Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Pages de début Préface Note au lecteur Michel Villey Le premier livre des pages Le deuxième livre des pages Le troisième livre des pages Le quatrième livre des pages Le cinquième livre des pages Le sixième (...) livre des pages Le septième livre des pages Le huitième livre des pages Le neuvième livre des pages Le dixième livre des pages Le onzième livre des pages Le douzième livre des pages Le treizième livre des pages Le quatorzième livre des pages Le quinzième livre des pages Le seizième livre des pages Le dix - septième livre des pages Le dix - huitième livre des pages Le dix - neuvième livre des pages Le vingtième livre des pages Le vingt et unième livre des pages Le vingt - deuxième livre des pages Le vingt - troisième livre des pages Le vingt - quatrième livre des pages Le livre vingt- cinquième des pages Index analytique Pages de fin. (shrink)

Les Leçons d'histoire de la philosophie du droit sont un jalon fondamental de la philosophie du droit de Michel Villey. Elles ambitionnent de construire une synthèse des apports nécessaires et successifs de l'histoire de la philosophie : " Il ne suffit plus de s'installer dans le sillage du seul Thomas, celui de Kant ou celui de Comte ; mais toutes ces doctrines ensemble sont les données de notre problème. Seule aura chance d'être acceptée par le corps social, seule pourra (...) devenir efficace, seule sera vraie la philosophie qui aura su réunir et réconcilier, sans en sacrifier aucun, ces aspects encore dispersés de la tradition. " A l'heure en particulier où les juges retrouvent progressivement leur rôle social fondamental, les juristes doivent relire ces développements qui leur confèrent collectivement le lourd privilège de réaliser la Justice, non pas idéale, mais simplement possible et concrète. (shrink)

La 4e de couverture indique : "À l'instar des grands penseurs du XXème siècle qui ont contribué à la renaissance de la philosophie du droit, Michel Villey (1924-1988) a été tout aussi bien débattu qu'admiré. Car contester la notion de justice universelle qui caractérise l'essor de la modernité ne peut que bousculer et déranger. Dans une liberté d'esprit rarement égalée à l'université, c'est en historien et en philosophe que Michel Villey n'a cessé d'explorer la vie en société. Il (...) assure qu'il n'est de droit juste que celui qui est pensé et appliqué dans un système étudiant les cas particuliers garantissant les libertés individuelles. D'où sa critique sans ambages de cette notion-culte de notre époque que sont les droits fondamentaux, et plus particulièrement l'utopie moderne des droits de l'homme. Une pensée incontournable, qu'on ne peut ignorer.". (shrink)

Michel Villey a consacré toute sa carrière universitaire à démontrer la fécondité de la définition philosophie du droit que nous ont léguée les jurisconsultes romains. Pour Villey, comprendre " le droit comme un partage " c'est saisir toute la richesse de l'esprit du droit romain. Le droit est bien plus que l'ensemble des règles juridiques posées par l'Etat ou l'ensemble des précédents judiciaires décidés par le Juge. Le droit est partage ; il est cette attribution de biens et (...) de charges que le Législateur ou le Juge découvrent. Le droit n'est pas un pouvoir qui dit, sans nuance, ce qui doit être des rapports juridiques entre citoyens. Le droit n'est pas extérieur aux relations humaines, il est dans la relation entre les hommes. Le droit unit pour " bien vivre ensemble " mettant ainsi fin à ce qui désunit. Plus que la décision d'une autorité formellement compétente, le droit ancré dans la réalité des choses, est une recherche intellectuelle. Prendre au sérieux l'intelligence des juristes signifie leur permettre de comprendre ce qu'il y a de juste dans les rapports sociaux. A l'heure où les pays de l'Union européenne peinent à se mettre d'accord sur le contenu juridique de la Constitution européenne, il paraît essentiel de revenir à la pensée de Michel Villey et à travers elle, redécouvrir la dimension historique commune à tous les systèmes juridiques européens. (shrink)

Trait permanent de la pensée de M. Villey : l’alternance d’une déconstruction anti-idolâtrique et d’une reconstruction iconique. Une théorie de l’idole et de sa subordination à l’icône est à construire. Dans les Carnets, le système des catégories fonctionne comme une configuration d’icônes solidaires. Nous fixons quelques traits du concept d’icône, de son rapport à l’idole, de la solidarité entre icônes. L’icône est objet de vénération salutaire. L’icône est ce qui seul a une valeur et sert de repère pour penser (...) l’idole. Référence première et contrepartie positive, antidote d’une contrefaçon, mais aussi d’un simulacre, d’un leurre, d’un dérèglement, d’une confusion ou d’une parodie. Nous insistons sur trois icônes solidaires : recherche, dialogue, considération de la chose même, qui toutes trois favorisent des avancées de la pensée du droit. On va alors de l’icône à l’idole en passant par « le savoir de foi », dont le moteur est l’amour, icône des icônes. (shrink)

In the debate on the origin of modern natural rights, the French philosopher Michel Villey became famous for his counter current theses: that the origin of modern subjective rights was a “deformation” or “degeneration” of the ancient and medieval concept of law; that those responsible for this rupture were Ockham and his nominalist disciples, as well as the Scholastics of Salamanca; that these last ones betrayed the thought of Aquinas on the right adhering to the nominalist. These theses serve (...) the purpose of justifying Villey’s radical opposition to the subjective foundations of modern human rights. The reply of the historian of medieval law, the Englishman Brian Tierney, is that Villey’s conception of ancient and medieval law is too restricted; that already in Roman law there was a notion of subjective rights; that the origin of modern subjective rights does not depend only on Ockham’s nominalism, but was already present in the medieval canonists; that the scholastics of Salamanca did not betray the Thomist thought, but they brought it up to the challenges of the new times; and that the idea of ​​subjective natural rights does not depend on a particular ideology, but is compatible with different ideologies and worldviews. In revisiting this debate, our main interest concerns the conclusions that Villey draws from the entire long historical trajectory he has studied, and the criticism that Tierney makes of his radical opposition to human rights. Finally the debate gives rise to some more general considerations about the history of concepts and the distinction between the historical genesis of the ideas and their validity. (shrink)

La 4e de couverture indique : "Qu'est-ce que le droit naturel aujourd'hui? Une approche morale du droit, qui vise à montrer les limites du droit positif, en insistant sur la nécessité d'introduire en son sein autre chose que le droit, pour le rendre plus légitime. Mais le droit naturel est aussi la valorisation, au sein du droit positif, d'un certain corpus normatif, celui des droits fondamentaux. Ce livre entend construire une troisième approche où le droit naturel ne cherche pas à (...) échapper à la juridicité, au bénéfice de la morale. Il s'agit, à partir de l'oeuvre de Michel Villey, d'élargir le propos jusqu'à la définition d'une essence du droit, opposable à certaines formes contemporaines du droit positif.". (shrink)

La virulence parait être le point commun entre Michel Villey et René Girard. Pour René Girard, droit, philosophie et sciences humaines ont pour but de cacher le "meurtre fondateur" tandis que pour Villey elles veulent répudier le "raisonnement dialectique" au profit du "raisonnement déductif". Mettre en rapport ces deux critiques permet de révéler une "épistémologie négative", seule capable de sauver, avec le droit, la philosophie et les sciences humaines.

Este artigo propõe retornar à interpretação histórica de Michel Villey acerca do direito que ele desenvolveu ao longo de sua carreira como filósofo e historiador do direito. Em primeiro lugar, será questão de reconstruir as linhas gerais de sua crítica à noção de direitos humanos e de mostrar como, segundo o filósofo francês, essa crítica deve ser entendida por relação ao nascimento da noção de direito subjetivo no final da Idade Média e no início do período moderno. Na segunda (...) parte, será questão de apresentar as principais críticas dos historiadores do direito e da filosofia à tese de Villey, em particular as de Brian Tierney. Além da crítica histórica, também será questão de se perguntar pela correção conceitual de sua tese. O artigo tentará mostrar que a tese de Villey esta baseada em um equívoco sobre a relação entre direito e política. Palavras-chave: Moralidade. Interpretação Histórica. Filosofia do Direito. (shrink)

Some authors of Jurisprudence, especially Michel Villey, tried to present what they thought to be the aristotelic theory of justice, grounding in it their own theories. To Villey, pecifically, “the right” would be the correct translation of the Greek to dikaion. To defend, based on Aristotle, a conception of the just that refuses subjective elements of a theory of action is an error. And this error lies in ignoring a redefinition of to dikaion made by Aristotle in Chapter (...) 9 of Book V of Nicomachean Ethics. There, Aristotle adds to the objective conditions of the just and the unjust (EN V, 1-7) some subjective conditions referring to person who suffers the action. Only after correctly understanding these conditions we will be able to correctly understand the aristotelic theory of justice. As Villey and other authors ignore it, they err interpreting Aristotle and using him to found their own theories. (shrink)

Séminaire « Penser ensemble le droit et la société » Organisateurs : Cécile Lavergne & Gabrielle Radica _Programme des séances : _ _Mardi 4 octobre 2022_. Richard Sobel (U-Lille, CLERSÉ) « Droit du travail et analyse du rapport salarial. Quelques réflexions épistémologiques sur la mobilisation du droit en économie politique institutionnaliste » _Mercredi 9 novembre 2022_ - Daniel Adjerad (Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, HIPHIMO EA 1451) : « Peut-on tout rapper? » _Mardi 6 décembre 2022_ - Cécile Degiovanni (Oxford University, Oxford (...) Law Faculty) « Devrions-nous pouvoir renoncer à nos droits fondamentaux? » _Mardi 17 janvier 2023_ - Elodie Djordjevic (Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas, Institut Michel Villey) « Peut-on émanciper le droit de sa matrice privatiste? Droit, société civile et État chez Hegel » _Mardi 7 février 2023_ - Stéphane Zygart (U-Lille, STL) « Droits sociaux, droits de l’homme et droit d’exception à partir des handicaps » _Mardi 14 mars 2023_ - Magali Bessone : (Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbon... (shrink)

Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) jesuite, juriste et theologien espagnol est un representant emblematique de la seconde scolastique. Sa reflexion se deploie dans le cadre bouillonnant de l'Universite de Salamanque qui voit la theologie se renover profondement. Considere comme un des plus grands theoriciens des questions juridiques et politiques, son maitre ouvrage, le De Legibus, a marque une etape essentielle de la reflexion anthropologique sur la nature politique de l'individu, mais est surtout remarquable pour le role qu'il a joue dans le long (...) processus de reflexion et de modernisation de la conception antique du pouvoir politique. Les reflexions et orientations qu'il propose sont, pour un certain nombre, a l'origine des outils et conceptions modernes de la politique en general et de la loi en particulier. Jean-Paul Coujou est professeur a la faculte de philosophie de l'Institut catholique de Toulouse et membre de l'Institut Michel Villey. Il est l'auteur d'une vingtaine d'ouvrages dont en 2012, Pensee de l'etre et theorie politique. Le moment suarezien, en trois volumes, aux editions Peeters a Louvain. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:How Old Are Modern Rights? On the Lockean Roots of Contemporary Human Rights DiscourseS. Adam SeagraveArguing for the proper placement of John Locke’s natural rights theory within intellectual history is a particularly high-stakes enterprise for historians of political thought and political theorists alike. This is due in large part to the fact that, as Brian Tierney notes in his recent study, it is “widely agreed that Locke’s work was (...) an important influence in the formation of modern liberal ideas, including ideas concerning rights.”1 Our understanding of Locke thus contributes to our reflective self-understanding as “modern liberals” (of one stripe or another) to an extent perhaps unequaled by any other thinker so far removed from our own time.As a result of the rare promise of studying Locke’s natural rights theory, there has been no shortage of scholarly attempts to determine its place in intellectual history on the basis of Locke’s own writings and their relation both to preceding and subsequent traditions and modes of thought. Although John Dunn had argued in his influential study that Locke’s political thought was too thoroughly steeped in theology to remain relevant in the contemporary context, this thesis has since been persuasively challenged (albeit in very different ways) by Simmons, Zuckert and Waldron, among others.2 Each of these scholars has contributed to an emerging agreement [End Page 305] that the thread of Locke’s natural rights theory may indeed be carried all the way up to current political and moral debates in some form or another. The precise length of this thread as it extends in the other historical direction has, however, remained a point of heated controversy. The scholarly literature on this issue may be broadly described in terms of a spectrum determined by two opposing emphases in understanding the relation of Locke’s natural rights theory to its medieval predecessors: a continuity emphasis and a discontinuity emphasis.On the discontinuity end of the spectrum stand those such as Michel Villey, Leo Strauss, C. B. Macpherson and, more recently, Michael Zuckert who argue for the existence of some sort of “Copernican moment” separating medieval natural rights theories from their modern counterparts.3 Whether this moment is identified with William of Ockham in the fourteenth century or Hobbes in the seventeenth century, these scholars tend to emphasize the distinctively “modern” character of Lockean natural rights theory and its significant departures from medieval modes of thought. According to many of the advocates of discontinuity, Lockean natural rights are not only “modern” in their political applications but also in their more profound meaning as foundations for morality, and particularly in their newly conceived relation to the concept of natural law.4The continuity end of the spectrum is, perhaps, more variegated, including scholars such as Tuck, Tierney, Tully, Oakley, Nederman, Coleman, and Swanson, among others.5 Despite their many important differences, [End Page 306] these scholars each focus upon the similarities between various elements or strains of medieval thought and modern natural rights theories rather than the differences between them. Insofar as the scholars on this end of the spectrum explicitly consider Locke’s natural rights theory, they tend to emphasize Locke’s intellectual debt to various preceding traditions and thinkers rather than his innovations upon them. Building explicitly upon the work of Tuck, Tierney and Tully, Janet Coleman finds “some extraordinarily Lockean moments” in the medieval thinkers John of Paris and Godefroid of Fontaines, and argues that Locke ought to be understood as contributing to this medieval tradition of thought rather than departing from it.6 Scott Swanson, in turn, builds upon Coleman’s scholarship in carefully connecting medieval understandings of the rights of subsistence and the principle of extreme necessity to Locke’s natural rights theory. Swanson initially goes even further than Coleman in asserting that “all of Locke’s celebrated doctrine is here [in John of Paris’s writings] offered in a nutshell” before concluding on the more moderate note, echoed by Cary Nederman, that Locke’s “application of natural rights of subsistence to politics” may indeed have been something “new under the sun.”7Brian Tierney, who has long been a prominent... (shrink)

Esta introducción a la filosofía del derecho nace de la experiencia de muchos años de enseñanza de esta materia en la Facultad de Derecho Canónico de la Universidad Pontificia de la Santa Cruz. Por tanto, el libro se dirige principalmente a los estudiantes de cursos de filosofía o teoría del derecho en cualquier ámbito universitario. El texto sigue una idea básica bien definida: el derecho como bien jurídico. Se trata de una presentación del realismo jurídico clásico, inspirado en Aristóteles, en (...) los juristas romanos y en Tomás de Aquino, repropuesto en la época contemporánea por varios autores, entre ellos Michel Villey y Javier Hervada. Por esta razón, el libro puede interesar a un público más amplio, en primer lugar a los juristas que deseen reconsiderar críticamente los fundamentos de su disciplina y de su práctica, pero también a los que se ocupan de la filosofía y la teoría del derecho, para conocer una vertiente de pensamiento que a menudo no encuentra lugar en la literatura especializada en derecho. (shrink)

<1>Acerca de la concepción realista del derecho.--<2>Los fundamentos del derecho natural clásico en el pensamiento de Michel Villey.--<3>Liberación y derecho.--<4>Sobre la equidad.--<5>Reflexiones acerca de la estructura del razonamiento judicial.

Not everyone agreed with Barker when he wrote those words. Few students of the Politics would agree with him today. Disagreement comes from different sides. On one hand--the "rights" hand, one might call it--Karl Popper argued in 1945 in The Open Society and its Enemies that Aristotle's essentialism was less interesting than Platonism but equally congenial to modern totalitarianism. On the other hand--call it the "anti-rights" hand --scholars such as Alasdair MacIntyre and the legal historian Michel Villey would have (...) it that the whole modern conception of rights, especially human or natural rights, is a pernicious fabrication of the Enlightenment, with roots going back no further than the similarly pernicious nominalism of William of Ockham. As far as the current consensus is concerned, then, whether one favors rights or not, and whether one admires Aristotle or not, there are no rights--or at least no individual natural rights--in Aristotle. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Michel de Montaigne: Accidental PhilosopherZahi ZallouaMichel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher, by Ann Hartle ; 303 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. $60.00.Ann Hartle's new book is arguably the clearest and most compelling interpretation of Montaigne as a genuine philosopher since Hugo Friedrich's masterful Montaigne (1949). Her study is indeed an emphatic response to Friedrich's call to read Montaigne philosophically. Hartle derives her almost oxymoronic title from Montaigne's own (...) self-description as "a new figure: an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher." Taking Montaigne's moment of self-discovery à la lettre, Hartle systematically proceeds to elucidate the full meaning of Montaigne's observation. What emerges from her reading is a radical thinker who breaks with ancient philosophy and medieval theology. Her Montaigne, however, does not disavow the past but ultimately enriches it, building upon prior models. In this respect, the essayist practices the Renaissance art of imitation—creative imitation that repeats but also alters its exemplary model in a move to rival it. While Hartle exhibits an outstanding knowledge of the history of philosophy—from Plato to Heidegger, passing through Machiavelli, Hume, and Rousseau—her book is not itself a historical study nor a work in the history of ideas: she insists that her interpretation is conceptual rather than historical.What is accidental philosophy? It is foremost a non-authoritative, thoroughly human philosophy, one which takes as a sine qua non the recognition of the world's contingency—an awareness that things might have been radically different. Accidental philosophy thus represents nothing short of a displacement and transformation of reason, a calling into question of its traditional sovereign and divine-like status. (One thinks here of Aristotle's notion of the active intellect [nous poetikos], which he considers to be divine in man in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics.) Rejecting the belief in an autonomous reason, Montaigne renders problematic the possibility of "deliberative philosophy" (accidental philosophy's counterpart): "the exercise of reason as rule within the soul, a place and function that reason claims for itself on the basis of its superiority with the hierarchy of nature." In his critique of reason—most eloquently displayed in the "Apology for Raymond Sebond," chapter 12 of [End Page 441] Book II of the Essays—Montaigne might be seen as proto-postmodernist, occupying a similar position as Nietzsche in a history of counter-Enlightenment thought. But such an interpretation, argues Hartle, is on the whole inaccurate, given Montaigne's commitment to truth.As would be expected in a book about Montaigne's philosophy, skepticism plays a major role in Hartle's positive assessment of the essayist. Skepticism has traditionally been interpreted in Montaigne scholarship either as a stage in the evolution of the essayist's thought, or as an expression of his fideism. The evolutionary reading was first championed by Pierre Villey in Les Sources et l'évolution des "Essais" de Montaigne (1933), in which he argued that Montaigne's thought evolved through three stages: Stoicism, Skepticism, and Naturalism (or Epicureanism). This now unpopular view was nevertheless recently reaffirmed by David Quint in his well-received Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy (1998). The essayist's fideism, on the other hand, is more readily accepted in Montaigne circles. It is commonly accepted that Montaigne's skepticism functions in a way that undermines reason's authority while leaving room for faith in religious matters. Hartle's understanding of Montaigne's skepticism differs in a major way from both of these accounts. She asks: "Does skepticism provide us with a complete and adequate understanding of Montaigne's philosophical activity?" Hartle offers a seemingly definitive answer: "Montaigne is not a skeptic" (p. 15). Yet, she makes her response more nuanced in several passage of her study, arguing again not for a clean break with ancient skep-ticism but with a profound transformation of this dominant philosophical school.What we have, then, is a "skeptical moment" rather than a full-fledged skeptical suspension of judgment. And it is in this moment that an openness to the possible—such as the discovery of the strange in the familiar—is made manifest. Hartle rightly points to Montaigne's discovery of his own... (shrink)

No que toca a filosofia do direito muitas são as dúvidas que recaem sobre as distintas noções de direito consideradas não só nas reflexões teóricas sobre a jurisprudência, mas também aquelas que surgem pela _práxis_ do sistema jurídico. Michel Villey defende a tese de que a única concepção estrita e exequível de direito é aquela criada em Roma que concebe o direito como uma coisa (_res_) atribuída de modo justo, pelos juristas, aos indivíduos. Qualquer noção subjetiva de direito, além (...) de ser desprovida do sentido lato do termo, se atribuída aos filósofos antigos e medievais, não passa de uma reinterpretação errônea. Entretanto, este artigo tem por objetivo mostrar que a argumentação de Villey contém algumas lacunas quanto a sua interpretação da noção de direito em textos como os de Gaio e de Tomás de Aquino. Posição essa sustentada através de autores como Brian Tierney e Alfredo Storck, os quais apresentam uma leitura pluralista acerca das noções de direito da antiguidade e do medievo mostrando que, ainda que não houvesse a presença do termo “direito subjetivo” no vocábulo da jurisprudência da época, por vezes, o direito era empregado nesse período para significar um poder, uma liberdade ou uma vantagem do indivíduo. (shrink)

In this paper we provide a summary of the discussions between Villey and Tierney concerning the rise of a concept of subjective right in late medieval thought, William of Ockham’s place in it, and the differences of this subjective notion with regards to an objective notion of right. Afterwards, we analyze Ockham’s main texts. According to the authors, Ockham’s notion of a natural right of the individual bears a relationship both to a rational concept of morality and to his (...) characteristic emphasis on the free choice of the will. (shrink)

Aborder Montaigne en pédagogue du jugement, c'est renouveler une lecture qui permit à Gabriel Compayré, Émile Faguet ou Pierre Villey de recommander la lecture d'un auteur réputé sceptique en dépit de son scepticisme. Comment bien juger? La connaissance des règles et l'aptitude à raisonner ne suffisent pas pour faire un bon jugement. En se confiant courageusement et lucidement à son jugement personnel, Montaigne apprend à penser en situation d'incertitude, tout en renouant avec l'expérience et les grands auteurs.

The present book verses on the current discussion, between authors writing within the Thomistic tradition, on the issue of human rights, and pretends to adjudicate that discussion. The positions of authors who are critical of the notion of human rights, like Michel Villey and Alasdair MacIntyre, as well as that of those who try to justify their existence and explain their nature, like Jacques Maritain, John Finnis, and others, are carefully explained and evaluated. This book is the first to (...) deal in detail with this contemporary discussion and therefore represents an important contribution to the bibliography on the philosophy of human rights, as well as to the bibliography on the Thomistic tradition. (shrink)

Cet article s’inscrit dans une réflexion sur le tournant que représente la philosophie politique moderne. Il a pour but de déconstruire la manière dont Michel Villey expose ce tournant : dans des cours professés entre 1961 et 1966 à la Faculté de droit de Paris, ce dernier extrapole, à la pensée juridique moderne, le mythe de l’« augustinisme politique », qui avait été forgé par Henri-Xavier Arquillière pour caractériser la source principale des doctrines théocratiques médiévales. Cette déconstruction montre que (...) la philosophie politique moderne provient certes d’un motif central de la Cité de Dieu, mais ce motif subit une double interprétation qui en modifie la signification : Luther accomplit le passage du motif spirituel des deux cités au problème théologico-politique des deux régimes, tandis que Hobbes fait entrer ce problème en philosophie sur la base des principes de la métaphysique classique. (shrink)