This article gives an overview of 4 important lacunae in political liberalism and identifies, in a preliminary fashion, some trends in the literature that can come in for support in filling these blind spots, which prevent political liberalism from a correct assessment of the diverse nature of religious claims. Political liberalism operates with implicit assumptions about religious actors being either ‘liberal’ or ‘fundamentalist’ and ignores a third, in-between group, namely traditionalist religious actors and their claims. After having explained what makes (...) traditionalist religious actors different from liberal and fundamentalist religious actors, the author develops 4 areas in which political liberalism should be pushed further theoretically in order to correctly theorize the challenge which traditional religious actors pose to liberal democracy. These 4 areas are: the context of translation; the politics of exemptions; the multivocality of theology; and the transnational nature of norm-contestation. (shrink)

This article introduces a distinction in the paradigm of multiple modernities between a comparative-civilizational and a post-secular perspective. It argues that the former perspective helps us to understand modernization processes in large cultural-civilizational units, whereas the latter viewpoint focuses on actors and cultural domains within civilizational units and on inter-civilizational crossovers. The two perspectives are complementary. What we gain from this distinction is greater precision in the use of multiple modernities to explain the place of religion in modern societies. The (...) example of Russian Orthodoxy is used to clarify the difference between these two perspectives: whereas from a comparative-civilizational viewpoint, Russian Orthodoxy may appear as Europe’s ‘other’; from a post-secular viewpoint, Orthodox religion is part of Europe’s religious pluralist landscape and partakes in an ongoing process of defining the meaning of European political and cultural integration. (shrink)

This article focuses on a religious structure that is intrinsic to the contemporary mechanisms that have enabled the global domination of economic power: faith in the market. Following Foucault’s transition from biopolitics to governmentality, this article articulates the mechanism that generates the ability for human beings to give shape and value to their lives. Through a reading of Schmitt and Hayek, as well as an updated reading of Weber’s thesis on the origin of capitalism, this article argues that we must (...) turn our attention to the Christian motifs that shape our contemporary understanding of the ‘economy’. (shrink)

Commonplace among deliberative theorists is the view that, when defending preferred laws and policies, citizens should appeal only to reasons they expect others reasonably to accept. This view has been challenged on the grounds that it places an undue burden on religious citizens who feel duty-bound to appeal to religious reasons to justify preferred positions. In response, I develop a conception of democratic deliberation that provides unlimited latitude regarding the sorts of reasons that can be introduced, so long as one (...) is prepared to defend them against criticism. Moreover, I contend that religious citizens have a powerful incentive, based on their religious convictions, to be fully responsive to criticism. I defend this proposition by drawing on Robert Erlewine’s account of Hermann Cohen’s ‘religion of reason’. (shrink)

This article offers a critique of John Rawls’s great work, Political Liberalism, from a non-Rawlsian liberal standpoint. It argues that Rawlsian political liberalism is influenced as much by a comprehensive view I call “radical-democracy” as by comprehensive liberal views. This can be seen in Rawls’s account of some of political liberalism’s fundamental ideas—notably the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation, the “liberal” principle of legitimacy, and the idea of public reason. I further argue that Rawls’s impressive attempt (...) to unify liberal and democratic traditions philosophically obscures the prudent liberal attitude to democracy, which remains sound. (shrink)

What is referred to as the “postsecular” situation is most properly conceived as an arc of trans-Atlantic self-understanding unfolding dialectically in the face of and in response to traumatically rapid, unprecedented patterns of globalization. I am myself so deeply immersed in the postsecular debates1 that I do not know whether this—what is meant to be—straightforward thesis strikes the reader as simple and self-evident, or rather as profoundly confused and jargon-riddled. Either way, my intention in this paper is to unpack the (...) terms used in my claim, flesh out their content and contexts, and attempt thereby to make the proposition as…. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to appropriate the explanatory power of some of Habermas' recent ideas (such as complementary learning processes, modernization of faith, tolerance, and non-violence) for the purpose of examining the current political situation in Iran. I would like to argue that the recent history of Iran has offered an occasion for a development away from a dogmatic religious consciousness and toward a more tolerant one. I submit that these opposing modes of thought are, respectively, represented by the (...) hardliners in power and the reformists in opposition. The current impasse, I argue, is the result of an asymmetrical learning process, where the conservative camp has not evolved along with the reformers. I submit that the way out of the impasse is a fully fledged non-violent movement of civil disobedience by the opposition. The politics of non-violence engagement can be realized by fostering a culture of tolerance as the acceptance of reasonable disagreements and the rejection of violent means in politics. I argue that such a movement has begun to emerge after the June 12 2009 presidential election in the form of the Green Hope Movement. (shrink)

Addressing the debate inspired by John Rawls's restrictive idea of the political role of religion, Jürgen Habermas proposes the institutional translation proviso as an alternative that corrects an overly secularist notion of the state. Maeve Cooke has suggested that religious arguments can be allowed without translation in the institutional level as long as they are non-authoritarian. However, her definition of non-authoritarianism requires an acceptance of the fallibility of the truths acquired by faith, which I argue is unnecessary. Instead, I propose (...) that non-authoritarianism is realized in the recognition of the reconcilability of religious and secular reasons. I demonstrate the viability of this form of non-authoritarianism using particular examples from the Philippine context. I conclude that these attempts constitute an alternative form of epistemic openness to the more stringent forms that Habermas and Cooke have proposed. (shrink)

This qualitative study explores the perceptions of democracy and citizenship among 14 teachers of Islamic religious education in the Israeli Arab and secondary schools in Israel. It expands the knowledge on how religious (Muslim) teachers conceptualize the meaning of democracy and citizenship education. The first theme addresses three critiques of democracy: the ethnopolitical (the failure of democratic regimes, including Israel, to protect the rights of religious minorities); epistemological (the shortcoming of the rule of majority in ensuring a decent and just (...) life for all citizens); and theological (moral). The second theme highlights the cultural obstacles for achieving democracy in Arab society in Israel and the possible contribution of Islamic education to detribalizing and depersonalizing the meaning and practice of democracy in this society. (shrink)

Jeffrey Stout claims that John Rawls's idea of public reason (IPR) has contributed to a Christian backlash against liberalism. This essay argues that those whom Stout calls “antiliberal traditionalists” have misunderstood Rawls in important ways, and goes on to consider Stout's own critiques of the IPR. While Rawls's idea is often interpreted as a blanket prohibition on religious reasoning outside church and home, the essay will show that the very viability of the IPR depends upon a rich culture of deliberation (...) in which all forms of reasoning can be put forth for consideration. This clarification addresses the perception that the IPR imposes an “asymmetrical burden” upon believers. In fact, the essay suggests that there are good reasons why believers, qua believers, might endorse the IPR. (shrink)

This paper approaches the issue of cosmopolitanism from the vantage point of hospitality. The notion of hospitality throws into relief some issues that are at the heart of political cosmopolitanism, but cannot be addressed by it. This is because these issues do not necessarily revolve around the category of the citizen, but around the categories of stranger and outsider. The paper critiques the tendency to conflate the categories of the stranger and the outsider and goes on to argue that the (...) standard cosmopolitan extension of democracy to international contexts risks reproducing the exclusion of “outsiders” by nation-states, even democratic ones. (shrink)

RESUMEN De acuerdo con la postura dominante sobre la laicidad, ésta debe ser concebida en relación con el reconocimiento del pluralismo y prestando atención a no reprodu cir sesgos antirreligiosos. El artículo defiende una propuesta alternativa: la laicidad como anticlericalismo, cuyo elemento distintivo consiste en instaurar un arreglo institucional de separación estricta y de exclusión de los contenidos religiosos de las instituciones del Estado. Se argumenta que esta forma de concebir la laicidad res ponde adecuadamente a la pregunta por el (...) lugar de la religión en la esfera pública en el contexto de los Estados liberales y democráticos latinoamericanos. ABSTRACT According to the dominant position regarding laicity, the later must be conceived in relation to the recognition ofpluralism and taking care not to reproduce anti-religious biases. The article defends an alternative proposal: laicity as anticlericalism, charac terized by the establishment of an institutional arrangement that strictly separates and excludes religious contents from State institutions. It argues that this concep tion of laicity responds adequately to the question regarding the place of religion in the public sphere, in the context of Latin American liberal and democratic States. (shrink)

In this essay both the facts/values and facticity/normativity divides are considered from the perspective of global semiotics and with specific regard to the relationships between legal meaning and spatial scope of law’s experience. Through an examination of the inner and genetic projective significance of categorization, I will analyze the semantic dynamics of the descriptive parts comprising legal sentences in order to show the intermingling of factual and axiological/teleological categorizations in the unfolding of legal experience. Subsequently, I will emphasize the translational (...) and enactive cognitive disposition underlying the construction of the second premise of the so-called judiciary syllogism and thereby the untenability of the idea that ‘law makes its facts.’ Hence, I will try to bring to the fore the cultural pre-assumptions encapsulated in the positivistic and therefore also formalistic or analytical approaches to legal experience and the loss of their inner consistency when legal experience confronts the phases and major changes of global semiotics. Finally, I will strive to relativize the opposition between the positivist and non-positivistic theories of law in view of an understanding of legal experience focused not only, or at least not primarily, on what ‘law is’ but also on ‘how’ it unwinds through, and _in spite of_, environmental and semantic transformations. (shrink)

This article considers Critchley's Infinitely Demanding and his essay "The Catechism of the Citizen" in relation to the theory-practice debate and the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It considers what these texts say about the relation between politics and religion on one hand and reason and sensuousness on the other. The focus is the way the latter text takes up a quasi-religious response to the motivational deficit in secular liberal democratic life thematized in Infinitely Demanding.

This paper critically evaluates what it identifies as ‘the institutional theory of freedom’ developed within recent neo-Hegelian philosophy. While acknowledging the gains made against the Kantian theory of autonomy as detachment it is argued that the institutional theory ultimately undermines the very meaning of practical agency. By tying agency to institutionally sustained recognition it effectively excludes the exercise of practical reason geared toward emancipation from a settled normative order. Adorno's notion of autonomy as resistance is enlisted to develop an account (...) of practical reason that is neither institutionally constrained nor without appropriate consideration of the historical location of the practical agent. (shrink)

Neo-Kantian philosophers see accountability as a key property of autonomy, or of social freedom more broadly. Autonomy, among those theorists, is, I contend, implicitly co-conceived with responsibility, producing a quasi-juridical conception of autonomy and a limiting notion of freedom. This article criticizes the connecting of freedom with accountability on a number of grounds. First, various conceptions of autonomy not only operate without a notion of accountability, but, in fact, would be impaired by an accountability requirement. Second, the neo-Kantians are unable (...) to defend the freedom enhancing properties that are supposedly brought about by the giving of reasons for one’s beliefs and actions. Third, the project of accountability is indifferent to personal outlooks, not because it takes a holistic perspective, but because of its interest in social convergence. (shrink)

This paper aims at reopening the debate regarding ‘religious diversity’ in religious studies. A review of literature demonstrates that we have not finished with the complexity of the issue of ‘diversity’, whether in academic or social debates. Furthermore, diversity must not only be taken seriously, but impels us towards a comparative methodology in order to highlight the variations of the forms, dynamics, effects and contexts of diversity. As such, Asian countries represent a very interesting location for an epistemological deconstruction of (...) the Western-style and monotheistic-centred concept of ‘religious diversity’, as it is often used in religious studies and the social sciences. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas has argued that religious views form a legitimate background for contributions to an open public debate, and that religion plays a particular role in formulating moral intuitions. Translating religious arguments into “generally accessible language” (Habermas, Eur J Philos 14(1):1–25, 2006) to enable them to play a role in political decisions is a common task for religious and non-religious citizens. The article discusses Habermas’ view, questioning the particular role of religion, but accepting the significance of including such counter-voices to (...) the predominant views. Furthermore it is pointed out that not only religious but also numerous secular views stand in need of translation to be able to bear on policy matters. Accepting Habermas’ general framework, I raise the question whether experts (such as clinicians working in relevant specialised areas of care) participating in political debates on biomedical issues have a duty to state their religious worldview, and to what extent the American government decision to restrict embryo stem cell research is an illegitimate transgression of the State-Church divide. (shrink)

In the debate on conscientious objection in healthcare, proponents of conscience rights often point to the imperative to protect the health professional’s moral integrity. Their opponents hold that the moral integrity argument alone can at most justify accommodation of conscientious objectors as a “moral courtesy”, as the argument is insufficient to establish a general moral right to accommodation, let alone a legal right. This text draws on political philosophy in order to argue for a legal right to accommodation. The moral (...) integrity arguments should be supplemented by the requirement to protect minority rights in liberal democracies. Citizens have a right to live in accordance with their fundamental moral convictions, and a right to equal access to employment. However, this right should not be unconditional, as that would unduly infringe on the rights of other citizens. The right must be limited to cases where the moral basis is more fundamental in a sense that all reasonable citizens in a liberal democracy should accept, such as the constitutive role of the inviolability of human life in liberal democracies. There should be a legal, yet circumscribed, right to accommodation for conscientious objectors refusing to provide healthcare services that they reasonably consider to involve the intentional killing of a human being. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn recent work, Maeve Cooke has criticised Jürgen Habermas’s post-metaphysical model in order to motivate an alternative “post-secular” conception of the state, which involves the replacement of the “institutional translation proviso” with the “nonauthoritarian reasoning requirement”. I provide a qualified defence of the Habermasian model by arguing that it does not lead to the kind of negative consequences regarding legitimacy and solidarity Cooke attributes to it. This, in turn, means that Cooke’s proposal for the secular foundation of political authority on (...) a post-secular basis is insufficiently motivated. In the process, I argue that the point of departure for the debate about religion in the public sphere shared by both Habermas and Cooke – the picture of the “total” religious citizen – should be rejected because it presupposes an overly simplistic view of religions and religious identities. (shrink)

This study presents an Islamic conception of sovereignty from mainstream Sunni theology by closely examining Ghiyāth al-umam fī iltyāth aẓ-ẓulam, the major political work of Abū al-Ma‘ālī al-Juwayn...

Thinkers committed to an ideal of public reason are suspicious of religiously informed political activity as it undermines democratic political legitimacy. This paper considers Jürgen Habermas’s recent shifts on this question in light of the history of Europe’s religious parties in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These parties made a real and lasting contribution to Europe’s democratization and their history suggests ways in which Habermas and other defenders of public reason misunderstand the nature of democratic political legitimacy.

Islamic education has been regarded as a thorn in the side of religious minority community integration into the nation state, and consequently to the expression of citizenship. Expressions of citizenship are associated with public participation while Islamic education is more readily associated with retreat and isolation of religious communities. At the same time the pervasiveness of religion in public life has led to calls for the post-secular—that is where religious communities are present in secular society. Habermas demonstrates that a public (...) which is literary constituted through critical rational communication is an effective means with which individuals can participate in the public sphere of modern society. Literary publics get constituted when three features are satisfied; writing, reading and discussing matters of common interest. The article considers the features of a literary public in relation to a review of some literature on the Deobandi education movement. The article argues that Islamic education at Deobandi institutions is able to constitute a literary public through the use of common texts in vernacular languages which are accessible to individuals who can then read and discuss them. The article suggests, then, that Islamic education within the Deobandi network of institutions opens up fascinating possibilities for expressing of post-secular citizenship requiring further research. (shrink)

Universities are under increasing pressure to demonstrate the economic and social relevance of the research they produce. In the UK, for example, recent developments in the UK under the Research Excellence Framework (REF) suggest that future funding schemes will grant “significant additional recognition…where researchers build on excellent research to deliver demonstrable benefits to the economy, society, public policy, culture and quality of life” (HEFCE 2009 ). Having conceded that this and similar developments are likely to continue into the future, this (...) paper explores the problematic ethical terrain facing philosophers of education under increasing pressure to produce work that has unambiguous, demonstrable practical value on terms offered by various funding regimes. A preliminary ethics of relevance is developed through an examination of the debate between John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas on the relationship between philosophy, public policy and public reason. The paper then articulates and defends a principle of legitimate relevance . This principle is then applied to the case of directing disciplinary competence in philosophy of education for the educational policy process as a means to producing social and economic benefits. (shrink)

My aim in this article is to compare traditional multiculturalist political theory with a new paradigm in which the usual strategies for dealing with cultural diversities are replaced by the tools provided by inferential semantics as developed by Robert Brandom. The upshot is the transition from a landscape which is highly demanding with respect to the common assumptions among different views of the world to a dialogical context in which contrasting beliefs can come to light more freely.

Robert H. Holden, in ‘The Public University's Unbearable Defiance of Being’ (2009, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 41:5, pp. 575–591) argues that the public university ought to welcome the infusion of relevant beliefs, including religious ones, in carrying out its research and teaching responsibilities. In this paper, I examine whether he has shown that some opinions are suppressed, whether he has shown that other views are hegemonic, the central argument that lies behind his thinking, and then consider the educational consequences of (...) his position. (shrink)

In this article, we scrutinize several arguments that are frequently used to legitimize a ban on religious symbols for civil servants. Most arguments, however, do not stand up to the test of Rawlsian political liberalism. One argument stands out as underpinning such a general ban: state neutrality. While this argument has the most potential, we argue why it is still not decisive for a ban on all religious symbols for all civil servants. We conclude that from a political liberal point (...) of view the discussion is inconclusive, and therefore advocate a context-sensitive and balanced approach to the matter of civil servants’ dress code with respect to religious symbols. By arguing that political liberalism is indecisive, our position is different from both ‘exclusive neutrality’ and ‘inclusive neutrality’. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss how insights from Martin Buber’s and Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophies of dialogue have enlightened my own experience of inter-faith dialogue in Norway. Central perspectives here are Buber’s notion of ’the realm of the between’ and Levinas’ emphasis on asymmetry and vulnerability. Some other philosophers’ reasonings about dialogue are also considered, from the overall perspective of ’practice in search of theory’. In connection with a distinction be-tween different types of dialogue, the difference between government initiated ’dialogue’ and (...) initiatives originating from the faith communities are discussed. The last part of the article analyses the notion of ’ change’ which is often brought forward when discussing the aims of interfaith dialogue. In this connection, religious education in school is also considered as a possible arena for dialogue—and ’change’. (shrink)

In matters of governance, is believing subject to ethical standards? If so, what are the criteria how relevant are they in our personal and political culture today? The really important matters in politics and governance necessitate a confidence that our beliefs will lead dependably to predictable and verifiable outcomes. Accordingly, it is unethical to hold a belief that is founded on insufficient evidence or based on hearsay or blind acceptance. In this paper, we demonstrate that the pragmatist concept of truth (...) best meets this standard for ethically held belief in matters of politics and governance. Currently, these standards are abused by the gaslighting and distortion characteristics of the often social media driven ‘misinformation society’. The legitimacy and trust in our institutions and leadership that is requisite for good governance is challenged thereby, threatening the viability of our republic. (shrink)

Kevin Vallier has recently argued that the ideals of public justification and public deliberation should be separated. The link between the two, Vallier suggests, has been assumed without being properly defended. Once examined, the connection falls apart. In this paper, I argue that there is, in fact, a clear and convincing story available for why the two ideals should be treated as mutually reinforcing. Drawing on recent empirical evidence, I argue that the deliberative behaviour of citizens can have a clear (...) and positive impact on the behaviour and policy choices of public officials. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe political public sphere is at one and the same time both public, and private and religion operates in both the public and the private spheres in the modern way of life. This article approaches the dynamics between the cultural and the political public sphere from the point of view of religion; how the cultural intelligentsia developed its worldview fuelled with attitudes towards religion in times of political turmoil. The case study, based on the empirical analysis of cultural periodicals and (...) societies around them, concerns the Finnish liberal intelligentsia in the early twentieth century. The first decade of the 1900s was a particularly important period of formation for the Finnish public sphere; the societal turmoil highlighted the importance of cultural periodicals in defining what was important for the national public sphere. The case of religion is an illustrative example of it, particularly from the point of view of the liberal intelligentsia of the era. (shrink)

The prolonged public debate on human embryonic stem cell (ECS) research has reflected a deepening moral divide in American society over the ontological status of the human embryo and the morality o...

Should scientific facts and methods have an epistemically privileged status in public reason? In Rawls’s public reason account he asserts what we will label the Scientific Standard Stricture: citizens engaged in public reason must be guided by non-controversial scientific methods, and public reason must be in line with non-controversial scientific conclusions. The Scientific Standard Stricture is meant to fulfill important tasks such as enabling the determinateness and publicity of the public reason framework. However, Rawls leaves us without elucidation with regard (...) to when science is and is not ‘non-controversial’ and more importantly, we are left without a justification for a stricture which excludes certain controversial beliefs and methods of inquiry from the realm of political justification. In this article, we offer what we deem to be the most plausible interpretation of Rawls’s Scientific Standards Stricture. We then use Rawls’s general theoretical framework to examine various potential justifications for privileging these ‘non-controversial’ scientific methods and conclusions. We conclude that no viable justification is available to Rawls. (shrink)

This guest column in Common Knowledge presents the concept of “communities of disagreement” to an international and interdisciplinary audience, perhaps for the first time. It takes as its starting point the contrast between agonistic and deliberative democratic theories, and it attempts to outline how democratic groups may live well with unresolved disagreement yet not give on up developing truth-sensitive decision-making processes. It argues against the widespread idea that shared values are the social glue of democratic communities. By developing arguments of (...) Manfred Frank, the article outlines a model of the relationship between social context, interpretation, and information. (shrink)

This article compares Habermas’s and Taylor’s approach to the role of religious language in a liberal democracy. It shows that the difference in their approach is not simply in their theories of religious language. The contrast lies deeper, in their incompatible moral theories: Habermas’s universal discourse ethics vs Taylor’s communitarian substantive ethics. I also explore William Rehg’s defence of discourse ethics by conceding that it is based on a metavalue of rational consensus. However, I argue that Habermas’s and Rehg’s discourse (...) ethics and translation proviso are untenable. While Taylor rightly argues that there is no reason to exclude religious reason from the formal political sphere, his proposed fusion of horizons to generate a new hybrid framework is also problematic. I suggest that Taylor’s historical hermeneutics should be extended to include the narrative approach to ethical deliberation as conducive to mutual experiential understanding, and hence to achieving a fusion of horizons of the diverse worlds of citizens in a liberal democracy. (shrink)

This article addresses the debate between Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor on the implications of state secularism for the public use of reason. Recent commentators have traced this debate either to Habermas’s and Taylor’s divergent views about the status of Western modernity or to their disagreement about the relation between the good and the right. I argue that these readings rest on misinterpretations of Habermas’s theory of social evolution and understanding of impartial justification. I show that the debate rests on (...) diverging interpretations of what it means for citizens to embed the principles of liberal democracy in their respective conceptions of the good. This difference in turn leads Habermas and Taylor to espouse different criteria of democratic legitimacy. I conclude by suggesting that we have prima facie reasons to prefer Habermas’s conception of legitimacy to Taylor’s, and to that extent, to favor his model of the public use of reason. (shrink)

Modernity has imposed on many of us, and perhaps especially on academics, a habit of silence with regard to what John Rawls called deeply held ‘comprehensive’ moral beliefs. According to Rawls and his many disciples, the survival of liberalism depends upon the bracketing of comprehensive beliefs whenever we step into the public sphere. And in the field of higher education, that would have to include the classroom, the lab, the library carrel, the hotel conference suites where we confer and exchange (...) ideas, as well as the vast academic publishing apparatus. I would like to call attention to the way that the supposed requirement of the Rawlsian silence is being challenged, not just by conservative critics but even by such a staunch defender of conventional liberalism as Jürgen Habermas. Second, if Habermas and the other critics are right, then a fortiori, the public university—perhaps the most representative and exemplary of all the institutions of civil society—ought to welcome the infusion of relevant but closely held beliefs, including religious ones, in carrying out its research and teaching responsibilities. (shrink)

Secularization in the Western world is not a contrived combination of disconnected phenomena. It is a complex, long-term, multi-faceted process in which the central place of Christianity has greatly diminished in all areas of life since the sixteenth century, and which derives from the enduring doctrinal disagreements and recurrent religio-political conflicts of the Reformation era. Because late medieval Christianity was embedded in and intended to influence all areas of human life, including buying and selling, the exercise of power, and higher (...) education, all areas of human life were powerfully affected by the Reformation’s rejection of Roman Catholicism. By problematizing religion, the disagreements and conflicts inspired new ideas and institutional means to address them, and thus inadvertently contributed to secularization. The two principal accounts of long-term Western secularization – Enlightenment-liberationist and Catholic-disembedding – diverge not in their descriptions of what happened, but rather in their overall assessments of the process as respectively positive or not. (shrink)

This essay explores what it means to say that we live today in ?a secular age.? A distinction between two kinds of secularism is introduced and the proposal is made that the secularity that characterises our age belongs to a distinctively Graeco-Christian heritage. This proposal is elaborated and developed in the context of the Nietzschean pronouncement of the death of God and against the background of the decline in theodicial conceptions of history. However, rather than see these issues as connected (...) to a growing nihilism in European society or in terms of a movement towards a widespread atheism, they are interpreted, in many respects optimistically, in terms of the awakening and ongoing movement of a distinctively democratic desire. (shrink)

Kitchen is also an image for a biblical generosity to the stranger, an expression of the ‘Hearthold of God’ and of mercy. A round table can be solid in a way that prevents hugging as well as fighting, yet a place where gestures of love can be expressed. My kitchen metaphor may also be read as claiming the sacrament of the kitchen table, of bread and wine in ordinary life.

This article presents a part of the results of an empirical study conducted at a Parisian hospital between 2011 and 2014. It aimed at understanding the women and couples’ motivations to terminate or not a pregnancy once a prenatal diagnosis has revealed a genetically related disease in the embryo or fetus. The article first presents the social and legal context of the study, the methodology used and the pathologies that were encountered. Then, it examines the results of the interviews conducted (...) with 5 women alone and 23 couples explaining their reasons for deciding to terminate or not the pregnancy. Finally, it explores the patients’ views about the doctor’s involvement in the decision-making process. The findings reveal the reasons they formulate when they ponder whether to terminate or not the pregnancy. It highlights the process of their deliberation, their hierarchisation of arguments and concerns. They also show how patients, though often consumed in sorrow, claim to be the legitimate decision-makers, especially women, in a social and legal context in which the rejection of eugenics is viewed as an undisputable principle. (shrink)