The volume brings together a collection of original papers on some of the main tenets of Joseph Raz's legal and political philosophy: Legal positivism and the nature of law, practical reason, authority, the value of equality, incommensurability, harm, group rights, and multiculturalism. James Griffin and Yael Tamir raise questions concerning Raz's notion of group rights and its application to claims of cultural and political autonomy, while Will Kymlicka and Bernhard Peters examine Raz's theory of multicultural society. Lukas Meyer investigates the (...) applicability of the notion of harm in the intergenerational context. Other papers are devoted to fundamental theoretical tenets of Raz's work. Hillel Steiner and Andrei Marmor examine Raz's account of value pluralism and incommensurability in light of what these authors consider to be goods whose equal distribution must be valued for its own sake. Robert Alexy and Timothy Endicott discuss traditional issues of jurisprudence and legal philosphy with special attention to Raz's contribution. Rüdiger Bittner, Bruno Celano, and J. E. Penner discuss and criticize aspects of Raz's theory of practical reason. Jeremy Waldron presents a critique of Raz's interpretation of authority.This volume concludes with a chapter by Joseph Raz in which he responds to arguments in the foregoing essays. (shrink)

I will discuss a variety of cases such that the subject's believing truly is somewhat of an accident, but less so than in a Gettier case. In each case, this is because her reasons are not ultimately undefeated full stop, but they are ultimately undefeated with certain qualifications. For example, the subject's reasons might be ultimately defeated considered in themselves but ultimately undefeated considered as a proper part of an inference to the best explanation that is undefeated without qualification. In (...) each section of the paper, I consider different qualifications and show how in each case we get an epistemic standing I call “coach-class knowledge”. First-class knowledge requires justifying reasons that are undefeated without qualification. Coach-class knowledge only requires qualified lack of defeat. I will use this distinction to bring debates over knowledge from falsehood and fake barns to an ecumenical resolution. In both cases, the subject enjoys coach-class rather than first-class knowledge. I will also show that the defeasible reasoning tradition can better account for graded accidental truth than safety theories. (shrink)

The volume brings together a collection of original papers on some of the main tenets of Joseph Raz's legal and political philosophy: Legal positivism and the nature of law, practical reason, authority, the value of equality, incommensurability, harm, group rights, and multiculturalism.

Hans Kelsen est, sans conteste, le juriste le plus important de ce siècle. Il n'y a pas une seule question de théorie juridique qu'on puisse traiter aujourd'hui sans examiner d'abord l'analyse qu'il en fait, mais son œuvre ne concerne pas seulement le droit et la philosophie du droit ; elle touche aussi la philosophie politique, l'épistémologie, l'éthique ou la logique. Sa théorie du droit représente, à côté du réalisme, l'une des deux branches du juspositivisme moderne, connue sous le nom de (...) normativisme et que lui-même appelait " Théorie pure du droit ". Elle se donne comme une théorie scientifique qui se borne à décrire son objet, le droit positif, et qui donc est " pure " de tout jugement de valeur. La pureté ne concerne toutefois que la méthodologie. Le droit, lui, n'est nullement pur, car il exprime des choix moraux et politiques. La doctrine kelsenienne pure apparaît ainsi doublement politique : d'une part, elle se donne pour tâche de mettre en évidence la fonction idéologique du droit ; d'autre part, dans la mesure où elle analyse les dispositifs juridiques comme des moyens au service de certaines fins, elle peut servir de fondement à une véritable technologie juridique. C'est cette technologie que Kelsen prétendait appliquer à la politique et qui fonde aussi bien son travail de constituant - il est le père de la Constitution autrichienne et de la première Cour constitutionnelle - que ses écrits sur la démocratie. La Théorie générale du droit et de l'Etat présente à cet égard un intérêt exceptionnel. Elle a été écrite aux Etats-Unis, où Kelsen s'était réfugié au début de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Comme le souligne Stanley L. Paulson dans son introduction, elle constitue une étape marquante dans l'évolution de sa pensée entre le néokantisme des origines et l'empirisme des derniers écrits. C'est aussi une présentation claire, systématique et concentrée de l'ensemble de sa doctrine et c'est le seul ouvrage de Kelsen qui porte à la fois sur les conditions de possibilité d'une science empirique du droit, sur la théorie générale du droit au sens strict - l'analyse structurale de tous les ordres juridiques possibles - et sur la théorie générale de l'Etat - l'analyse des concepts constitutifs de tout Etat possible. (shrink)

In this paper, I will present a problem for reductive accounts of knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. By “reductive” I mean accounts that try to analyze epistemic luck in non-epistemic terms. I will begin by briefly considering Jennifer Lackey's (2006) criticism of Duncan Pritchard's (2005) safety-based account of epistemic luck. I will further develop her objection to Pritchard by drawing on the defeasible-reasoning tradition. I will then show that her objection to safety-based accounts is an instance of a more general problem with (...) reductive accounts of epistemic luck. In short, they face a dilemma: they can either fail to vindicate the intuitive verdicts about cases or they can illicitly appeal to the epistemic vocabulary they are trying to reduce. The upshot is that we can only understand epistemic luck in terms of the assessment of the subject's reasons and we can't give a reductive account of that. (shrink)

In Section I, Kelsen introduces the legal order as an aggregate of norms and considers the question of the basis of the validity of a norm. He then turns, in Section II, to a series of questions that arise in connection with “unconstitutional” statutes. Finally, in Section III, Kelsen defends at length a monistic interpretation of the relation between the international and domestic legal orders. (Translator's summary.).

I am interested in the “rational irrationality hypothesis” about voter behavior. According to this hypothesis, voters regularly vote for policies that are contrary to their interests because the act of voting for them isn’t. Gathering political information is time-consuming and inconvenient. Doing so is unlikely to lead to positive results since one's vote is unlikely to be decisive. However, we have preferences over our political beliefs. We like to see ourselves as members of certain groups (e.g. “rugged individualists”) and being (...) part of those groups depends on having certain beliefs (e.g. about welfare spending). Even if a decrease in welfare spending would be bad for me, I might still benefit by believing in and, consequently, voting for a decrease since my vote is unlikely to make a difference but getting to see myself as a rugged individualist will make a noticeable difference to my wellbeing. It is sometimes argued that this hypothesis fails for empirical reasons. I will argue that things are worse: it is conceptually incoherent. I will do so by first showing that it is a rationalizing explanation and then argue that rationalizing explanations must be reflectively stable from the agent's perspective. The rational irrationality hypothesis is not. (shrink)

First, the author examines the traditional doctrine of imputation. A look at the traditional doctrine is useful for establishing a point of departure in comparing Kelsen's doctrines of central and peripheral imputation. Second, the author turns to central imputation. Here Kelsen's doctrine follows the traditional doctrine in attributing liability or responsibility to the subject. Kelsen's legal subject, however, has been depersonalized and thus requires radical qualification. Third, the author takes up peripheral imputation, which is the main focus of the paper. (...) It is argued that with respect to the basic form of the law, exhibited by the linking of legal condition with legal consequence, peripheral imputation counts as an austere doctrine, shorn as it is of all references to legal personality or the legal subject. If Kelsen's reconstructed legal norms are empowerments, then the austere doctrine of peripheral imputation captures the rudiments of their form, exactly what would be expected if peripheral imputation does indeed serve as the category of legal cognition. Finally, the author develops the puzzle surrounding the legal “ought” in this context. Although Kelsen talks at one point as though the legal “ought” were the peculiarly legal category, the author submits that this is not the best reading of Kelsen's texts. (shrink)

Traditionally legal theorists, whenever engaged in controversy, have agreed on one point: legal norms are par excellence rules which impose obligations. The author examines this assumption, which from another perspective (that of constitutional law, for instance) appears less obvious. In fact, constitutional rules are commoniy empowering norms, norms which do not create duties but powers. To this objection many theorists would reply that empowering rules are incomplete and that they are to be understood as parts of duty‐creating rules. A different (...) position from this traditional stance is that defended in Kelsen's later writings, according to which the fundamental type of norm is the empowering norm. The author discusses Kelsen's three theories on the “ideal form” or structure of the legal norm, with special attention to the third of these, the empowerment theory. (shrink)

Here I will re-purpose Nozick’s (1974) “Experience Machine” thought experiment against hedonism into an argument against Veritic Epistemic Consequentialism. According to VEC, the right action, epistemically speaking, is the one that results in at least as favorable a ratio of true to false belief as any other action available. A consequence of VEC is that it would be epistemically right to outsource all your cognitive endeavors to a matrix-like “True Belief Machine” that uploads true beliefs through artificial stimulation. Rather than (...) reflecting, inferring or inquiring, all of your beliefs would be the product of updates coming from the machine. This implication of VEC is counter intuitive. I will spend much of the paper considering defensive maneuvers and showing them to be lacking. The problem with going in for the True Belief Machine seems to be that the subject forfeits her autonomy. There has been much work lately on the virtue of intellectual autonomy and some of it has the potential to explain what is epistemically amiss about plugging into the machine. However, I will argue that the proponent of VEC cannot appeal to it without abandoning her preferred order of explanation. (shrink)

Ackermann’s function can be expressed using an iterative algorithm, which essentially takes the form of a term rewriting system. Although the termination of this algorithm is far from obvious, its equivalence to the traditional recursive formulation—and therefore its totality—has a simple proof in Isabelle/HOL. This is a small example of formalising mathematics using a proof assistant, with a focus on the treatment of difficult recursions.

Hans Kelsen's legal philosophy and legal theory is regarded by many in the field as the most influential theory in this century. This volume makes available some of the best work extant on Kelsens' theory, including papers newly translated into English. It covers topics such as competing philosophical positons on the nature of law, legal validity, legal powers, and the unity of municipal and international law, as well as shedding light on Kelsen's intellectual milieu and his intellectual debts.

This present study takes a new look at the essayist Michel de Montaigne and the philosopher Rene Descartes and attempts to show a new interrelationship between the two. Previous studies have linked the latter's Discours de la mÈthode to the Essais and have noted general similarities, but no major study to date has examined the pair from the standpoint of Descartes' TraitÈ des passions and Montaigne's Essais.

This present study takes a new look at the essayist Michel de Montaigne and the philosopher Rene Descartes and attempts to show a new interrelationship between the two. Previous studies have linked the latter's Discours de la m,thode to the Essais and have noted general similarities, but no major study to date has examined the pair from the standpoint of Descartes' Trait, des passions and Montaigne's Essais.

Whereas fundamental norms in the juridico‐philosophical tradition serve to impose constraints, Kelsen's fundamental norm—or basic norm —purports to establish the normativist character of the law. But how is the basic norm itself established? Kelsen himself rules out the appeals that are familiar from the tradition—the appeal to fact, and to morality. What remains is a Kantian argument. I introduce and briefly evaluate the Kantian and neo‐Kantian positions, as applied to Kelsen's theory. The distinction between the two positions, I argue, is (...) reflected in an ambiguity in the use of the term “regressive.”. (shrink)

This book tells an overlooked story in the history of the will, a contested idea in both politics and philosophy of mind. For it is Cicero, statesman and philosopher, who gives shape to the notion of will as it would become in Western thought and who invents the idea of 'the will of the people'. In a single word – voluntas – he brings Roman law in contact with Greek ideas, chief among them Plato's claim that a rational elite must (...) rule. When the republic falls to Caesarism, Cicero turns his political argument inward: will is a force to win the virtue in the soul that was lost on the battlefield, the marker of inner freedom in an unfree age. Though his vision of a free republic failed in his time, Cicero's ideal of rational elitism has shaped and fractured the modern world – and Ciceronian creativity may yet save it. (shrink)

In his introductory section, Christian Dahlman points to various “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” generated by the basic norm. I adduce arguments showing that these “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” do not arise - not, at any rate, from Dahlman’s premises. In his central section, Dahlman sets out three purported problems and claims to resolve them by appeal to one or another of the “three basic norms” that he adumbrates. None of these problems is resolved by Dahlman. Specifically, I adduce arguments showing that the (...) first problem is a straw man of Dahlman’s own making, his resolution of the second problem turns on his confusion of the fictitious basic norm in Kelsen’s post-1960 period with the basic norm of ostensibly normative import in Kelsen’s classical or neo-Kantian phase, and, finally, Dahlman’s resolution of the third problem turns on his confusion of Kelsen’s basic norm with H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition. I close with remarks on Kelsen’s own conception of the juridico-theoretical problems he faced. (shrink)

In his introductory section, Christian Dahlman points to various “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” generated by the basic norm. I adduce arguments showing that these “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” do not arise - not, at any rate, from Dahlman’s premises. In his central section, Dahlman sets out three purported problems and claims to resolve them by appeal to one or another of the “three basic norms” that he adumbrates. None of these problems is resolved by Dahlman. Specifically, I adduce arguments showing that the (...) first problem is a straw man of Dahlman’s own making, his resolution of the second problem turns on his confusion of the fictitious basic norm in Kelsen’s post-1960 period with the basic norm of ostensibly normative import in Kelsen’s classical or neo-Kantian phase, and, finally, Dahlman’s resolution of the third problem turns on his confusion of Kelsen’s basic norm with H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition. I close with remarks on Kelsen’s own conception of the juridico-theoretical problems he faced. (shrink)

Authority qua empowerment is theweak reading of authority in Hans Kelsen's writings.On the one hand, this reading appears to beunresponsive to the problem of authority as we know itfrom the tradition. On the other hand, it squares withlegal positivism. Is Kelsen a legal positivist?Not without qualification. For he defends anormativity thesis along with the separation thesis,and it is at any rate arguable that the normativitythesis mandates a stronger reading of authority thanthat modelled on empowerment. I offer, in the paper,a prima (...) facie case on behalf of a stronger reading ofauthority in Kelsen. I go on to argue, however, thatthe textual evidence weighs heavily in favour of theweak reading. Both nomostatics and nomodynamics arepervasive points of view in the Pure Theory of Law,and both reflect species of empowerment as theendpoint of Kelsen's reconstructions. (shrink)

Authority qua empowerment is theweak reading of authority in Hans Kelsen's writings.On the one hand, this reading appears to beunresponsive to the problem of authority as we know itfrom the tradition. On the other hand, it squares withlegal positivism. Is Kelsen a legal positivist?Not without qualification. For he defends anormativity thesis along with the separation thesis,and it is at any rate arguable that the normativitythesis mandates a stronger reading of authority thanthat modelled on empowerment. I offer, in the paper,a prima (...) facie case on behalf of a stronger reading ofauthority in Kelsen. I go on to argue, however, thatthe textual evidence weighs heavily in favour of theweak reading. Both nomostatics and nomodynamics arepervasive points of view in the Pure Theory of Law,and both reflect species of empowerment as theendpoint of Kelsen's reconstructions. (shrink)

Hans Kelsen’s purity thesis is the basic methodological principle of the Pure Theory of Law. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that virtually everything that is peculiar to Kelsen’s legal theory stems from the purity thesis. This includes Kelsen’s normativism or non‐naturalism and his polemic against various dualisms in legal science. I set out Kelsen’s position on these issues after looking at the nomenclature of purity in his writings as well as the philosophical and contextual sources of purity as (...) he understands them. (shrink)

The separability thesis claims that the concept of law can be explicated independently of morality, the normativity thesis, that it can be explicated independently of fact. Continental normativism, prominent above all in the work of Hans Kelsen, may be characterized in terms of the coupling of these theses. Like Kelsen, H. L. A. Hart is a proponent of the separability thesis. And–a leitmotiv–both theorists reject reductive legal positivism. They do not, however, reject it for the same reasons. Kelsen's reason, in (...) a word, is the normativity thesis. Hart, however, grounds his theory in social fact. In place of the reductive thesis of the legal positivist tradition, and in sharp contrast to Kelsen's normativity thesis, Hart defends a non‐reductive version of what the author terms the facticity thesis. (shrink)

It is often thought that the test for whether an indicative conditional is assertible is to first suppose the antecedent and then check to see if the consequent is probable on that supposition. Call this procedure the “Ramsey Test”. Some influential accounts of indicative conditionals hold that the Ramsey Test works because indicative conditionals are used to express a high credence in the consequent conditional on the antecedent. In this paper I will argue that a different expressivist account, one inspired (...) by Brandom can handle a wider range of phenomena. In particular, it does a better job explaining how conditionals function in modus tollens arguments. I will end by discussing how the account proposed here goes beyond Brandom’s own work on logic and hermeneutics. Of particular importance is the role played by a conversational common ground, distinct from the commitments of the interpreter and interpreted. (shrink)

In jurisprudential circles the year 1981 might well be dubbed the year of Hans Kelsen, with no fewer than three symposia celebrating the hundredth anniversary of his birth. The Association for Legal and Social Philosophy in the United Kingdom held a conference on Kelsen in Edinburgh in April, giving special attention to “legal epistemology” in the Pure Theory of Law. A symposium of the Austrian Association for Legal and Social Philosophy, held in the Schloss Retzhof near Graz in May, was (...) devoted to Kelsen's political theory and critique of ideology. And the Hans Kelsen Institute in Vienna sponsored a symposium in September on Kelsen's posthumously published work, the Allgemeine Theorie der Normen. All three events were marked by significant international participation, and they point to continuing widespread interest in Kelsen and the Pure Theory of Law. (shrink)

Kelsen's theory of legal norms can be assessed adequately only if his writings are assigned to different phases. Contrary to Stanley L. Paulson's view, there is a radical break in the genesis of the theory around 1940, when Kelsen abandons the specific neo-Kantian thesis that the general legal norm is identical with the hypothetical judgment of legal science in favour of a rather naïve conception, according to which the judgment of legal science simply reproduces the pre-existing legal norm on (...) a descriptive level. By reading this simple correspondence theory of truth of the later period into Kelsen's writings of the twenties, Paulson misses the central thesis of Kelsen's neo-Kantianism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to give an account of what it is to internalize a rule. I claim that internalization is the process of redistributing the burden of instruction from the teacher to the student. The process is complete when instruction is no longer needed, and the rule has reshaped perceptual classification of the circumstances in which it applies. Teaching a rule is the initiation of this process. We internalize rules by simulating instruction coming from someone else. Running (...) these simulations enables us to toggle between the perspective of the instructor and our own perspective. By doing this we coordinate our perspectives with that of the teacher. The account given here provides a deeper explanation of why internalizing a rule involves the dispositions and reactive attitudes proponents of Rule Consequentialism often say it does, why moral reflection is variably demanding, how intergenerational moral progress is made possible by our cognitive architectures, and why the adoption of a rule should be understood in terms of teaching that rule. (shrink)

As the prevalence of conflict and fragility continue to rise around the world, research is increasingly heralded as a solution. However, current ethical guidelines for working in areas suffering from institutional and social fragility, insecurity or violent conflict have been heavily critiqued as highly abstract; focussed only on data collection; detached from the realities of academia in the Global South; and potentially extractive. This article seeks to respond to that assessment by spotlighting some of the most prevalent challenges researchers face (...) in the pursuit of ethical working practices. It explores the material and epistemic injustices that often shape and underpin research structures and relationships in these contexts. The paper draws on the authors’ experiences of research in conflict-affected and fragile contexts over the last fifteen years and on workshop discussions with researchers based in fragile and conflict-affected contexts conducted in Amman, Bogotá and Dhaka in 2019-2020. The paper works from the premise that achieving ethical research in fragile spaces is not dependent solely on activity at the site of research, but also on decisions made across the entire ecosystem of a research project. It therefore interrogates the full research landscape, from funding models, to research design, to dissemination plans and ethical gatekeeping. The paper critically reflects on inequities in the processes of knowledge production about conflict and fragility and the key ethical challenges that researchers encounter. It highlights the need for further guidance, support and accountability to ensure ethical research practices. (shrink)

We present an embedding of quantified multimodal logics into simple type theory and prove its soundness and completeness. A correspondence between QKπ models for quantified multimodal logics and Henkin models is established and exploited. Our embedding supports the application of off-the-shelf higher-order theorem provers for reasoning within and about quantified multimodal logics. Moreover, it provides a starting point for further logic embeddings and their combinations in simple type theory.

The thesis is examined that medical schools tend to recruit those who, because of a single-minded pursuit of admission, lack the breadth of interest and the social experience necessary for the development of a socially sensitive and emotionally mature personality. This negative characterization, labeled “the premed syndrome,” has been linked to a perceived lack of physician concern for patients, interpersonal warmth, and humanitarian care. This paper reviews the various published arguments advanced by proponents and opponents of this view, analyzing the (...) presumed roots and implications and proposed remedies. (shrink)