It is widely agreed that obsessive-compulsive disorder involves irrationality. But where in the complex of states and processes that constitutes OCD should this irrationality be located? A pervasive assumption in both the psychiatric and philosophical literature is that the seat of irrationality is located in the obsessive thoughts characteristic of OCD. Building on a puzzle about insight into OCD (Taylor 2022), we challenge this pervasive assumption, and argue instead that the irrationality of OCD is located in the emotions that (...) are characteristic of OCD, such as anxiety or fear. In particular, we propose to understand the irrationality of OCD as a matter of harboring recalcitrant emotions. We argue that this account not only solves the puzzle about insight, but also makes better sense of how OCD sufferers experience and describe their condition and helps explain some otherwise puzzling features of compulsive behavior. (shrink)

How should addictive behavior be explained? In terms of neurobiological illness and compulsion, or as a choice made freely, even rationally, in the face of harmful social or psychological circumstances? Some of the disagreement between proponents of the prevailing medical models and choice models in the science of addiction centres on the notion of “loss of control” as a normative characterization of addiction. In this article I examine two of the standard interpretations of loss of control in addiction, one (...) according to which addicts have lost free will, the other according to which their will is weak. I argue that both interpretations are mistaken and propose therefore an alternative based on a dual-process approach. This alternative neither rules out a capacity in addicts to rationally choose to engage in drug-oriented behavior, nor the possibility that addictive behavior can be compulsive and depend upon harmful changes in their brains caused by the regular use of drugs. (shrink)

This article historicizes a single stage in how the contemporary obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) category was built. Starting from the position that the two central components which make up OCD are ‘obsessions’ and ‘compulsions’, it illustrates how these concepts were taken apart by a small group of clinical psychologists working at the Institute of Psychiatry and the Maudsley psychiatric hospital in south London in the early 1970s, and why compulsions were investigated whilst obsessions were ignored. The decision to distinguish the (...) previously undifferentiated symptoms is attributed to the commitment amongst psychologists at the Maudsley, most notably Stanley Rachman, to an empirical conception of science which emphasized observability. Two aspects of this are discussed. First, compulsions were deemed ‘visible’ through their correspondence with animal behaviour. Second, the symptom was seen as open to an experimental modification procedure which privileged visible outcomes. Ultimately, the article concludes that the historical division between ‘obsessions’ and ‘compulsions’, and the extensive investigation of the latter, has had substantial implications for the development of OCD as a category centred on visible behaviours and treated through behavioural means. (shrink)

Normative thinking about addiction has traditionally been divided between, on the one hand, a medical model which sees addiction as a disease characterized by compulsive and relapsing drug use over which the addict has little or no control and, on the other, a moral model which sees addiction as a choice characterized by voluntary behaviour under the control of the addict. Proponents of the former appeal to evidence showing that regular consumption of drugs causes persistent changes in the brain (...) structures and functions known to be involved in the motivation of behavior. On this evidence, it is often concluded that becoming addicted involves a transition from voluntary, chosen drug use to non-voluntary compulsive drug use. Against this view, proponents of the moral model provide ample evidence that addictive drug use involves voluntary chosen behaviour. In this paper we argue that although they are right about something, both views are mistaken. We present a third model that neither rules out the view of addictive drug use as compulsive, nor that it involves voluntary chosen behavior. -/- . (shrink)

Addicts sometimes engage in such spectacularly self-destructive behavior that they seem to act under compulsion. I briefly review the claim that addiction is not compulsive at all. I then consider recent accounts of addiction by Holton and Schroeder, which characterize addiction in terms of abnormally strong motivations. However, this account can only explain the apparent compulsivity of addiction if we assume—contrary to what we know about addicts—that the desires are so strong as to be irresistible. I then consider (...) accounts that invoke the phenomenon of “ego depletion,” according to which a person can resist temptation for a while, but not indefinitely. Implicit in this account is the assumption that addiction-related desires persist long enough to deplete the addict’s willpower. The balance of the paper argues that the persistence of the desire to consume drugs is a significant form of dysfunction in its own right, and that it makes an important and independent contribution to the compulsivity of addiction. I argue that addiction involves dysfunction in a mechanism that normally prevents a person from being tempted to do something that would invite disaster. (shrink)

The experiences of 90 individuals who self-identify as “excessive” or “maladaptive” fantasizers are summarized in this report. Our sample consisted of 75 female and 15 male participants, ranging in age from 18 to 63 who responded to online announcements. Participants completed a 14-question emailed survey requesting descriptions of their fantasy habits and causes of potential distress regarding fantasy. Results demonstrated that participants shared a number of remarkably specific behaviors and concerns regarding their engagement in extensive periods of highly-structured, immersive imaginative (...) experiences, including the use of kinesthetic activity which accompanies the fantasies of 79% of participants. Participants reported distress stemming from three factors: difficulty in controlling the need or desire to engage in fantasizing; concern that the quantity of fantasizing interfered with actual relationships and endeavors; and intense shame and exhaustive efforts to keep this behavior hidden from others. It is hoped that this report will encourage interest in this elusive syndrome. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References Further reading.

The dominant philosophical conceptions of obsessive-compulsive behavior present its subject as having a deficiency, usually characterized as volitional, due to which she lacks control and choice in acting. Compulsions (mental or physical) tend to be treated in isolation from the obsessive thoughts that give rise to them. I offer a different picture of compulsive action, one that is, I believe, more faithful to clinical reality. The clue to (most) obsessive-compulsive behavior seems to be the way (...) obsessive thoughts, which are grounded in an irrational cognitive style in matters of risk, danger, and responsibility, motivate compulsions through bizarre means–end reasoning. I show that the patient with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is not weak and passive with regard to the compulsive act; rather, the act is voluntary and regarded by the patient as an instrument of control. I also defend the idea that OCD-related cognitions are either beliefs or mental states with relevantly similar functional roles. (shrink)

People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) do things they do not want to do, and/or they think things they do not want to think. In about 10 percent of OCD patients, none of the available treatment options is effective. A small group of these patients is currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). Deep brain stimulation involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in which they are (...) implanted. It turns out that patients may experience profound changes as a result of DBS treatment. It is not just the symptoms that change; patients rather seem to experience a different way of being in the world. These global effects are insufficiently captured by traditional psychiatric scales, which mainly consist of behavioural measures of the severity of the symptoms. In this article we aim to capture the changes in the patients’ phenomenology and make sense of the broad range of changes they report. For that we introduce an enactive, affordance-based model that fleshes out the dynamic interactions between person and world in four aspects. The first aspect is the patients’ experience of the world. We propose to specify the patients’ world in terms of a field of affordances, with the three dimensions of broadness of scope (‘width’ of the field), temporal horizon (‘depth’), and relevance of the perceived affordances (‘height’). The second aspect is the person-side of the interaction, that is, the patients’ self-experience, notably their moods and feelings. Thirdly, we point to the different characteristics of the way in which patients relate to the world. And lastly, the existential stance refers to the stance that patients take towards the changes they experience: the second-order evaluative relation to their interactions and themselves. With our model we intend to specify the notion of being in the world in order to do justice to the phenomenological effects of DBS treatment. (shrink)

How does doubt come about? What are the mechanisms responsible for our inclinations to reassess propositions and collect further evidence to support or reject them? In this paper, I approach this question by focusing on what might be considered a distorting mirror of unreasonable doubt, namely the pathological doubt of patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD). Individuals with OCD exhibit a form of persistent doubting, indecisiveness, and over-cautiousness at pathological levels (Rasmussen and Eisen in Psychiatr Clin 15(4):743–758, 1992; Reed in (...) Obsessional experience and compulsive behaviour: a cognitive-structural approach, Academic Press, Cambridge, 1985; Tolin et al. in Cogn Ther Res 27(6):657–669, 2003). I argue that the failure in OCD is of an affective nature, involving both excessive epistemic anxiety and hyperactive feelings of uncertainty. I further argue that our adaptive disposition to inquire about the right matters—that is, about propositions which are both epistemically risky and imply harmful possibilities—might depend on these affective mechanisms. (shrink)

This paper aims to defend the common-sense view that we exempt compulsive agents from responsibility to the extent that they are unable to choose what they do and hence they cannot control their actions by their choices. This view has been challenged in a seminal paper by Gary Watson, who claimed that akratic agents lack control in the same sense but they are responsible nonetheless. In the first part of the paper, I critically examine the arguments Watson advances for (...) this claim first in his original paper and then in some more recent works. I conclude that his account is based on the widely held assumption that both compulsive behavior and weakness of the will must be understood as a direct result of some inner motivational conflict. In the second part, I argue for an alternative understanding of the difference between weakness and compulsion. My claim is that compulsion is a cognitive rather than a motivational deficiency, since the compulsive, unlike the weak-willed, does not desire to perform the action which she actually performs. Furthermore, I argue that compulsive agents cannot control their actions by their choices because they have a distorted view of their own actional abilities. In the final part of the paper, I discuss a consequence of this account to the conditional analysis of free will as a condition of responsibility. (shrink)

Consumers’ inclinations towards materialism and compulsive buying are influenced by a variety of factors. Materialistic consumers face maladies that cause stress and lower subjective well-being and are unable to control their buying behaviour that in turn leads to social and financial issues. This paper aims to investigate the effect of emotional intelligence training on consumers’ materialism and compulsive buying. The experimental design involves 36 respondents across both groups. Findings confirm the hypothesis that ability-based training programmes can help consumers (...) improve their emotional intelligence whilst also lowering their levels of materialism and compulsive buying. In sum, the results extend the existing literature on consumer materialism by providing an explanation on how specific emotional ability-based training can diminish materialistic and excessive buying inclinations. The development of emotional intelligence skills-based training programmes contributes to more sustainable consumer behaviour, mitigating the vulnerability to materialism and related addictive behavioural consequences. (shrink)

Ritualized behavior, intuitively recognizable by its stereotypy, rigidity, repetition, and apparent lack of rational motivation, is found in a variety of life conditions, customs, and everyday practices: in cultural rituals, whether religious or non-religious; in many children's complicated routines; in the pathology of obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD); in normal adults around certain stages of the life-cycle, birthing in particular. Combining evidence from evolutionary anthropology, neuropsychology and neuroimaging, we propose an explanation of ritualized behavior in terms of an evolved (...) Precaution System geared to the detection of and reaction to inferred threats to fitness. This system, distinct from fear-systems geared to respond to manifest danger, includes a repertoire of clues for potential danger as well as a repertoire of species-typical precautions. In OCD pathology, this system does not supply a negative feedback to the appraisal of potential threats, resulting in doubts about the proper performance of precautions, and repetition of action. Also, anxiety levels focus the attention on low-level gestural units of behavior rather than on the goal-related higher-level units normally used in parsing the action-flow. Normally automatized actions are submitted to cognitive control. This “swamps” working memory, an effect of which is a temporary relief from intrusions but also their long-term strengthening. Normal activation of this Precaution System explains intrusions and ritual behaviors in normal adults. Gradual calibration of the system occurs through childhood rituals. Cultural mimicry of this system's normal input makes cultural rituals attention-grabbing and compelling. A number of empirical predictions follow from this synthetic model. (Published Online February 8 2007) Key Words: childhood ritual; compulsion; event boundaries; evolutionary psychology; obsessive-compulsive disorder; ritual; thought intrusion. (shrink)

The standard philosophical view is that compulsive behaviors are caused by “irresistible” desires. Gary Watson famously argued that this view conflates compulsion with weakness of the will, and proposed differentiating weakness and compulsion by appealing to the normal strength-of-will of members of the community. This extrinsic distinction leaves no room for phenomenological differences between weakness and compulsion. Evidence from clinical psychology shows, however, that compulsion is associated with certain phenomenological features that are absent in cases of weakness. I therefore (...) reject the irresistible desire account. Instead, I propose that psychological compulsions “wear down” an individual’s normal faculty of self-control, i.e., the will. The recurrent inhibition of the behavior by the will overexerts this faculty, causing the psychological stress noted by psychologists. This stress raises the cost of resistance until it is unbearable. The subject abandons resistance and therefore performs the behavior. (shrink)

Obsessive compulsive disorder is a debilitating psychiatric condition where people become obsessed by remotely possible harm, error, bad luck, and compulsively repeat mental or behavioural rituals to neutralize these possibilities. This tendency to draw inferences on the basis of remote rather than more likely possibilities is termed 'inferential confusion' and can lead to immersion in possible worlds accompanied by feelings of dissociation between: knowing and doing, imagination and reality, and authentic and inauthentic self. These dissociation experiences in OCD may (...) inform us on the relational 'possibilistic' nature of consciousness. In a relational model of consciousness, the boundaries of consciousness are located between the person and the world, and shift according to the 'aboutness' of self-world interaction. A key element of 'aboutness' is projecting into the future to what is 'about to be', so sense of reality is constructed through a consensus about what could be, operationalized as a personal possibility distribution. Experiences such as derealization and depersonalization occur in OCD when there is a clash between personally possible worlds and the person ends up living in simultaneously a possible and an impossible world. Recognizing this confusion may be a key to alleviating dissociative symptoms. (shrink)

The authors comments on several articles on addiction. Research suggests that addicted individuals have substantial impairments in cognitive control of behavior. The authors maintain that a proper study of addiction must include a neurobiological model of addiction to draw the attention of bioethicists and addiction neurobiologists. They also state that more addiction neuroscientists like S. E. Hyman are needed as they understand the limits of their research. Accession Number: 24077921; Authors: Carter, Adrian 1; Email Address: [email protected] Hall, Wayne 1; (...) Affiliations: 1: The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia; Subject: EDITORIALS; Subject: ADDICTIONS; Subject: BEHAVIOR; Subject: HYMAN, S. E.; Subject: NEUROBIOLOGISTS; Subject: NEUROSCIENTISTS; Number of Pages: 3p. (shrink)

The concept of "terrorism" is problematized and argued to be at one end of a continuum of behavior that can be characterized as "compulsion." This approach to conflict is explained in terms of Transactional Analysis and the inadequacy of compulsion as a means of managing human affairs (politics) is explored in relation to the use of power that it requires, and to the responses it generates. An alternative behavior, based on "turning the other cheek" and Satyagraha (confronting), is (...) advocated in the expectation that it will prove more fruitful in managing conflict and reducing terrorist outrages. (shrink)

Hoarding disorder is a psychiatric condition characterized by difficulty discarding items and accumulation of clutter. Although studies have established the negative impact of HD and compulsive hoarding behavior, fewer have examined the impact on quality of life of hoarding behavior independent of obsessive–compulsive disorder. Moreover, specific aspects of QoL such as success in work/academics or satisfaction with interpersonal relationships have not been well-investigated. In this study, we examined, in a sample of 2100 adult participants obtained from (...) Amazon Mechanical Turk, the relationships between hoarding, OCD, and depression symptomatology and four QoL domains derived from a factor analysis of the Quality of Life Inventory. We performed linear regressions to examine associations between psychiatric symptomatology and QoL domains and then conducted mediation analyses to investigate the role of depressive symptomatology in the identified relationships. We found that while hoarding and obsessive–compulsive symptoms were both negatively associated with QoL, they were associated with different domains [hoarding was significantly associated, and was less strongly associated with success or enrichment. Mediation analyses confirmed the role of depression as a complete mediator of hoarding’s effect on total, environment, and family QoL, and as a partial mediator of hoarding’s effect on success and enrichment QoL. Further examination of the relationship between hoarding symptoms and QoL in those with mild, moderate, and severe depression indicated that in those with more severe depression, hoarding was associated with improved QoL, indicating a possible buffering or compensatory effect. The findings suggest a differential impact of hoarding and obsessive–compulsive symptoms on QoL and emphasize the importance of considering co-morbid depressive symptoms in designing more targeted interventions. Future studies should continue to investigate these complex relationships, given the high co-morbidity of hoarding and depression. (shrink)

A study of the organization of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) rituals in time and space illuminates a postulated mechanism on shifting focus in action parsing, from mid-ranged actions to finer movements (gestures). Performance of OCD rituals also involves high concentration rather than the automated, less attended performance of rituals in normal and stereotyped behaviors in animals and humans. (Published Online February 8 2007).

Behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) is characterized by an absence of obvious cognitive impairment and presence of symptoms such as disinhibition, social inappropriateness, personality changes, hyper-sexuality, and hyper-orality. Affected individuals do not feel concerned enough about their actions to be deterred from violating social norms, and their antisocial behaviours are most likely caused by the neurodegenerative processes in the frontal and anterior temporal lobes. BvFTD patients present a challenge for the traditional notion of autonomy and the medical and criminal justice (...) systems. Antisocial behaviour is often the earliest recognized manifestation of bvFTD. Given that the symptoms are not specific and that atrophy of the frontal lobes is only observable with structural neuroimaging in the later stages of the disease, it is hard to ascertain their autonomy. Recently proposed re-conceptualizations of autonomy (Dworkin’s, Jaworska’s, and Dubljević’s) can, however, be sufficiently redefined to provide explicit rules and offer nuanced guidance in such cases. A combination of notions of autonomy gives the most nuanced guidance with three modifications: 1) including socio-moral judgement in the notion of “normal cognitive competence,” 2) excluding in-principle un-endorsable ideals from the notion of “capacity to value,” and 3) redefining ideal-typical degrees of compulsion (mild, severe, and total). (shrink)

In reply to commentary on our target article, we supply further evidence and hypotheses in the description of ritualized behaviors in humans. Reactions to indirect fitness threats probably activate specialized precaution systems rather than a unified form of danger-avoidance or causal reasoning. Impairment of precaution systems may be present in pathologies other than obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), autism in particular. Ritualized behavior is attention-grabbing enough to be culturally transmitted whether or not it is associated with group identity, cohesion, or (...) with any other social aspect of collective ceremonies. (Published Online February 8 2007). (shrink)

Psychologists and cultural historians typically have argued that early modern theologians such as Martin Luther, John Bunyan, and Ignatius Loyola exhibited behavior that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV) classifies as a subtype of obsessive-compulsive disorder termed “religious scrupulosity.” This essay argues that, although early modern theologians do manifest scrupulosity, such religiosity was a culturally acceptable, even recommended component of spiritual progress, a necessary means of receiving an unmerited bestowal of God’s grace. The larger (...) aim of the essay is to point out some of the limitations of current DSM criteria when attempting retrospectively to diagnose historical figures with mental pathology. (shrink)

A central methodological innovation in cognitive science has been the development of connectionist or neural network models of psychological phenomena. These models may also comprise a theoretically integrative and methodologically rigorous approach to psychiatric phenomena. In this paper we employ connectionist theory to conceptualize obsessive-compulsive disorder . We discuss salient phenomenological and neurobiological findings of the illness, and then reformulate these using neural network models. Several features and mechanisms of OCD may be explicated in terms of disordered networks. Neural (...) network modeling appears to constitute a novel and potentially fertile approach to psychiatric disorders such as OCD. (shrink)

In this highly original study of the nature of performance, Spencer Golub uses the insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein into the way language works to analyze the relationship between the linguistic and the visual in the work of a broad range of dramatists, novelists, and filmmakers, among them Richard Foreman, Mac Wellman, Peter Handke, David Mamet, and Alfred Hitchcock. Like Wittgenstein, these artists are concerned with the limits of language’s representational capacity. For Golub, it is these limits that give Wittgenstein’s thought (...) a further, very personal significance—its therapeutic quality with respect to the Obsessive Compulsive Disorder from which he suffers. Underlying what Golub calls “performance behavior” is Wittgenstein’s notion of “pain behavior”—that which gives public expression to private experience. Golub charts new directions for exploring the relationship between theater and philosophy, and even for scholarly criticism itself. (shrink)

Harcourt argues that in clinical contexts, children and young people with mental health illness can experience epistemic, specifically testimonial, injustice when their perspectives are unjustifiably discounted by health service providers.1 Our goal in this commentary was to illustrate how caregivers, a critical component of CYP treatment triad, can also engage in testimonial injustice towards CYP patients. Testimonial injustice occurs when one suffers a credibility deficit and that credibility deficit is based on prejudice.2 Harcourt expands Fricker’s account of testimonial injustice by (...) arguing that for CYPs, the credibility deficits attributed to them by clinicians, for example, may result from epistemic arrogance in that CYPs are viewed as having unreliable knowledge about their condition. Harcourt writes: ‘Being a CYP is treated as a heuristic for epistemic unreliability across a wide range of domains’, including clinical settings. Harcourt’s expansion of Fricker’s account thus includes epistemic arrogance as an alternative necessary condition, in addition to prejudice, to apply the concept of testimonial injustice. We think Harcourt’s argument can also be extended to caregivers, who are central to the CYP treatment triad. We illustrate how this may be the case by drawing from research we conducted to understand the perspectives of clinicians and prospective families, both caregivers and paediatric patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder about the possibility of …. (shrink)

ObjectiveIntimate partner violence has been related to emotional dependence and addictive disorders. This study aims to provide a global approach to analyse the relationship between these variables and to determine the factors underlying permanence in violent relationships.MethodsIt is a non-experimental, cross-sectional correlational design study. Participants had to have at least one dating relationship for at least 1 month to complete the questionnaire, which included the following instruments: emotional dependence scale, scale of violence in dating relationships and impulse control disorders scale.ResultsThe (...) sample consisted of 1.533 adolescents, 53.9% were male and 46.1% female, between 14 and 18 years. Emotional dependence correlated significantly with received violence. Compulsive spending is strongly associated with emotional dependence, whereas sex addiction is associated with received violence to a greater extent. Received violence mediates on emotional dependence and addictions.ConclusionIPV is a risk factor for the perpetuation of addictive behaviours. It is advisable to promote affective education for developing resilience and adequate coping. (shrink)

There is a spectrum of child psychiatric and neurological disorders, in all of which a comorbidity with obsessive-compulsive disorder and ritualized behavior is very common. Therefore, they may appear as a basis for the rituals in children that cross into adolescence and adulthood. Resolving the nature of these disorders may help us to better understand “Why ritualized behavior?” (Published Online February 8 2007).

The Diagnostic Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association defines substance dependence, more commonly known as “drug addiction,” as “a cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological symptoms indicating that the individual continues use of the substance despite significant substance-related problems. There is a pattern of repeated self-administration that usually results in tolerance, withdrawal, and compulsive drug-taking behavior.” If drug addiction is a matter of compulsion, as this definition suggests, then is it correct to say that a drug addict (...) chooses to take their drug of choice? Similarly, does it make sense to say that a person in the grip of fear really chooses to flee from what frightens them? In this book, Jon Elster argues that in general drug addicts and people subject to powerful emotions should be interpreted as making choices. Although there is a compulsion to choose, there is choice nonetheless. This is different from cases where there is a compulsion to act but no choice. But what kind of choice is this? And are such choices rational or not? These are among the central questions addressed in this book. (shrink)

We group encephalitic behaviors as shown in Table 1. It is striking that the majority of these behaviors, namely groups 1 and 2, help spread viral and bacterial infections underlying encephalitis, a situation similar to Ophiocordyceps unilateralis .Could some of the behaviors in Table 1 be of utility to the host as well? Note that the behavioral symptoms may not coincide with impaired intellect . Furthermore, these symptoms may be vestigial in the sense of having been of utility to the (...) host species at a time when the latter possessed lower intelligence to begin with. It is also important to note that encephalitis is often triggered by physical and emotional stress, so that utility of behaviors is better assessed for such conditions.Continuous and compulsive exploration of one’s environment is of course a recipe for learning and discovery. Drinking, eating, biting, chewi .. (shrink)

Research findings on addiction are contradictory. According to biographical records and widely used diagnostic manuals, addicts use drugs compulsively, meaning that drug use is out of control and independent of its aversive consequences. This account is supported by studies that show significant heritabilities for alcoholism and other addictions and by laboratory experiments in which repeated administration of addictive drugs caused changes in neural substrates associated with reward. Epidemiological and experimental data, however, show that the consequences of drug consumption can significantly (...) modify drug intake in addicts. The disease model can account for the compulsive features of addiction, but not occasions in which price and punishment reduced drug consumption in addicts. Conversely, learning models of addiction can account for the influence of price and punishment, but not compulsive drug taking. The occasion for this target article is that recent developments in behavioral choice theory resolve the apparent contradictions in the addiction literature. The basic argument includes the following four statements: First, repeated consumption of an addictive drug decreases its future value and the future value of competing activities. Second, the frequency of an activity is a function of its relative (not absolute) value. This implies that an activity that reduces the values of competing behaviors can increase in frequency even if its own value also declines. Third, a recent experiment (Heyman & Tanz 1995) shows that the effective reinforcement contingencies are relative to a frame of reference, and this frame of reference can change so as to favor optimal or suboptimal choice. Fourth, if the frame of reference is local, reinforcement contingencies will favor excessive drug use, but if the frame of reference is global, the reinforcement contingencies will favor controlled drug use. The transition from a global to a local frame of reference explains relapse and other compulsive features of addiction. (shrink)

Interactions between an intelligent software agent and a human user are ubiquitous in everyday situations such as access to information, entertainment, and purchases. In such interactions, the ISA mediates the user’s access to the content, or controls some other aspect of the user experience, and is not designed to be neutral about outcomes of user choices. Like human users, ISAs are driven by goals, make autonomous decisions, and can learn from experience. Using ideas from bounded rationality, we frame these interactions (...) as instances of an ISA whose reward depends on actions performed by the user. Such agents benefit by steering the user’s behaviour towards outcomes that maximise the ISA’s utility, which may or may not be aligned with that of the user. Video games, news recommendation aggregation engines, and fitness trackers can all be instances of this general case. Our analysis facilitates distinguishing various subcases of interaction, as well as second-order effects that might include the possibility for adaptive interfaces to induce behavioural addiction, and/or change in user belief. We present these types of interaction within a conceptual framework, and review current examples of persuasive technologies and the issues that arise from their use. We argue that the nature of the feedback commonly used by learning agents to update their models and subsequent decisions could steer the behaviour of human users away from what benefits them, and in a direction that can undermine autonomy and cause further disparity between actions and goals as exemplified by addictive and compulsive behaviour. We discuss some of the ethical, social and legal implications of this technology and argue that it can sometimes exploit and reinforce weaknesses in human beings. (shrink)

It is often maintained that practical freedom is a capacity to act on our view of what we ought to do and in particular on our view of what it would be best to do. Here, I discuss an important exception to that claim, namely habitual agency. Acting out of habit is widely regarded as a form of reflex or even as compulsive behaviour but much habitual agency is both intentional and free. Still it is true that, in so (...) far as we act out of habit, we have no capacity to determine what we do by making a judgement about whether we ought to be doing it. Habitual agency is nonetheless free because we have the capacity to determine whether we act out of habit by making a judgement about whether or not the habit is a virtue. I develop this view of habit by contrasting habitual agency with action on policy and I argue that much virtuous agency is best understood as a form of habitual agency rather than as a form of action on policy. (shrink)