Philosophia 48 (3):1075-1092 (2021)

Changsheng (Lex) Lai
Shanghai JiaoTong University
It is epistemological orthodoxy that the object of propositional knowledge is the truth of propositions. This traditional view is based on what I call the ‘KT-schema’, viz, ‘S knows that p, iff, S knows that “p” is true’. The purpose of this paper is to reject the KT-schema. By showing the paradoxical upshot of the KT-schema and providing counterexamples to the KT-schema, this paper argues that ‘knowing that p’ is more than ‘knowing that “p” is true’. Consequently, we shall rethink the object problem of propositional knowledge – if knowing that p is not merely knowing that ‘p’ is true, then what is indeed the object of propositional knowledge? I will also attempt to solve this problem by proposing a complementary answer: knowing that p requires at least knowing the truth of p, plus, understanding the content of p.
Keywords T-Schema  propositional knowledge  knower paradox  the object problem  epistemic gradualism
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Reprint years 2020
DOI 10.1007/s11406-019-00113-4
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