This paper develops an interpretation and analysis of the arguments for public education which open Book VIII of Aristotle's Politics, drawing on both the wider Aristotelian corpus and on examination of continuities with Plato's Laws. Part I: The paper opens with the question of why Aristotle would say that no one will doubt that education should be the concern of the legislator, and Sections I–III identify the nature of his enterprise in the Politics, the audience he wishes to address, the (...) conclusions he seeks to establish in VIII. 1, and what public education would amount to for him. An important conclusion reached is that the first of Aristotle's two conclusions in VIII.1 has been routinely misidentified. (shrink)

This paper develops an interpretation and analysis of the arguments for public education which open Book VIII of Aristotle's Politics, drawing on both the wider Aristotelian corpus and on examination of continuities with Plato's Laws.Part II: Sections IV–VII examine the arguments for the first of the two conclusions which Aristotle advances in VIII. 1, namely that education is important enough to merit the legislator's attention. It is shown, through a development of links between Politics V and the arguments of VIII. (...) 1, that Aristotle's two arguments for this conclusion are calculated to appeal to two distinct subgroups within his intended audience, those who would be moved by a desire to promote the common good, and those who could only be counted on to desire the preservation of their own rule. (shrink)

A renewed concern with Aristotle’s thought about the economic aspects of human life and society can be observed. Aristotle dealt with the economic issues in his practical philosophy. He thus considered ‘the economic’ within an ethical and political frame. This vision is coherent with a specific ontology of ‘the economic’ according to Aristotle. In a recent paper, I analysed this ontology and left its consequences, especially for Ethics and Politics, for another paper. In this article, I firstly summarise the reasoning (...) and conclusions of the aforementioned paper. Then, I extract the ethical and political “lessons” of the Aristotelian conception. I finally add a section with epistemological “lessons”, and consequences for the teaching of Economics. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The polis Nature Distributive Justice “The polis of our prayers” Slavery Constitutions The Good Man and the Good Citizen Bibliography.

Is the virtue of the good citizen the same as the virtue of the good man? Aristotle addresses this in Politics 3.4. His answer is twofold. On the one hand, (the account for Difference) they are not the same both because what the citizen’s virtue is depends on the constitution, on what preserves it, and on the role the citizen plays in it, and because the good citizens in the best constitution cannot all be good men, whereas the good man’s (...) virtue is uniform. On the other hand, (the account for Identity) the two virtues are identical in the good men in the best constitution, in which all are good citizens, each possessing the ability for ruling and for being ruled. This nuanced answer can be seen as Aristotle’s synthesis of a Periclean view (contribution to state blots out personal wrongs) and a Socratic view (no good citizen is without justice). Its nuances reflect the extent to which Aristotle’s conceptions of good citizenship and the best constitution accommodate deviations of what is probable from the human ideal set out in his ethical writings. In the present chapter, I will first address three puzzles regarding the nuances of Aristotle’s answer. Second, I will consider one question about its implication: Does Aristotle’s account for Difference turn out to entail something ultra-Periclean: that no one can simultaneously be a good man and a good citizen in any constitution other than the best? I shall argue the negative. (shrink)

English translation, with Chinese source text, of a seminal Chinese classic.

This is a review of Kazutaka Inamura's book "Justice and Reciprocity in Aristotle's Political Philosophy" (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

AtPol.7.12, 1331a19–20, Aristotle states it as a matter of fact that the citizenry of the best city should be divided into ‘public messes’ (syssitia). His primary concern in the rest of the chapter is to uncover the optimal way in whichsyssitiashould be organized, and the way in which they should be situated in relation to other facilities, public buildings,agoraiand temples in the city. The proposed plan is roughly as follows.Syssitiawould be divided into three main sections. First, thesyssitiaof soldiers would be (...) held at the guardhouses located at strategic points along the walls surrounding the city (1331a20–3). Next come ‘the most supremesyssitiaof the magistrates’ (τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσσίτια: 1331a24–5) and thesyssitia‘of the priests’ (τῶν ἱερέων: 1331b5). These would be held at a place appropriately having ‘an appearance directed at establishing virtue and [being] more strongly positioned than the neighbouring parts of the city’ (1331a28–30), that is, the highest place in the city. This envisioned acropolis would also house temples (1331a24–5). Situated below it would be the ‘freeagora’, which would include gymnasia (1331a35–7) and would be generally directed at leisurely activity (1331b12). Finally, below the freeagora, a ‘necessaryagora’ and buildings of officials entrusted with legal, commercial and municipal duties would be established, at a location conducive to importing and exporting goods (1331b6–12). (shrink)

In thePolitics, Aristotle maintains, contrary to his predecessors, that there is a distinctive mode of authority that husbands should exercise over their wives. He even coins a word for it: γαμιϰή, ‘the marital art’ or ‘marital rule’ (Pol. 1.3, 1253b8–10; 1.12, 1259a37–9). Marital rule is supposed to differ from the authority that fathers have over their children and from the kind of rule that citizens exercise over one another. Yet it is not clear whether there is any conceptual space between (...) political and paternal rule for marital rule to occupy. Where fathers rule and children are ruled, citizens take turns ruling and being ruled. Husbands, however, either share their rule with their wives, or they do not. If they do not, then marital rule seems indistinct from paternal rule; if they do, then it seems indistinct from political rule. To add to the confusion, Aristotle says that husbands properly rule their wives politically, but without alternating in positions of ruling and being ruled. On its face, this idea seems flatly contradictory. Political rule just is shared, reciprocal rule, and so if the husband rules permanently and his wife is merely ruled, then his rule cannot be political. So Aristotle's own description of marital rule appears inconsistent, and in any case it is difficult to see how marital rule could have the distinctive character that he insists it does. (shrink)

We are told that when news of Caracalla's death reached Rome a group of senators denounced their former emperor, likening him to all the tyrants of the past who had ruled over them. The senator who recorded these actions, the historian Cassius Dio, does not say which tyrants were listed, but it is likely that such a comprehensive list included the last king of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus, and his son Sextus. The senators' actions were doubtless more an act of group (...) catharsis than a private show of loyalty to their new emperor, Marcus Opellius Macrinus. Yet what the scene reveals perhaps most clearly is the Romanexemplatradition in practice. (shrink)

In Aristotle’s world there is no God to answer our prayers (euchê) and yet prayers follow the excellent city of the Politics like a shadow. Nonetheless, as far as I know, people have been content to narrow the focus of investigation to Aristotle’s utopia, its plausibility, structure and infrastructure, leaving prayers out of the picture. The most prayers themselves seem to deserve is a footnote or so. The result is that attention is switched away from the most basic questions: What (...) is the function of practical reason that prayers are meant to perform and why could not, or should not, that function be carried out by deliberate choices, wishes, and action plans? Prayers matter, and matter a lot, so I will argue, for they mirror our understanding of constitutive moral luck. The legislators and the rulers who ignore or overlook this truth are theoretically incompetent and politically perilous. (shrink)

Según una influyente línea interpretativa, la mejor polis de Aristóteles debe ser considerada una politeia. Esta corriente predomina aún hoy entre los eruditos alemanes. En tanto paladina de la “social democracia aristotélica”, Martha Nussbaum pertenece también a esta línea exegética. En oposición a tales interpretaciones, este ensayo defiende la tesis de que Aristóteles pertenece a la tradición de pensamiento político aristocrático. Esta tradición se remonta a Teognis, Heráclito y Platón y se inicia como una crítica dirigida tanto a la decadencia (...) de la virtud aristocrática cuanto al ascenso de valores democráticos e igualitarios. Este trabajo demuestra que Aristóteles concibe las diferentes formas de constitución como manifestaciones de distintas concepciones de la justicia distributiva. Aristóteles mantiene una clara preferencia por una concepción aristocrática de la justicia, y, por tanto, por la aristocracia. La constitución de la mejor polis que detalla en los libros VII y VIII de la Política debe entenderse como una “verdadera aristocracia” en la que los cargos políticos son distribuidos según el mérito entre los ciudadanos que sean los mejores desde el punto de vista moral e intelectual. Palabras clave: Aristóteles, pensamiento político aristocrático, justicia distributiva, aristocracia, mejor polis. (shrink)

In this paper, I perform an analysis of Aristotle’s organic analogy when discussing the different “organs” of the Greek polis. I argue that this analysis demonstrates that the proper functioning of the polis depends upon the generation of different forms of life that will incline towards tension with one another, due to the fact that some members will be prevented by their form of life from enjoying the chief virtue of political life, namely, the accomplishment of human virtue and the (...) good life. I argue that, at least within the context of the polis, there remains the possibility that those disenfranchised people experience sensuous recognition that they are contributing to human thriving. I contrast this with the modern city, in which what existed as a natural and visible tension in the polis becomes a concealed tension, with the result that no such recognition is possible, leaving modern city-dwellers alienated from the conditions that generate their forms of life. (shrink)

How are we to understand Solon's departure from Athens "for the sake of theôria" immediately after the introduction of his laws ? Previous accounts have taken theôria to mean "sightseeing," but the goal of Solon's departure-to avoid explaining or changing the laws-is guaranteed by certain religious features of theôria: the theôros plays the role of civic guardian and must not add to or subtract from an oracle he conveys to the city, and during the theôria the city itself must remain (...) pure and avoid disturbances. Solon adapts these features of theôria to establish his laws as a pseudo-oracular discourse, as a purification of the city, and as a permanent civic medium. The beginning of Solon's open-ended journey thus gives ideological finality to the laws at the middle of the city. This reading of Solon's theôria coheres with other instances of the creative adaptation of ritual in archaic Greek politics. It also develops our understanding of the discourse on theôria as regulating the laws that constitute the political sphere. (shrink)

In this article I propose a new interpretation of Aristotle’s arguments about the authority of the many at Politics III 11, 1281a40–b21. It consists of the following main tenets. First, the multitude that Aristotle refers to in his arguments should be understood on the model of the multitude which rules in polities and the members of which are accomplished in only a part of political excellence, namely, military excellence. Second, the best citizens with whom he compares that multitude in his (...) arguments do not possess complete political excellence but rather the highest degree of military excellence among their fellow citizens in a polity. Third, the members of that multitude are collectively superior to the best citizens in making decisions about political particulars, for example, decisions about specific policies. Fourth, their superiority can be explained by reference to the fact that they collectively possess superior experience than the best citizens, though they have individually and collectively inferior political understanding. Finally, their collective superiority in making political decisions is the outcome of the aggregation of their individual political judgements that are based on experience rather than the outcome of some form of public deliberation that enables them to grasp the political reasons which support their decisions. (shrink)

El artículo muestra la importancia de la amistad en el contexto de la filosofía política aristotélica. Esta importancia se verifica en su peso específico en comparación con la justicia, puesto que Aristóteles mismo sostiene que la amistad cívica es incluso un objetivo superior al de la búsqueda de la justicia. En concreto, el artículo se centra en la función de la concordia, como tipo especial de amistad cívica, en términos de conservación de la unidad y estabilidad de la polis. Para (...) captar su significación, se plantea el papel de la concordia como complemento a la condición política del ser humano. La concordia es necesaria a la luz de la tendencia a la lucha entre las partes de la ciudad, entre el demos y los oligarcas. Puesto que esta lucha pone en peligro la continuidad de la polis, la concordia entre ciudadanos se convierte en un antecedente privilegiado del principio de fraternidad republicana, el cual todavía no ha gozado de una atención suficiente en el campo de la historia de la filosofía política. (shrink)

Any attempt to apply Aristotelian political categories to the principles of modern constitutionalism is undoubtedly at risk of anachronism. This paper acknowledges non-trivial differences between the Ancient Greek politeia, as theorised by Aristotle, and the modern constitution. It nonetheless argues that the central principles of the modern liberal constitution can be elucidated within the explanatory frame of the Aristotelian concept of the politeia as a political determination of institutional structures and competences oriented by an interpretation of the public good. The (...) paper is divided in three sections. Section 1 outlines Aristotle’s account of the politeia. Section 2 considers some central principles of modern constitutionalism. Section 3 then examines these principles under an Aristotelian lens. The conclusion sketches a potential objection, implicit in the paper’s arguments, to a recent proposal for a ‘neo-Aristotelian’ normative constitutional theory. (shrink)

The paper disproves the widely held interpretation of Aristotle’s statement that the concept of the citizen varies with the constitution. I claim that it gives no evidence for any positivism or constitutional relativism. What Aristotle truly intends here is to put emphasis on his idea of the good life in a city that consists of a variety of forms and ways. This variety is generally desirable and thus prescriptive. It is only under these conditions that the constitution is „the Form (...) of the city“ which determines the citizenship. The concept of the citizen is thus conceived as rather broad and the argument reveals to be a plea for the rule of majority (polity). But on the other hand, the definition of citizen enables to distinguish the virtue of the good man from that of the good citizen und thus to differentiate among the good constitutions. (shrink)

La relación entre el arte y la naturaleza fue concebida a lo largo de más de veinte siglos en los términos que Aristóteles estableció mediante el principio téchne mimeîtai phúsin, el cual tradicionalmente se tradujo como “el arte imita a la naturaleza”. Mediante el presente artículo propongo reevaluar la formulación completa del principio aristotélico con el propósito de entender que éste no solo refiere a la similitud y/o analogía entre las habilidades humanas y la naturaleza, sino también al papel complementario (...) que estas desempeñan respecto de la naturaleza. En la primera parte del trabajo, examino las distintas enunciaciones del principio atestiguadas en el corpus. En la segunda, analizo la función que la política y su principal herramienta, la educación, cumplen respecto de la naturaleza. (shrink)

Una Según una influyente línea interpretativa sostiene que la mejor ciudad polis ideal de Aristóteles debe ser considerada como un gobierno constitucionaluna politeia (πολιτεία). Son eruditos alemanes quienes adoptan esta lecturaEsta corriente predomina aún hoy entre los eruditos alemanes.. En este grupo hay que incluir a Martha Nussbaum en tanto que aboga por una “socialdemocracia aristotélicaEn tanto paladina de la “social democracia aristotélica”, Martha Nussbaum pertenece también a esta línea exegética ”. En oposición a tales interpretaciones, este ensayo defiende la (...) tesis que Aristóteles pertenece a la tradición de pensamiento político aristocrático. Esta tradición se remonta a Teognis, Heráclito y Platón y se inicia como una crítica dirigida tanto a la decadencia de la virtud aristocrática como cuanto al ascenso de valores democráticos ey egalitariosigualitarios. Este ensayo trabajo demuestra que Aristóteles concibe las diferentes formas de constitución como manifestaciones de distintas concepciones de la justicia distributiva. Aristóteles mantiene una clara preferencia por una concepción aristocrática de la justicia, y , por tantocomo consecuencia, por la aristocracia. La constitución de la mejor polis ideal que detalla en los libros VII y VIII de la Política debe entenderse como una “verdadera aristocracia” en la que los cargos políticos son distribuidos, según el mérito (κατ᾽ ἀξίαν), a los mejores ciudadanos entre los ciudadanos que sean los mejores desde el punto de vista moral e intelectualtanto moral como intelectualmente hablando. Aristóteles, pensamiento político aristocrático, justicia distributiva, aristocracia, mejor poli, sEstado ideal . (shrink)