An introduction to a collection of nine papers on contempt, bringing contemporary philosophical approaches to the phenomenon into relation with its construction and presentation in the four classical cultures of China, Greece, India, and Rome. The introduction offers a brief summary of the papers and places the issues that they explore in the wider research context of the historical and cross-cultural study of emotion.

Original in content and approach, Philosophy in Classical India focuses on the rational principles of Indian philosophical theory, rather than the mysticism usually associated with it. Ganeri explores the philosophical projects of a number of major Indian philosophers and looks into the methods of rational inquiry deployed within these projects. In so doing, he illuminates a network of mutual reference and criticism, influence and response, in which reason is simultaneously used constructively and to call itself into question.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Vedic heritage The Prithivi Sukta The Epics and Puranic heritage The sanctity‐of‐life principle Pollution and its prevention in Hindu scriptures Eco‐spirituality and environmental conservation.

The Charvakas were the sceptic‐materialists of classical India, existing about the same time as the beginnings of early atheistic Buddhism and overlapping with the rise of both Buddhism and Jainism. This chapter examines the primary source literature that focuses on Charvakas in order to glean information about them and to assess the extent of materialist influence. Materialists were of sufficient influence, it seems, for other sects to take heed of them and to offer criticism of their beliefs. The (...) materialists challenged the very basis of established religion and gained the displeasure not just of the orthodox Hindus but also of the heterodox Buddhists and Jains, who accused them of lacking any morality, hence the long‐lasting accusation of hedonism that has been attached to the Charvakas. Another, more well‐known, text that castigates the materialists is the Bhagavad Gita written perhaps around the second century BCE. (shrink)

In this book, Phillips gives an overview of the contribution of Nyaya--the classical Indian school that defends an externalist position about knowledge as well as an internalist position about justification. Nyaya literature extends almost two thousand years and comprises hundreds of texts, and in this book, Phillips presents a useful overview of the under-studied system of thought. For the philosopher rather than the scholar of Sanskrit, the book makes a whole range of Nyaya positions and arguments accessible to students (...) of epistemology who are unfamiliar with classical Indian systems. (shrink)

Had I been willing to run the risk of multiplying cuteness beyond necessity, this article would have worn the title “So you are one of those naṭs!.” The Hindi word naṭ, which helpfully sounds like the English nut, represents the way most of us in contemporary India pronounce the Sanskrit word naṭa. When we notice that a nut, in English, is someone crazy, pointing us toward the divine madness that a Dionysian performer might be expected to manifest — while (...) on the other hand no known classical Indian theory essentially associates the theater with madness — the contrast between conceptualizations of the theatrical in classical India and in classical Greece comes into view. Relative to what has come to.. (shrink)

Indian classical thought about society and polity had to deal with a basic dilemma which was set for it by the fundamental premises of the culture in which it developed. This derived from the fact that both Buddhism and Jainism, which emerged as powerful forces on the Indian scene sometime in the sixth century bce, regarded the social and political worlds not only as inferior realities in relation to the ultimate pursuit of man, but also as impeding that pursuit (...) to a substantive extent. And this, strangely enough, occurred in spite of the fact that both of these religions spread with the active support of kings and wealthy merchants, as evidenced in the earliest stories pertaining to the times of the Buddha and the Mahāvīra (the founder of Jainism). Yet, as every thinker concerned with these realms well knows, they constitute the very basis and foundation of all the worthwhile pursuits of man, including the spiritual pursuits. Thinkers dealing with these subjects, therefore, had simultaneously to be true to the reality of the realm they were thinking about and also be on the right side of the values dominant in the culture in which they lived. In addition, they had to take into account the changes that occurred in their culture over time, for while both society and polity may have dimensions that are comparatively invariant, there are also those which are subject to important changes that inevitably occur with the passage of time. The latter feature is revealed more in the legal texts, which have to take note of the changes that occur in social customs and deal with them fairly directly, than in the theoretical and abstract issues relating to society and polity with which the social and political theorists are primarily concerned. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 3, pp 147 - 172 The Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu has seldom been considered in conjunction with the problem of external-world skepticism despite the fact that his text, _Twenty Verses_, presents arguments from ignorance based on dreams. In this article, an epistemological phenomenalist interpretation of Vasubandhu is supported in opposition to a metaphysical idealist interpretation. On either interpretation, Vasubandhu gives an invitation to the problem of external-world skepticism, although his final conclusion is closer to skepticism (...) on the epistemological phenomenalist interpretation. The article ends with reflections on what light Vasubandhu might shed on the issue of whether skepticism is a natural problem in epistemology as well as why, despite Vasubandhu, the skeptical problem was not a central issue in the later Indian tradition. (shrink)

When Western philosophy was introduced to Indian academia in the late nineteenth century, there arose for Indian philosophers a two-fold need: the need to preserve the self-identity of Indian philosophy and the need to dialogue with Western philosophy. In their attempt to defend the distinctiveness of Indian philosophy, the philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century affirmed that classical Indian philosophy was essentially spiritual. The philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century, however, did not have (...) a compulsion to defend Indian philosophy in the face of Western philosophy. Many of them critiqued the traditional view about classical Indian philosophy. For them classical Indian philosophy, too, was a rational discourse and it is equally capable to contribute to the enrichment of philosophy. Today the two traditions—Indian and Western—are known to each other fairly well and hence there is little need to pursue comparative philosophy as a distinct discipline in philosophy. Instead, what should be promoted is an open philosophizing—philosophizing that is characterized by our openness to diverse ways of thought. (shrink)

This book argues that the philosophical history of India contains a tradition of skepticism about philosophy represented most clearly by three figures: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa. Furthermore, understanding this tradition ought to be an important part of our contemporary metaphilosophical reflections on the purposes and limits of philosophy.

Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad offers illuminating new perspectives on contemporary phenomenological theories of body and subjectivity, based on studies of diverse classical Indian texts. He argues for a 'phenomenological ecology' of bodily subjectivity in health, gender, contemplation, and lovemaking.

En este artículo, nos preguntamos si es pertinente un análisis del personaje de Medea de Eurípides, y más concretamente, de su filicidio, a la luz de la doctrina aristotélica de la acción. Resulta dudoso, y quizás equívoco, hablar de "responsabilidad" (en sentido aristotélico) en el caso de la heroína, ya que sus motivaciones, como las de todo héroe trágico, tienen un doble signo: enfrentado a una ἀνάγκη superior, también desea lo que está forzado a hacer. Además, Medea no es una (...) mujer común: es un personaje ontológicamente complejo que participa, más de lo que frecuentemente se ha enfatizado, del plano divino. In this article we wonder if it is pertinent to analyse the character of Euripides' Medea and, more precisely, her filicide, in the light of Aristotle's doctrine of action. With regard to the heroine, it is doubtful and perhaps confusing to talk about "responsibility" (in Aristotelian terms) because her motivations, as all tragic heroes', are two-sided: faced to a superior ἀνάγκη he wants what he is forced to do as well. In addition, Medea is not an ordinary woman: she is an ontologically complex character that has a share in the divine level, a share which is more crucial than what has usually been emphasized. (shrink)

The classical Indian variety of history may be called ‘istory’. It is not completely true that no real importance was attached to istory in classical India. But much of oral istorical literature is lost since—perhaps—narrating istory was considered a performance. Unlike historical narratives, istorical narratives are presentative, not representative. Istory can be understood as a system of narrating past events that has a purpose and poetic beauty. Finally, the paper will argue that istory is based on cognitive (...) tools of two types: epistemic tools such as testimony, inference, tarka and aesthetic tools. Thus, it has a hybrid cognitive method. (shrink)

Compared with the Greek and Latin fields, the systematic study of the concept of textual criticism in classical India has made little progress, despite the quality of work produced by specialists. And yet research of this nature would probably lead, paradoxically, to a clearer formulation of the aims and methods of modern critical editions of Indian texts.

The practice of rational debate between philosophers from different traditions, especially between Hindu—Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka—, Buddhist and Jain philosophers, is unique in classical India. Around the 7th c., a pan-Indian consensus was achieved on what counts as a satisfactory justification. The core of such discussions is an inferential reasoning whose structure is such that it ensures that its conclusions are recognised as knowledge statements, irrespective of the obedience of the interlocutor. In this line, stories of conversion following those (...) philosophical debates are commonplace in the narratives of the different traditions and regularly involve the conversion of a royal patron. Beside the influence of argumentative practices on social and political changes, theories of argumentation have deeply influenced the whole edifice of philosophy in pre modern India, since no philosopher can claim a thesis without being committed to defend it in this highly regulated dialogical framework. Moreover, the characterisation, as well as the methods to test the validity of this justification, raised the question of the existence of shared principles and was a battlefield for the different traditions to establish their own conceptions on the constitution of the world and on our ability to know it. The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the contribution of the minority tradition that is Jainism to the framework of philosophical disputation in India. (shrink)

There is relatively little literature on Indian skepticism, with hardly any monograph on the subject comparable to, e.g., Julia Annas’ and Jonathan Barnes’ The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations, R.J. Hankinson’s The Sceptics: The Arguments of the Philosophers, a series of Richard H. Popkin’s monographs on the history of skepticism, or two recent competing volumes as collective efforts: The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism edited by John Greco and The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism edited by Richard Bett. (...) Therefore what promises to provide a survey of the skeptical tradition of South Asia should potentially be regarded as a milestone work in the... (shrink)

In the matter of the body, even comparative language—the very use of English today—is soaked through and through with the Cartesian version of the intuition of dualism: the idea that we are fundamentally a mind and a body that must be either related ingeniously, or else reduced to one another. Instead, by deliberately looking at genres that pertain to other aspects of being human, I seek to go deeper into texts that simply start elsewhere than with intuitions of dualism, even (...) while being engrossed in the category of the experiential ‘body’. (shrink)

The author enters an already old dispute, that is, whether a countеrpart of the notion of philosophy could be encountered in the traditional India, upholds the view that the term ānvīkṣikī (lit. “investigation”) was nearest to it and traces its meaning along the texts on dharma, politics, poetics and philosophy properly. Two main avenues to the understanding of philosophy’s vocations in India have been paved in the Mānavadharmaśāstra, along with the commentaries thereon and by Kamandaki, the author of (...) the Nītisāra (as the knowledge of Ātman) and in the Arthaśāstra and the Nyāya texts composed by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara (as a metascience helping the other branches of knowledge bear their fruits). Therefore philosophy in India as well was regarded as the duality of ideological and methodological constituents, while the emphasis on analytic practice in the definitions of ānvīkṣikī (Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as a practice is also referred to in this context) paves a good promise for comparative philosophy. (shrink)

The subject of this extraordinary, demanding, and often moving book is being human. What it means to be such a being is here explored by means of scrupulous attention to ways in which "bodily being"--the author's term for how subjectivity may be expressed through contextually specific modes of embodiment--are drawn on, expressed, and transformed in what one might call different epistemic and experiential contexts found in premodern Indian thought in Sanskrit and Pāli.One of the most attractive things in this book (...) is that, within its pages, Indian philosophy is found in a number of genres: in medical texts, in epic (in the... (shrink)

The collection of Malayalam records entitled Vanjeri Grandhavari, taken from the archives of an important Namputiri Brahmin family and the temple under its leadership, provides some long-awaited information regarding a wide range of legal activities in late medieval Kerala. The organization of law and the jurisprudence represented by these records bear an unmistakable similarity to legal ideas found in dharmastra texts. A thorough comparison of the records and relevant dharma texts shows that landholding Namputiri Brahmins, who possessed enormous political and (...) economic power in the region, mediated the implementation of dharmastra into the legal system. From this comparison arise new understandings of law and legal categories such as custom and positive law. Moreover, such comparisons begin to elucidate the problems involved in Western assumptions that it is textual law, not its interpretation and application by humans, which controls behavior. The Vanjeri records demonstrate not only the importance of dharmastra as a historical document but also the manner and extent to which dharmastra provided the foundation for legal systems in Kerala as well as in other regions of India. (shrink)

The cross-cultural philosopher B.K. Matilal is one of many who have argued that some Indian philosophers are skeptics. Inspired by Matilal, in Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India, Ethan Mills argues that Nāgārjuna (150–200 CE), Jayarāśi (770–830 CE), and Śrī Harṣa (1125–1180 CE) are skeptics in a specific sense: as part of a textually inspired tradition of “skepticism about philosophy,” they share overlapping methods. Mills’ arguments about method are more successful than those about tradition, although the book’s (...) engaging exposition of these three thinkers will hopefully spark new interest in their work. (shrink)

The cross-cultural philosopher B.K. Matilal is one of many who have argued that some Indian philosophers are skeptics. Inspired by Matilal, in Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India, Ethan Mills argues that Nāgārjuna (150–200 CE), Jayarāśi (770–830 CE), and Śrī Harṣa (1125–1180 CE) are skeptics in a specific sense: as part of a textually inspired tradition of “skepticism about philosophy,” they share overlapping methods. Mills’ arguments about method are more successful than those about tradition, although the book’s (...) engaging exposition of these three thinkers will hopefully spark new interest in their work. (shrink)

Human Being, Bodily Being: Phenomenology from Classical India. By Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. viii + 204.

The study of Greco-Roman civilisation is as exciting and innovative today as it has ever been. This intriguing collection of essays by contemporary classicists reveals new discoveries, new interpretations and new ways of exploring the experiences of the ancient world. Through one and a half millennia of literature, politics, philosophy, law, religion and art, the classical world formed the origin of western culture and thought. This book emphasises the many ways in which it continues to engage with contemporary life. (...) Offering a wide variety of authorial style, the chapters range in subject matter from contemporary poets' exploitation of Greek and Latin authors, via newly discovered literary texts and art works, to modern arguments about ancient democracy and slavery, and close readings of the great poets and philosophers of antiquity. This engaging book reflects the current rejuvenation of classical studies and will fascinate anyone with an interest in western history. (shrink)