El concepto de "inmanencia" ha adquirido una creciente relevancia en el campo filosófico contemporáneo. Dos destacados pensadores franceses, Gilles Deleuze y Franfois Jullien, le han otorgado un lugar fundamental en sus investigaciones. El propósito de este artículo es indagar el diálogo, poco explorado aún, entre ambos autores. Nuestra hipótesis de trabajo propone los siguientes ejes de análisis: primero, comparamos los usos de la expresión "absolutización de la inmanencia", acuñada por el sinólogo a fin de relativizar la trascendencia en el pensamiento (...) chino y luego empleada por Deleuze en el marco de la creencia en este mundo. En segundo lugar, examinamos las críticas que Jullien le dirige a Deleuze respecto a la relación entre la filosofía y la sabiduría. En tercer lugar, confrontamos sus perspectivas divergentes sobre la inmanencia en tanto "plano" (Deleuze) y como "fondo" (Jullien). Finalmente, ponemos de manifiesto la dificultad presente en ambos autores para pensar la idea de inmanencia. The concept of "immanence" has acquired substantial relevance within the contemporary philosophical field. Two influential french thinkers, Gilles Deleuze and Franfois Jullien, have conferred this concept a fundamental standing in their research. The purpose of this work is to explore the dialogue between both authors as this exploration has not been concluded. Our hypothesis puts forward the following axes of analysis. First, we shall compare the usage of the expression "absolutization of immanence" coined by the sinologist in order to put in perspective the idea of transcendence in Chinese thought. This expression was then applied by Deleuze within the frame of the belief in this world. Second, we shall examine Jullien's critique of Deleuze concerning the relationship between Philosophy and Wisdom. Third, we shall confront the divergent perspectives on immanence: as "plane" (Deleuze) and as "buttom" (Jullien). Finally, we shall show the difficulty to ponder the idea of immanence in both authors. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este artículo abordamos la cuestión del poder en el pensamiento de Deleuze. Según nuestra hipótesis, no hay en su obra un único concepto de poder sino diferentes enfoques no incompatibles entre sí pero que no se dejan reducir a un solo punto de vista. Esta variedad de abordajes puede ser reunida alrededor de dos posiciones generales adoptadas por Deleuze: primero, tiende a relativizar su eficacia respecto de otros elementos más fundamentales, realzando así los límites o la impotencia del (...) poder; segundo, le quita valor con relación a otras entidades y procesos en los que deposita su apuesta filosófica. Nos proponemos desarrollar estas perspectivas a fin de ofrecer un panorama integral de una temática relevante de la filosofía política deleuziana. ABSTRACT In this article, we address the question of power in Deleuze's thinking. According to our hypothesis, there is not a single concept of power in his work, but different approaches not incompatible with each other but that cannot be reduced to a single point of view. This variety of approaches can be gathered around two general positions about power, adopted by Deleuze: first, he tends to relativize its effectiveness with respect to other more fundamental elements, thus enhancing the limits or impotence of power; second, he takes away value in relation to other entities and processes in which he places his philosophical commitment. We intend to develop these perspectives in order to offer a comprehensive overview of a relevant theme of Deleuzian political philosophy. (shrink)

Tras elaborar una versión de la Historia Universal motorizada por la producción deseante, Deleuze adoptó un viraje anti-historicista, desplazándose a los devenires no históricos y multiplicando perspectivas negativas sobre la historia. En el marco del debate entre quienes le adjudican posiciones exclusivamente anti-historicistas y quienes le atribuyen una filosofía de la historia o una metodología historicista, proponemos elucidar las críticas deleuzianas a la historia sirviéndonos de la distinción entre la historia como realidad objetiva y la disciplina histórica. Además, analizamos la (...) primacía otorgada a la filosofía sobre la historia a partir de su concepción del acontecimiento y su temporalidad. (shrink)

El debate que aborda el cruce entre Foucault y Deleuze oscila entre dos polos, según se resalten las convergencias o las divergencias entre estos autores: se los aproxima para unificarlos, o bien se los aleja debido a desacuerdos inconciliables. En este artículo sostenemos que, pese a indudables diferencias en sus recorridos de pensamiento, comparten posiciones filosóficas nodales, entre las que destacamos las siguientes: rechazan los universales, proponen estudiar las multiplicidades, analizan el poder desde una perspectiva “molecular”, reformulan la función del (...) intelectual y critican la representación política. Antes de fundamentar estos puntos de correspondencia, retomamos el interrogante acerca de las razones para cruzar a Deleuze y a Foucault, dado que no es una asociación arbitraria. También hacemos algunas precisiones metodológicas con el ánimo de diferenciar nuestro abordaje de otros ya ensayados, y argumentamos en favor de las tesis comunes a ambos, específicamente en los ámbitos epistemológico y político. (shrink)

El artículo presenta la “inmanencia práctica” como clave de la ética que G. Deleuze elabora a partir de B. Spinoza y F. Nietzsche. La noción involucra tres tesis que manifiestan la reivindicación incondicional de la inmanencia y la crítica a toda trascendencia: valorización del cuerpo en detrimento de la conciencia; apelación a lo bueno y lo malo, en lugar del bien y el mal; y apología de la alegría e inocencia del devenir. Se sostiene que esta ética naturalista y pluralista (...) se apoya en criterios de valoración ligados a la vida como punto fundamental de apreciación, y se propone la creación de nuevas maneras de ser como medio de enfrentar al sistema del juicio moral sobre el que descansa el nihilismo. (shrink)

Quentin Meillassoux es un filósofo francés que ha cobrado notoriedad a partir de la publicación de Après la finitude. Essai sur la nécessité de la contingence en 2006. Su obra se inscribe en el Realismo Especulativo, movimiento de reciente expansión en el campo filosófico contemporáneo que promueve una ontología realista. Además de reivindicar una filosofía materialista, Meillassoux defiende la inmanencia ya en su tesis doctoral L’inexistence divine y, especialmente, en el artículo “L’immanence: d’outre-monde”, donde afirma que una verdadera filosofía de (...) la inmanencia no puede fundamentarse en un pensamiento de la finitud sino en una ética de la inmortalidad. Meillassoux opone su perspectiva, aparentemente paradójica, de una inmanencia “de otro mundo” a los pensamientos contemporáneos de la inmanencia, esencialmente al de Deleuze, quien hizo de dicho concepto un blasón de su proyecto filosófico. En este artículo queremos ensayar una confrontación entre la idea de Meillassoux de una creencia en el Mundo de la Justicia y la propuesta deleuziana de una creencia en este mundo con vistas a elucidar convergencias y divergencias relevantes en sus abordajes de la inmanencia y sus concepciones del vínculo entre la filosofía y el ateísmo. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo presenta la “inmanencia práctica” como clave de la ética que G. Deleuze elabora a partir de B. Spinoza y F. Nietzsche. La noción involucra tres tesis que manifiestan la reivindicación incondicional de la inmanencia y la crítica a toda trascendencia: valorización del cuerpo en detrimento de la conciencia; apelación a lo bueno y lo malo, en lugar del bien y el mal; y apología de la alegría e inocencia del devenir. Se sostiene que esta ética naturalista y (...) pluralista se apoya en criterios de valoración ligados a la vida como punto fundamental de apreciación, y se propone la creación de nuevas maneras de ser como medio de enfrentar al sistema del juicio moral sobre el que descansa el nihilismo. ABSTRACT The article presents ‘practical immanence’ as the key to the ethics developed by G. Deleuze on the basis of B. Spinoza and F. Nietzsche. This notion involves three theses that show the unconditional vindication of immanence and the critique of all transcendence: affirmation of the body over consciousness; appealing to the good things and the bad things rather than to good and evil; and the defense of the joy and innocence of becoming. The article argues that this naturalistic and pluralistic ethics is grounded in assessment criteria linked to life as the focal point of appreciation, and suggests the creation of new ways of being as a means to tackle the system of moral judgment on which nihilism is based. (shrink)

The present paper analyzes the dialogue between Gilles Deleuze and François Jullien. We focus on three axes articulated by the idea of immanence. Firstly, we shall compare the usage of the expression “absolutization of immanence”, coined by the sinologist in order to play down transcendence in Chinese thought, which was eventually applied by Deleuze within the realm of belief in this world. Secondly, we shall examine Jullien’s critic to Deleuze on the relation between philosophy and wisdom. We sustain that even (...) if the deleuzian description presents ambivalence in the “pre-philosophical” plane of immanence, it does not entail the superiority of philosophy. Thirdly, we shall confront the divergent perspectives on immanence: Deleuze’s treatment as plan and Jullien’s conception as fonds. Finally, we shall expose the hardship to think the idea of immanence present in the work of both authors. (shrink)

En el marco del debate sobre los lineamientos fundamentales de la ética de Deleuze, diversos autores han reparado en nociones destacadas de su obra: el deseo, el devenir, la afirmación, el nomadismo. Mi propuesta en este artículo es desarrollar una vía poco estudiada, que gira alrededor de la idea de prudencia práctica experimental. Según mi hipótesis, este concepto reúne perspectivas relevantes de la producción deleuzeana posterior a L'Anti-Œdipe, en particular su orientación vitalista, su opción por la desubjetivación y su apelación (...) a una dimensión ascética vinculada con el deseo como impulsor de la experimentación. Within the realm of debate on fundamental layouts of Deleuze's ethics, several authors have concentrated on significant notions in his work: desire, becoming, affirmation, nomadism. In this article my proposal is to develop a road, scarcely studied yet, in connection with the idea of experimental practical prudence. Respect to my hypothesis, this concept assembles relevant perspectives of Deleuze's post L'Anti-Œdipe production, especially his orientation towards vitalism, his choice for desubjectivation and his appeal to an ascetic dimension linked to desire as motor to experimentation. (shrink)

Franz Brentano was a leading philosopher and psychologist of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the impact of his scholarship was so great that he became synonymous with a school of thought and a new approach in scientific philosophy. The Brentano School stood against the Idealistic and post-Kantian German tradition and Brentano played a crucial role in the founding of Austrian philosophy. He had an enormous impact on the work of Husserl and Heidegger, as well as on Moore’s _Ethics_ and Stout and (...) Russell’s analysis of mind. In particular, situated between the phenomenology movement and the analytic tradition, the concept of intentionality was redefined by Brentano and has been—and remains—a key concept of twentieth- and twentieth-first century philosophy of mind. But Brentano not only reshaped philosophy of mind; he was also a remarkable and innovative thinker in several other fields of philosophy, and recent debate in metaethics, metaphysics, and the history of analytic philosophy shows a strong resurgence of interest in Brentano’s thought. Published to coincide with the centenary of Brentano’s death, this four-volume collection, a new title from Routledge Major Works, provides an essential intellectual tool for the exegetical evaluation of all aspects of Brentano’s work. Bringing together early reviews and reactions from his contemporaries—many of which have never before been translated into English—as well as the best critical assessments of Brentano’s work, this ‘mini library’ provides Brentano scholars, historians of philosophy and psychology, and phenomenologists, with a rigorous historical appraisal of Brentano’s thought and influence. Brentano’s relationships with Husserl, Heidegger, and the phenomenological tradition are examined in depth, alongside investigations of key themes from his work on Aristotle, medieval and modern philosophy, philosophy of mind, logic, ontology, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of history. (shrink)

In this paper we show that the Gupta-Belnap systems S# and S* are П12. Since Kremer has independently established that they are П12-hard, this completely settles the problem of their complexity. The above-mentioned upper bound is established through a reduction to countable revision sequences that is inspired by, and makes use of a construction of McGee.

Der Triestiner Vittorio Benussi (1878-1927), Mitglied der Grazer gegenstandstheoretischen und psychologischen Schule um Alexius Meinong, war einer der bedeutendsten Experimentalpsychologen seiner Zeit. Seine Pionierleistungen auf dem Gebiet der experimentellen Gestaltpsychologie gerieten jedoch bald durch die fortschreitende Durchsetzung der Berliner Schule der Gestalttheorie in Vergessenheit, so daß sein Werk bis heute weitgehend unbekannt geblieben ist. Benussis wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit, die sich durch eine streng experimentelle Vorgangsweise auszeichnet, erweist sich rückblickend als fruchtbarer Anknüpfungspunkt für die zeitgenössische Kognitionswissenschaft. Dies ermöglicht eine Neubewertung seiner wissenschaftlichen (...) Arbeit und jener aktpsychologischen Tradition, der er angehörte. Benussis Untersuchungen nehmen ihren Ausgangspunkt in der Voraussetzung der Intentionalität des Psychischen. Seine Arbeiten thematisieren das Problem des subjektiven Eingriffs in die Konstitution der Erfahrungsgegebenheiten, indem sie die Vorherrschaft des Subjektes über die elementaren Sinnesbedingungen betonen. In Benussis Gesamtwerk läßt sich ein einheitliches Programm erkennen: Ausgehend von der Gegenstands- und Produktionstheorie der Grazer Schule, entwickelt Benussi seinen eigenen theoretischen Standpunkt, der ihn - bewußt - der Phänomenologie Husserls nähebringt. Benussi verlagert schrittweise den Schwerpunkt seiner Forschungen von der gegenstandstheoretischen Perspektive zur Hervorhebung der latenten Subjektivität, die im Konstitutionsprozeß des Gegebenen wirksam ist. Leben und Werk Vittorio Benussis rückblickend zu betrachten, heißt sich mit einem Klassiker der Psychologie zu beschäftigen, dessen Modernität erst in der heutigen Zeit erkannt werden kann. (shrink)

No cinema brasileiro recente, o diálogo entre o documentário e a ficção tem merecido destaque, com produções de baixo orçamento e ideias originais. É o caso de Santiago (João Moreira Salles, 2007) e Viajo Porque Preciso, Volto Porque Te Amo (Marcelo Gomes, Karim Aïnouz, 2009), filmes que trabalham esse diálogo de forma sutil e diegética, ressignificando imagens de um arquivo próprio, pessoal.

This paper is concerned with the way different axiom systems for set theory can be justified by appeal to such intuitions as limitation of size, predicativity, stratification, etc. While none of the different conceptions historically resulting from the impetus to provide a solution to the paradoxes turns out to rest on an intuition providing an unshakeable foundation,'each supplies a picture of the set-theoretic universe that is both useful and internally well motivated. The same is true of more recently proposed axiom (...) systems for non-well-founded universes, and an attempt is made to motivate such axiom systems on the basis of an old and respected ‘algebraic’ intuition. (shrink)

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle takes up the position of those who hold that all knowledge is demonstrable, and, hence, scientific. Such people are said to base their arguments on the fact that some demonstrations are circular or reciprocal (72b251). As Aristotle makes clear in the text, a circular demonstration consists of an argument (form) in which the conclusion is equivalent to one of the premises. But as Aristotle hastens to point out, demonstrations cannot be circular, for the essence of (...) demonstration is to proceed from what is prior to what is posterior, and the same things cannot be both prior and posterior. A circular demonstration has the form ‘if A is, then B must be;’ and ‘if B is, then A must be’: “consequently, the upholders of circular demonstration are in the position of saying that if A is, A must be—a simple way of proving anything” (73a5). (shrink)

O manuscrito clandestino Jordanus Brunus redivivus ou Traité des erreurs populaires foi publicado em 1771, não trazendo indicação alguma de sua autoria. Entretanto, a despeito do anonimato da obra, ela tornou-se um dos textos mais famosos dentre a filosofia clandestina do século XVIII, aludindo a um filósofo que foi uma das maiores vítimas da superstição e do fanatismo de sua época: Giordano Bruno. O título do escrito é uma espécie de homenagem ao pensador italiano, mas não há no decorrer da (...) obra uma menção sequer que comprove que o autor anônimo tenha lido uma linha de suas obras, mesmo que seja considerado o elo filosófico de união entre o brunismo da primeira metade do século XVII e o da segunda metade do século XVIII. É em um encadeamento de ideias progressivo no Jordanus Brunus que nos permite encontrar o fio condutor das reflexões do autor: a sua formulação do ateísmo caracteriza-se por sua abordagem não dogmática, dissimulada, preparando o solo para o racionalismo ateu que estaria por vir. O presente artigo limitar-se-á à terceira e quarta partes do manuscrito, nas quais o autor anônimo vai tratar diretamente da questão da existência de deus e fazer diversas objeções às provas de sua existência. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a characterization of the intellectual virtue of social inquisitiveness, paying attention to its difference from the individual virtue of inquisitiveness. I defend that there is a significant distinction between individual and social epistemic virtues: individual epistemic virtues are attributed to individuals and assessed by the quality of their cognitive powers, while social epistemic virtues are attributed to epistemic communities and are assessed by the quality of the epistemic relations within the communities. I begin presenting Lani (...) Watson's characterization of the (individual) practice of questioning and its related intellectual virtue, inquisitiveness. While she does not employ normative language, I show that her description can be constructed through four norms. Then, based on an account of epistemic communities, I defend that, while epistemic virtues attributable to individuals have norms regulating cognitive powers, epistemic virtues attributable to epistemic communities have norms regulating social epistemic interactions and shared epistemic responsibility. I then present a robust characterization of the epistemic virtue of social inquisitiveness through its social epistemic norms: DISTRIBUTION, ACCESSIBILITY, SOCIAL SINCERITY, SOCIAL CONTEXT, and FREQUENCY. I respond to two possible objections to my account and conclude by offering suggestions to broaden the scope of the epistemology of questioning. (shrink)

Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism has been repeatedly criticized since its initial defense in the paper Mental Events, which was published in 1970. Despite the widespread rejection, there seems to be no agreement on why anomalous monism fails. This paper systematizes two strong objections to anomalous monism. First, Davidson’s argument for monism requires the problematic assumption that physics can provide strict causal laws for causal relations in general. Second, Davidson’s monism requires an ontology of events for which no satisfactory criterion of (...) identity has been provided. Despite these problems, the paper argues that the theses on the anomalism and irreducibility of the mental remain acceptable, despite the difficulty of reconstructing precisely the arguments Davidson uses to defend them. (shrink)

Multialgebras have been much studied in mathematics and in computer science. In 2016 Carnielli and Coniglio introduced a class of multialgebras called swap structures, as a semantic framework for dealing with several Logics of Formal Inconsistency that cannot be semantically characterized by a single finite matrix. In particular, these LFIs are not algebraizable by the standard tools of abstract algebraic logic. In this paper, the first steps towards a theory of non-deterministic algebraization of logics by swap structures are given. Specifically, (...) a formal study of swap structures for LFIs is developed, by adapting concepts of universal algebra to multialgebras in a suitable way. A decomposition theorem similar to Birkhoff’s representation theorem is obtained for each class of swap structures. Moreover, when applied to the 3-valued algebraizable logics J3 and Ciore, their classes of algebraic models are retrieved, and the swap structures semantics become twist structures semantics. This fact, together with the existence of a functor from the category of Boolean algebras to the category of swap structures for each LFI, suggests that swap structures can be seen as non-deterministic twist structures. This opens new avenues for dealing with non-algebraizable logics by the more general methodology of multialgebraic semantics. (shrink)

Despite being fairly powerful, finite non-deterministic matrices are unable to characterize some logics of formal inconsistency, such as those found between mbCcl and Cila. In order to overcome this limitation, we propose here restricted non-deterministic matrices (in short, RNmatrices), which are non-deterministic algebras together with a subset of the set of valuations. This allows us to characterize not only mbCcl and Cila (which is equivalent, up to language, to da Costa's logic C_1) but the whole hierarchy of da Costa's calculi (...) C_n. This produces a novel decision procedure for these logics. Moreover, we show that the RNmatrix semantics proposed here induces naturally a labelled tableau system for each C_n, which constitutes another decision procedure for these logics. This new semantics allows us to conceive da Costa's hierarchy of C-systems as a family of (non deterministically) (n+2)-valued logics, where n is the number of "inconsistently true" truth-values and 2 is the number of "classical" or "consistent" truth-values, for every C_n. (shrink)

Judging a person as morally responsible involves believing that certain responses (such as punishment, reward, or expressions of blame or praise) can be justifiably directed at the person. This paper develops an account of the evolution of moral responsibility judgment that adopts Michael Tomasello’s two-step theory of the evolution of morality and borrows also from Christopher Boehm’s work. The main hypothesis defended is that moral responsibility judgment originally evolved as an adaptation that enabled groups of cooperative individuals to hold free (...) riders responsible more safely by acting in a coordinated way. (shrink)

The logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs, for short) are paraconsistent logics (that is, logics containing contradictory but non-trivial theories) having a consistency connective which allows to recover the ex falso quodlibet principle in a controlled way. The aim of this paper is considering a novel semantical approach to first-order LFIs based on Tarskian structures defined over swap structures, a special class of multialgebras. The proposed semantical framework generalizes previous aproaches to quantified LFIs presented in the literature. The case of QmbC, (...) the simpler quantified LFI expanding classical logic, will be analyzed in detail. An axiomatic extension of QmbC called QLFI1o is also studied, which is equivalent to the quantified version of da Costa and D'Ottaviano 3-valued logic J3. The semantical structures for this logic turn out to be Tarkian structures based on twist structures. The expansion of QmbC and QLFI1o with a standard equality predicate is also considered. (shrink)

In 1988, J. Ivlev proposed some (non-normal) modal systems which are semantically characterized by four-valued non-deterministic matrices in the sense of A. Avron and I. Lev. Swap structures are multialgebras (a.k.a. hyperalgebras) of a special kind, which were introduced in 2016 by W. Carnielli and M. Coniglio in order to give a non-deterministic semantical account for several paraconsistent logics known as logics of formal inconsistency, which are not algebraizable by means of the standard techniques. Each swap structure induces naturally a (...) non-deterministic matrix. The aim of this paper is to obtain a swap structures semantics for some Ivlev-like modal systems proposed in 2015 by M. Coniglio, L. Fariñas del Cerro and N. Peron. Completeness results will be stated by means of the notion of Lindenbaum–Tarski swap structures, which constitute a natural generalization to multialgebras of the concept of Lindenbaum–Tarski algebras. (shrink)

O presente trabalho procura se debruçar sobre a dimensão ontológica do homem animal-político-social em Aristóteles. Logo, desde já nos cabe ressaltar que a verificação do homem enquanto animal político-social abarcará um caráter metafísico para a efetivação no e do físico-material-natural, ou seja, o ser biopsicossocial. Refletindo, construindo e interligando o ser físico e “espiritual”. Portanto, o objeto principal será o que diz respeito ao homem como um animal político-social, no sentido ontológico do ser sensível em Aristóteles. Para tanto, a proposta (...) abarcará a Teoria das Quatro Causas de Aristóteles. Isso para demonstrar certa ontologia de uma suposta essência da ou na substancia no e do ser humano. Ou seja, quem é o “homem-ser-ente” coberto por sua estrutura física e sensível no sentido ontológico no corporal? São os seres humanos animais essencialmente políticos? E se forem são seres políticos do e ou no “espiritual”, “almático” e metafísico ou no físico-corporal? (shrink)

The paper argues against the growing tendency to interpret Brentano’s conception of inner consciousness in self-representational terms. This trend has received support from the tendency to see Brentano as a forerunner of contemporary same-order theories of consciousness and from the view that Brentano models intransitive consciousness on transitive consciousness, such that a mental state is conscious insofar as it is aware of itself as an object. However, this reading fails to take into account the Brentanian concept of object, which is (...) ultimately derived from ancient and medieval philosophy, as well as the secondary, elusive character that Brentano attributes to inner perception. According to Brentano, we have an aspectual but transparent consciousness of transcendent objects, whereas our awareness of our own mental acts is always complete but incidental, and ultimately opaque. Reversing the relationship between intentionality and consciousness faces difficulties at the textual interpretative level, but also raises theoretical problems, for it risks treating Brentano’s theory of mind as a form of subjectivism and idealism. (shrink)

In 1986, Mikenberg et al. introduced the semantic notion of quasi-truth defined by means of partial structures. In such structures, the predicates are seen as triples of pairwise disjoint sets: the set of tuples which satisfies, does not satisfy and can satisfy or not the predicate, respectively. The syntactical counterpart of the logic of partial truth is a rather complicated first-order modal logic. In the present article, the notion of predicates as triples is recursively extended, in a natural way, to (...) any complex formula of the first-order object language. From this, a new definition of quasi-truth is obtained. The proof-theoretic counterpart of the new semantics is a first-order paraconsistent logic whose propositional base is a 3-valued logic belonging to hierarchy of paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency, which was proposed by Carnielli and Marcos in 2002. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore Fregean metatheory, what Frege called the New Science. The New Science arises in the context of Frege’s debate with Hilbert over independence proofs in geometry and we begin by considering their dispute. We propose that Frege’s critique rests on his view that language is a set of propositions, each immutably equipped with a truth value (as determined by the thought it expresses), so to Frege it was inconceivable that axioms could even be considered to be (...) other than true. Because of his adherence to this view, Frege was precluded from the sort of metatheoretical considerations that were available to Hilbert; but from this, we shall argue, it does not follow that Frege was blocked from metatheory in toto. Indeed, Frege suggests in Die Grundlagen der Geometrie a metatheoretical method for establishing independence proofs in the context of the New Science. Frege had reservations about the method, however, primarily because of the apparent need to stipulate the logical terms, those terms that must be held invariant to obtain such proofs. We argue that Frege’s skepticism on this score is not warranted, by showing that within the New Science a characterization of logical truth and logical constant can be obtained by a suitable adaptation of the permutation argument Frege employs in indicating how to prove independence. This establishes a foundation for Frege’s metatheoretical method of which he himself was unsure, and allows us to obtain a clearer understanding of Frege’s conception of logic, especially in relation to contemporary conceptions. (shrink)

Suszko's Thesis maintains that many-valued logics do not exist at all. In order to support it, R. Suszko offered a method for providing any structural abstract logic with a complete set of bivaluations. G. Malinowski challenged Suszko's Thesis by constructing a new class of logics (called q-logics by him) for which Suszko's method fails. He argued that the key for logical two-valuedness was the "bivalent" partition of the Lindenbaum bundle associated with all structural abstract logics, while his q-logics were generated (...) by "trivalent" matrices. This paper will show that contrary to these intuitions, logical two-valuedness has more to do with the geometrical properties of the deduction relation of a logical structure than with the algebraic properties embedded on it. (shrink)

The logical status of abstraction principles, and especially Hume’s Principle, has been long debated, but the best currently availeble tool for explicating a notion’s logical character—permutation invariance—has not received a lot of attention in this debate. This paper aims to fill this gap. After characterizing abstraction principles as particular mappings from the subsets of a domain into that domain and exploring some of their properties, the paper introduces several distinct notions of permutation invariance for such principles, assessing the philosophical significance (...) of each. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to analyze the expressive power of the square operator of Łukasiewicz logic: ∗x=x⊙x⁠, where ⊙ is the strong Łukasiewicz conjunction. In particular, we aim at understanding and characterizing those cases in which the square operator is enough to construct a finite MV-chain from a finite totally ordered set endowed with an involutive negation. The first of our main results shows that, indeed, the whole structure of MV-chain can be reconstructed from the involution and the (...) Łukasiewicz square operator if and only if the obtained structure has only trivial subalgebras and, equivalently, if and only if the cardinality of the starting chain is of the form n+1 where n belongs to a class of prime numbers that we fully characterize. Secondly, we axiomatize the algebraizable matrix logic whose semantics is given by the variety generated by a finite totally ordered set endowed with an involutive negation and Łukasiewicz square operator. Finally, we propose an alternative way to account for Łukasiewicz square operator on involutive Gödel chains. In this setting, we show that such an operator can be captured by a rather intuitive set of equations. (shrink)

The article went deeper into Richard Rorty’s texts that address the self as “a set of beliefs and desires.” In an imbrication of philosophy with psychoanalysis, Rorty’s hermeneutics accompanies the critique of psychoanalysis regarding the self-centralization from Metaphysical tradition, one of the strategies of self-redescription. The other strategy is aesthetic redescription. This redescription is based on understanding the psychic world as an encounter of “beliefs and desires” as “quasi-people.” The thread of our argument is the articulation of psychoanalysis with the (...) concept of “hegemony.” This reflexive line occurs due to the agonist and conflicting context of internal alterity from the “interpersonal” relationship between conscious and unconscious, rediscovering the self. (shrink)

We analyze the variety of A. Monteiro’s tetravalent modal algebras under the perspective of two logic systems naturally associated to it. Taking profit of the contrapositive implication introduced by A. Figallo and P. Landini, sound and complete Hilbert-style calculi for these logics are presented.