admiration, concord. […] Two (...) voices is the minimum for life.1 Notably, Bakhtin's commendation of dialogue as a sine qua non ontological condition communicates both necessity and hope, implying the indispensability of an encounter... (shrink)

In this thesis I investigate the question of whether or not dispositional properties are able to necessitate their manifestations. I provide three main discussions that reflect three aspects of my question. The first and second discussions concern different aspects of the 'problem of prevention'. This is the premise that causal interactions can be subject to interference/prevention, generally construed. A number of philosophers have argued that the problem of prevention undercuts the necessitation of lawful regularities in the context of dispositional essentialism. (...) We can term this issue the 'necessitation issue'. In the first discussion I examine whether or not antidotes qua preventative entities are metaphysically possible within the context of Alexander Bird's dispositional monism. I argue that Bird's theory raises a problem of ontological representation re antidotes. The line of thought in this discussion is that it is difficult for Bird to say what antidotes are and how they operate; nevertheless, in this discussion I provide a solution to my problem that stays within the confines of Bird's dispositional monism. In this section of the thesis I remain neutral on the necessitation issue, but I take myself to clarify the question of whether or not dispositional properties are able to necessitate their manifestations by criticising Bird's model of antidotes/prevention and setting out a replacement. In the second discussion I examine Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum's anti-necessitarian strategies. Mumford and Anjum's 'causal dispositionalism' encompasses a theory of dispositional properties, antidotes, and prevention. Mumford and Anjum's causal dispositionalism is not subject to the problem of ontological representation that Bird's theory raises; nevertheless, I argue that their theory is multiply problematic. The purpose of this discussion, taken as a whole, is to show that a recent strategy for attacking the necessitarian claim of dispositional essentialism is weaker than it has appeared to a number of philosophers. In this section of the thesis I move from a neutral stance on necessitation to a defensive stance. In the first two stages of the thesis, which concern the problem of prevention, I work with the background assumption that dispositional essentialism is a tenable position. In the third section of this thesis, however, I begin by endorsing Stephen Barker's essay The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers, which argues that the main articulations of dispositional essentialism are either internally inconsistent or otherwise disguised versions of brute modalism, where brute modalism focuses upon possible worlds as oppose to properties. In response, I develop a replacement position for dispositional essentialism that I term 'temporal essentialism'. I advance temporal essentialism as a prototype position in the properties and laws debate. It aims to provide a metaphysical explanation for lawful regularities by drawing upon the passage of time. In short, temporal essentialism is the position that it is built into a system of ontology that it dynamically adds new entities to its ontological categories and constructs states of affairs in a rule-following way. (shrink)

The papers in this volume reflect much of the current unease of a world that perceives itself once more at the edge of chaos. The authors present different vistas of that experience and their inherent dialectic, expressed in numerous and ceaseless conflicts between ordering and disordering processes. They can be read as comments on the ongoing processes that lead toward greater complexity.

We note in Section I that an acceptable formulation of Presentism must preserve its consistency with Transient Time and inconsistency with Static Time. After arguing in Section II that certain formulations of Presentism are unacceptable, we offer in Section III a formulation of Presentism that we defend against the charge of triviality.

This book initiates a discussion among scholars in rhetoric and hermeneutics in many areas of the humanities. Twenty leading thinkers explore the ways these two powerful disciplines inform each other and influence a wide variety of intellectual fields. Walter Jost and Michael J. Hyde organize pivotal topics in rhetoric and hermeneutics with originality and coherence, dividing their book into four sections: Locating the Disciplines; Inventions and Applications; Arguments and Narratives; and Civic Discourse and Critical Theory. For readers across the humanities, (...) the book demonstrates the usefulness of rhetorical and hermeneutic approaches in literary, philosophical, legal, religious, and political thinking. (shrink)

Contemporary psychiatry faces serious challenges because it has failed to incorporate accumulated knowledge from basic neuroscience, neurophilosophy, and brain–mind relation studies. As a consequence, it has limited explanatory power, and effective treatment options are hard to come by. A new conceptual framework for understanding mental health based on underlying neurobiological spatial-temporal mechanisms of mental disorders (already gained by the experimental studies) is beginning to emerge.

This research explores temporal concept drift and temporal alignment in knowledge organization systems. A comparative analysis is pursued using the 1910 Library of Congress Subject Headings, 2020 FAST Topical, and automatic indexing. The use case involves a sample of 90 nineteenth-century Encyclopedia Britannica entries. The entries were indexed using two approaches: 1) full-text indexing; 2) Named Entity Recognition was performed upon the entries with Stanza, Stanford’s NLP toolkit, and entities were automatically indexed with the Helping Interdisciplinary Vocabulary application, using both (...) 1910 LCSH and FAST Topical. The analysis focused on three goals: 1) identifying results that were exclusive to the 1910 LCSH output; 2) identifying terms in the exclusive set that have been deprecated from the contemporary LCSH, demonstrating temporal concept drift; and 3) exploring the historical significance of these deprecated terms. Results confirm that historical vocabularies can be used to generate anachronistic subject headings representing conceptual drift across time in KOS and historical resources. A methodological contribution is made demonstrating how to study changes in KOS over time and improve the contextualization historical humanities resources. (shrink)

This is the definitive collection of the ethical work of the great Oxford moral philosopher H. A. Prichard. Prichard is famous for his ethical intuitionism: he argued that moral obligation cannot be reduced to anything else, but is perceived by direct intuition. The essays previously included in the posthumous collection Moral Obligation are now augmented by a selection of previously unpublished writings from Prichard's manuscripts, allowing for the first time a full view of his distinctive contribution to moral philosophy, (...) at just the time when intuitionism is enjoying a revival of interest. (shrink)

J. L. Austin was one of the more influential British philosophers of his time, due to his rigorous thought, extraordinary personality, and innovative philosophical method. According to John Searle, he was both passionately loved and hated by his contemporaries. Like Socrates, he seemed to destroy all philosophical orthodoxy without presenting an alternative, equally comforting, orthodoxy. -/- Austin is best known for two major contributions to contemporary philosophy: first, his ‘linguistic phenomenology’, a peculiar method of philosophical analysis of the concepts (...) and ways of expression of everyday language; and second, speech act theory, the idea that every use of language carries a performative dimension (in the well-known slogan, “to say something is to do something”). Speech act theory has had consequences and import in research fields as diverse as philosophy of language, ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of law, linguistics, artificial intelligence and feminist philosophy. -/- This article describes Austin’s linguistic method and his speech act theory, and it describes the original contributions he made to epistemology and philosophy of action. It closes by focusing on two main developments of speech act theory─the dispute between conventionalism and intentionalism, and the debate on free speech, pornography, and censorship. (shrink)

740 page life in letters, including all Hegel's available letters at time of publication by Indiana University Press in 1984 tied together by a running commentary by Clark Butler. The volume is in a searchable PDF format. Publication was supported by a Major Grant by the National Endowment of the Humanities (NEH).

This article provides a retrospective, current and prospective overview on developments in brain research and neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies are considered, with emphasis in the concept of multivariability and metastability in the brain. In this new view on the human brain, the potential multivariability of the neuronal networks appears to be far from continuous in time, but confined by the dynamics of short-term local and global metastable brain states. The article closes by suggesting some of the implications (...) of this view in future multidisciplinary brain research. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the A-theorist's argument from experience is undermined by a commitment to ‘experiential punctivism' - the view that instantaneous experiences are metaphysically prior to durative ones. The experiences to which the A-theorist's argument appeals are those of processual events. For these experiences to constitute perceptions of temporal passage it would be necessary to perceive such processes qua processes; but, if experiential punctivism were true, this would be impossible. We could only ever perceive (...) those processes qua temporal variation, which merely amounts to an awareness of change as described by the B-theory. If there is such a phenomenon as the passing of time, it could not be an object of our experience. (shrink)

Although from diverse times and backgrounds, Confucius in the sixth century b. C. In china and immanuael kant in enlightenment both set forth doctrines for ethics and positive social interaction which revolve around the concept of respect. For confucius, Respect takes the form of "jen", What "ought" to occur when two people come together. Individuals are respected as social beings. In kant's case the principle of humanity demands respect for human beings "qua" rational. The difference reveals confucian dynamism versus kantian (...) universalism, Each keynotes of the respective cultural contexts. (shrink)

How patients and nurses experience the acute care psychiatric environment The concept of the therapeutic milieu was developed when patients’ hospitalizations were long, medications were few, and one‐to‐one nurse–patient interactions were the norm. However, it is not clear how the notion of ‘therapeutic milieu’ is experienced in American acute psychiatric environments today. This phenomenological study explored the experience of patients and nurses in an acute care psychiatric unit in the USA, by asking them, ‘What stands out to you about this (...) psychiatric hospital environment?’ Three figural themes emerged, contextualized by time, which was a source of stress to both groups: for patients there was boredom, and for nurses, pressure and chaos. Although they shared some themes, nurses and patients experienced them differently. For instance, nurses felt caged‐in by the Plexiglas‐enclosed nursing station, and patients felt caged‐in by the locked doors of the unit. The findings from this US study do not support the existence of the therapeutic milieu as described in the literature. Furthermore, although the nurse–patient relationship was yearned for by nurses, it was nearly absent from patients’ descriptions. The caring experienced by patients was mainly derived from interactions with other patients. (shrink)

This thesis is about the conceptualization of persistence of physical, middle-sized objects within the theoretical framework of the revisionary ‘B-theory’ of time. According to the B-theory, time does not flow, but is an extended and inherently directed fourth dimension along which the history of the universe is ‘laid out’ once and for all. It is a widespread view among philosophers that if we accept the B-theory, the commonsensical ‘endurance theory’ of persistence will have to be rejected. The endurance (...) theory says that objects persist through time by being wholly present at distinct times as numerically the same entity. Instead of endurantism, it has been argued, we have to adopt either ‘perdurantism’ or the ‘stage theory’. Perdurantism is the theory that objects are four-dimensional ‘space-time worms’ persisting through time by having distinct temporal parts at distinct times. The stage theory says that objects are instantaneous temporal parts (stages) of space-time worms, persisting by having distinct temporal counterparts at distinct times. In the thesis, it is argued that no good arguments have been provided for the conclusion that we are obliged to drop the endurance theory by acceptance of the B-theory. This conclusion stands even if the endurance theory incorporates the claim that objects endure through intrinsic change. It is also shown that perdurantism and the stage theory come with unwelcome consequences. -/- Paper I demonstrates that the main arguments for the view that objects cannot endure in B-time intrinsically unchanged fail. Papers II and III do the same with respect to the traditional arguments against endurance through intrinsic change in B-time. Paper III also contains a detailed account of the semantics of the tenseless copula, which occurs frequently in the debate. The contention of Paper IV is that four-dimensional space-time worms, as traditionally understood, are not suited to take dispositional predicates. In Paper V, it is shown that the stage theory needs to introduce an overabundance of persistence-concepts, many of which will have to be simultaneously applicable to a single object (qua falling under a single sortal), in order for the theory to be consistent. The final article, Paper VI, investigates the sense in which persistence can, as is sometimes suggested, be a ‘conventional matter’. It also asks whether alleged cases of ‘conventional persistence’ create trouble for the endurance theory. It is argued that conventions can only enter at a trivial semantic level, and that the endurance theory is no more threatened by such conventions than are its rivals. (shrink)

While the presence or absence of consciousness plays the central role in the moral/ethical decisions when dealing with patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC), recently it is criticized as not adequate due to number of reasons, among which are the lack of the uniform definition of consciousness and consequently uncertainty of diagnostic criteria for it, as well as irrelevance of some forms of consciousness for determining a patient’s interests and wishes. In her article, Dr. Specker Sullivan reexamined the meaning of (...) consciousness in the DOC taxonomy and proposed to go away from the routinely used clinical definition of consciousness as “wakeful awareness”, and adopt the meaning that is common in the Eastern tradition which is a form of “pure experience” (Specker Sullivan 2018). She further argued that understanding consciousness as a “pure experience” is ethically relevant for DOC patients. This suggestion is original, novel and important since it preserves the importance of the notion of consciousness for the clinical practice while simultaneously offering an additional ethical tool for the moral decisions in medicine. At the same time, without placing such Eastern notion in the Western tradition it is difficult to see how pure experience could be usefully operationalized to make sense in the clinical practice with DOC patients. It is so because pure experience is a subjective phenomenon which is completely inaccessible in noncommunicative DOC patients and also it does not express behaviorally (Monti et al 2010), therefore some objective-like operationalization is needed. This is why the fusion of Eastern and Western traditions is required to gain the full potential of Dr. Specker Sullivan’s suggestion. We propose that such fusion could be achieved on the basis of the Operational Architectonics (OA) theory of brain-mind functioning (Fingelkurts et al. 2010; 2013a) which suits ideally the purpose due its compatibility with both Western and Eastern traditions of consciousness. (shrink)

Living together peacefully in a world of differences asks for a practice of respecting the irreducible difference of the other. Acknowledging this `not-me' of the other subject generates an in-between: a space/time between subjects that cannot be transgressed other than by violence. Following Irigaray, I argue that this `in-between' comes about through the passion of wonder, a being touched in the flesh in the encounter with the other, which opens the subject to him/herself and to the other. To perceive (...) this touch asks for a life-style directed at keeping open and sensitizing the sensibilities of the senses, so that the subject's aesthesis or awareness for the perceptions of the sensible flesh and of its reactions to the other is heightened. Key-element in this aesthetics is the practice of breathing. It enables the subject to remain rooted in him/or herself and open to the other: generating and respecting the in-between between them. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:119. THE IMPORT OF HUME'S THEORY OF TIME In this paper I examine the significance of Hume's theory of time for some of the more famous of the doctrines in the Treatise, and how it works as a basis for his peculiar brand of scepticism, a basis that is at least as important in this regard as his principle that all ideas are derived from some original (...) impression. To bring into relief some of the peculiarities of Hume's theory of time we may observe that it was not uncommon in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to distinguish between space and extension and between time and duration, to say, as does for example Leibniz, that "in some way extension is to space as duration is to time", and perhaps also to agree with him "that duration and extension are attributes of things, but time and space are taken to be something outside of things and serve to measure them. " Duration taken as an attribute of things or substantives connotes the permanence, or perseverance, or continuation of the existence of such substantives. Thus Descartes says, "the duration of each thing is a mode [he subsequently calls it an 'attribute'] under which we consider the thing in so far as it continues to exist" (French version) or "perseveres 2 in existence" (Latin version). Or Spinoza: "Duration is the attribute under which we conceive the existence of created things in so far as they persevere in their own 3 actuality". But though duration refers to things as persevering or continuing in existence, it applies equally, as Descartes indicates, to both changing and unchanging things. In order to comprehend the duration of all things under the same measure we usually compare their duration with the duration of the greatest and most regular motions, which are those which create years and days, and these we call time.4 Spinoza's account of duration and time are much the same. Duration is the primary notion and time presupposes it. Going beyond Hume to Kant we find that in distinguishing 120. three modes of time, namely duration, succession and coexistence, Kant argues that succession presupposes duration and that all time determinations of change (or succession) presuppose substance as that which is permanent or continuant through change. In Hume, however, we find no distinction between space and extension, nor between time and duration. These are merely two pairs of synonyms. In the case of space Hume seems to prefer on the whole to talk about extension, probably because extension lends itself more easily to discussion of divisibility. In the case of time, however, which he, defines as succession, he is indeed aware of the view which we have just been considering, according to which duration is referred primarily to an object qua con-. tinuing or persevering or enduring, whether or not undergoing successive changes. This concept of duration, he says, I take to be the common opinion of philosophers as well as of the vulgar. (T37) Duration in this common philosophical and vulgar sense is not a synonym of Humean time or succession, and it is for Hume, a "fiction", something falsely attributed to objects. Why is this so? 'Tis evident, that time or duration [Hume is here taking the two terms as synonyms] consists of different parts... 'Tis also evident, that these parts are not co-existent: For that quality of the co-existence of parts belongs to extension, and is what distinguishes it from duration. Now as time is compos 'd of parts, that are not co-existent; an unchangeable object, since it produces none but co-existent impressions, produces none that can give us the idea of time; and consequently that idea must be deriv'd from a succession of changeable objects, and time in its first appearance can never be sever 'd from such a succession (T35,36) Although Hume maintains that there is no idea which is not derived from some original impression, it would appear that this is not strictly so with the idea of time [or, for that matter with the idea of space]. Rather time is the manner or way in which impressions appear to the mind, namely... (shrink)