In our exposure to weakness, vulnerability, loss, anguish and different forms of impairment, the following pastoral theological questions arises: What is meant by divine almightiness within the human need for spiritual strength, empowerment, encouragement and well-being? The epithet of almightiness (omnipotence, pantokratōr) gave birth to fictitious and speculative associations, even fear and anxiety: The paralyzing fear of God Almighty – divine intoxicating and spiritual pathology. Instead of a pantokratōr-definition of God, a paraklēsis-infinition of God is proposed. This (...) paradigm shift is based on the hermeneutical insight, namely, that the El Shadday of Yahweh is based on the respect in Jewish hermeneutics to render God not as a personified substance, but as an ‘operating verb’ – hjh. In the verbing of God, El Shadday points to encouragement, empowerment and a kind of pity and comfort based on the passio Dei. Contribution: How one perceives the power of God, determines the practice of Christian devotion and spirituality. Therefore, the emphasis on the notion of ‘God Almighty’ (omnipotence of God) and its link to the notion of the ‘weakness of God’ as exposed in the basic outline for a theology of the cross and as a source for hope in pastoral care and compassionate reaching out. (shrink)

In Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, Michael Martin argues that to posit a God that is both omnipotent and omniscient is philosophically incoherent. I challenge this argument by proposing that a God who is necessarily omniscient is more powerful than a God who is contingently omniscient. I then argue that being omnipotent entails being omniscient by showing that for an all-powerful being to be all-powerful in any meaningful way, it must possess complete knowledge about all states of affairs and thus must (...) be understood to be omniscient. (shrink)

This paper wishes to offer a historical derivation of the mature Diderot’s fully materialistic, physiological theory of the soul, and to show the conflict between the theological concept of the soul as a principle of freedom, and the materialistic-deterministic concept of the soul, in his philosophical and literary oeuvre. In historical respect, Diderot formulated his mature position on the basis of Locke’s theory of ‘thinking matter’, of Toland’s idea that ‘action is essential to matter’, of Maupertuis’s theory of ‘spontaneous creative (...) degeneration’. We present and analyze these theories one by one, together with Voltaire’s propaganda of the Lockean conception. Next, d’Alembert’s orthodox philosophy of the soul is examined, as this was Diderot’s immediate target in Le Rêve d’Alembert. The last chapters of the paper describe the afore-mentioned conflict within Diderot’s philosophy of the soul. We reach the conclusion that in Diderot’s theory, soul as a not fully determined substance still seems the ‘differentia’ of man from the rest of the living beings, though he would certainly argue that our freedom is very limited. A philosophical comparison with Kant’s account of human freedom closes the article. (shrink)

This paper wishes to offer a historical derivation of the mature Diderot’s fully materialistic, physiological theory of the soul, and to show the conflict between the theological concept of the soul as a principle of freedom, and the materialistic-deterministic concept of the soul, in his philosophical and literary oeuvre. In historical respect, Diderot formulated his mature position on the basis of Locke’s theory of ‘thinking matter’, of Toland’s idea that ‘action is essential to matter’, of Maupertuis’s theory of ‘spontaneous creative (...) degeneration’. We present and analyze these theories one by one, together with Voltaire’s propaganda of the Lockean conception. Next, d’Alembert’s orthodox philosophy of the soul is examined, as this was Diderot’s immediate target in Le Rêve d’Alembert. The last chapters of the paper describe the afore-mentioned conflict within Diderot’s philosophy of the soul. We reach the conclusion that in Diderot’s theory, soul as a not fully determined substance still seems the ‘differentia’ of man from the rest of the living beings, though he would certainly argue that our freedom is very limited. A philosophical comparison with Kant’s account of human freedom closes the article. (shrink)

This collection of thirteen previously unpublished essays arose from a conference in 1982 entitled “Divine Omniscience, Omnipotence, and Future Contingents in Medieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Thought.” The book is divided into four sections: two essays provide an introduction to the subject; four give an account of various Islamic views; a further four concern Jewish writers; and the last three focus on Christian thought.

The chapters of this volume originated as papers presented at the Ohio State University, March 3-4, 1982. Students of philosophy and theology should find the work interesting, both as an introduction to medieval thought and as a source of insights into issues still disputed.

I discuss Thomas Aquinas’ views on being, power, and logic, and show how together they provide rebuttals against certain principal objections to the notion of divine omnipotence. The objections I have in mind can be divided into the two classes. One says that the notion of omnipotence ends up in self-contradiction. The other says that it ends up contradicting certain doctrines of traditional theism. Thomas’ account is frequently misunderstood to be a version of what I call a (...) ‘consistent description’ account of omnipotence, which is a standard contemporary account. That account of omnipotence, however, succumbs to certain contemporary objections. Thomas’ account withstands those objections because of his view of logic and, specifically self-contradiction. Moreover, a certain thesis found in Thomas’ understanding of God, but almost entirely absent from contemporary debates about omnipotence, is that God is not just a being, but the source of being. This thesis, I argue, puts Thomas’ account in a position that differs greatly from many contemporary accounts since the scope of possibility, and specifically the scope of what possible powers there are, is ultimately grounded in God’s being. Further still, many contemporary accounts of omnipotence do not seek to establish substantive account of power itself. Thomas, by contrast, has a robust and independent account of what power is. And that account informs his account of what it is to have all powers, or to be omnipotent, in a way that makes his account resistant to contemporary objections. Against contemporary objections, Thomas’ account of omnipotence can sustain the claim that God can do all things. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Leibniz’s form/matter defense of omnipotence is paradoxical, but not irretrievably so. Leibniz maintains that God necessarily must concur only in the possibility for evil’s existence in the world (the form of evil), but there are individual instances of moral evil that are not necessary (the matter of evil) with which God need not concur. For Leibniz, that there is moral evil in the world is contingent on God’s will (a dimension (...) of divine omnipotence), with the result that even though it is necessary that God exerts his will, there are particular products of his will that are contingent and unnecessary—including human moral evil. If there are instances of evil which are contingent on God’s will and yet unnecessary, then the problematic conclusion for Leibniz’s view must be that human evil depends upon divine concurrence, not just for its possibility in the world (which is necessary) but for its instance (which is contingent). If the form/matter defense of omnipotence contains a true paradox, then God concurs in the form as well as the matter of evil. To assuage this difficulty for Leibniz, I will argue that he could either give up an Augustinian notion of evil, or rely upon a distinction between *potenta absoluta* and *potenta ordinate*, which was popular among important thinkers in the medieval period. (shrink)

The idea of omnipotence plays a crucial role within the framework of classical theism. God is typically considered omnipotent, that is, able to perform any action. Sometimes, it is said that for God there is no difference between will and action; everything he wishes happens. However, as one reflects on the concept of omnipotence, some rather complex questions arise; the range of God’s possible “actions” is not clear. What are the boundaries of the power of an omnipotent being, (...) if these boundaries exist at all? In this paper, we will examine an interesting question: is it possible that two omnipotent beings exist? Or, does the property of omnipotence necessarily imply the uniqueness of its instantiation? Intuitively, the existence of more than one omnipotent being seems to be contradictory. However, we will demonstrate that under some conditions the existence of two omnipotent beings is possible. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Maximal Power and the Uniqueness of God What an Omnipotent Agent Can Do The Analysis of Omnipotence Divine Omnibenevolence, Omnipotence, and Freedom.

An omnipotent being would be a being whose power was unlimited. The power of human beings is limited in two distinct ways: we are limited with respect to our freedom of will, and we are limited in our ability to execute what we have willed. These two distinct sources of limitation suggest a simple definition of omnipotence: an omnipotent being is one that has both perfect freedom of will and perfect efficacy of will. In this paper we further explicate (...) this definition and show that it escapes the standard objections to divine omnipotence. (shrink)

One of the cornerstones of western theology is the doctrine of divine omnipotence. God is traditionally conceived of as an omnipotent or all-powerful being. However, satisfactory analyses of omnipotence are notoriously elusive. In this paper, I first consider some simple attempts to analyze omnipotence, showing how each fails. I then consider two more sophisticated accounts of omnipotence. The first of these is presented by Edward Wierenga; the second by Thomas Flint and Alfred Freddoso. I argue (...) that both of these accounts fail. Finally, I propose and defend a novel account of omnipotence. (shrink)

Translated from the edition in Pierre Damien: Lettre sur la toute-puissance divine. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes, André Cantin, ed. & tr., (“Sources Chrétiennes,” vol. 191; Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1972.

This chapter contains sections titled: What Omnipotence Signifies The Riddle of the Stone Further Limitations on the Power of an Omnipotent Agent Are Divine Omnipotence and Moral Perfection Compatible? Works cited.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Jahrgang: 20 Heft: 1 Seiten: 101-136.

Omnipotence is the property of being all-powerful; it is one of the traditional divine attributes in Western conceptions of God. This notion of an all-powerful being is often claimed to be incoherent because a being who has the power to do anything would, for instance, have the power to draw a round square. However, it is absurd to suppose that any being, no matter how powerful, could draw a round square. A common response to this objection is to (...) assert that defenders of divine omnipotence never intended to claim that God could bring about logical absurdities. This observation about what is not meant by omnipotence does little, however, to clarify just what is meant by that term. Philosophers have therefore attempted to state necessary and sufficient conditions for omnipotence. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the supposition of divine omnipotence entails a contradiction: omnipotence both must and must not be intrinsic to God. Hence, traditional theism must be rejected. To begin, I separate out some theoretical distinctions needed to inform the discussion. I then advance two different arguments for the conclusion that omnipotence must be intrinsic to God; these utilise the notions of essence and aseity. Next, I argue that some necessary conditions on being omnipotent (...) are extrinsic, and that this means omnipotence cannot be intrinsic to God. I consider three different ways of resolving this conflict, but contend that each is unsuccessful. Before concluding, I explain why the type of strategy used to resolve the traditional paradoxes of omnipotence cannot be successfully employed against the paradox presented here. (shrink)

Analytical philosophers of religion widely assume that God is a person, albeit immaterial and of unique status, and the divine attributes are thus understood as attributes of this supreme personal being. Our main aim is to consider how traditional divine attributes may be understood on a non-personal conception of God. We propose that foundational theist claims make an all-of-Reality reference, yet retain God’s status as transcendent Creator. We flesh out this proposal by outlining a specific non-personal, monist and (...) ‘naturalist’ conception of God, which we call the ‘euteleological’ conception of God, and then considering euteleological interpretations of omnipotence, omniscience and divine goodness. (shrink)

Recently, many philosophers have supposed that the divine attribute of omnipotence is properly understood as some kind of maximal power. I argue that all of the best known attempts to analyse omnipotence in terms of maximal power are multiply flawed. Moreover, I argue that there are compelling reasons for supposing that, on orthodox theistic conceptions, maximal power is not one of the divine attributes.

Focusing on God's essential attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, being eternal and omnipresent, being a creator and sustainer, and being a person, I examine how far recent discussion has been able to provide for each of these divine attributes a consistent interpretation. I also consider briefly whether the attributes are compatible with each other.

The Divine Attributes explores the traditional theistic concept of God as the most perfect being possible, discussing the main divine attributes which flow from this understanding - personhood, transcendence, immanence, omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence, perfect goodness, unity, simplicity and necessity. It argues that the atemporalist's conception of God is to be preferred over the temporalist's on the grounds of perfect being theology, but that, if it were to be the case that the temporal God existed, rather than the (...) atemporal God, He'd still be 'perfect enough' to count as the God of Theism. (shrink)

Orthodox Christian theists frequently petition God in the sense that they ask him to bring about some state of affairs which they believe may not occur without divine intervention. Such petitions basically fall into three categories: requests in which the petitioner is asking God to influence significantly the natural environment – e.g. calm a hurricane, requests in which the petitioner is asking God to influence significantly the lives ofother individuals – e.g. reconcile the broken marriage of friends, and requests (...) in which the petitioner is asking God to influence significantly his or her own life – e.g. soothe his or her troubled mind. (shrink)

Studies in Philosophical Theology [7] Kampen, Kok Pharos, 1993.

According to traditional Western theism, God is maximally great (or perfect). More explicitly, God is said to have the following divine attributes: omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. In this paper, I present three puzzles about this conception of a maximally great (or perfect) being. The first puzzle about omniscience shows that this divine attribute is incoherent. The second puzzle about omnibenevolence and omnipotence shows that these divine attributes are logically incompatible. The third puzzle about perfect rationality (...) and omnipotence shows that these divine attributes are logically incompatible. (shrink)