A consensus exists among contemporary philosophers of biology about the history of their field. According to the received view, mainstream philosophy of science in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s focused on physics and general epistemology, neglecting analyses of the 'special sciences', including biology. The subdiscipline of philosophy of biology emerged (and could only have emerged) after the decline of logical positivism in the 1960s and 70s. In this article, I present bibliometric data from four major philosophy of science journals (Erkenntnis, (...) Philosophy of Science, Synthese, and the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science), covering 1930-59, which challenge this view. (shrink)

How do we think about what we plan to do? One dominant answer is that we select the best possible option available. However, a growing number of philosophers would offer a different answer: since we are not equipped to maximize we often choose the next best alternative, one that is no more than satisfactory. This strategy choice is called satisficing. This collection of essays explores both these accounts of practical reason, examining the consequences for adopting one or the other for (...) moral theory in general and the theory of practical rationality in particular. It aims to address a constituency larger than contemporary moral philosophers and bring these questions to the attention of those interested in the applications of decision theory in economics, psychology and political science. (shrink)

It is common, though perhaps not correct, to think that practical rationality is strictly instrumental.1 The functions of instrumental reason include finding suitable means to our determinate ends, helping to determine our indeterminate ends, and implementing our principles in appropriate actions. One reason that might be given for adopting instrumentalism with respect to rationality might be that our best scientific evidence offers little support for the idea that our brains have powers to detect good and bad as such in persons, (...) actions, or lives. But whatever one’s reasons for taking up instrumentalism, it remains to specify the relationship means are to have with ends. A natural demand is that instrumentally rational actions implement the best means to one’s given ends. Optimizing conceptions of rationality endorse this demand. A competing conception of rationality—the satisficing conception—weakens this requirement and permits some rational actions to implement (merely) satisfactory means to the agent’s given ends. The present article argues that instrumentalist theories of rationality as commonly understood cannot consistently accommodate this satisficing conception of rationality. (shrink)

In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes famously characterizes the state of nature as a predicament in which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” The only means of escape from that dire condition is to found the commonwealth, with its notorious sovereign. Hobbes invests the sovereign with virtually absolute power over the poor subjects of the commonwealth, and that vast and unlimited sovereign has drawn the reader’s eye for 350 years. -/- Yet Hobbes has a great deal to say about subjects (...) in a commonwealth as well, and he articulates a normative conception of a good subject. This book develops a novel interpretation of the role of submission in Leviathan, and it introduces the concept of subjection to explain the expectations Hobbes has for good subjects. (shrink)

The evil God challenge argues that for every theodicy that justifies the existence of an omnibenevolent God in the face of evil, there is a mirror theodicy that can defend the existence of an omnimalevolent God in the face of good. People who invoke the evil God challenge further argue that because we find evil God theodicies to be implausible, we should find good God theodicies to be equally implausible. This article argues that in fact evil God theodicies are more (...) reasonable than good God theodicies by expanding upon arguments offered by David Benatar regarding the nature of existence, and David Hume regarding the asymmetry in our sensations of pain and pleasure.Export citation. (shrink)

Pregnancy-based employment discrimination has long been a topic of interest for gender inequality scholars and civil rights agencies. Prior work suggests that employer stereotypes and financial interests leave pregnant women vulnerable to being fired. We still know little, however, about women’s interpretations of their terminations and how employers justify such decisions in the face of arguably protective laws. This article provides much needed, in-depth analyses of such dynamics and a relational account of pregnancy-based employment discrimination claims. Elaborating on theoretical expositions (...) of power and research surrounding the patriarchal character of organizational life, we draw on unique quantitative and qualitative data from verified cases of pregnancy-based firing discrimination. Our analyses reveal a two-pronged legitimation process where employers symbolically vilified pregnant workers while simultaneously amplifying ostensibly meritocratic organizational procedures and concerns. Pregnancy discrimination plaintiffs attempted to counter employer arguments. Yet, their limited power within the organizational hierarchy along with the culturally resonant nature of employer logics—logics that seem gender-neutral but that reify gendered assumptions and prioritize business profit—place pregnant women at a considerable disadvantage. Without attending to such cultural and structural power imbalances and the relational processes that undergird them, pregnancy discrimination will remain a significant problem. (shrink)

The WHO recently made news by apparently advising couples in Zika affected areas to delay pregnancy. On closer inspection, however, it is not so clear what advice was actually being offered in their interim guidance regarding the prevention of the sexual transmission of Zika. In this paper, we lay out a framework for considering the ethical issues that arise in the context of advising and use it to evaluate the WHO guidance. We argue that advising is not merely an informative (...) act. The choices that agencies make in how and whom they advise are ethical choices with practical implications; these choices change not only how people ought to think about their options but also how they indeed ought to act. While we focus on these interim guidance updates from the WHO, the framework we provide can shed light more generally on the ethical issues surrounding advising in other public health contexts. (shrink)

In current debates concerning atheism, two positions are considered possible: naturalistic atheism or anti-naturalistic theism. Anti-naturalistic theism is motivated by the failure of naturalism to explain the fundamental nature of reality. We, however, endorse anti-naturalistic atheism by reviving the ‘anthropomorphic critique’, arguing that theism misattributes human traits to the deity. Anti-naturalistic atheism is better suited to refute theists, since it undercuts their appeal to science's inadequacies. We trace the anthropomorphic critique from Hume's Dialogues, through Kant's epistemology, and conclude with its (...) reception in Feuerbach. The anthropomorphic critique is an epistemological – not metaphysical – thesis, hence, it is agnostic about the fundamental nature of reality. Yet it convincingly shows that theism is not a tenable position. In essence, we aim to decouple atheism from naturalism, on the basis of a salient critique in the history of modern philosophy, in order to ameliorate current debates between atheists and theists.Export citation. (shrink)

The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and widely-accepted account of the reference relation. On CTR the reference of a term is fixed by whatever property causally regulates the competent use of that term. CTR poses a metaethical challenge to realists by demanding an account of the properties that regulate the competent use of normative predicates. CTR might pose a challenge to ethical theorists as well. Long argues that CTR entails the falsity of any normative ethical theory. First-order (...) theory attempts to specify what purely descriptive property is a fundamental right-making property (FRM). Long contends that the notion that the FRM causally regulates competent use of the predicate ‘right’ leads to a reductio. The failure of this argument is nevertheless instructive concerning a point at which ethics and metaethics overlap. (shrink)

Distributive justice is the paradigmatic philosophical position regarding matters of contemporary justice. Distributive justice often focuses on issues of resource allocation and/or welfare allocation. In this essay I argue that this paradigm has ‘the cart before the horse’ because issues of productive justice—logically and normatively—are of antecedent concern. The way in which people work, and the nature of the productive workplace, conditions the conceptual and concrete possibilities of obtaining distributive justice, thus productive justice is of antecedent concern for realizing justice (...) overall. Contra Rawls, it is productive justice which in the ‘first instance’ ought to provide ‘a conception of social justice’. But even if this claim is hasty, it remains the case that distributive justice theorists have not allowed productive justice into their considered judgments and thus are operating with something short of serious reflective equilibrium. Productive justice therefore deserves unprecedented analysis and philosophical consideration. (shrink)

Heir to Augustine’s and Anselm’s encounters with the Psalmist’s fool, Hobbes s confronts his own foolish interlocutor in Leviathan. This Foole says in his heart: there is no justice. Hobbes rebuts the unjust Foole’s objection by defending the reasonableness of justice. Readers’ ideas about the adequacy of Hobbes’s response to the Foole vary according to their views about what reason, justice, and covenant-keeping require. A confounding and little-remarked feature of this passage in Leviathan is Hobbes’s claim that his unjust Foole (...) is the same with respect to his atheism as the Psalmist’s fool. This identity, far from being accidental or coincidental, is crucial to an adequate understanding of the Foole’s objection and Hobbes’s rebuttal. (shrink)

In Leviathan chapter 31 Hobbes refers to atheists and deists as "God's enemies." The contrast class is God's subjects in what he calls the Kingdom of God by Nature. This chapter offers an account of how one submits to God to become God's natural subject. The explanation reinforces the distinction between a primary and secondary state of nature. Submission to God obligates natural subjects to obey the laws of nature because the precepts of those laws acquire thereby the normative force (...) of law. The view further explains why submission to God differs from submission to a civil sovereign, despite the fact that both are voluntary. (shrink)

Recent discussion of mechanism has suggested new approaches to several issues in the philosophy of science, including theory structure, causal explanation, and reductionism. Here, I apply what I take to be the fruits of the 'new mechanical philosophy' to an analysis of a contemporary debate in evolutionary biology about the role of natural selection in speciation. Traditional accounts of that debate focus on the geographic context of genetic divergence--namely, whether divergence in the absence of geographic isolation is possible (or significant). (...) Those accounts are at best incomplete, I argue, because they ignore the mechanisms producing divergence and miss what is at stake in the biological debate. I argue that the biological debate instead concerns the scope of particular speciation mechanisms which assign different roles to natural selection at various stages of divergence. The upshot is a new interpretation of the crux of that debate--namely, whether divergence with gene flow is possible (or significant) and whether the isolating mechanisms producing it are adaptive. (shrink)

Original chapters complement anthologized readings on topics in research ethics such as informed consent, the use of humans and animals in research, research misconduct, and conflicts of interest.

Fifteen Million Merits depicts a reality remarkably similar to our own, in which technology has developed to the point where we could, in principle, work less, and reproduce the basic goods and services needed to survive into the future without arduous effort. Nevertheless, we cycle endlessly, towards nothing, and the only motivation keeping our feet rigidly attached to our peddles is vacuous entertainment in the form of pornography, video games, cruel comedy, and the improbable prospect of becoming a celebrity. Each (...) of these lurid topics is explored in this chapter, with a special focus on the philosophers Marx, Marcuse, Adorno, and Lukacs. Finally, the issue as to whether or not resisting entertainment‐capitalist is possible is raised and addressed, albeit with pessimism. (shrink)

Recent literature defends consequentialism against the charge that consequentialists cannot be friends. This paper argues in rebuttal that consequentialists value friends for the wrong reasons. Even if they are motivated by love and affection, consequentialists must act as if they valued their friends as merely instrumental goods, a mode of valuing I call. I conclude by suggesting the root cause of the problem of intrinsic value for consequentialism.

We argue in this article that Marx’s scientific method coupled with his analysis of the phenomenological consciousness of agents trapped within the capitalist mode of production provides a sufficient solution to the transformation problem. That is, Marx needs no amending – mathematical, philosophical, or otherwise – and the tools he uses to demonstrate and resolve the problem – science and phenomenology – were already clearly spelled out in his texts. Critics of Marx either fail to understand his scientific method, or (...) are themselves trapped within a non-scientific capitalist phenomenology. Similarly, Marxists that mathematically resolve the transformation problem fail to realise that Marx’s scientific analysis alone demonstrates that a mathematical solution to the transformation problem is a misapprehension of the relation between Marx’s abstract theory and concrete phenomena. Consequently, we also criticise the monetary theorists who try to dismiss the problem as pointless by claiming that Marx was not a pre-monetary theorist. (shrink)

Gauthier argues in Morals by Agreement that morality is derivable from rationality. A crucial premise is that rational bargaining is procedurally fair. Gauthier defends this claim by trying to show that his principle of rational bargaining determines a fair distribution of the overall return from cooperation, including the cooperative surplus. He supports this point in part by the argument from agreement: since (1) procedurally fair principles proportion return to contribution, and since (2) every bargainer has the power to agree in (...) equal measure, and since (3) the agreement component of the bargainer’s contribution is what makes the cooperative surplus available, it follows (4) that fairness requires a distributive principle that divides the cooperative surplus equally among the bargainers. I argue that the falsity of (3) not only renders the argument unsound, it refutes the conclusion. Hence Gauthier should think that rational bargaining is not procedurally fair and that his own derivation of morality from rationality is unsound. (shrink)

The philosophical position against procreation is known as anti‐natalism, and Rust is an anti‐natalist. Rust's insights, coupled with the philosophy of David Benatar, not only require the characters of True Detective to cease procreation but also morally compel all people to stop procreating. This chapter explores whether or not anti‐natalism is a philosophically cogent position by presenting Rust's perspective on human existence and connecting it with Benatar's argument that coming into existence is necessarily harmful. According to Benatar's philosophy, one can (...) see that Rust's anti‐natalism is actually quite reasonable. Benatar's points are that pleasure is good and pain is bad. However, it also is true that "the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone", whereas "the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation". (shrink)

Consider the paradox of altruism: the existence of truly altruistic behaviors is difficult to reconcile with evolutionary theory if natural selection operates only on individuals, since in that case individuals should be unwilling to sacrifice their own fitness for the sake of others. Evolutionists have frequently turned to the hypothesis of group selection to explain the existence of altruism; but group selection cannot explain the evolution of morality, since morality is a one-group phenomenon and group selection is a many-group phenomenon. (...) After spelling out just what the problem is, this paper discusses several ways of solving it. (shrink)

Consider the paradox of altruism: the existence of truly altruistic behaviors is difficult to reconcile with evolutionary theory if natural selection operates only on individuals, since in that case individuals should be unwilling to sacrifice their own fitness for the sake of others. Evolutionists have frequently turned to the hypothesis of group selection to explain the existence of altruism; but group selection cannot explain the evolution of morality, since morality is a one-group phenomenon and group selection is a many-group phenomenon. (...) After spelling out just what the problem is, this paper discusses several ways of solving it. (shrink)

The Prosecutor's Fallacy is a well-known hazard in the assessment of probabilistic evidence that can lead to faulty inferences. It is perhaps best known via its role in the assessment of DNA match evidence in courts of law. A prosecutor, call him Burger, presents DNA evidence in court that links a defendant, Crumb, to a crime. The conditional probability of a DNA match given that Crumb is not guilty, or p(M | ~G), is very low: according to Burger, one chance (...) in tens of millions. Burger goes on to argue that this very low probability entails another low probability. He asserts that it is very improbable that Crumb is not guilty given the match, and so p(~G | M) is also very low. As this latter probability is precisely what the jury is called upon to assess, Burger's assertion is likely to lead the jury into convicting Crumb. (shrink)

Luciano Floridi has proposed that we are on the cusp of a fourth revolution in human self-understanding. The information revolution with its prospect of digitally enhancing human beings opens the door to engineering human nature. Floridi has emphasized the importance of making this transition as ethically smooth as possible. He is quite right to worry about ethics after the fourth revolution. The coming revolution, if it unfolds as he envisions, spells the demise of traditional ethical theorizing.

In current debates concerning atheism, two positions are considered possible: naturalistic atheism or anti-naturalistic theism. Anti-naturalistic theism is motivated by the failure of naturalism to explain the fundamental nature of reality. We, however, endorse anti-naturalistic atheism by reviving the ‘anthropomorphic critique’, arguing that theism misattributes human traits to the deity. Anti-naturalistic atheism is better suited to refute theists, since it undercuts their appeal to science's inadequacies. We trace the anthropomorphic critique from Hume's Dialogues, through Kant's epistemology, and conclude with its (...) reception in Feuerbach. The anthropomorphic critique is an epistemological – not metaphysical – thesis, hence, it is agnostic about the fundamental nature of reality. Yet it convincingly shows that theism is not a tenable position. In essence, we aim to decouple atheism from naturalism, on the basis of a salient critique in the history of modern philosophy, in order to ameliorate current debates between atheists and theists. (shrink)

Human rights have become an enormously useful tool in our time, and this for a variety of reasons. Useful, yes: but are rights real? I propose first to examine the most significant philosophical attempts to justify human rights. A universally justified conception of rights I call ‘robust,’ since a successful rational justification would fully underwrite the real existence of rights. Alas, we have no such justification; the second part of my remarks sketches devastating objections to each proposed justification. But all (...) is not lost for rights: a new pragmatic justification for rights talk is available, one that is modest. On the modest view rights are real; but then we should like to know whether rights are as useful as they are on the robust view. Not as useful, no; but a. (shrink)

The term “individuarian” describes a person who seeks leadership in service of his community—he is neither blatantly self-interested nor blindly communistic, but seeks to contribute positively to society. In _Individuarian Observations, _William J. Byron reflects on this concept and the place of individuarians in both the Catholic Church and an American society in the midst of crises and transitions. Byron’s sharp insights propose an alternative ethical model based on engaged social participants who are committed to advancing the common good in (...) these difficult times. (shrink)

Consider the paradox of altruism: the existence of truly altruistic behaviors is difficult to reconcile with an evolutionary theory which holds that natural selection operates only on individuals, since in that case individuals should be unwilling to sacrifice their own fitness for the sake of others. Evolutionists have frequently turned to the hypothesis of group selection to explain the existence of altruism; but, even setting aside difficulties about understanding the relationship between altruistic behaviors and morality, group selection cannot explain the (...) evolution of morality, since morality is a one-group phenomenon and group selection is a many-group phenomenon. After spelling out just what the problem is, this paper discusses several ways out and concludes by offering suggestions why one seems best. (shrink)

At dusk on a summer evening in Bloomington, as mosquitoes and fireflies hovered amidst a congregation of academics, the conversational volume went up as the sun (and drinks) went down. Yet nowhere among the din of voices could one hear the accusatorial phrases, ‘‘that’s not history,’’ or ‘‘is that really philosophy?’’.

I develop a technique for specifying truth-conditions.

The term 'sociobiology' was introduced in E. O. Wilson's Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975) as the application of evolutionary theory to social behavior. Sociobiologists claim that many social behaviors have been shaped by natural selection for reproductive success, and they attempt to reconstruct the evolutionary histories of particular behaviors or behavioral strategies. This survey attempts to clarify and evaluate the aim of sociobiology. Given that a neutral account is impossible, this entry does the next best thing. It takes sociobiology as (...) well as its critics seriously. On the one hand, by demonstrating that current studies of evolution and human behavior are based on Darwin's arguments for evolution (properly updated), we gain a strong rationale for thinking that something closer to sociobiology than to disconnectionism is needed to properly understand human sociality. Nevertheless, this survey reconstructs sociobiology in its best light, according to its aims. Consequently, criticism of sociobiology as it is actually practiced is not ignored or dismissed. This approach reveals what is best about sociobiology, while remaining sensitive to many of the problems it has generated. (shrink)

Fifty years ago, Herbert Simon complained that the available models of rational choice were not feasible decision procedures for agents like us. These models involved variants on the theme of maximizing expected utility: the rational action for an agent is the one that is most likely to bring about outcomes that the agent prefers. Simon ’s complaints about these models included the now-familiar notions that human beings do not manage probabilities well, that we have at best radically incomplete utility functions, (...) and that we lack the cognitive resources to calculate the expected utilities of even a few alternatives. (shrink)

For the first time all Byron's miscellaneous prose writings are collected together, including his speeches in the House of Lords, short stories, reviews, critical articles, and Armenian translations, as well as such shorter pieces as memoranda, notes, reminiscences, and marginalia. Although some of this material has been published before - most notably in the appendices to Prothero's edition of the Letters and Journals - a considerable proportion is here published for the first time. For the first time too, the prose (...) works are presented with full scholarly apparatus. The texts are reproduced from their original manuscripts wherever these are still extant; and the notes provide an introduction to each item, detailing the circumstances of its composition, its publication history, and its historical and literary background, as well as providing comprehensive annotation of individual points of obscurity, allusions, and other matters of content. (shrink)

Many philosophy instructors came up in departments that taught in a traditional style. Our professors lectured to us while we took notes, they encouraged us to ask questions when we sought clarity on a particular point or passage, and required us to write a term paper. The model worked for graduate school, too. Some instructors encouraged more discussion in class than others. Work outside class meant reading the assigned text, talking about it with a friend, and writing the term paper (...) on your own in the library. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Philip Kitcher boldly challenges the very idea of objectivism in ethics.1 The structure of his argument is disarmingly simple: objectivist moral theories must take a certain explanatory form. If they take that form, then they fail on their own terms. Hence objectivism cannot be a satisfactory theory. Proving impossibility is a dicey matter, and Kitcher qualifies his premises and conclusions in ways that my summary misses. His arguments are nuanced, and he never states his conclusion as (...) baldly as I have. Moreover, he focuses on one particular form of objectivism—Thomas Hurka’s perfectionism2—and an uncharitable reading of Kitcher would accuse him of hasty generalization: the demise of objectivism surely does not follow from Hurka’s purported shortcomings. Nevertheless, the thrust of the argument is as I have said: objectivism has no future. (shrink)