This volume, which is rooted in biogeophysical studies, addresses conceptions of political action in the Anthropocene and the tension between a desire to accomplish the Promethean project of modernity and a post-Promethean approach. This work explores the idea of ​​an anthropological mutation of political consolidation from a “post-Promethean togetherness”, to creating the capacity to act together. The political thinking of the human condition developed by Hannah Arendt is important here as a resource for thinking about humanity in terms of human (...) adventure. This has three dimensions: hubris, the world and coexistence referring respectively to the logic of profit of the homo oeconomicus, the logic of responsibility of the homo collectivus and the logic of the hospitality of the homo religatus. The intellectual and political attitude outlined in this book is an extension of critical theory: the work also puts forward a critique of what poses a problem in our relationship to the world and suggests how to overcome it, the ultimate goal being social transformation. The author propose an uprising and an anthropological consolidation of politics based on the revitalization that is brought about by the sharing of a conviviality both between humans and with what is non-human. The identification of conviviality as an educational paradigm to survive the Anthropocene gives us the much needed reason for hope despite this heritage of the Anthropocene. In addition to Arendtian thinking, this critical theory for the Anthropocene draws on the political thinking of several contemporary authors including Maurice Bellet, Hartmut Rosa, Andreas Weber, Dominique Bourg, and Christian Arnsperger. This volume is of interest to researchers in the Anthropocene. (shrink)

The Covid-19 crisis is testing human societies. It is obviously first and foremost a health problem – it causes deaths and numerous diseases – but it is also an economic problem – it is expensive, it weighs on the usual economic functioning – and finally, it is a hindrance to freedom – circulation, sociality, vaccination, etc. – and to the development of the human condition. This crisis highlights the interdependence between the environment, the economy and freedom, and reveals our condition (...) and its future. (shrink)

Transition education is a major challenge to be taken up. It is not simply a question of teaching a person a specific area of ​​knowledge – in this case ecological and societal questions – but rather recognizing that individuals are built by their reflections, with their feelings and according to their experiences. None of these dimensions should be left aside if we want to promote the full development of each individual. In this sense it seems important to us to explain (...) the values ​​that underlie our educational offer and the goals pursued by transition education, as well as its founding roots. This chapter thus starts by presenting the pillars for head-heart-body learning, namely a pedagogy that is relational and transformational, integrative and holistic, inter- and transdisciplinary, rooted and open. Secondly, we structure the pedagogy of the transition around six major areas of questioning, corresponding to the six gates of the FORTES approach. Eventually, drawing on the competency-based approach we present the six main transversal skills to be acquired. (shrink)

Implementing a head-heart-body pedagogy in higher education institutions needs the mobilization of all the actors currently involved in education, to identify those who are absent today and surpass the logic that feeds on silo effects in order to support actors towards sustainable educational actions. By transforming campuses and courses, the university can thus become a learning organization where everything is about learning not only for students, but also for all actors in the university community. This chapter mentions first students, who (...) are the direct beneficiaries of education as well as the future actors of the transition. Secondly, it calls upon teacher-researchers to incarnate the multifaceted role of mentors, which far beyond the transmission of knowledge involves accompanying the students in a holistic transformation. Third, it turns towards pedagogical support services, whose diverse disciplines and skills are essential to develop the pedagogical methods required for transition education. Finally, the chapter underlies the role of public authorities to systematize good practices, to allow bottom-up incentives to grow, to put in place the necessary conditions and resources as well as to engage the whole of society. (shrink)

To meet the ecological challenge, higher education must face many challenges: the educational offer, which is currently limited in many aspects, must evolve by renewing its methods while adapting its content. An “ecological awakening” is necessary to stimulate student awareness and action. This awakening is already present in some establishments which have transformed their educational model as well as their training in order to integrate and incarnate a more holistic vision of the world. These examples are all sources of inspiration (...) that can serve as a basis for reflection to modify university courses in depth. This chapter outlines first the shortcomings of the current educational model – in terms of content and methods – drawing on the authors’ insights, mostly from France. Then, the chapter turns towards recent evolutions, be it structural or transient, as well as incentives at various levels that could contribute to a transition of higher education. (shrink)

This introduction draws on Charles Dickens’ analysis of schooling in England during the industrial revolution to highlight the connection bethween the Anthropocene epoch we currently live in and education. While we outline points for critique, we are far from making a simple judgment. In reaction, we present the Great Transition Handbook with its systemic approach based on six gates, and we call on pedagogy to be more holistic in order to integrate all dimensions of humanity. We also clarify our understanding (...) of the Great Transition, as a process interweaving both social and ecological concerns. (shrink)

In this chapter we identify seven transversal principles which guide our pedagogical approach, and which are today widely shared by teachers. These principles also seem to us to be consistent with research in neuroscience, in particular that of Stanislas “Dehaene, Stanislas. Apprendre! les talents du cerveau, le défi des machines. Odile Jacob, Paris, (2018)” and his four pillars of learning – attention, active engagement, error and surprise signals and the consolidation of acquired knowledge – or those of Antonio “Damasio, Antonio (...) R. L’erreur de Descartes: la raison des émotions. Odile Jacob, Paris, (1995)” on the fundamental role of emotions in supporting learning. The principles advocated are: solicitation of curiosity and commitment; learning through sensitive experiences; connection of knowledge, emotions and values; reappropriation of assessment methods; multifaceted posture of the teacher; politicization of education; self-awareness and striving for common good.The principles highlighted in this section represent the major levers to be operated in order to provide students with truly transformative learning. Tools and examples of real-life implementation of these principles will be detailed in the second part of this book. (shrink)

Some universities have set up courses relating to the systemic integration of ecological and social issues into their curricula. We are presenting two types of initiatives here: first, those that come directly from universities or higher education institutions, such as the University of Lausanne; secondly, those which emanate from small organizations created to constitute a higher education transition laboratory, linked to a university institution, as is the case of Schumacher College (United Kingdom) linked to the University of Plymouth or the (...) Sustainability Institute (South Africa) attached to Stellenbosch University. (shrink)

Teachers may be skeptical about the possibility of implementing transition pedagogy, as outlined in the first part of this book, given the current context of higher education. Here we synthetize therefore the pedagogical tools that we have identified in the courses offered by establishments that have practiced a transition pedagogy for a long time, as well as those being used at the Campus de la Transition since 2018. We also draw on interviews with experts and practitioners, psychologists, teachers and explorers (...) of new practices. (Interviews with Chrysoline Brabant – clinical psychologist and certified coach, Mark Swilling – founder of the Sustainability Institute, Jacques Tardif – professor at the University of Sherbrooke and specialist in university pedagogy, Laurent Van Ditzhuyzen – co-founder of the Université du Nous, Thibault Griessinger – PhD in cognitive sciences and founder of Acte Lab, Hubert Trapet and Valérie Fayard – Emmaüs France CEO and vice-chair). The chapter starts with the lightest tools, which can be set up quite easily in a classroom, moving towards the most ambitious, and resulting in a coherent picture of the higher establishment in service of the Great Transition teachings. (shrink)

This book functions as a practical guide to support teachers and higher education institutions in the construction of their courses and programmes in light of the Anthropocene. It is divided into two complementary parts. The first part lays the theoretical foundations of what is a transition pedagogy and provides a pedagogical framework. It offers practical tools and didactic levers to be used by teachers and institutions to build a truly transformative pedagogy for students, with reference to universities already experimenting such (...) alternative methods. The second part presents an analysis of the pedagogical tools and levers experienced in worldwide institutions, by teachers, as well as philosophers and experts of pedagogy. The authors of this book advocate for an embodied pedagogy which not only gives students access to content but also to ways of thinking and acting in all conscience. A pedagogy of the Anthropocene epoch therefore encourages the mobilization of reason, emotions and senses as well as systemic reflection in the questioning of our lifestyles and the development of transversal skills. Based on internationally recognized research and practical experiences of institutions and teachers all over the western world, this book gathers the knowledge and experience of professors and researchers, coming from a wide variety of disciplines and cultural context. Their reflections have led them to develop a “head-heart-body approach” and a “6 Gates questioning method” to remodel pedagogy. This book is of interest to those working in the education sector. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that imagination is heterogeneous: we need to draw a series of cross-cutting distinctions even to begin any serious general discussion of the range of activities we take to be typical instances. The nature of the heterogeneity being exhibited is usually left unclear, however, and thus so are its consequences both for our understanding of imagination and for assessing certain challenges such as reductionism. Here it is argued that we can accept heterogeneity while recognizing important forms of (...) unity among the various kinds of imaginative activity. Four distinct but compatible strategies are considered, three of which have historical precedents in Aristotle’s and Hegel’s work. These proposals yield an interesting and plausible answer to the problem raised by heterogeneity, and have consequences for how we should respond to it. They share a plausible framework for thinking about the relationships among the various activities contemporary thinkers take to involve imagination. However, there are some ways in which deploying them is not straightforward, given some differences between modern approaches and older ones, and they conflict with a common thought about the epistemic status of imagination. (shrink)

Though not often discussed as such, Gore Vidal's Myra Breckinridge is a work of queer utopianism. Myra herself is an entrancing figure—a self-created goddess who is determined to save humanity by abolishing gender itself. That her efforts ultimately fail is a testament to the queerness of her utopianism. Using Lee Edelman's discussion of “reproductive futurism” and José Esteban Muñoz's insights into the queerness of utopianism, this article analyzes the ways in which Myra Breckinridge channels both hopeful and destructive urges as (...) a way of imagining a counter-narrative to the human catastrophe represented by the atomic bomb and the threat of overpopulation. (shrink)

The third author has shown that Shelah's eventual categoricity conjecture holds in universal classes: class of structures closed under isomorphisms, substructures, and unions of chains. We extend this result to the framework of multiuniversal classes. Roughly speaking, these are classes with a closure operator that is essentially algebraic closure (instead of, in the universal case, being essentially definable closure). Along the way, we prove in particular that Galois (orbital) types in multiuniversal classes are determined by their finite restrictions, generalizing a (...) result of the second author. (shrink)

We describe an approach to textual inference that improves alignments at both the typed dependency level and at a deeper semantic level. We present a machine learning approach to alignment scoring, a stochastic search procedure, and a new tool that finds deeper semantic alignments, allowing rapid development of semantic features over the aligned graphs. Further, we describe a complementary semantic component based on natural logic, which shows an added gain of 3.13% accuracy on the RTE3 test set.

O genocídio indígena esteve presente na ditadura civil-militar brasileira (1964-1985), assim como em todos os períodos após as invasões portuguesas de 1500. A partir do uso dos ideais coloniais e da estrutura capitalista, as políticas de desenvolvimentismo com as invasões às terras indígenas culminaram no genocídio que foi protagonizado pelo Exército Brasileiro. Segundo a Comissão Nacional da Verdade, mais de 8.350 indígenas foram mortos durante o período de 1946 a 1988, número este que pode ser bem maior, dado que o (...) levantamento da CNV contabilizou apenas 10 povos –, dentre eles, 2.650 do povo Waimiri Atroari. O principal evento em que as mortes dos Waimiri Atroari ocorreram foi a construção da BR-174 que liga Manaus a Boa Vista. A Comissão Nacional da Verdade, estabelecida com a Lei 12.528/2011, teve o objetivo de examinar e esclarecer as graves violações de direitos humanos praticadas no período de 1946 a 1988. Por meio do campo teórico-metodológico da História do Tempo Presente foi possível analisar os temas elencados para apontar as feridas ainda abertas na história e memória nacional. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:arrêt sur visagefrom Hatred of Translation1Nathanaël (bio)or else isolated in silence—Danielle Collobert, Ça des motsIn the language of film there are often extraordinary divergences between English and French, which prove at times to be irreconcilable.2 If this tendency toward discrepancy is true of translation as a rule, it reveals itself to be particularly true in the case of this work in translation. Danielle Collobert's Recherche,3 rendered as Research, in (...) which the search of re-search must be read as detachable, with emphasis on its repetitive motion—but also in its slide from substantive to predicate (search>searches)—makes salient such divergences, through the implied camera movement panning over the evacuated faces of A and B and the marked distances especially that define the space of their bodies, in proximity and in remove, as though the text were annotating a form of recusal that is implicit in the spaces of desire to which their mortiferous movements owe everything; an intimacy of anticipated death, and seizure, from which the camera extracts movements of degradation through violent stillness.Indeed the term still here is adopted to render the French arrêt, proposing a false equivalency between the (film) still and its seemingly concordant locution, the arrêt (sur image). These are "attested" terms that reveal something of the contexts in which each seeks to function. In Recherche Collobert limits herself [End Page 138] to the use of arrêt sur, designating in each instance a specific detail on which the camera is to stop. "Stop" of course is one of the translations of the lone substantive "arrêt," which also implies "arrest" (from the verb arrêter), replete with its juridical (enforceable/enforcible) intent.4One might just as readily translate "arrêt sur" as "stop at," stopping at nothing to achieve the irresistible demands of such a transitive language that subverts its own objectivity through a persistent preference for passive forms, abdicating one's responsibility to the law in abject deference to its capital aims. Regimens of grammar are coincident with regimens of power now as always.5More than one frontier has now been crossed, and reading the three works6 gathered by Françoise Morvan under the title Expériences (experiments and/ or experiences) in this so-called America is a serious transposition indeed in which the sands of north-western France adjoining the virulent Atlantic, may readily allow themselves to be supplanted by an imagined far-ouest of burnt deserts shimmering with radioactive particulate, under some gun. These are voided investigations that succeed only in subtracting the body from its criminality—a condemnation of ages pressed into moments, a crime committed to each and every one.Meurtre (Murder), the title of Collobert's first acknowledged work,7 is just as operative in these cinematic and radiophonic works; indeed, it can be read as a mot d'ordre for her entire oeuvre,8 and with which its entire topography is suffused. The stills of Recherche and "Polyphonie" attest to this, as does the recurrence of the isolate arrêt, whether in its designation of a bus stop or a pause in action (breaks in the fight, for example, between B and the man on the dock), toppling into the near untranslatable arrêts in the plural, stops, which invites, again, a transitive reading rather than the congealment of the plural substantive, and this, in keeping with the stares that transfix and bore into the faces verging on the dunes. The polysemic displacement of arrêt is such that the cumulative effect of its multiply transposed sense is that of a filmstrip caught in a projector, and it isn't clear whether the image is held or whether it is caught in the mechanism; in either case, the reader is among those held captive by a language that forbids release, burrowing instead, more deeply, into a thickeningly menacing interiority with its inscription of fear similar to that elicited by the perceived approach of the beast in Kafka's "The Burrow." The time of exposure holds the permanent promise of such a threat. [End Page 139]Nathanaël Nathanaël... (shrink)

Working in a fixed Grothendieck topos Sh(C, J C ) we generalize \({\mathcal{L}_{{\infty},\omega}}\) to allow our languages and formulas to make explicit reference to Sh(C, J C ). We likewise generalize the notion of model. We then show how to encode these generalized structures by models of a related sentence of \({\mathcal{L}_{{\infty},\omega}}\) in the category of sets and functions. Using this encoding we prove analogs of several results concerning \({\mathcal{L}_{{\infty},\omega}}\) , such as the downward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, the completeness theorem and (...) Barwise compactness. (shrink)

Depuis plusieurs décennies, s’est instaurée « une nouvelle ère » pour le corps, caractérisée par une évolution des pratiques médicales, mais aussi et surtout par le développement de nouvelles utopies. Face aux envahissantes mythologies et agitations idéologiques, l’objectif de cet article est donc de tenter de définir la réalité du « surhomme » d’aujourd’hui et d’analyser quelques-uns des mécanismes idéologiques qui participent à la fabrication de ce mythe.

This book aims to answer two main questions about Aristotle’s theory of causality and causal explanation, especially in relation to natural science: (1) How does he answer the main philosophical questions about causes to which he thinks his predecessors’ answers are flawed? (2) How do his answers bear on the main questions we confront in thinking about causality in general? The texts that deal with causality directly are analyzed against the background of his criticisms of his predecessors and his broader (...) views about explanation, highlighting their theoretically important commitments. This allows us to reveal the conceptual architecture of his theory. The basic theory is then applied to two questions about causality, one metaphysical and one epistemological. The metaphysical question is how to account for the relation between causes and what they cause, in light of a fundamental tension between different desiderata for causal explanations. Aristotle’s answer is pluralistic: he does not think that there is one metaphysical relationship between causes and what they cause even within a given mode of causality. The epistemological question asks how we grasp causes, and grasp them in a way that yields scientific understanding. Aristotle’s answer is again a pluralist one: metaphysically different phenomena demand different cognitive resources, and some are more accessible than others. Nevertheless, there is a discernible path from simpler to more sophisticated types of cognitive grasp on causality, in such a way that Aristotle can plausibly satisfy the epistemological constraints he thinks his predecessors cannot. Aristotle thus aims to provide a non-reductionist account of causality that still leaves room for a substantive conception of understanding in natural science. (shrink)

We show how to encode, by classical structures, both the objects and the morphisms of the category of complete metric spaces and uniformly continuous maps. The result is a category of, what we call, cognate metric spaces and cognate maps. We show this category relativizes to all models of set theory. We extend this encoding to an encoding of complete metric structures by classical structures. This provide us with a general technique for translating results about infinitary logic on classical structures (...) to the setting of infinitary continuous logic on continuous structures. Our encoding will also allow us to talk about not only the relations between complete metric structures, but also the potential relations between complete metric structures, i.e. those which are satisfied in some larger model of set theory. For example we will show that given any two complete metric structures we can determine if they are potentially isomorphic by looking at any admissible set which contains them both. (shrink)

Define a second order tree to be a map between trees. We show that many properties of ordinary trees have analogs for second order trees. In particular, we show that there is a notion of “definition by recursion on a well-founded second order tree” which generalizes “definition by transfinite recursion”. We then use this new notion of definition by recursion to prove an analog of Lusin’s Separation theorem for closure spaces of global sections of a second order tree.

Every set can been thought of as a directed graph whose edge relation is ∈. We show that many natural examples of directed graphs of this kind are indivisible: for every infinite κ, for every indecomposable λ, and every countable model of set theory. All of the countable digraphs we consider are orientations of the countable random graph. In this way we find indivisible well‐founded orientations of the random graph that are distinct up to isomorphism, and ℵ1 that are distinct (...) up to siblinghood. (shrink)

Aristotle thinks that we understand something when we know its causes. According to Aristotle but contrary to most recent approaches, causation and explanation cannot be understood separately. Aristotle complicates matters by claiming that there are four causes, which have come to be known as the formal, material, final, and efficient causes. To understand Aristotelian causation and its relationship to explanation, then, we must come to a precise understanding of the four causes, and how they are supposed to be explanatory. Aristotle’s (...) discussion of the causes, however, is compact, and he typically presents them without arguing for them. He thus leaves us with a number of questions, ranging from the highly specific to the highly general. One question in particular has captured the attention of scholars and philosophers over the last century, and it has had a strong influence on recent treatments of the four causes – namely, whether we are right to understand Aristotle as committed to a plurality of kinds of causation, or rather a plurality of kinds of explanation. Sometimes the question is raised as one of whether it would be more accurate to speak of the four ‘becauses’ rather than the four ‘causes’. This worry is highly general, and there are in fact several ways in which it might be formulated; nonetheless, it is important to clarify the precise nature of the problem, and the possible ways of responding to it. At issue is not just whether Aristotle’s notions are sufficiently like the modern notion of causation to be relevant to our concerns, but, more importantly, whether the distinctions he draws are ultimately metaphysical or epistemological in character. (shrink)

In this paper we define a notion of relativization for higher order logic. We then show that there is a higher order theory of Grothendieck topoi such that all Grothendieck topoi relativizes to all models of set theory with choice.

Central to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology is the claim that ‘aitia’ – ‘cause’ – is “said in many ways”, i.e., multivocal. Though the importance of the four causes in Aristotle's system cannot be overstated, the nature of his pluralism about aitiai has not been addressed. It is not at all obvious how these modes of causation are related to one another, or why they all deserve a common term. Nor is it clear, in particular, whether the causes are related to (...) one another as species under a single genus, such that there is a univocal definition of ‘aitia’ which applies to all of them, or whether Aristotle means to assert that the four causes are homonyms. It is argued here that although there are strong reasons to group the four causes together, there are also powerful considerations on the side of homonymy. It is further argued that the four causes are more closely tied to the ontological theory of categories and predication than is often recognized. As a result, we can reconcile the competing demands of unity and plurality by taking one mode of causation, the formal cause, as basic, and accounting for the other modes with reference to it, in the manner of so-called pros hen homonyms. (shrink)

Aristotle opens his discussion of time in Physics 4.10-14 with a puzzle, an argument which purports to show that time does not exist, since its only parts – the past and future – do not exist. He does not discuss the puzzle again, and so we are left with the question of how he would or could solve it. A full solution would involve not only a justification of realism about time, but also an account of why the puzzle arises, (...) what must be corrected to prevent it from arising, and how much of our pre-theoretical picture of time survives these adjustments. This paper argues that we can provide such a solution by (i) distinguishing between two ways of being committed to the reality of past, present, and future, and (ii) examining Aristotle’s remarks in Physics 4.12 on the notions of being in time and being surrounded by time. (shrink)

Like many realists about causation and causal powers, Aristotle uses the language of necessity when discussing causation, and he appears to think that by invoking necessity, he is clarifying the manner in which causes bring about or determine their effects. In so doing, he would appear to run afoul of Humean criticisms of the notion of a necessary connection between cause and effect. The claim that causes necessitate their effects may be understood—or attacked—in several ways, however, and so whether the (...) view or its criticism is tenable depends on how we understand the necessitation claim. In fact, Aristotelian efficient causation may be said to involve two distinct necessary connections: one is a relation between causes considered as potential, while the other relates them considered as active. That is, the claims that (1) what has the power to heat necessarily heats what has the power to be heated, and that (2) a particular flame which is actually under a pot necessarily heats it, both of which appear to be true for Aristotle, involve distinct notions of necessity. The latter kind of necessity is based on the facts, as Aristotle sees them, about change, whereas the former is based in the nature of properties. Though different, both kinds of necessity are instances of what contemporary philosophers would call metaphysical necessity, and together they also amount to a theory of causal determination. (shrink)

Aristotle presents four causes in Posterior Analytics 2.11, but where we expect matter we find instead the confusing formula, ‘what things being the case, necessarily this is the case’, and an equally confusing example. Some commentators infer that Aristotle is not referring to matter, others that he is but in a non-standard way. I argue that APo. 94a20-34 presents not matter, but determination by general features or facts, including facts about something’s genus. The closest connection to matter is Aristotle’s view (...) that the relation between genus and species is analogous to that between matter and a hylomorphic compound. (shrink)

Suppose that $\sigma\in{\mathcal{L}}_{\omega _{1},\omega }$ is such that all equations occurring in $\sigma$ are positive, have the same set of variables on each side of the equality symbol, and have at least one function symbol on each side of the equality symbol. We show that $\sigma$ satisfies Vaught’s conjecture. In particular, this proves Vaught’s conjecture for sentences of $ {\mathcal{L}}_{\omega _{1},\omega }$ without equality.

Let G be a model of Presburger arithmetic. Let be an expansion of the language of Presburger. In this paper, we prove that the ‐theory of G is ‐minimal iff it has the exchange property and is definably complete (i.e., any bounded definable set has a maximum). If the ‐theory of G has the exchange property but is not definably complete, there is a proper definable convex subgroup H. Assuming that the induced theories on H and are definable complete and (...) o‐minimal respectively, we prove that any definable set of G is ‐definable. (shrink)

Let be the field of p‐adic numbers in the language of rings. In this paper we consider the theory of expanded by two predicates interpreted by multiplicative subgroups and where are multiplicatively independent. We show that the theory of this structure interprets Peano arithmetic if α and β have positive p‐adic valuation. If either α or β has zero valuation we show that the theory of has the NIP (“negation of the independence property”) and therefore does not interpret Peano arithmetic. (...) In that case we also prove that the theory is decidable if and only if the theory of is decidable. (shrink)

Sartre analyse l’imagination dans le contexte d’une radicalisation de l’intentionnalité husserlienne. Alors que Husserl opérait avec un concept de constitution qui explicitait le statut de la transcendance à partir de l’immanence, la phénoménologie sartrienne semblerait faire l’économie de la notion de constitution. Mais ce point est plus délicat qu’il n’y paraît. Sartre rencontre plusieurs types de transcendances problématiques : celle de l’Ego (en 1936), de certaines images (1940), et celle du « soi » (1943). Cette étude vise à montrer comment (...) ces transcendances amènent à un remaniement implicite : il existerait un concept de constitution opératoire chez Sartre qui se passe de toute référence à l’immanence. Au moyen de l’imagination, nous proposons de clarifier le lexique sartrien : unité, identité et individualité sont des termes impliqués dans une analyse de la constitution. On montrera en quoi la « constitution sartrienne » met en évidence une dimension transcendantale de la phénoménologie de Sartre qui permet d’apprécier à nouveaux frais l’enjeu et les limites de ses prétentions ontologiques. (shrink)

Sartre analyse l’imagination dans le contexte d’une radicalisation de l’intentionnalité husserlienne. Alors que Husserl opérait avec un concept de constitution qui explicitait le statut de la transcendance à partir de l’immanence, la phénoménologie sartrienne semblerait faire l’économie de la notion de constitution. Mais ce point est plus délicat qu’il n’y paraît. Sartre rencontre plusieurs types de transcendances problématiques : celle de l’Ego (en 1936), de certaines images (1940), et celle du « soi » (1943). Cette étude vise à montrer comment (...) ces transcendances amènent à un remaniement implicite : il existerait un concept de constitution opératoire chez Sartre qui se passe de toute référence à l’immanence. Au moyen de l’imagination, nous proposons de clarifier le lexique sartrien : unité, identité et individualité sont des termes impliqués dans une analyse de la constitution. On montrera en quoi la « constitution sartrienne » met en évidence une dimension transcendantale de la phénoménologie de Sartre qui permet d’apprécier à nouveaux frais l’enjeu et les limites de ses prétentions ontologiques. (shrink)

Hayek and the Efficient Market Hypothesis are often seen as proposing a similar theory of prices. Hayek is seen as proposing to understand prices as information conveyer, incorporating inform...

We have reason to think that a fundamental goal of natural science, on Aristotle’s view, is to discover the essence-specifying definitions of natural kinds—with biological species as perhaps the most obvious case. However, we have in the end precious little evidence regarding what an Aristotelian definition of the form of a natural kind would look like, and so Aristotle’s view remains especially obscure precisely where it seems to be most applicable. I argue that if we can get a better understanding (...) of how the forms of natural kinds are or come to be known, and how they make things intelligible, we can get a better appreciation of the nature of form in general, as well as solve certain puzzles about form and definition. (shrink)

George Eliot strikingly describes one of her characters as making a mistake because he has gotten his thoughts “entangled in metaphors,” saying that we all do the same. I argue that Eliot is here giving us more than an illuminating description, but drawing our attention to a distinctive kind of mistake—a form of irrationality, in fact—of which metaphor can be an ineliminable part of the correct explanation. Her fictional case helps illuminate both a neglected function of the imagination, and a (...) pervasive way in which metaphor can affect it. The function is the creation and maintenance of what I call imaginative expectations, which are relatively stable imaginative representations of future events or experiences, analogous to latent memories. These imaginative expectations have a distinctive causal profile and distinct ways of interacting with other mental activities. I argue that their formation is subject to at least two norms—a “source” norm and an “experience” norm—and show how metaphorical framing can give rise to violations of either. (shrink)

La figure de l’entrepreneur est aujourd’hui utilisée dans une grande variété de discours publics. Ce travail cherche à remonter à l’une des sources théoriques de la constitution de cette figure : la théorie de l’entrepreneur de Schumpeter (1911a et 1911b). Ce retour montre que Schumpeter, dans son contexte intellectuel et théorique, est amené à importer une anthropologie philosophique en économie, celle de Nietzsche, auteur largement lu dans l’Autriche du début du xxe siècle. En transposant, à l’intérieur de sa théorie économique, (...) certaines caractéristiques majeures du grand homme créatif nietzschéen dans la figure de l’entrepreneur, Schumpeter développe une explication originale de la nature dynamique du marché et de l’évolution économique. Néanmoins il importe aussi de Nietzsche une série d’ambiguïtés, notamment en ce qui concerne l’origine de l’exceptionnalité individuelle de l’entrepreneur, et plus particulièrement de sa puissance créatrice. Une seconde ambiguïté est très largement héritée, qui concerne l’extension du modèle de l’individu entrepreneur : constitue-t-il une théorie de l’action valable pour tous les individus ou uniquement pour un type d’individus particuliers? Comment concilier exceptionnalité de l’entrepreneur et norme d’un entreprenariat pour tous? La dernière partie de ce travail s’attache ainsi à explorer ces ambiguïtés, qui apparaissent chez Schumpeter et ses successeurs, notamment Israël Kirzner.Codes JEL : B13, B25, B31, B40. (shrink)

Les années 1930 et 1940 marquent une période de crise pour le libéralisme. Des auteurs aussi divers que Friedrich Hayek, Wilhelm Röpke, Walter Lippmann ou encore Michael Polanyi et Louis Rougier se réunissent lors de deux événements fondateurs, le colloque Walter Lippmann en 1938 et la création de la Société du Mont-Pèlerin en 1947, pour repenser le libéralisme. Cette refonte du projet libéral les pousse à établir un diagnostic relatif à la crise du libéralisme, remontant, pour les auteurs mentionnés, à (...) la Révolution française. Cet article se propose de montrer la cohérence du projet néolibéral à partir de leur diagnostic historique dans cette période de crise. En effet, en critiquant la Révolution française et ses effets comme participant d’un rationalisme néfaste, ayant donné naissance aussi bien au laissez-faire qu’aux divers collectivismes, les néolibéraux reprennent explicitement des concepts des critiques de la révolution, au premier rang desquels Edmund Burke. Le concept de tradition, compris comme recouvrant des règles sociales et juridiques ayant lentement évolué de façon à constituer des dispositifs de coordination permettant nos actions, est ainsi très largement repris et valorisé par les néolibéraux. Nous interprétons ainsi la théorie néolibérale à partir de cette recatégorisation du concept de tradition, et pointons les affinités des positions néolibérales avec le conservatisme philosophique. Ce rapprochement fait apparaître plusieurs tensions conceptuelles entre d’une part un évolutionnisme culturel et d’autre part la défense de valeurs occidentales substantielles. (shrink)

The alleged but unclear distinction between so-called “immanent” and so-called “transeunt” causation is structurally similar to an Aristotelian distinction between two kinds of potentiality (dunamis). It is argued that Aristotle’s distinction is in turn grounded in one between a metaphysically basic notion, rooted in his property theory, and a metaphysically posterior notion proper to the understanding of change in the science of nature. By examining Aristotle’s distinction, we can give a satisfying account of immanent and transeunt causation more generally. Furthermore, (...) once we clarify the distinction in this way, some contemporary appeals to immanent causation turn out to be misguided, while others look promising. (shrink)