Philosophia 48 (3):1075-1092 (2021)

Authors
Changsheng (Lex) Lai
Shanghai JiaoTong University
Abstract
It is epistemological orthodoxy that the object of propositional knowledge is the truth of propositions. This traditional view is based on what I call the ‘KT-schema’, viz, ‘S knows that p, iff, S knows that “p” is true’. The purpose of this paper is to reject the KT-schema. By showing the paradoxical upshot of the KT-schema and providing counterexamples to the KT-schema, this paper argues that ‘knowing that p’ is more than ‘knowing that “p” is true’. Consequently, we shall rethink the object problem of propositional knowledge – if knowing that p is not merely knowing that ‘p’ is true, then what is indeed the object of propositional knowledge? I will also attempt to solve this problem by proposing a complementary answer: knowing that p requires at least knowing the truth of p, plus, understanding the content of p.
Keywords T-Schema  propositional knowledge  knower paradox  the object problem  epistemic gradualism
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Reprint years 2020
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-019-00113-4
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