Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Alonzo Church.Oliver Marshall & Harry Deutsch - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Alonzo Church (1903–1995) was a renowned mathematical logician, philosophical logician, philosopher, teacher and editor. He was one of the founders of the discipline of mathematical logic as it developed after Cantor, Frege and Russell. He was also one of the principal founders of the Association for Symbolic Logic and the Journal of Symbolic Logic. The list of his students, mathematical and philosophical, is striking as it contains the names of renowned logicians and philosophers. In this article, we focus primarily on (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Montague’s Paradox, Informal Provability, and Explicit Modal Logic.Walter Dean - 2014 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (2):157-196.
    The goal of this paper is to explore the significance of Montague’s paradox—that is, any arithmetical theory $T\supseteq Q$ over a language containing a predicate $P$ satisfying $P\rightarrow \varphi $ and $T\vdash \varphi \,\therefore\,T\vdash P$ is inconsistent—as a limitative result pertaining to the notions of formal, informal, and constructive provability, in their respective historical contexts. To this end, the paradox is reconstructed in a quantified extension $\mathcal {QLP}$ of Artemov’s logic of proofs. $\mathcal {QLP}$ contains both explicit modalities $t:\varphi $ (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Intoxicating Effects of Conciliatory Omniscience.David McElhoes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2151-2167.
    The coherence of omniscience is sometimes challenged using self-referential sentences like, “No omniscient entity knows that which this very sentence expresses,” which suggest that there are truths which no omniscient entity knows. In this paper, I consider two strategies for addressing these challenges: The Common Strategy, which dismisses such self-referential sentences as meaningless, and The Conciliatory Strategy, which discounts them as quirky outliers with no impact on one’s status as being omniscient. I argue that neither strategy succeeds. The Common Strategy (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Prospects for the Cyberiad: Certain Limits on Human Self-Knowledge in the Cybernetic Age.John Barresi - 1987 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 17 (March):19-46.
  • Given the Web, What is Intelligence, Really?Selmer Bringsjord & Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (4):464-479.
    This article argues that existing systems on the Web cannot approach human-level intelligence, as envisioned by Descartes, without being able to achieve genuine problem solving on unseen problems. The article argues that this entails committing to a strong intensional logic. In addition to revising extant arguments in favor of intensional systems, it presents a novel mathematical argument to show why extensional systems can never hope to capture the inherent complexity of natural language. The argument makes its case by focusing on (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Non‐Classical Knowledge.Ethan Jerzak - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):190-220.
    The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely-held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single-premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. I develop a consistent theory validating (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Given the Web, What is Intelligence, Really?Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu Selmer Bringsjord - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (4):464-479.
    This article argues that existing systems on the Web cannot approach human‐level intelligence, as envisioned by Descartes, without being able to achieve genuine problem solving on unseen problems. The article argues that this entails committing to a strong intensional logic. In addition to revising extant arguments in favor of intensional systems, it presents a novel mathematical argument to show why extensional systems can never hope to capture the inherent complexity of natural language. The argument makes its case by focusing on (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Knower Paradox in the Light of Provability Interpretations of Modal Logic.Paul Égré - 2004 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (1):13-48.
    This paper propounds a systematic examination of the link between the Knower Paradox and provability interpretations of modal logic. The aim of the paper is threefold: to give a streamlined presentation of the Knower Paradox and related results; to clarify the notion of a syntactical treatment of modalities; finally, to discuss the kind of solution that modal provability logic provides to the Paradox. I discuss the respective strength of different versions of the Knower Paradox, both in the framework of first-order (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Restricting Factiveness.Fredrik Stjernberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):29 - 48.
    In discussions of Fitch’s paradox, it is usually assumed without further argument that knowledge is factive, that if a subject knows that p, then p is true. It is argued that this common assumption is not as well-founded as it should be, and that there in fact are certain reasons to be suspicious of the unrestricted version of the factiveness claim. There are two kinds of reason for this suspicion. One is that unrestricted factiveness leads to paradoxes and unexpected results, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Is ‘Knowing That P’ Identical with ‘Knowing That “P” Is True’?Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Philosophia 48 (3):1075-1092.
    It is epistemological orthodoxy that the object of propositional knowledge is the truth of propositions. This traditional view is based on what I call the ‘KT-schema’, viz, ‘S knows that p, iff, S knows that “p” is true’. The purpose of this paper is to reject the KT-schema. By showing the paradoxical upshot of the KT-schema and providing counterexamples to the KT-schema, this paper argues that ‘knowing that p’ is more than ‘knowing that “p” is true’. Consequently, we shall rethink (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Sharp Edges From Hedges: Fatalism, Vagueness and Epistemic Possibility.Roy Sorensen - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):607-626.
    Mights plug gaps. If p lacks a truth-value, then ‘It might be that p’ should also lack truth-value. Yet epistemic hedges often turn an unassertible statement into an assertible one. The phenomenon is illustrated in detail for two kinds of statements that are frequently alleged to be counterexamples to the principle of bivalence: future contingents and statements that apply predicates to borderline cases. The paper concludes by exploring the prospects for generalizing this gap-plugging strategy.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Paradoks znatljivosti iz raslovske perspektive.Pierdaniele Giaretta - 2009 - Prolegomena 8 (2):141-158.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Some Remarks on Extending and Interpreting Theories with a Partial Predicate for Truth.William N. Reinhardt - 1986 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 15 (2):219 - 251.
  • Problems for Omniscience.Patrick Grim - 2013 - In J. P. Moreland, Chad Meister & Khaldoun A. Sweis (eds.), Debating Christian Theism. Oxford Univ. Press. pp. 169-180.
    A survey of logical problems for the concept of omniscience.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Montagovian Paradoxes and Hyperintensional Content.Dustin Tucker - 2017 - Studia Logica 105 (1):153-171.
    A number of authors have taken a family of paradoxes, whose members trace back to theorems due either in whole or in part to Richard Montague, to pose a serious, possibly fatal challenge to theories of fine-grained, hyperintensional content. These paradoxes all assume that we can represent attitudes such as knowledge and belief with sentential predicates, and this assumption is at the heart of the purported challenge: the thought is that we must reject such predicates to avoid the paradoxes, and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Knower Paradox and Epistemic Closure.Stephen Maitzen - 1998 - Synthese 114 (2):337-354.
    The Knower Paradox has had a brief but eventful history, and principles of epistemic closure (which say that a subject automatically knows any proposition she knows to be materially implied, or logically entailed, by a proposition she already knows) have been the subject of tremendous debate in epistemic logic and epistemology more generally, especially because the fate of standard arguments for and against skepticism seems to turn on the fate of closure. As far as I can tell, however, no one (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Rationality and Epistemic Paradox.Frederick Kroon - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):377 - 408.
    This paper provides a new solution to the epistemic paradox of belief-instability, a problem of rational choice which has recently received considerable attention (versions of the problem have been discussed by — among others — Tyler Burge, Earl Conee, and Roy Sorensen). The problem involves an ideally rational agent who has good reason to believe the truth of something of the form:[Ap] p if and only if it is not the case that I accept or believe p.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Toward Formalizing Common-Sense Psychology: An Analysis of the False-Belief Task.Konstantine Arkoudas & Selmer Bringsjord - 2008 - In Tu-Bao Ho & Zhi-Hua Zhou (eds.), Pricai 2008: Trends in Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 17--29.
  • Operators in the Paradox of the Knower.Patrick Grim - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):409 - 428.
    Predicates are term-to-sentence devices, and operators are sentence-to-sentence devices. What Kaplan and Montague's Paradox of the Knower demonstrates is that necessity and other modalities cannot be treated as predicates, consistent with arithmetic; they must be treated as operators instead. Such is the current wisdom.A number of previous pieces have challenged such a view by showing that a predicative treatment of modalities neednot raise the Paradox of the Knower. This paper attempts to challenge the current wisdom in another way as well: (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • A Representational Account of Mutual Belief.Robert C. Koons - 1989 - Synthese 81 (1):21 - 45.
    Although the notion of common or mutual belief plays a crucial role in game theory, economics and social philosophy, no thoroughly representational account of it has yet been developed. In this paper, I propose two desiderata for such an account, namely, that it take into account the possibility of inconsistent data without portraying the human mind as logically and mathematically omniscient. I then propose a definition of mutual belief which meets these criteria. This account takes seriously the existence of computational (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Kripkean Approach to Unknowability and Truth.Leon Horsten - 1998 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 39 (3):389-405.
    We consider a language containing partial predicates for subjective knowability and truth. For this language, inductive hierarchy rules are proposed which build up the extension and anti-extension of these partial predicates in stages. The logical interaction between the extension of the truth predicate and the anti-extension of the knowability predicate is investigated.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Rule of Contradictory Pairs, Insolubles and Validity.Stephen Read - 2020 - Vivarium 58 (4):275-304.
    The Oxford Calculator Roger Swyneshed put forward three provocative claims in his treatise on insolubles, written in the early 1330s, of which the second states that there is a formally valid inference with true premises and false conclusion. His example deployed the Liar paradox as the conclusion of the inference: ‘The conclusion of this inference is false, so this conclusion is false’. His account of insolubles supported his claim that the conclusion is false, and so the premise, referring to the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Paradoxes of Demonstrability.Sten Lindström - 2009 - In Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), Logic, Ethics and all that Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel. Uppsala, Sverige: pp. 177-185.
    In this paper I consider two paradoxes that arise in connection with the concept of demonstrability, or absolute provability. I assume—for the sake of the argument—that there is an intuitive notion of demonstrability, which should not be conflated with the concept of formal deducibility in a (formal) system or the relativized concept of provability from certain axioms. Demonstrability is an epistemic concept: the rough idea is that a sentence is demonstrable if it is provable from knowable basic (“self-evident”) premises by (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Yablo's Paradox and Kindred Infinite Liars.Roy A. Sorensen - 1998 - Mind 107 (425):137-155.
    This is a defense and extension of Stephen Yablo's claim that self-reference is completely inessential to the liar paradox. An infinite sequence of sentences of the form 'None of these subsequent sentences are true' generates the same instability in assigning truth values. I argue Yablo's technique of substituting infinity for self-reference applies to all so-called 'self-referential' paradoxes. A representative sample is provided which includes counterparts of the preface paradox, Pseudo-Scotus's validity paradox, the Knower, and other enigmas of the genre. I (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • The Paradox of the Believer.Sven Ove Hansson - 1991 - Philosophia 21 (1-2):25-30.
  • God's Blindspot.Frederick Kroon - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (4):721-734.
    God, by definition, is all-powerful, all-good, all-wise, and all-knowing. Therein lies a problem for the theist, of course, for every one of these attributes has been the subject of fierce debate. In this paper I want to return to the debate by introducing a new problem for the idea that anyone could have the kind of perfect knowledge God is supposed to have. What distinguishes my problem from others is that the sort of knowledge it focuses on is self-knowledge, hence (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Paradox of the Knower Revisited.Walter Dean & Hidenori Kurokawa - 2014 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165 (1):199-224.
    The Paradox of the Knower was originally presented by Kaplan and Montague [26] as a puzzle about the everyday notion of knowledge in the face of self-reference. The paradox shows that any theory extending Robinson arithmetic with a predicate K satisfying the factivity axiom K → A as well as a few other epistemically plausible principles is inconsistent. After surveying the background of the paradox, we will focus on a recent debate about the role of epistemic closure principles in the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On a Moorean Solution to Instability Puzzles.Frederick W. Kroon - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (4):455 – 461.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations