Not Being Oneself: A Critical Perspective on ‘Inauthenticity’ in Schizophrenia

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 48 (1):63-82 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The task of being oneself lies at the heart of human existence and entails the possibility of not being oneself. In the case of schizophrenia, this possibility may come to the fore in a disturbing way. Patients often report that they feel alienated from themselves. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that schizophrenia sometimes has been described with the heideggerian notion of inauthenticity. The aim of this paper is to explore if this description is adequate. We discuss two phenomenological accounts of schizophrenia: Binswanger’s account of schizophrenia as a form of inauthenticity and Blankenburg’s account of schizophrenia as a loss of common sense, which seems construable as a loss of inauthenticity. We argue that the accounts are highlighting aspects of the same underlying phenomenon, viz. schizophrenic autism. Moreover, we argue that Binswanger’s description of schizophrenia as a form of inauthenticity is inadequate and we discuss experiences of self-alienation in schizophrenia.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,491

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Mania of Existence: Klein, Winnicott, and Heidegger's Concept of Inauthenticity.Beau Shaw - 2015 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 46 (1):48-60.
Deviance as Inauthenticity: an Ontological Perspective.Mortaza Zare - 2016 - Philosophy of Management 15 (2):151-159.
The Man at the Mirror (Dialogue with Oneself).Dmitri Nikulin - 2011 - Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 3 (5):61-79.
On incomprehensibility in schizophrenia.Mads Gram Henriksen - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):105-129.
Phenomenology, Meaning, and Metaphor.Mads Gram Henriksen & Josef Parnas - 2015 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (3):193-196.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-06-01

Downloads
35 (#390,208)

6 months
3 (#430,134)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mads G. Henriksen
University of Copenhagen

References found in this work

Being and Time.Ronald W. Hepburn - 1964 - Philosophical Quarterly 14 (56):276.
The Divided Self, An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness.R. D. Laing - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 15 (3):405-405.

View all 13 references / Add more references