The hypothesis of a theoretical unity between On Sophistical Refutations and Prior Analytics presents a major challenge to scholars attempting to unify the criteria of analysis. This paper examines this problem and proposes a middle ground between the perspectives of Woods and Boger to address this crucial question: If a unitary and coherent theory of deduction exists, why does not the technical apparatus of syllogistic modes for analyzing fallacies appear in SE? This paper makes useful contributions to the discussion on (...) the internal unity of Aristotle's logical writings on around categorical syllogistics and the doctrine of sophistical refutations. (shrink)

This essay addresses the relationships between prescription and description in legal rules. The analysis will focus on the culture-laden connotations of factual categories implied in all legal sentences and/or provisions. This investigation is spurred by the need to assess the impact of cultural difference in people’s understanding of legal imperatives and, symmetrically, how that impact is to be considered in the application of law. Differences in ways of categorizing the world could position the cultural pre-understanding required by law, and the (...) pluralism recognized and protected by constitutional principles and human/fundamental rights discourse, at a crossroads. Hence, even when we find an illegitimacy or an ignorance about what legal rules do not explicitly state but instead implicitly presuppose, this does not exclude that behind that ignorance there may be something worthy of legal protection. A question emerges: is it legitimate and reasonable to consider the ignorantia facti resulting from differing ways of categorizing the factual world as automatically and uncritically subject to the principle ignoratia legis non excusat? The essay continues with an assessment of the possible consequences of ignorantia facti in the administration of justice in multicultural societies and migration contexts. For this purpose, the opportunity for an intercultural use of law—including within national law—will be considered as a means of avoiding the discriminatory application of ignorantia facti. This topic will be addressed by leveraging both semiotic and cultural-anthropological analytical tools, including the well-known greimasien “contrat de véridiction”. (shrink)

Ignoratio Elenchi: The Red Herring Fallacy.

The bio-ethical debate on PGD and embryonie stem-cell research is characterized by many paradoxes, regarding the moral status of earliest human life between ›nature‹ and ›subjectivity‹. The ›conditio humana‹, however, is not defined by biological features. As a cultural factor, it focuses on the self-realization of the subject in contexts of social acknowledgement. Against this background, the article deals with the anthropological metaphor of the image-of-god and its peculiar character of not being an image. This allows us to explain a (...) ›negative‹ concept of anthropology, analogaus to the dialectical model of ›docta ignorantia‹. On the one hand, this concept of a human being avoids a definition of its very beginning as coming tagether of ›nature‹ and ›subjectivity‹, whereas, on the other hand, the absolute dignity of the human is emphasized. By this line of thought some argurnents are clarified, which have arisen in the bioethical debate for and against PGD and stern-cell research. (shrink)

The author contends that none of the rationales for not allowing ignorance of the law as an excuse in criminal law cases is persuasive. The paper begins by analyzing the condition under which "reasonable" ignorance of the law ought to be allowed as an excuse. Second, the author indicates in greater detail the sense in which 'justice' requires that we recognize these conditions. Third, the author critically examines the arguments used by legal theorists for disregarding the claims of justice to (...) the individual defendant in cases where reasonable ignorance of law is alleged. Finally, the author wants to show that philosophy matters. A philosophical reading of ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of the law does not excuse) can expose conceptual errors that are not seen in legal readings. (shrink)

This article explores the relations between Leibniz and the French erudite Pierre-Daniel Huet in the context of their shared anti-Cartesianism. After an introductory survey of the available commentaries and primary texts, I focus on a publication by Leibniz in the Journal des sçavans from 1693, where he fully endorses the critique of Descartes developed by Huet in his 1689 Censura philosophiae cartesianae. Next, I provide some indications as to Leibniz’s motivations behind this public approval of Huet. First, I show how (...) Leibniz throughout the 1690s was attempting to have his 1692 Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum and other anti-Cartesian items annexed to a reedition of Huet’s Censura. I finally show how these attempts to team up with Huet were prompted by Leibniz’s dislike of certain German Cartesians, in particular J. E. Schweling, and by his fear that orthodox Cartesianism might do irremediable damage to the intellectual ethics of the Republic of Letters. (shrink)

Філософія доби Відродження, а саме XV–XVI ст., передбачає наявність світоглядних детермінант, що мають глибинний герметичний смисл. З розвитком гуманітарного знання необхідним стає прагнення визначити послідовність суджень теоретичного й наукового змісту. Людина як специфічний мікро-макрокосм у площині буття дістає універсальні риси, пов’язані з визначенням метафізичних основ пантеїстичної діалектики. М. Кузанський вибудовує комплекс ідей пантеїстичного і магічного розуміння природи, що уособлює ідею вічного творення. Автор статті захищає тезу, згідно з якою теоретична спадщина мислителя має значення для поглиблення внутрішніх зв’язків між отологічними і (...) теоретико-пізнавальними детермінантами гуманістичної традиції. (shrink)

The proliferation of criminal laws in different legal systems has made legal practitioners and scholars deliberate upon the present day relevance of old age principles and concepts. The maxim ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorantia juris hereinafter) also falls in this category. The application of criminal law is said to rest on the maxim ignorantia juris, meaning ignorance of law is no excuse. The application of the maxim has from time immemorial been defended on grounds of convenience, utility, (...) and community interests. At the same time it has been challenged on grounds of legality and morality. The application of the maximin criminal matters is secured through penal laws. These laws are further validated through judicial pronouncements. Penal statutes and judicial pronouncements have largely been the basis to determine the exceptions and scope of the maxim. -/- Breaking it down to a single case in hand, several factors come into picture including the nature of the crime in question, the mental state of the person accused, the conduct of the accused person, the objective or public utility of the criminal legislation or provision, and the reasons or justifications offered for its rigid or qualified application. The single case is viewed in light of the general provisions of criminal law of the legal system in which the case is being tried. The uniqueness of each case and the criminal statutes of legal systems make it both complex and conducive to generalize or conclude on the true import and application of the maxim ignorantia juris. (shrink)

Les commentateurs latins ont rencontré pour la première fois le « Troisième homme » d’Aristote dans le chapitre vingt-deux des Sophistici elenchi. Cette rencontre illustre bien à la fois leur respect de la lettre et la radicalité de certaines de leurs innovations. Influencée par la traduction de Boèce, leur exégèse de l’argument a tenu compte de l’ensemble des indications du texte tout en lui conférant une tournure inédite.

The prologue of the Sophistici elenchi is as close an Aristotelian text gets to dealing with language as a subject matter in its own right, only in reverse. Language and its features bear consideration to the extent that they account for some major predicaments discursive reasoning is prone to, both as a separate and as a common endeavour. That being said, the linguistic pitfalls that trick us into thinking that whatever is the case for words and word-compounds is also (...) the case for the things and facts linguistic items stand for reveal as much about good linguistic habits and sound argumentation as they themselves are revealed by the principles and rules our argumentation goes by. In this connection, Aristotle resorted to a curious (or not so curious) analogy between words and counters which played a major role in explaining why language is such a powerful source of illusion and deception. As it happens, Aristotle accounting analogy is a case in point for showcasing the level of sophistication medieval Latin literature on fallacies achieved as early as the first half of the twelfth century. As a matter of fact, Western commentators managed to build compelling cases both in favour of and against the understanding that was to become and still is the standard story – which, of course, speaks volumes about their exegetical proficiency and technical expertise. On the one hand, trusting implicitly Boethius’ translation and well aware of his views on disputational hazards as opposed to computational reliability, they usually understood Aristotle’s comparison as if it was an analogy in name only. On the other hand, despite Boethius’ translation put them at a considerable disadvantage, Latin commentators were able to construe Aristotle’s analogy as bringing together two sets of symbolic variables (words and counters) that are neither entirely free nor entirely bound – which expose them to subtle but critical shifts in value and meaning. (shrink)

Few arguments from the past have stirred up as much interest as Aristotle’s “Third man” and not so many texts have received as much attention as its account in chapter 22 of the Sophistici elenchi. And yet, several issues about both remain highly controversial, starting from the very nature of the argument at stake and the exact signification of some of its features. The essay provides a close commentary of the text, dealing with its main difficulties and suggesting an (...) overall interpretation of Aristotle’s discussion of the “Third Man” argument. (shrink)

In the eighth chapter of De Sophisticis Elenchis, Aristotle introduces a mode of sophistical refutation that constitutes an addition to the taxonomy of the earlier chapters of the treatise. The new mode is pseudo-scientific refutation, or “the [syllogism or refutation] which though real, [merely] appears appropriate to the subject matter”. Against the grain of its most commonly accepted reading, I argue that Aristotle is not concerned in SE 8 to establish that both the apparent refutations of SE 4–7 and pseudo-scientific (...) refutations issue in false conclusions. His concern rather is to provide a causal analysis of both classes of apparent refutation alike which will explain why both kinds of apparent refutation are sophistical – and whose solutions are therefore the task of no special science but of a dialectical σλλογιστιϰή τέχνη. I conclude my analysis with the observation that Aristotle exploits the results of SE 8 to fend off inSE 9, 10, and 11 respectively a triad of threats to the very existence of a τέχνη of the resolution of sophistical refutation. The three threats are: the impossibility of omniscience; the relativity of semantic beliefs; and the incapacity of a questioner ignorant of a science to expose the ignorance of a pretender to scientific expertise. (shrink)

The presence of Neoplatonism in contemporary french phenomenology has a pregnance that crosses its most relevant points. Jean-Luc Marion's work does not escape this. In this work we approach the marionian appropriation of Nicholas of Cusa's thought, in the light of his writing Certitudes négatives, with the intention of understanding the cusanu´s ignorant doctrine as a way of negative certainty. La presencia del neoplatonismo en la fenomenología francesa contemporánea posee una pregnancia que atraviesa sus puntos más relevantes. La obra de (...) Jean-Luc Marion no escapa a esto. En este trabajo abordamos la apropiación marioniana del pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusa, a la luz de su escrito Certitudes négatives, con la intención de comprender la doctrina ignorante del Cusano como un modo de certeza negativa. (shrink)

This article discusses the reception of Plato's Timaeus in De docta ignorantia of Nicolas of Cusa (1401-1464), particularly about the philosophical concepts of being, time and the production of the cosmos. In this context, it is argued that the School of Chartres had played a significant role in the replacement of philosophical categories of Plato in the Christianity. But the contribution of Nicolas of Cusa to the history of the reception of the Timaeus in the Middle Ages it seems (...) original because Nicolas, more than others, use this text in order to show that the world is a being-in-relation, as God is the relationship of three persons. (shrink)

The surviving textual tradition of the Topics and Elenchi down to A.D. 1503 includes, as far as we know: Greek texts: a small papyrus fragment, c. A.D. 100; over a hundred Greek manuscripts, from c. A.D. 900 onwards; the Aldine ‘editio princeps’, A.D. 1495; commentaries, paraphrases, and scholia; notably: Alexander of Aphrodisias on Top., c. A.D. 200; John Italos on Top. 2–4, 11th century; Michael of Ephesus on EL, 11th century; Sophonias on EL., c.,. A.D. 1300; Leo Magentenus on (...) Top., 14th century. (shrink)

The surviving textual tradition of the Topics and Elenchi down to A.D. 1503 includes, as far as we know: Greek texts: a small papyrus fragment, c. A.D. 100; over a hundred Greek manuscripts, from c. A.D. 900 onwards; the Aldine ‘editio princeps’, A.D. 1495; commentaries, paraphrases, and scholia; notably: Alexander of Aphrodisias on Top., c. A.D. 200; John Italos on Top. 2–4, 11th century; Michael of Ephesus on EL, 11th century; Sophonias on EL., c.,. A.D. 1300; Leo Magentenus on (...) Top., 14th century. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Das Mittelalter Jahrgang: 19 Heft: 1 Seiten: 34-60.

This paper discusses the fallacies of combination and division as they are presented by Aristotle in chapter 4 of his Sophistici Elenchi. Aristotle's examples are concise, their discussion is unclear, and it is difficult to distinguish the cases of combination from those of division. I analyse the Aristotelian examples and the interpretations offered so far. I show that these interpretations suffer from a major defect: they fail to identify a common characteristic whereby the Aristotelian examples can be classified as (...) instances of combination or division. In my reconstruction of the examples, I repair this deficiency: I give a single pattern of explanation for the fallacy of combination and another (similar) pattern for the fallacy of division. Thus, it is possible to free Aristotle from the following charges: (i) he did not clearly distinguish between combination and division, and (ii) he reduced combination and division to a single fallacy. My explanation of the fallacies uses the notion of scope of an expression: in modern terminology, the fallacy of combination can be described as ?fallacy of the wide scope?, the fallacy of division as ?fallacy of the narrow scope? (shrink)

Il contributo consiste in una analisi e commento della prima sezione del De docta ignorantia di Nicola Cusano (capp. I-XVI), dedicata ai concetti di precisione matematica e di uguaglianza. Il saggio offre la possibilità di ripercorrere la teoria della conoscenza di Cusano, laddove l'impossibilità per la ragione di giungere ad una mens-ura precisa dell'oggetto da conoscere non si trasforma in una mera cultura del limite, bensì la filosofia negativa diviene base per la mistica. In altri termini l'obiettivo specifico del (...) saggio è rilevare come il metodo della dotta ignoranza apra alla conoscenza dell'infinito proprio nel momento in cui essa nega ogni conoscenza razionale precisa. La matematica diviene dunque il fondamento su cui far leva per innalzare la propria mente (transferre) verso la conoscenza simbolica di Dio, nel medesimo solco tracciato da Dionigi e dalla tradizione della mistica speculativa. (shrink)

Relying on evidence from fifteen epigraphic collections and sixty-odd ancient sources as well as discussing a literature of over five hundred titles, the essay’s highly unorthodox conclusions are a case in point of the micrological ideal of achieving novelty on any given subject by way of transcribing and studying first-hand all relevant materials – edited and unedited alike. The paper’s ambition was to shed new light on one of the most intriguing analogies of the whole Aristotelian corpus, namely the comparison (...) between words and pebbles. A review of all material evidence and virtually all extant sources made short work of two related, albeit mutually exclusive, misconception about ancient reckoning boards and their workings: (1) the idea that – for all practical purposes – the abacus’ arrangement mirrored the decimal system, its columns and rows conveniently matching units, tens, hundreds, thousands, etc. (2) the idea that the inscriptions on several surviving counting boards were a nuisance to the extent that, being inconsistent to a fault with the decimal system itself, they made actual calculations harder than they already were (as opposed to making them easier, as one would expect). The paper demonstrated that the first assumption – the « decimal » bias – is simply mistaken and betrays little or no awareness of the epigraphic and archaeological evidence. The paper also demonstrated that the second assumption – the « abacus riddled with complications » bias – simply defeats the purpose of resorting to the abacus in the first place and betrays a poor understanding of its practical vocation which, most assuredly, was not to add to the very problem it was meant to solve. After bulldozing its way through both misunderstandings, the essay focused on the abacus most distinctive features, that is positionality (i.e. the abacus being a positional system through and through) and hybridity (i.e. the abacus’ place value system being monetary in nature and purpose, as opposed to it being abstract and homogeneous). The final result is an interpretation that moves away from the received views by showing that the prologue of the Sophistici elenchi offers no support to the notion that, when Aristotle referred to counters, he was leaning on a kinship of sorts – or any kinship, for that matter – between abstract calculation and speech. Once we turns the pebble’s simile on its head and set it back upon its feet (Aristotle’s pebble analogy is about pebbles, what else?), it becomes clear that it presupposed numeracy all right, but it was not about numeracy itself. Moreover its goal was not to explain why computational and linguistic symbolisms succeed, but to explain how they fail – failure being the whole point; in this particular instance, failure to detect and prevent abusive value shifts affecting words and counters alike. (shrink)

Edizione con introduzione delle nove questioni anonime sugli Elenchi Sofistici conservate nel ms Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3523, ff. 70rb-72rb . Nell'introduzione l'A. esamina le convergenze fra queste e le questioni sugli Elenchi conservate nel ms. Praha, Méstska Lidova Knihovna, L. 76 . L'ed. affronta anche il problema, irrisolto, di riferimenti interni ad autori, verosimilmente maestri, non identificati: Albertus , Robertus e Antonius. Su quest'ultimo si concentra l'attenzione dell'ed., per il quale Antonius commentò gli Elenchi attorno al 1260, (...) probabilmente a Parigi. Antunius e Albertus sono ricordati anche in due scholia nella copia dei Sophistici Elenchi in Wien, ÖNB, 2377, f. 49r. (shrink)

By focussing on the logical relations between scientific theories and religious beliefs in his book Where the Conflict Really Lies, Alvin Plantinga overlooks the real conflict between science and religion. This conflict exists whenever religious believers endorse positive factual claims to truth concerning the supernatural. They thereby violate an important rule of scientific method and of common sense, according to which factual claims should be endorsed as true only if they result from validated epistemic methods or sources.

Resenha - CUSA, Nicolás de. De docta ignorantia.

v. 1. The Greek tradition -- v. 2. Greek texts and fragments of the Latin translation of "Alexander's" commentary -- v. 3. Appendices, Danish summary, indices.

At the beginning of De Visione Dei, Nicholas of Cusa puts us before an icon of the divine glance and invites us to an experimentation – initially surrounded by the metaphorical reflection – of the mystic contemplation. Working with the metaphor of the glance, the Cusano leaves us before the Creator’s look and the creature’s look. In the De Visione Dei, the divine look is creator and lover. The God’s look sees, creates and loves. This way, the present work will (...) look for to meditate on the importance of the glance, seeking in the De Visione Dei a way to relate the multiplicity of the created look with the unit of the creator look. (shrink)

To the venerable and devout man, Lord John of Gelnhausen,2 formerly abbot in Maulbronn, intercessor for one of his own. Most lovable Father, I was recently presented with Learned Ig- norance, which consists of three books (each incomplete in itself) and which is written in a sufficiently elegant style. It begins with the words “Admirabitur, et recte, maximum tuum et iam probatissimum ingeni- um” and ends “Eo aeternaliter fruituri qui est in saecula benedictus. Amen.” Having looked over [this work], I (...) feel called upon to write Un- known Learning. Here—by means of [a view] opposed to the points which the aforementioned Learned Ignorance deals with (in my judgment, harmfully) in regard to God, the universe, and Jesus Christ— an entrance opens unto the powers of the Lord so that we may be mindful of His justice.3 Those who lack the knowledge of this justice have disobediently established their own, as the apostle says in Romans 10.4 The promise of eternal life will perhaps lighten the burden of this work which I have undertaken. [ This promise] concerns the repayment of supererogation (Luke 10)5 and was made by God to the clarifiers of truth—[made] in what is written in Ecclesiasticus 24: “Those who explain me shall have eternal life.”6 From an innate desire for health the minds of my readers will be vigilant with regard even to this Unknown Learning. With spiritual weapons, however, I am going to rebut certain statements from Learned Ignorance-—[rebut them] as being incompatible with our faith, offensive to devout minds, and vainly leading away from obedience to God. At the head of what must be said comes the [command] in Psalms 45 (“Be still and see that I am God”)7 as being the legitimate enlistment of all our mental activity. For if I behold the mind of the prophet: after the elimination of malevolent wars. which are repugnant to our God, and, moreover, after the weapons of treachery have been broken8 and knowledge is to be had of Christ, our peacemaker and defender, then comes the command “Be still and see that.... (shrink)