In this paper, the author considers five basic understandings of metaphysics as a philosophical discipline that 1) studies the most general characteristics of everything that is, 2) investigates beings as beings, 3) considers what goes beyond the framework of experience, 4) analyses the most general terms and 5) provides an explanatory theory. In addition, the author considers a number of relevant ideas and distinctions, the distinction between reality and appearance, the distinction between the apparent and scientific picture of the world (...) (Wilfrid Sellars), the idea that philosophy is the queen of science (Moritz Schlick), the distinction between descriptive and revisionist metaphysics (Peter Frederick Strawson), the synoptic view, the idea of naturalised metaphysics, etc. The author accepts the first point of view, the one according to which metaphysics is understood as a philosophical discipline that studies the most general characteristics of everything that is, and accordingly believes that categorical ontology best fits into that picture. After that, the author briefly presents the most famous criticisms of metaphysics (David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and logical positivists), as well as the positions that led to the formation of modern metametaphysics (Rudolf Carnap and Willard Van Orman Quine). Finally, the author considers verbalism and trivialism and tries to determine whether these two positions can represent a basis for the elimination of metaphysics. The author tries to show that these positions do not eliminate metaphysics, but rather set the framework for contemporary metaphysical discussions. (shrink)

Kritika okularocentrizma, prevladujoče težnje privilegirati vid na račun drugih čutnih modalnosti v zahodnem mišljenju, je pred nedavnim postala predmet napada poststrukturalističnih in postfenomenoloških mislecev. Kritika okularo-centrizma naj bi okrepila in dopolnila kritiko logo-centrizma in metafizike navzočnosti. Povedano drugače, ta kritika tvori del kritike razsvetljenske racionalnosti. V članku zagovarjam mnenje, da kritika razsvetljenstva pogosto cilja višje kot pa leži njena tarča. Heideggrova kritika »skopične« racionalnosti naše kulture naj bi služila kot radikalna alternativa okularocentričnemu mišljenju. Pokazati (...) skušam, da Heideggrova kritika razsvetljenske racionalnosti in modernosti ni radikalno antiesencialistična in antifundacionalistična, kot trdijo njegovi učenci. Pokazati tudi skušam, da je Heidegger, zaradi svoje problematične politične preteklosti in kritike modernosti, v najboljšem primeru dvomljiv zaveznik v boju proti zatiralski »skopični« racionalnosti. (shrink)

Abstract in English, German, French and Croatian -/- In the paper “The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean Politics in Europe”, which was published in 2013 in the Journal of Civil Society, Mary Kaldor and Sabine Selchow attempted to reveal the specific qualities of the uprisings which emerged after the year 2010 in some European countries, such as Germany, Spain, Italy, England etc. According to the authors, the mode of organization which forms the main body of these emancipatory movements obtains its basic (...) logic from the world of the Internet. The use of the Internet requires a re-evaluation of negative philosophical commentary regarding technology. In the context of twentieth-century philosophy, Martin Heidegger and Herbert Marcuse are the most influential philosophers who studied the negative aspects of technology. Heidegger portrayed the destructive effects of scientific reasoning and technology on the Western culture through the criticism of the traditional Western metaphysics on a phenomenological-ontological level. Marcuse, belonging to the tradition of Western Marxism, formed his critique of technology in the context of the concept of instrumental rationality and the critique of advanced industrial society and capitalism. Although the starting points of their perspectives on technology and the underlying purposes of their critiques of technology were different, it may be asserted that both have a rather negative and almost entirely pessimistic disposition towards technology. Heidegger’s and Marcuse’s criticisms of technology will be discussed in this context and the differences and similarities between these criticisms will be shown. Finally, the paper will emphasise the question of the possibility of a positive role of technology. Technology can serve as an alternative to negative uses by shedding light on the relation between the current uprisings and the Internet. Keywords technology, rationality, freedom, enframing, criticism, revolt movements, Internet, politics //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /////// Ist die Emanzipation des Menschen durch Technologie möglich? Zusammenfassung In dem Artikel „The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean Politics in Europe”, veröffentlicht im Jahre 2013 im Journal of Civil Society, versuchten Mary Kaldor und Sabine Selchow die spezifischen Qualitäten der Aufstände zum Ausdruck zu bringen, die nach 2010 in den europäischen Ländern ausbrachen – Deutschland, Spanien, Italien, England usw. Nach Ansicht der Autoren erhält der Modus der Organisation, der den Hauptkörper dieser emanzipatorischen Bewegungen bildet, seine grundlegende Logik aus der Welt des Internets. Die Analogie mit dem Internet erfor- dert eine Neubewertung der negativen Kommentare über die Technologie aus philosophischer Perspektive. Martin Heidegger und Herbert Marcuse sind die einflussreichsten Philosophen, die sich mit den negativen Aspekten der Technologie in der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts befasst haben. Heidegger schilderte die zerstörerischen Auswirkungen der wissenschaftlichen Vernunft und Technologie auf die westliche Kultur durch die Kritik an der traditionellen abend- ländischen Metaphysik auf der phänomenologisch-ontologischen Ebene, während Marcuse, ein Mitglied des westlichen Marxismus, seine Kritik an der Technologie im Rahmen des Konzepts der instrumentellen Rationalität und der Kritik der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft und Kapitalismus geformt hat. Obgleich die Ansatzpunkte ihrer Perspektiven über die Technologie und die zugrunde liegenden Zwecke ihrer Kritik an der Technologie unterschiedlich waren, kann behauptet werden, dass beide eine eher negative und fast völlig pessimistische Einstellung zur Technologie hatten. In diesem Zusammenhang werden Heideggers und Marcuses Kritiken an der Technologie diskutiert sowie Unterschiede und Ähnlichkeiten zwischen den beiden Kri- tiken aufgezeigt. Abschließend unterstreicht das Paper die Frage nach der Möglichkeit einer positiven Rolle für die Technologie, die als Alternative zur negativen Perspektive dienen kann, indem sie Licht in das Verhältnis zwischen aktuellen Aufständen und Internet bringt. Schlüsselwörter Technologie, Rationalität, Freiheit, Gestell, Kritik, Revoltebewegungen, Internet, Politik //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /////// L’émancipation humaine est-elle possible à travers la technologie ? Résumé Dans l’article « The “Bubbling Up” of Suberranean Politics in Europe » publié en 2013 dans Journal of Civil Society, Mary Kaldor et Sabine Selchow tentent de mettre en lumière les caractéristiques spécifiques des révoltes qui ont fait jour après 2010 dans certains pays européens – Allemagne, Espagne, Italie, Angleterre, etc. Selon nos auteures, le mode d’organisation qui a formé le corps essentiel de ces mouvements émancipatoires tire sa logique de base du monde de l’internet. Cette analogie avec l’internet requiert une réévaluation, à partir d’un point de vue philosophique, des commentaires négatifs sur la technologie. Martin Heidegger et Herbert Marcuse sont les philosophes les plus influents ayant travaillé sur les aspects négatifs de la technologie au sein de la philosophie du XXe siècle. Heidegger a dépeint les effets destructeurs de la raison scientifique et de la technologie de notre culture occidentale à travers son criticisme de la métaphysique traditionnelle occidentale à un niveau phénoménologico-ontologique, tandis que Marcuse, membre du « communisme occidentale », a formé une critique de la technologie au sein du concept de rationalité instrumentale et une critique de la société industrielle avancée et du capitalisme. Bien que le point de départ de leur perspective sur la technologie et que le but sous-jacent de leur critique diffèrent, il est possible d’affirmer que leur point commun est d’avoir posé un regard négatif et presque entièrement pessimiste sur la technologie. À cet égard, le criticisme d’Heidegger et de Marcuse vont être abordés afin d’en soulever les différences et les similarités. Enfin, cet article mettra l’accent sur la possibilité d’un rôle positif de la technologie qui pourrait servir d’alternative aux perspectives négatives en faisant la lumière sur le lien entre les révoltes actuelles et l’internet. Mots-clés technologie, rationalité, liberté, mettre en forme, criticisme, mouvements de révolte, internet, politique //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /////// Je li moguća ljudska emancipacija kroz tehniku? Sažetak U članku »The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean Politics in Europe«, objavljenom 2013. u časopisu Journal of Civil Society, Mary Kaldor i Sabine Selchow pokušale su otkriti specifične značajke pobuna koje su se javila nakon 2010. godine u europskim zemljama poput Njemačke, Španjolske, Italije, Engleske itd. Prema autoricama, način organiziranja koji čini glavno tijelo ovih emancipatornih pokreta preuzima svoju osnovnu logiku iz svijeta Interneta. Analogija s Internetom zahtijeva ponovnu evaluaciju negativnih komentara o tehnici iz filozofske perspektive. Martin Heidegger i Herbert Marcuse najutjecajniji su filozofi 20. stoljeća koji su se bavili negativnim aspektima tehnike. Heidegger je prikazao destruktivne učinke znanstvene racionalnosti i tehnike na zapadnu kulturu kroz kritiku tradicionalne zapadne metafizike na fenomenološko-ontološkoj razini, dok je Marcuse, kao predstavnik zapadnoga marksizma, oblikovao svoju kritiku tehnike u kontekstu pojma instrumentalne racionalnosti te kritike razvijenog industrijskog društva i kapitalizma. Iako su polazišne točke njihovih pogleda na tehniku, kao i osnovne svrhe kritike tehnike, različite, može se reći da obojica imaju poprilično negativno i gotovo u potpunosti pesimističko shvaćanje tehnologije. U tom će se kontekstu razmotriti Heideggerova i Marcuseova kritika tehnike kao i razlike i sličnosti između tih dvaju pristupa. Zaključno će rad naglasiti mogućnost pozitivne uloge tehnike, koja može služiti kao alternativa negativnoj perspektivi osvjetljavajući odnos između nedavnih pobuna i interneta. Ključne riječi tehnologija, racionalnost, sloboda, postav, kritika, pobunjenički pokreti, Internet, politika. (shrink)

What makes cases of pure risking sometimes wrong? There is a strong intuition that the wrongness of pure risking stands in an explanatory relationship with the wrongness of the non-risky act, other things being equal. Yet, we cannot simply take this for granted insofar as in cases of wrongful pure risking, the risked outcome fails to materialize. To this end, I motivate and develop an underexplored approach in the literature that I call Unificationism. According to the Unificationist account that I (...) defend, the fact that pure risking φ is pro tanto wrong is grounded by a general moral fact that φ-ing is pro tanto or all-things-considered wrong, other things being equal. This relationship holds even if and when an agent’s risky conduct fails to transpire or culminate into φ-ing ex post. I argue that this Unificationist account captures our explanatory intuition, avoids problems of extensional and explanatory inadequacy that existing alternative faces, and most importantly, renders Unificationism as a plausible view within the ethics of pure risking. (shrink)

What is wrong with imposing pure risks, that is, risks that don’t materialize into harm? According to a popular response, imposing pure risks is pro tanto wrong, when and because risk itself is harmful. Call this the Harm View. Defenders of this view make one of the following two claims. On the Constitutive Claim, pure risk imposition is pro tanto wrong when and because risk constitutes diminishing one’s well-being viz. preference-frustration or setting-back their legitimate interest in autonomy. On the Contingent (...) Claim, pure risk imposition is pro tanto wrong when and because risk has harmful consequences for the risk-bearers, such as psychological distress. This paper argues that the Harm View is plausible only on the Contingent Claim, but fails on the Constitutive Claim. In discussing the latter, I argue that both the preference and autonomy account fail to show that risk itself is constitutively harmful and thereby wrong. In discussing the former, I argue that risk itself is contingently harmful and thereby wrong but only in a narrow range of cases. I conclude that while the Harm View can sometimes explain the wrong of imposing risk when risk itself is contingently harmful, it is unsuccessful as a general, exhaustive account of what makes pure imposition wrong. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Stefansson (forthcoming) argues that by emitting and offsetting, we fail to fulfil our justice-based duty to avoid harm owed to specific individuals. In this paper, I explore a case where offsetting fails to prevent some but not all risks of harms that our emissions impose on them. By drawing on a distinction between general and specific duties not to (risk) harm, I argue that if by emitting and offsetting, we satisfy some (if not all) of our specific duties we (...) owe others, then this gives us stronger moral reasons to offset than give to charities that do good more effectively. (shrink)

During times of emergency like the pandemic itself, governments are often seen as exercising “exceptional power”. Given the state of growing urgency in responding to the pandemic, there is a worry that governments may resort to exercising their exceptional power arbitrarily—either willingly, unintentionally or perhaps even negligently. When power is exercised by states or even by non-state actors arbitrarily over a person or group, that is, at their own will in the absence of appropriate institutional checks and balances, republican theorists (...) argue that we are confronted with a threat to our freedom as non- domination. In this chapter, I explore whether, and in what ways, worries about domination could surface in the context of government’s enforcement of risk- containment measures in response to the pandemic. While imposition of these measures is deemed necessary and important for reducing risks in response to the pandemic, their imposition is prima facie problematic if it constitutes or entails wrongful exercise of arbitrary power, thereby risking domination of citizens. I motivate this claim by examining India’s initial response to the Covid-19 pandemic, particularly focussing on the public health emergency legislature (or lack thereof) authorising the implementation of emergency risk-containment measures. (shrink)

This paper motivates institutional epistemic trust as an important ethical consideration informing the responsible development and implementation of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies (or AI-inclusivity) in healthcare. Drawing on recent literature on epistemic trust and public trust in science, we start by examining the conditions under which we can have institutional epistemic trust in AI-inclusive healthcare systems and their members as providers of medical information and advice. In particular, we discuss that institutional epistemic trust in AI-inclusive healthcare depends, in part, on (...) the reliability of AI-inclusive medical practices and programs, its knowledge and understanding among different stakeholders involved, its effect on epistemic and communicative duties and burdens on medical professionals and, finally, its interaction and alignment with the public’s ethical values and interests as well as background sociopolitical conditions against which AI-inclusive healthcare systems are embedded. To assess the applicability of these conditions, we explore a recent proposal for AI-inclusivity within the Dutch Newborn Screening Program. In doing so, we illustrate the importance, scope, and potential challenges of fostering and maintaining institutional epistemic trust in a context where generating, assessing, and providing reliable and timely screening results for genetic risk is of high priority. Finally, to motivate the general relevance of our discussion and case study, we end with suggestions for strategies, interventions, and measures for AI-inclusivity in healthcare more widely. (shrink)

Mercier and Sperber (M&S) claim that the main function of reasoning is to generate support for conclusions derived unconsciously. An alternative account holds that reasoning has a deliberative function even though it is an internalized analogue of public discourse. We sketch this alternative and compare it with M&S's in the light of the empirical phenomena they discuss.

Review of Harris Wiseman, The Myth of the Moral Brain: The Limits of Moral Enhancement, 340 pp.

The term sustainability has become one of the most significant in the current era. It seems to be ubiquitous amongst academics, politicians, business leaders, media personnel and even the general public. It is no exaggeration to state that it is considered all over the world to be the most pressing issue to be addressed for the long-term future of the planet and its inhabitants. The topic is of course complex, and the issue of sustainability is under much debate as to (...) what it actually is and how it can be achieved, but it is completely certain that the resources of the planet are fixed in quantity and, once used, cannot be reused except through being reused in one form or another. At present, much of the discourse of sustainability has focused upon the environment and in particular upon climate change and the effects that this is having. Thus, the discourse has tended to be about mitigation. Sustainability of course requires all three pillars of the triple bottom line—economic, environmental and social—to be addressed. Indeed, it might be considered that the effects upon the social, and how we choose to live our lives, might well be the most profound effect of achieving sustainability. This book therefore focuses upon some of the many aspects of the social and how we can adapt our lives to accommodate the requirements of sustainability. it therefore takes a very different approach to addressing the issues of sustainability, while of course not ignoring the other pillars. This book therefore sets out to examine various aspects of the changes to personal, corporate and institutional behaviour which may have to come about in our search for sustainability. It is tended to address some of the issues and how they are being dealt with in various parts of the world. As always, our concept is to share best practice and thereby enrich both the discourse and our progress towards sustainability. Thus, we focus upon the current situation while also considering the extent to which the focus is changing so much that we need to think about new approaches to our understanding of behaviour and differing effects in practice. The international origins of the contributors to this book make this an original contribution taking some of the best ideas from around the world. This book therefore addresses these issues from a perspective not generally addressed by researchers, or even by politicians and the press. It therefore provides fresh perspectives upon the important issue of our common future. As always, this approach is based on the tradition of the Social Responsibility Research Network srrnet.org (a worldwide body of scholars with membership of several thousand), which in its 20-year history has sought to broaden the discourse and to treat all research as inter-related and relevant to business. This tradition has always been to explore the subject widely and to seek relevant solutions, while also sharing best practice. This book is based primarily upon some of the contributions from the network at our recent conference and shows both commonality and diversity in approaches and effects. (shrink)

Tarihte Aydınlanma adıyla bilinen dönemden bu yana metafizik, “bilimsel” olanın karşısına konumlandırılmıştır. Kabaca söyleyecek olursak Aydınlanma düşüncesi, bir zamanlar dünyayı açıklama ve onu anlamlandırmanın yegane yolu olan metafiziği hurafe ve safsata olarak görme, buna karşılık deneyime ve olgulara itibar etme eğilimindedir. Biz bu çalışmada, metafiziğe mesafeli olmak konusunda birleşen ve felsefelerinde genel olarak deneyimden ve olgulardan yana tavır takındığını söyleyebileceğimiz iki filozof olan Ludwig Wittgenstein ve William James’i karşılaştırdık. Herhangi iki şey arasında kıyaslama yapabilmek, ortak unsurların asgari düzeyde varlığını gerektirir. (...) Biz bahsi geçen iki düşünürü onların “doğruluk” anlayışları ve buna paralel olarak metafiziği değerlendirme biçimleri bağlamında ele aldık. Wittgenstein’a göre dünya hakkında öznellikten arınmış objektif bilgiye erişmek mümkündür. Ona göre psikoloji, epistemolojiden kesin olarak ayrılmalıdır. Doğruluğun süzgeci dildeki mantıksal form, nesneleri de olgulardır. Bu koşulları yerine getirmeyen tümceler anlamdan yoksundur. Metafiziğin kendisine konu edindiği nesneler, üzerine konuşulamayanlardır. Onlar “gösterilebilir” fakat dile getirilemezler. Oysa James için durum farklıdır. Ona göre olgular kendi başlarına doğru veya yanlış olamazlar. Doğruluk James’e göre zihnin deneyim süreçleriyle şekillenmektedir ve esnek bir yapıdadır. Mevcut inanç stokumuz ile uyumlu olan ve pratik olarak bir fark yaratabilen her türden düşünce doğruluk vasfını yerine getirmeye hak kazanacaktır. James’e göre psikoloji, doğrulanma süreçlerinden ve doğrunun kendisinden bağımsız değildir. (shrink)

Bu makalede solipsizmin argümanlarının metafizik ve epistemolojik düzlemlerde geçerli olup olmadığı değerlendirilecektir. Bu çerçevede çalışmada ilk olarak solipsizmin şüphecilikle ilişkisi bağlamında tarihsel arka planı verilecek, Rene Descartes ve George Berkeley’in solipsizmin teorik açıdan derinleşmesini mümkün kılan savlarına da yer verilecektir. Ardından George Edward Moore ve Hilary Putnam’ın solipsizme karşı kullanılabilecek argümanları ele alınacak ve son olarak solipsizm eleştirel bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutulacaktır. Makalenin temel argümanı solipsizmin ne metafizik ne de epistemolojik açıdan gerekçelendirilebileceğidir.

Za svjetlo možemo reći da je istinski razbuđivač mišljenja , kako u metafizici tako u prirodnoj filozofiji i znanosti. Želimo ukazati na posebnost Petrića kao onoga mislioca s kojim je dokončana epoha od antike nasljeđene metafizike svjetla i koji otvara put za novovjekovnu fiziku svjetla, naročito u djelu Panaugia, ali ne samo u njemu. Nakon Petrića uslijedila su brojna uzbudljiva znanstvena otkrića koja su rezultirala dubokim uvidima u narav svjetla, u geometriji, a posebice u fizikalnoj optici: svjetlo se širi (...) konačnom brzinom, složeno je, dio je elektromagnetskog spektra zračenja, djeluje na materiju , dovedeno je u svezu s masom i energijom. Ono nas začuđuje dualnošću svoje prirode čestice i vala. Istraživanjem zračenja tamnog tijela, suprotnosti vidljivog svjetla, otvorena je epoha kvantne fizike. Pitamo: Možemo li na osnovu mnoštva znanja o svjetlu do kojih su došli fizičari govoriti o bîti svjetla ? Fotonika je nova epoha u komunikacijskoj tehnologiji. Što tek treba očekivati od istraživanja fotosinteze?Light has been defined as a true instigator of thought both in metaphysicsand in philosophy of natureand science. This article focuses on the exceptional position of Frane Petrić as the philosopher with whom the epoch of metaphysics of light inherited fromantiquityended and the path for the new epoch of the physics of light started – especially inhiswork Panaugia,though not only in it. AfterPetrić, numerousexciting scientific discoveries occurred that resulted in profoundinsights into the nature of light – in geometry,and especiallyinphysical optics: light travels with finite speed, it is complex, it is part of electromagneticspecterof radiation, it has effect on matter , it has been relatedto mass and energy.Lightamazes us with the duality of its natureas both a particle and a wave. The researchon theradiationof dark objects and the contrast with visible light has opened the epoch of quantumphysics.The question this lectureposes is: Based on the body of knowledge about light accumulatedby the physicists, could we talk about the essence of light ? Photonics isanew epoch in communication technology.What then could we expect from the research on photosynthesis? (shrink)

Çalışmamızın amacı Bergson’un belirlenemezcilik metafiziğinin pozitif bilimlerin deneysel yöntemine olan ilgisini gösterebilmektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, Bergson’un pozitif bilimler ve metafizik arasında hem işbirliği hem de meydan okumaya dayalı olarak kurguladığı bağlantı özellikle pozitif metafizik kavramı çerçevesinde açılacaktır. Bergson metafiziği pozitif bilimlerle özgün bir şekilde bağlayarak metafiziğe yeni bir yaklaşım getirme çabası içerisindedir. Bu yeni yaklaşım, yalnızca felsefeyi bilimle ortak konular üzerine düşünmeye motive etmekle kalmaz aynı zamanda bunlara ilişkin ortak bir deneysel model geliştirmeye çalışır. Bergson’a göre, ortak konular ve deneysel (...) model iki alanı pratikte ayırırken, idealde birleştirmelidir. (shrink)

Tekst je potaknut polemikom Gaje Petrovića sa Savkom Dabčević Kučar iz 1965. godine, odnosno člankom »O nepoštednoj kritici svega postojećeg« . Petrović kritiku poima prije svega kao analitičko sredstvo kojim se dopire do bîti .No Petrović integrira kritiku u čitav sustav svoje filozofije povezujući je s pojmovima ‘sloboda’ i ‘praksa’. Naime sintagma »sve postojeće«, koja se veže uz kritiku, daje joj aktivno i društveno značenje . Petrović ironizira situaciju u našem društvu toga vremena gdje »nema predrasuda«, pa nisu potrebna »ograničenja«, (...) »izuzetci« i »dopuštenja« za kritiku. Moglo bi se reći da je kritika bit filozofskog opusa Petrovića, koji se stavlja u poziciju kritičara dogmatske filozofije i politike koja prisvaja monopol nad kritikom. Upravo stoga valja istaknuti važnost Gaje Petrovića, a značenje kritike svega postojećega – što podrazumijeva i kritiku kao društvenu privilegiju i moć – aktualno je i danas.This text was inspired by the discussion between Gajo Petrović and Savka Dabčević Kučar in 1965, that is, by the article “About the Unrelenting Criticism of All that Exists” . Petrović conceives criticism primarily as an analytical vehicle that reaches the essence .However, Petrović integrates criticism into his entire philosophical system, linking it with concepts of freedom and practice. To be more specific, the syntagm “all that exists” combined with criticism, gives both an active and a social meaning . Petrović ironically assesses the situation in our society of the time, where “there is no prejudice”, so no “limitations”, “exceptions” or “permissions” for criticism are necessary. One might say that criticism is the essence of Petrović’s philosophical opus, because he positions himself as a critic of the dogmatic philosophy and politics, which appropriate monopoly over criticism. This is precisely why it is necessary to emphasize the importance of Gajo Petrović, and why the meaning of criticism of “criticism as a social privilege” and power, is still valid today. (shrink)

Temel ontoloji, sonlu insan özünün ontolojik açıdan çözümlenmesi anlamına gelir. Bu ontolojik çözümleme, “insanın doğasına ait” metafizik için temel hazırlamalıdır. Temel ontoloji, metafiziğin olanaklılaşması için gerekli olan insan Dasein’ın metafiziğidir ve tüm antropoloji türlerinden, felsefi antropolojiden de temelden ayrışır. Bir Temel ontoloji idesini açıklamak demek, Dasein’a ilişkin tanımlı ontolojik çözümlemeyi kaçınılmaz bir gereksinim olarak görmek ve bu yolla temel ontolojinin “insan nedir?” biçimindeki somut soruyu hangi amaçla ve hangi tarzda, hangi sınırlama içerisinde ve hangi koşullar altında sorduğunu açıklığa kavuşturmak demektir. (...) Ancak bir fikir öncelikle bir olguyu ya da olayı aydınlatma gücüne dayanarak beliriyorsa, temel ontoloji idesi de bir metafiziğin temellendirilmesi olarak “Saf Aklın Eleştirisi”nin bir yorumunda kendini savunmalı ve göstermelidir. (shrink)

The paper is a critical analysis of Kant´s concept of practical reasoning. It is based upon an analysis of Kant´s understanding of a man as a sensual-oversensual human being. The author focuses in an analysis of lawmaking of a practical reason. He concerns in Kant´s differentiation of cathegorical and hypothetivcal imperatives, or pure and ordinary will, respectively. Based on this analysis he consequently reconstructs Kantś understanding of a practical reasoning. He characterizes its basic types based on a technical imperative and (...) pragmatic advice, on cathegorical and hypothetical imperative. (shrink)

Arthur Schopenhauer , filozof postkantovske tradicije, u svojim se djelima Svijet kao volja i predodžba i O temelju morala u velikoj mjeri bavio i etičkim pitanjima. Pri tome je bilo nemoguće zaobići Kantovo etičko naučavanje, koje je Schopenhauer podvrgnuo detaljnoj kritici. Schopenhauer je Kantu spočitavao rigorizam u etici, koji je za njega neprihvatljiv s obzirom da predstavlja čisti formalizam, a ne govori ništa o zbiljskim motivima koji pokreću ljudsko ponašanje. Za te Kantove odredbe Schopenhauer je pronašao mjesto unutar uređenja pravne (...) države, jer se pravne države ne tiču motivi koji nekoga navode na određeno ponašanje, već isključivo formalno zadovoljenje načela pravednosti.Arthur Schopenhauer , the philosopher of postKantian tradition, in his writings The World as Will and Representation and On the Basis of Morality, has been dealing a lot with ethical questions. In that way, it was impossible to skirt from Kant’s ethical teaching, which Schopenhauer submitted to detailed criticism. Schopenhauer reproached him his ethical rigorism, which was unacceptable for Schopenhauer, knowing the fact that it represents pure formalism, but it does not tell anything on real motives that are driving force of a human behaviour. These Kant’s instructions were placed by Schopenhauer in the frame of establishing legal state, because the system in itself is not considered of human motives as being a reason for certain behaviour, while the system is exclusively considered of a formal fulfillment of a principle of justice. (shrink)

Ovaj prilog posvećen je temi zahvalnosti. Tomu je više razloga. U prvom redu čini se da je zahvalnost danas »zaboravljena vrlina«. Drugi je razlog više metodologijske naravi. Nakana nam je pokazati da se upravo na temi zahvalnosti može jasno vidjeti bitna povezanost fenomenologije i metafizike.Sukladno tako postavljenoj zadaći najprije ćemo izložiti fenomenologiju zahvalnosti Dietricha von Hildebranda, a potom pokazati na koji je način ona otvorila nove perspektive za utemeljenje personalističke metafizike, što će doći do izražaja u radovima njegovih (...) učenika, posebice Josefa Seiferta.In der vorliegenden Arbeit befasst sich die Autorin aus mehreren Gründen mit dem Thema der Dankbarkeit. Erstens, es scheint, dass in unserer Zeit die Dankbarkeit eine „vergessene Tugend“ ist. Zweitens, handelt es sich um methodologische Gründe. Obwohl im Zentrum der Untersuchung ethische Dimension der Dankbarkeit steht, versucht die Autorin am Beispiel der Dankbarkeit die Zusammenhang zwischen Phänomenologie und Metaphysik zu zeigen.Zunächst wird Dietrich von Hildebrands Phänomenologie der Dankbarkeit dargestellt. Danach wird gezeigt auf welche Weise J. Seifert von der Analyse des personalen Aktes der Dankbarkeit ausgehend, den Zugang zu einer personalistischen Metaphysik findet. (shrink)

Okosnica ovog doprinosa jest odgovor na neke opaske i predrasude Darka Polšeka iz Zagreba, iznesene u kritičkom osvrtu na moju kritičku procjenu njegova viđenja eugeničkog nasljeđa u biotehnološkom dobu. Za tu je svrhu doprinos podijeljen u devet paragrafa, koji donose filozofsku kritiku nekih Polšekovih prigovora. U doprinosu se rasvjetljavaju još neki novi problematični aspekti glavne Polšekove teze o takozvanoj ‘novoj eugenici’. Autor u ovom doprinosu iznosi argumente koji pokazuju i epistemološke i etičke slabosti takozvane nove eugenike, ali ne na način (...) isticanja ničim dokazanih pretpostavki i predrasuda, nego na način filozofske analize i prosudbe. Stoga iznesena argumentacija u ovom kritičkom odgovoru ostaje u okvirima diskutirane teme i pokušava čuvati dostojanstvo argumentirane rasprave. Jer, niti uz najbolju volju argument snage ne može zamijeniti snagu argumenta. Sve se ostalo prepušta kritičkoj prosudbi čitatelja.The framework of this contribution is an answer to some of the comments and prejudices madeby Darko Polšek from Zagreb, published in a critical analysis of the author’s critical judgementof his view of eugenic heredity in the biotechnological era. To this end, the article prints nineparagraphs philosophically criticizing some of Polšek’s objections. It also sheds light on a num­ber of other new problematic aspects of Polšek’s main thesis on the so-called »new eugenics«.The author of this contribution presents arguments that illustrate both the epistemological andethical weaknesses of the so-called new eugenics – not in the manner of accentuating unprovedpresuppositions and prejudices, but in the manner of philosophical analyses and judgements.Accordingly, the arguments set out in this critical reply remain within the framework of thetopic discussed and attempt to preserve the dignity of the argued discourse. For, the argumentof power can never replace the power of argument. All else is left to the critical judgement of the readers. (shrink)