Laura Grams - Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.1 153-154 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Laura Grams University of Nebraska at Omaha Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, editors. Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xi + 353. Cloth, $90.00. This collection of papers on Hellenistic philosophy of language (...) resulted from the ninth Symposium Hellenisticum, held in Hamburg in July 2001. It makes an important contribution to the secondary literature on this topic and will be valuable to anyone who studies Hellenistic philosophy. Because some chapters discuss broader issues in the philosophy of language or connect.. (shrink)

In this comparative study, we examine experiential disruptions of embodiment and affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We suggest that using phenomenological resources to explore these experiences may help us better understand what it’s like to live with these conditions, and that such an understanding may have significant therapeutic value. Additionally, we suggest that this sort of phenomenologically-informed comparative analysis can shed light on the importance of embodiment and affectivity for the constitution of a sense of self and interpersonal relatedness (...) in normal conditions. (shrink)

This article examines the supposedly incomprehensibility of schizophrenic delusions. According to the contemporary classificatory systems (DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10), some delusions typically found in schizophrenia are considered bizarre and incomprehensible. The aim of this article is to discuss the notion of understanding that deems these delusions incomprehensible and to see if it is possible to comprehend these delusions if we apply another notion of understanding. First, I discuss the contemporary schizophrenia definitions and their inherent problems, and I argue that the notion (...) of incomprehensibility in these definitions rests heavily on Jaspers’ notions of understanding and empathy. Secondly, I discuss two Wittgensteinian attempts to comprehend bizarre delusions: (a) Campbell’s proposal to conceive delusions as framework propositions and (b) Sass’s suggestion to interpret delusions in the light of solipsism. Finally, I discuss the phenomenological conception of schizophrenia, which conceives delusion formation as resulting from alterations of the structure of experiencing and from underlying self-disorders. I argue that although a psychological understanding that seeks to grasp meaning in terms of motivations, desires, and other more straightforward psychological connections between mental states is impossible in schizophrenia, we can in fact have a philosophical understanding of the schizophrenic world and of the emergence of delusions typically found in schizophrenia. (shrink)

Auditory verbal hallucinations form an essential criterial feature in the schizophrenia definition in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders -IV and International Classification of Diseases -10. In both classificatory systems, the presence of a hallucinatory voice that continuously comments the patient’s behavior or thoughts, or the presence of several voices that discuss the patient with each other, is a sufficient criterion to diagnose schizophrenia. The DSM-IV defines a hallucination as “a sensory perception that has the..

a vigorous and challenging defence of direct realism in which one gets not only a clear overview of what precisely the problems are, but also a forceful and ...

The task of being oneself lies at the heart of human existence and entails the possibility of not being oneself. In the case of schizophrenia, this possibility may come to the fore in a disturbing way. Patients often report that they feel alienated from themselves. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that schizophrenia sometimes has been described with the heideggerian notion of inauthenticity. The aim of this paper is to explore if this description is adequate. We discuss two phenomenological accounts of (...) schizophrenia: Binswanger’s account of schizophrenia as a form of inauthenticity and Blankenburg’s account of schizophrenia as a loss of common sense, which seems construable as a loss of inauthenticity. We argue that the accounts are highlighting aspects of the same underlying phenomenon, viz. schizophrenic autism. Moreover, we argue that Binswanger’s description of schizophrenia as a form of inauthenticity is inadequate and we discuss experiences of self-alienation in schizophrenia. (shrink)

Homeopathy is over 200 years old and is still experiencing an uninterrupted influx of new practitioners and patients. Many patients and therapists swear by this "alternative healing method", which in some countries is even financed by health insurances. This seems completely incomprehensible to critics: For them it is clearly evident that homeopathy is hopelessly unscientific and has at best a placebo effect. The positions of supporters and opponents seem to be just as immutable as they are incompatible. This book answers (...) some essential and fascinating questions: What remains of the founding ideas of homeopathy in 21st century medicine? Does it really work and, if so, how? Which of the original theories can we still apply today with a clear conscience and use for the benefit of patients and the healthcare system? Where does homeopathy have its limits and does it indeed need to be critically reconsidered and evaluated? The author has dealt with the points of criticism for years, but at the same time also takes seriously the wishes and concerns of patients who often feel insufficiently cared for by conventional medical practice. Against the background of her own personal history, her book attempts to bridge the gap between these two traditionally opposing camps. (shrink)

Research in psychopathology is booming in an unprecedented way, at least, in terms of increasing number of publications. Yet, a few questions arise: Does quantity also give us quality? Are the collected data generally of sound quality? How are data typically collected in psychopathology? Are the applied methods of data collection appropriate for this particular field of study? This article explores three different methods of data collection in psychopathology, namely self-rating scales, structured interviews, and semi-structured, phenomenological interviews. To identify the (...) most adequate methodological approach, we first establish the nature of the object of psychopathology and then we critically assess each method’s appropriateness to this field of study. We emphasize fundamental issues that make self-rating scales and structured interviews unfit for the task of adequately examining psychopathology. By contrast, we propose that a semi-structured, phenomenological interview presents a more appropriate method. Finally, we describe two types of semi-structured, phenomenological interviews that can be applied to assess and explore psychopathology, respectively. (shrink)

In the First Antinomy of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant drew two conclusions from the argument he gives. First, Kant took his argument to show that the referent of the concept of ‘world’ does not exist as a thing in itself. For at B532 he says.

In the First Antinomy of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant drew two conclusions from the argument he gives. First, Kant took his argument to show that the referent of the concept of ‘world’ does not exist as a thing in itself. For at B532 he says.

Plato’s Timaeus provides a significant, original account of diseases afflicting the body and soul. The causes of disease are explained according to the same physical principles that account for the motion of the four elements in the universe. As a result, medical expertise concerning the microcosm of the human body depends on cosmological expertise concerning the macrocosm of the universe. in addition, the methods of division and collection (diairesis and sunagōgē) that Plato uses in other late dialogues are employed in (...) the Timaeus to classify ailments according to differences in their dunamis. Each of the three main kinds of disease is caused by a unique kind of bodily motion, which explains why the same body parts, humours, and elements are involved in multiple kinds of disease. (shrink)

Direct Realism as a theory of perception has traditionally been thought to collapse on the existence of hallucinations. The cause of that collapse is what is familiar to philosophers as the Argument from Illusion. And what sustains that argument is the equally familiar No-Intrinsic-Difference Claim. The argument and the claim conspire to undermine Direct Realism as follows. We are first given cases in which we are acquainted with perceptual states of affairs that can be neither material bodies nor parts of (...) such bodies. We are told that what we see in such cases is phenomenally indistinguishable from what we see in cases of veridical perception: There is, so the argument goes, no characteristic of either kind of state of affairs available to inspection which enables us to distinguish one from the other. And since there is no phenomenal difference between them, there is also no intrinsic difference; hence, we are never directly aware of material bodies or their parts in perception—from which it is generally inferred that Direct Realism is false. (shrink)

SummaryThe paper undertakes to disentangle the problem facing Kant's Third Antinomy from the problems confronting the transcendental reality of time and the distinction between things–in–themselves and appearances. Three different resolutions of the Third Antinomy are distinguished. It is shown that neither the appeal to the transcendental ideality of time nor to the distinction between things‐in‐themselves and appearances in the first Kritik resolution succeeds in resolving the antinomy as Kant states it. The appeal in the Groundwork to the distinction between heteronomy (...) and autonomy shifts the problem. And the reliance in the second Kritik on our ability to know a priori that there are necessary connections in our experience fails in yet another way to forestall the antinomy. The common core of all of these difficulties lies in what is called here the Duplication Problem: The tendency of the distinctions introduced to resolve the problem to duplicate the very antinomy they are supposed to resolve. Finally, it is shown how isolating these issues helps to strengthen Kant's argument for transcendental ideality and to clarify the conditions under which the antinomy can he resolved. (shrink)